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Abstract 
The western Balkans is a region that throughout history has been the field of the competition of 
great powers and of power games. Many hegemonies have b~en established in this region and even 
more conflicts have took place, with Germany to play an important role in most ofthem. Despite the 
past and the recent destruction that finished in 1999, the western Balkans appearing stable enough 
and ready to integrate into the West. Nevertheless, the terms of this integration as well as the 
historical experience create questions that this research comes to answer. 
In particular, this thesis focuses on the role of Germany in this region and secondly on the role 
of the EU in the western Balkans and tries to explore whether there is a German hegemony. 
Furthermore, we are trying to identify the role of the European Union in the establishment of an 
hegemony and whether the European Union represents a tool for the promotion of certain interests 
in the western Balkans. As it would be obvious later, the kind of hegemony that is explored has 
politico-economic nature and operates at elite level. For this purpose, we will rely on the neo-
Gramscian theory of hegemony. Finally, and in order to prove our case, we will conduct the research 
with the use of Serbia, Albania and FYR Macedonia as case studies. 
Key words: Hegemony, Western Balkans, Germany, political economy. 
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Introduction. 
The western Balkans is a region that has suffered a long period of instability 
and disorder since the end of the Cold War. The countries of the region (i.e. Albania, 
Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia) have 
experienced a brutal and destructive war that led to the final disintegration of 
Yugoslavia. In addition, the existence of large ethnic minorities in each state, a result 
of the distinct historical process of these states and their late establishment as 
nation states, has led to armed conflicts in Kosovo in 1999 and FYR Macedonia in 
2001, with the distinct possibility of new conflicts in the future. 
Moreover, the wars and the economic failure of the communist regimes in the 
region, have left the western Balkan states with very considerable economic and 
social problems, while their weak political structures have compounded their 
instability. Therefore, the western Balkan states have embarked on the process of 
integrating with the West from a very low starting point. It is an integration that, due 
to the above mentioned characteristics of the region, is seen as vital for their survival 
and development. This is particularly the case for the region's relationship with the 
European Union (EU). 
From the other side, the West has anticipated the importance of the 'fragile' 
western Balkans for European stability and has thus responded in all the crises that 
have occurred, deploying violent 'hard power' as well as the 'soft' power of 
negotiation and persuasion. The western Balkans have also taken on an additional 
significance, namely as a potential energy bridge between the Caspian basin and 
western Europe, a role that is attracting special attention because of Russia's 
pOSition in the region. Hence, with the final settlement of the Balkan borders, the 
West has decided that the best solution for the stability of the western Balkans is 
their integration into western structures and particularly into the EU that, in 
Gardner-Feldman's words, has undertaken the 'patronage' of these states (Gardner-
Feldman 2001). 
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The EU's actions have taken place within the framework of the enlargement 
process and the integration of the western Balkans into western structures. This 
process was accompanied by new instruments such as the Stability Pact for South 
Eastern Europe (SPSEE), the regional energy community etc. The EU has also 
undertaken the reconstruction and the maintenance of security in the region with its 
police and military missions. Furthermore, the western Balkan saga has highlighted 
the role of Germany as an integral component of EU policy towards the western 
Balkans. This role remains significant up to the present day. 
Main objective and research questions. 
Within this framework, this thesis investigates the role of Germany in the process of 
western Balkan integration into the EU in particular and into the West in general. 
The main argument advanced in this investigation is whether Germany is (or is about 
to be) exercising hegemony in the western Balkans. The type of hegemony exercised 
is not the traditional hegemony of one state towards another, with the use of 
military force, or with more subtle means such as political patronage. Such 
hegemonic situations seem almost extinct in the contemporary globalised world. 
With the rapid movement of capital and knowledge, with the existence of global 
problems such as global warming and, a world where states share their power with 
other global and transnational actors, we are obliged to examine more embedded 
and indirect forms of hegemony. Thus, we are looking at a hegemony that has a 
primarily economic and indirect character. 
It is thus becoming apparent that the primary goal of this study is to assess 
Germany's role as putative hegemon. The enquiry is based on an established 
literature which, in the first instance, debated the broad issue of German dominance 
in the economies ofthe transition states after 1990 (Goldberger 1993; Markovits and 
Reich 1993a; 1993 b; Sperling 2001; Baun 2005), a debate in which the claim of both 
economic dominance and political influence (Markovits and Reich 1993a) was 
persuasive. Secondly, in the wake of Germany's role in the break-up of Yugoslavia 
(Crawford 1996; 2007; Hodge 1998), there were renewed assertions of an 
international German programme to dominate a fragmented Balkan peninsula 
(Gervasi 1993; Chossudovsky 1996; Flurry 2002) and more differentiated analyses of 
2 
German political and economic interests in the region (Crawford 1996; 2007). It 
therefore seemed appropriate to test the strength of these arguments in a se.t of 
case studies and using the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony in international 
politico-economic relations as the theoretical starting point. Therefore, the main 
research question is: 
Does Germanv exercise politico-economic hegemony in the western Balkans? 
As will become explicit during the narration of this thesis, this question testing 
a core hypothesis is accompanied by three research questions/sub-hypotheses. 
These are: 
.:. RQ1. Does Germany use the EU and other institutions os a means of 
establishing a hegemony and to what degree is this in collaboration (or not) 
with other states (primarily other EU member states plus the US)? 
.:. BQ6. If the case for an economic hegemony is demonstrated, to what degree 
does it have a political dimension? 
.:. RQ3. If there is a political dimension to German hegemony, what degree of 
intentionality is demonstrable? 
RQ1: This question will be the centre of Chapter 2. Its importance is great because, 
as will be obvious later, the EU is the main actor in the region and the one with the 
greatest influence. Therefore, a positive answer will allow us to establish, in 
accordance with the theoretical framework, at least the existence of an embedded 
hegemony. 
RQ2: This question will be addressed by the case studies in Chapters 3-5. The answer 
is crUCial, because the existence of a huge economic presence may appear 
hegemonic, but without the existence of political back-up and planning to support 
the economic penetration of the region, the hegemony may be transformed into an 
autonomous economic dependence. 
RQ3: Again this will be covered in the case studies. If the research shows that indeed 
there is a certain level of intentional action, then this could mean that German 
capital has intentionally shaped these policies, through the German political elite, for 
its benefit and that therefore this will indicate the existence of an organised 
3 
hegemonic plan. In case the research reveals different results, then German capital 
can be seen to be simply taking advantage of EU policies like every other EU-based 
capital. Obviously there is an interconnection with the other two questions. Hence, if 
Germany is using the EU intentionally then it is expected that German actions in the 
western Balkans are intentional as well, and this could be expected to have a 
political dimension. 
At this point we have to clarify that the term Germany, as well as the name of 
every other state, refers predominantly to the politico-economic elite of these states. 
The same distinction applies to the EU as well. As will be mentioned in later chapters 
the term EU signifies. the bureaucratic establishment that is responsible for 
enlargement or for political and economic relations with the western Balkan states. 
Moreover, political influence refers to influence on the policy-making of the 
recipient state, 
To this end we will base the analysis on the neo-Gramscian theory of 
hegemony, which is the subject of Chapter 1. According to this theory, hegemony 
lies in the combination of political power that flows from intellectual and moral 
leadership (authority or consensus), and state coercion. Hence, such hegemony is 
both ethical-political and economic, with its base in state-civil society relations (see 
Femia 1981). Therefore, it becomes obvious that the analysis will be based on social 
relations and their mutual interactions. The analysis will also look at economic flows 
and economic policy decisions, at political parties and their connection to economic 
capital, domestic or transnational. In addition, we have to look at social resistance, 
the means of propaganda and issues of cultural penetration. Finally, it is necessary to 
underscore that the hegemony we are examining is at a regional level and primarily 
economic. Therefore, hegemony is evident from the level of FDI and trade relations 
because these are the fields that create economic dependencies that can lead to 
hegemony. In addition, the military and political developments take on a secondary 
role, which is instrumentally supportive of the establishment and consolidation of 
hegemony. 
4 
Time framework and case study selection. 
The time framework of this thesis is between February 1999 upJo September 200S. 
The beginning of the thesis coincides with the start of the NATO bombing of Serbia 
and thus the beginning of the Kosovo war, the impact of which is still evident in the 
region. In this 'post-war' era, the western Balkan states would seem to have 
stabilised and to be in tune with the process of integration into western structures, 
notably into the EU and NATO. This is thus the period where new social blocs are 
forming and an era of foreign, particularly EU-based, economic penetration is taking 
place. This time span has been chosen for two reasons. The first is that, by 
September 2008, the planned elections in the case studies have all taken place, and 
new social alliances have been formed. Additionally, by the end of the time-frame, 
the status of Kosovo had been (seemingly) settled. Therefore, there is a degree of 
(necessary) stability for assessing the situation relating to the case studies and for 
applying the theory. The second reason is purely technical and relates to the fact 
that this thesis was planned to be completed by the end of 2008. 
The narrowing of the framework is also geographical. This thesis includes three 
case studies, namely Serbia, FYR Macedonia and Albania. The selection of these case 
studies is not random. Serbia was chosen because of its traditional linkage with 
Germany and is thus the case study where the validation of the hypothesis is 
expected to be verified. It is also the case study where the formation of hegemony 
and of an operational hegemonic group! would appear to be most obvious. FYR 
Macedonia has all the elements for the establishment of hegemony and like Serbia it 
has close relations with Germany, though to a lesser degree. Finally, Albania is the 
case study where our hypothesis is less likely to be proven and is thus perfect for 
generating a null hypothesis. Albania lacks the historical links with Germany, it has 
completely different political processes compared to the rest of the region and yet at 
the same time it has the conditions for the formation of an Historic Bloc (Le. the 
hegemonic group; see Chapter 1)) and for the existence of hegemony. 
The western Balkans contain three other states that we excluded from our 
selection for various reasons. Croatia and Bosnia were rejected as case studies 
1 In Chapter 1 we are analysing this group under the name Historic Bloc. 
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because there is already a considerable amount of research on these states. We also 
rejected Montenegro because, when this thesis was started, Montenegro was part 
of Serbia and with its independence being so recent, its political presence was not 
substantial enough to justify its choice as a fruitful case study. 
Research methods. 
This research has a deductive character. Hence, having set the questions, we are 
trying through a series of logical assumptions to reach a meaningful outcome. In this 
case, having set the core hypothesis and the research questions we set about 
answering them through a series of deductive steps. The deductive character of this 
thesis will be become obvious in the case study chapters, where the presentation of 
the data is followed by a deductive analysis that addresses our main questions. 
Furthermore, we have to clarify that it is our intention to apply the theory in the case 
studies and by applying it, to elicit whether or not a German hegemony exists in the 
western Balkans. 
Because of the nature of this thesis and the demands of researching a 
dynamic process like the ongoing process of integration, this thesis will use a mixture 
of primary and secondary resources and it will use both quantitative and qualitative 
methods, with the former to account for the bulk of this thesis. In summary, the data 
that we use in this thesis are: 
Primary sources Secondary sources 
EU documentation Books 
Documentation from international Academic journal articles 
institutions that are operating in the 
western Balkans 
Speeches and published interviews of Conference papers 
prominent actors 
Documentation and press releases from Newspaper articles, Magazines and TV 
national institutions and agencies broadcasts 
Websites of national and international Documents, reports and working papers 
bodies operating in the western Balkans from think-tanks and NGOs 
Official statistics 
Interviews conducted by the author 
Speeches from attended events 
Newspaper articles written within the 
thesis time limit 
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The use of primary sources has proved extremely important because it provided 
us with a large body of information. Particularly, the reports from the EU and other 
international institutions were sufficient both to give a clear picture of the situation 
within the case studies and also to allow us to identify the existence of institutions 
that, according to the theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 1, could be called 
hegemonic, as well as the application of a certain economic ideological doctrine in 
the western Balkans. The sources from national bodies were also extremely useful 
because they provided us with the necessary evidence for the formation of the 
Historic Bloc, and the interests of the domestic and external elites. 
A large proportion of these sources were retrieved from the internet, and it is 
true that the quantity of material on the Web has been substantial. However, the 
collection of primary data faced three main problems. The first had to do with the 
reliability of statistical resources as well as their availability. Extensive efforts were 
made to retrieve reliable statistics and to cross-check the data in order to verify their 
accuracy. The second set of problems had to do with a basic element of this thesis. 
As will become obvious in later chapters, a great number of companies that operate 
in the Balkans are eastern affiliates of German, Italian and other corporations, 
resulting in the need to conduct an extensive investigation of who owns what and 
thus establish the existence or not of hegemonic trends. Finally, some problems 
arose in relation to the selectivity and bias of sources, which again required cross-
checking of their validity. 
Deficiencies and weaknesses of primary data thus make the use of secondary 
sources essential for producing a balanced outcome. The literature on the Balkans 
and on enlargement is substantial in both quantity and quality. The same is also true 
for the literature on neo-Gramscian theory, and therefore it was easy to find the 
necessary sources. However, the sources that connect hegemony with the western 
Balkans and EU-enlargement have been extremely scarce, which is also an indication 
. of the relative novelty of this thesis. Also very useful was the information that we 
were able to retrieve from think-tanks and NGOs such as the International Crisis 
Group (ICG) and the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS). This kind of 
information was crucial in providing an insight into the region and its political 
developments. The latter were also covered by information which could be retrieved 
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from the Serbian, FYR Macedonian and Albanian media as well as from Greek and 
German media. Certainly, problems of bias, of outdated data and outsider 
) 
perspectives were obvious but the use of an extensive number of sources and cross-
checking was adequate for filtering the information and providing reliable and 
objective information. 
Interviews. 
The roles of the interviews were important for this thesis because, despite their 
small number - just seven - they were in-depth, based on elite interviewees, and 
provided the thesis with important inside information. The interviews were in three 
sets, representing three different times between 2006-2008, and all of them except 
two, which were conducted in the UK. and Greece respectively, were conducted in 
Brussels. The selection of the interviewees was based on the demands of the 
research and particularly on the need to find information as well as confirmation of 
certain issues that could not be retrieved otherwise. Hence, for each case study we 
tried to locate those people that were expected to fill particular gaps in the research. 
The interviewees were contacted by email.Prior to each interview as well as in 
the introductory email, the interviewees were informed of the thesis outline, the 
research objectives, and the central issues of the theSis, as well as the type of 
questions that they could expect. Moreover, in all interviews it was made clear that 
they would follow strict ethical guidelines, with a special focus on confidentiality. To 
this end no use was made of recording equipment, which gave the interviewees the 
necessary flexibility to provide more sensitive information. All interviewees were 
explicitly asked for permission to use the data in the elaboration of this thesis and 
related academic work, to which they all agreed. They were informed about the 
ownership of the data and the final research results as well as the methods used to 
store information. 
The interviews were semi-structured, face-to-face conversations. The time 
length varied between 1-2 hours, in one case lasting even longer. In each case the 
interviewee was aware of eight questions, while three more questions were at our 
disposal to be used during the conversation in case more information was needed. In 
all cases, more questions emerged during the conversation, while the friendly and 
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off-the-record character of the interviews made the speakers more relaxed, such 
that that their answers were gratifyingly detailed. 
Thesis outline. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the theoretical aspects 
of the thesis. Hence, in Chapter 1, the neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony, which is 
the theoretical framework of this thesis, is presented. The same chapter contains a 
detailed discussion of the methodology that we will follow in the application of the 
theory as well as the developments in the field. In Chapter 2, the theoretical 
framework is completed by analysing the role of the EU, which for this thesis is the 
putative main vehicle for the promotion of hegemony in the western Balkans. 
Chapters 3-5 deal with our case studies. Each case study begins with a 
presentation of the politico-economic conditions and then there is an analysis of the 
data and application ofthe theory. In particular, Chapter 3 deals with Serbia; Chapter 
4 with FYR Macedonia and; Chapter 5 with Albania. The thesis closes with the 
conclusion, which summarises and explains the results and gives an overall 
evaluation of the core hypothesis. 
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Chapter 1: Theoretical framework 
1.1 Introduction. 
In this chapter we present the theoretical framework that we apply in this thesis and 
the manner of its application. In addition, the chapter also aims to provide a 
justification for the selection of this theoretical framework. 
Hence, the chapter begins with the term hegemony that derives from the 
Greek word hegemonia,2 which first appeared in ancient Greece during the 
Peloponnesian war through the writings of Thucydides, in order to characterise the 
policy of the two fighting sides. In addition, the word had the meaning of leadership 
and control of a nation or a state over another nation or state, while hegemon takes 
the form of someone who controls or guides or someone who has the leadership of 
a group. 
1.2. Historical background. 
The existence of hegemony according to the above-mentioned definition was 
common in Balkan history, at least until 1991. For reasons of space, I will make a 
short historical introduction covering the region's past in terms of foreign 
hegemonies. 
From the 14th century, the region was under Ottoman control, as part of its 
Empire or as satellite states. This period of absolute Ottoman control lasted until the 
late eighteenth century, and was characterised by the multinational character of the 
Empire, where the division was religious and not ethnic (All cock 1994; Poulton 1993). 
Beyond this, the division and relocation of ethnic groups created the minority 
problems that emerged with the creation of the first Balkan states, because the 
whole region was a mosaic of different ethnic groups; spread unequally among the 
Balkan states resulting in the existence of minorities in every state. This fact, in 
combination with the inability of the newly established states to include the whole 
of their core ethnic group, was the source of inter-state competition and conflicts 
(Prevelakis 1996:141). 
2 Alternatively, QV£/1.ov[a in Greek. 
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The decfine of the Ottoman Empire signalled the beginning of the Eastern 
Question, namely how to dispose of the Empire's lands after its collapse (Krieger 
2001:65). This induced the interference of the Great Powers and led to the Russo-
Turkish wars3 (Mowat 1930:45-51). The decisive and active role of the Great Powers 
was channelled through the Concert of Europe. In addition this interference was 
intensified particularly after 1878 and the Russo-Turkish war (Prevelakis 1996:138). 
In fact, as we will show later, the interests ofthe Concert's members were highly 
influenced by the political circumstances of the Balkans. British policy, that favoured 
Turkey's integrity in contrast to Russian policy, is an indicative example. Indeed 
British preferences influenced the final settlement of the Balkan borders (Mowat 
1930) . 
. Another great power with' vested interests in the Balkans was the Austro-
Hungarian Empire that had within its territory Croatia and 5lovenia. Indeed, the 
Hapsburg Empire was active in the formation of the. new Balkan states as 
exemplified by the Berlin Treaty in 1878 when the Hapsburgs prevented the creation 
of a big Slav state with the capacity to challenge it,when it annexed Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and prevented a strong Serbia (Mowat 1930; lelavich 1983a; 1983b: 59). 
Moreover, the decline of Ottoman rule coincided with the development of 
national awareness and subsequent insurrectionism within the Balkan nations. 
Hence, the region became a significant locus of international relations in this period 
(Le. 1815-1914). This fact transformed the Balkans into the powder keg of Europe, 
(which when it exploded in 1914 triggered the start of the First World War), due to 
the conflicting interests of the Great Powers and the national/territorial aspirations 
of the Balkan states (Krieger et al. 2001: 65; lelavich 1983b). 
In the first case, Russia, by winning the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, made a 
bilateral agreement in which a 'Greater Bulgaria' was established with access to the 
Aegean Sea and with the whole of Macedonia within its territory. However, the lack 
of consultation and Britain's persistent support for the integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire, led to the Berlin conference and the Berlin Treaty that reduced Bulgarian 
3 At this paint, it is worth noting that Russian influence in the region has been expanded through wars 
from 1774 and the treaty of kuchuk-kainarji. The Russian influence was mainly in the Danubian 
principalities, in Bulgaria and in Greece. 
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territory. In addition, it created the so-called Macedonian Question (Mowat 1930: 
54-67; Allcock 1994: 149; Jelavich 1983a: 358-360). 
In the second case, the increasing influence of Russia over Greece4 and the 
necessity of the Aegean for British interests motivated the Concert of Europe to 
interfere actively in the Greek revolution and in 1830 to guarantee the 
independence of the Greek state. As a result, Greece was under the protection of 
England, France, and Russia, forming an international protectorate with a German 
royal family ruling Greece (see Jelavich 1983a). 
In the First and Second World Wars the western powers actively interfered in 
the Balkans, with the states divided among the different camps in relation to their 
foreign patron (Jelavich 1983b; Stavridis 2003: 12-13; Wheeler 1996: 2). It is worth 
noting that the ou~break of First World War hostilities emanated from the Balkans, 
where pan-Slavism (in Serbia and Russia) collided with pan-Germanism in which 
Germany used Austria as a vehicle. In the Second World War the Balkan states once 
again served their hegemonic patrons by joining the two fighting camps. Hence, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia joined the Axis powers and the rest aligned 
themselves with the Allies (Blackwood 2001; Jelavich 1983b). 
The post-War era brought division along East-West lines. Thus, Greece joined 
the western camp and the US sphere of control, while the rest of the Balkans joined 
the eastern camp under Soviet patronage. This division clearly was not without 
problems, with civil war in Greece between a communist-led movement and , 
nationalists/royalists supported by US and British military intervention, whilst in the 
communist states it was followed by direct Soviet control (Howkins 2005:188; 
Crampton 2002; Farakos 2000). This period of division within the Cold War also 
signalled the last phase of open hegemony in the region. 
The present situation ofthe Balkan states is an outcome of the dissolution ofthe 
Eastern Bloc and the subsequent Yugoslav wars. In addition, in this new era of 
globalisation we cannot unequivocally establish hegemonic presence of a traditional 
type in the area. Hence, the aim of this thesis is to test whether there is some kind of 
hegemony in the region, if not in the traditional mode, but in a new form. 
4 Particularly on the basis of the common religion. 
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1.3. Gramscian theory of hegemony. 
1.3.1. General introduction. 
The Gramscian notion of hegemony can be summarised as the combination of 
political power that flows from intellectual and moral leadership (that generates 
authority and creates consensus among social forces), and coercion. The former 
describes the guidance of society by the hegemonic elite through the creation of a 
reality which expresses the ideas of the ruling class but is accepted as common sense 
by the subordinated classes (see Femia 1981). Hence, such hegemony is both ethico-
political and economic, with its base in state-civil society relations (Femia 1981: 24). 
The term ethico-political indicates the strong connection with civil society and 
implies the element of culture. It also indicates that the hegemony is ideological and 
contains elements of social reality and of consensus (see Boothman 2008). The 
economic character of hegemony is important because a solely political character of 
control creates a hegemony that is based solely on violence, whereas the economic 
means can create a framework for consensus by accommodating the masses. Thus, 
hegemony can also be seen as a kind of 'alliance' between the leader and the 
follower, in a clear consensual framework. 
For Gramsci, hegemony answers the question why the revolution succeeded in 
Czarist Russia and not in the much more developed western societies (Hobden and 
lones 2005: 235). Gramsci's definition of hegemony moves beyond the mainstream 
realist definition of a hegemonic state that assumes direct hegemony over the 
system. Instead, Gramsci sees a dual nature of both consent and coercion, which is 
close to the Centaur state of Machiavelli that, as 'se'mi-animal, semi-man', uses a 
combination of both consent and coercion for hegemonising (Gramsci 1971; 
Machiavelli 1961: 99; Boothman 2008: 209). Based on this approach, Robert Cox 
goes further and speaks of 'a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of 
material power, the prevalent collective image of world order (including certain 
norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance 
of universalitl' (Cox 1981: 139). 
'See below for a more detailed analysis of the neo-Gramscian perspective. 
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According to Machiavelli, power is a combination of consent and coercion. To 
the extent that the consensual aspect of power is to the fore, hegemony prevails and 
coercion is only applicable in marginal cases. Hegemony in this sense is enough to 
ensure conformity of behaviour in most people most of the time (Cox 1983: 164; 
Machiavelli 1961). 
In this sense, Gramsci makes the breakthrough between Marxism and realism. 
The state is not just a coercive machine that submits the mass to the will of 
dominant classes through coercive means, but also has the element of consent. The 
consent itself is produced and reproduced by the ideological and cultural hegemony 
of the ruling class. In other words, this type of hegemony spreads the political and 
cultural values of the ruling class(-es} to the rest of the society and particularly to 
subordinate groups and classes that accept them as their own, as common sense. 
Thus, these values become the ideological sediment in society to the degree that 
they take on the status of unchallenged common sense (Cox 1983: 164; Gill and law 
1993: 93). 
Such a development requires the creation of a common culture and language 
which will facilitate the assimilation of different groups under the same hegemony. 
Culture and language have a powerful transmitting power and can indirectly create 
subconscious realities. It is no coincidence that the American hegemony after the 
Second World War was based on the creation of a common culture and the use of 
English as a common language. Culture must also convey a feeling of autonomy and 
freedom that will mislead the subordinate classes about the hegemony. An example 
is the ability of the voter to choose between different political parties, although the 
main political forces belong to the same ideological bloc, as in the case of 
contemporary western Europe with little ideological differences between 
mainstream conservative and social-democratic parties. 
To summarise, Gramsci's approach to hegemony is characterised by the ability 
of a group to exercise political and moral leadership in society. The other groups 
accept this leadership and provide the hegemon with a broad political consensus for 
his policy goals. The hegemon from his perspective exercises control by responding 
to the two basic aspects of human nature, according to Augelli and Murphy: the 
position of individuals in the mode of production and the shape of ideal aspirations 
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that emerge within civil society (Augelli and Murphy 1993: 130). Such a structure 
employs coercion as a tool of last resort when consent is not possible. For instance, 
the use of riot police during demonstrations or, in even more extreme situations, the 
use of armed forces for changing the regime, are cases of coercion where consent is 
not possible. 
1.3.2. Construction and consolidation of hegemony at national level. 
The mechanism that creates and operates hegemony is the Historic Bloc. This term 
refers to mutually reinforcing interactions within socio-economic relations and 
political-cultural practices that jOintly underpin a given order. The Historic Bloc 
describes the way in which the ruling social forces of a particular society establish a 
relationship with and over competing social forces. Thus, it is more than simple 
political alliance between social forces, represented by classes or fractions. It 
illustrates the integration of a variety of different class interests that are spread 
throughout society, establishing unanimity of economic and political aims as well 
intellectual and moral unity (Gramsci 1971: 181, 366; Bieler and Morton 2003: 2; 
Rupert 1993: 81; Gill and Law 1988: 64). 
Here, and before any further analysis of the Historic Bloc, it is necessary to 
define some terms. The Historic Bloc, for Gramsci, intervenes between the economic 
structure and the ideological superstructure. With the term structure is meant the 
production process, the profit motive, capital accumulation and generally the 
economic sphere. This, along with the two parts of the superstructure, namely 
political and civil society, forms the three levels of society in Gramscian theory. 
Political society contains the coercive apparatus of the state, and civil society is the 
sum of 'cultural institutions and practices in which the hegemony of a class may be 
constructed or challenged' (Rupert 1993: 79; Gramsci 1971: 263). Political a.nd civil 
society together form the integral state and therefore 'the state is the entire 
complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only 
justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of 
those over whom it rules' (quoted in Morton 2007: 120). 
The Bloc's construction begins with the formation of the dominant front. This 
front need not be just one dominant class that manages to overcome its rivals in the 
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struggle for power, but is usually a group of classes that are gathered around a core 
hegemonic idea. However, each Historic Bloc needs a hegemonic class (i.e. a leader). 
Its existence is necessary for the cohesion of the group and the propagation of a 
common culture. In addition, since even within the group there is a hierarchy, it 
becomes necessary to establish a rigorous dialogue between leaders and followers 
for the well-being of the Bloc (Cox 1983: 168). However, as Lentner notes, the 
components of the coalition are not always stable. There are instances of 'update', 
e.g. the move from Keynesian to neo-liberal economics. This results in new groups 
entering the hegemonic group and old ones becoming opponents (Lentner 2005: 
741). 
The Historic Bloc operates within the framework of state-civil society relations 
that represent the basis for the application of hegemony, since by definition 
hegemony is political, economic and cultural. In fact, for Gramsci the nature of state 
power is related to the strength of the dynamic synthesis between the key forces in 
economy and society, operating politically on an inclusive basis. This synthesis 
among these forces creates the Historic Bloc that, given the right circumstances, can 
establish hegemony (Gill 1993: 39-40). 
For Gramsci 'civil society and State are one and the same' (Gramsci 1971: 160) 
from the moment that the state participates in the economic process as a substitute 
to private enterprises by offering protection and privileges to the extent that 
Gramsci considered laissez-faire as 'a form of State 'regulation', introduced and 
maintained by legislative and coercive means' (Gramsci 1971: 160). 
Civil society takes the form of voluntary associations. The importance of civil 
society lies in its function as the place where private and group interests, (which are 
derived from a specific position of the group in the mode of production), are 
transformed into political aspirations within a broader ideological framework. 
Therefore, for Gramsci civil society is the first step towards hegemony, because in 
civil society there will be the creation and formation of identity and ideological 
struggle. To this end a crucial role is played by the autonomy of the system that 
allows the existence of debate which generates the counter-hegemonic ideas. 
Debate is crucial because it manages to produce a constant consent as well as the 
perSistence of politics and conflict among and between groups. However, consent is 
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not the only outcome. Debate also offers the 'competing groups the means to 
struggle for dominance. Intellectuals have a significant role in this process. They will 
help in the construction of hegemony or the preparation of counter-hegemony. 
Gramsci was clear on this point in his stress on the need for 'organic' intellectuals, i.e. 
intellectuals coming from the people and who formulate their ideas through struggle. 
In this way a new generation of intellectuals is produced who, in addition to the 
ideology, come from the popular class (Harman 2007). Examples of contemporary 
intellectuals of neo-Iiberalism can be considered the managers of multinationals and 
of various financial institutions (Adorno 2005) as well as academics. 
In sum, civil society is the place where interests are grouped, where ideologies 
are formed and where political action is conceived and alliances formed (Augelli and 
Murphy 1993: 129; Gramsci 1971: 12, 245). This is something that history teaches us 
with the October revolution or the French revolution which were sparked by the 
economic situation of the time. Political society contains the government and its 
institutions (Gramsci 1971: 12, 208). Here again Gramsci is revealing. In the West 
the main institutional apparatus is bourgeois parliamentary democracy, the struggle 
should therefore be through the parliamentary and democratic institutions by 
. representing class interests and conflicts (see Bambery 2007: 100-101). 
The formation of an Historic Bloc is important, because it is the main 
mechanism for the expression and consolidation of hegemony in society. Indeed, the 
Historic Bloc, by constituting an alliance of various classes that belong to the same 
political party in the Gramscian sense6, transmits the hegemonic ideas that provide 
strategic direction and coherence to its integral parts (Gramsci 1971: 147-150; Gill 
2003: 58). 
6 For Gramsci the political party is the Machiavellian modern prince. The party has significant 
importance for Gramscian hegemony because it represents the collective will. The party is the actor 
that undertakes the organisation of hegemony and forms the state since it is also the expression of 
the hegemonic ideology. In fact, each party of course in certain given conditions represents a single 
social group. For instance, all the political parties that claim to be liberal are in fact parts of one party, 
the liberal/neo-liberal that has the ideology and the intellectuals that carry it. However, this. 
representation depends on the party's ability to exercise a balancing and arbitrary function between 
the interests of their group and those of other groups, and to succeed in securing the development of 
the group, which they represent with the consent and assistance of the allied groups (Gramsci 1971). 
In addition, the party remains the same despite splits and various factions since the main ideology is 
the same (Gramsci 1971: 147-156). 
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Having referred to the basic principles of hegemony, the next step is to define 
the hypothesis for a group achieving supremacy and thus establishing hegemony. 
According to Augelli's and Murphy's interpretation of Gramsci there are three 
conditions for a corporate actor to establish hegemony. Firstly, the group needs self-
understanding of its own interests and of the hegemonic project that it has. 
Furthermore, members of the Bloc 'must attain self-awareness of the economic role 
they perform and of the political role that they could fulfil' (Augelli and Murphy 
1993: 131). On the basis of this self-understanding the hegemon sets alliances and 
promotes the economic interests of the Bloc. The second hypothesis concerns 
ideological struggle. In other words, through the work of intellectuals and the mass 
media, the Bloc tries to prevail and gain intellectual and moral support for its 
hegemony and therefore to establish it as common sense. If they lose this battle the 
Bloc cannot sustain its position because another group will take its place (Augelli and 
Murphy 1993: 132). The last condition is economic development. The hegemon has 
to ensure economic development in order to consolidate the Bloc's interests and 
therefore to ensure unity. Economic dominance is necessary to ensure the power of 
the Bloc and the preservation of its control (Augelli and Murphy 1993). Any failure of 
these requirements leads to a crisis of authority and prevents the hegemon from 
achieving supremacy and Bloc cohesion. Hence, as Gramsci notes, the supremacy of 
a corporate actor is based on hegemony over allies within the Historical Bloc and 
domination, either by force of fraud, or those social groups outside the alliance' 
(Augelli and Murphy 1993: 132). 
In this context, the Historic Bloc functions by gathering and distributing the 
combined material forces, and thus consolidates power and supremacy in civil 
society and the economy, which are the main areas of hegemony. Nevertheless, the 
Historic Bloc has a greater role which is to combine and expound a certain ideology 
and initiatives that can develop its political networks and organisations as well the 
operation of civil-society institutions for its benefit (Gill 2003: 58). Here again 
Gramsci explains that the political initiatives and the ideology are vital for the 
existence of the Historic Bloc and its power to assimilate new movements, and that 
when an Historic Bloc reaches the limits of its capacity it is overthrown by a new one 
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(Gramsci 1971; Cox 1983: 167). Having in mind this outline of the Bloc's formation 
the next step is the analysis of the process itself. 
Firstly, Gramsci identifies two forms of social control. The first, internal, form 
transmits its values to the rest of the sOciety as common sense. The second, 
external, form operates through carrot-and-stick strategies, for instance, by 
promising better conditions and by using sanctions for non-conformist societal 
elements, (c.f. electoral campaigns and the response of the state to its opponents). 
Such internal control needs a common concept of reality, in order that the values are 
transformed into common sense. Therefore, consent is more important than 
coercion because it provides control without the use of force, through the 
formulation of intellectual and moral leadership and its transmission from the 
institutions of civil society (Femia 1981: 24). 
By creating this reality, force is never applied brutally (e.g. through dictatorship 
etc) or in the name of the group's interests, but is covered by grand moral principles, 
which the representatives of power always declare. For Gramsci this means that the 
use of force is always accompanied by the organs of mass public opinion that justify 
its use (Augelli and Murphy 1993:128), e.g. news agencies. 
The establishment of hegemony and a new Historic Bloc also demands the 
existence of a period of social revolution (or counter-hegemony) beforehand. This is 
important in order for new modes of production and social relations to be 
constructed and to reflect completely the new Historic Bloc and its hegemony, which 
will be established with the eruption of the revolution. However, this type of 
revolution is not possible in all societies. I n fact, it takes place in societies with 
advanced cultural and economic levels and thus in pre-existing hegemonic societies, 
such as was French society at the eve of French revolution. This is because, in these 
SOcieties, there is already an intellectual base which is capable of formulating ideas 
and successfully transmitting these ideas to the social base which will support the 
revolution. Even in the case of the October Revolution, which happened in a non-
advanced society, the elite was 'trained' in the ideas of the West as formulated by 
the French revolution, the revolutions of 1848 and in Marxist writings. For other less 
advanced SOCieties, the revolution fails because they import a new order that is 
created abroad, without the previous annihilation of the old order. The net outcome 
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of this is the coexistence of these two elites in a 'new' hegemony. Thus, instead of a 
revolution that brings changes, there is a further facilitation of elite interests and a 
corresponding fragmentation of the popular masses' demands. This development in 
Gramscian terminology is called passive revolution, which is summarised7 in van der 
Pijl's interpretation of Gramsci as 'the modernisation of society from above, which 
must remain 'passive' to ensure that the state class is not dispossessed' (van der Pijl 
2007: 627) and which is mimicking the adoption of foreign economic and political 
structures (Gramsci 1971; Cox 1983: 165). 
Consequently, the failure of the local elite to establish hegemony leads to two 
options. The first is Caesarism and refers to the case when a person intervenes and 
balances the opPosing forces by seizing power. The second is transforismo and 
involves the creation of a broader coalition of forces and interests (e.g. industrialists 
and workers). In addition, this case diffuses polarisation and assists in the 
assimilation of opposing and counter-hegemonic forces, by including them in the 
hegemonic Historic Bloc (Gramsci 1971: 58, 106-114; Gill 1993: 54-55). In all cases, 
however, a new hegemony is established after a crisis because the crisis facilitates 
new ideas prevailing over old ones. The French revolution is an example of such a 
crisis since, prior to the revolution, France had a severe economic and institutional 
crisis. 
The Historic Bloc, by constituting an intellectual defence against co-optation by 
transforismo, acquires a dialectical dimension. This is achieved because the Bloc 
moves between the superstructure and the structure, and creates a larger unity, 
since the Bloc is politico-economic and thus 'not just an alliance, but a, 'dialectical 
unity of base and superstructure, of theory and practice, of intellectuals and masses' 
(quoted in Augelli and Murphy 1993: 131). This interaction between political, ethical, 
ideological, and economic spheres of activity prevents the reduction of everything 
either to economic or to ideational factors (Cox 1983: 167). Thus, hegemony is 
established because the dominant group manages to promote its ideology and 
interests to the rest of the society without using coercion but by establishing them 
as common sense in the minds of society. Coercion is used only in marginal cases as 
1 The term is extensively analysed at the conclusion. 
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in outbreaks of social discontent. In other words, in general the subordinate classes 
willingly submit themselves to hegemonic control (Cox 1983: 167). 
Hegemony achieves this. because the ruled cannot distinguish their interests 
from those of the elite group and thus hegemony functions through consent. In 
order to achieve thiS, the dominant Historic Bloc needs to make concessions by 
partially suppressing its interests and including some of the interests of the 
subordinate classes. In that way, the latter become more willing to accept hegemony. 
Cox gives the example of post-war social democracy as such a concession. However, 
the concessions do not touch the essential hegemony which is ethical-political and 
economics (Gramsci 1971: 161; Cox 1983: 163). This inclusion also provides the 
hegemony with legitimacy, since the subordinate classes believe that participating in 
the system is advantageous (Gill 1993: 40; 2003: 34). 
Such concessions mean that the elite group has clear and well-defined 
interests and political aspirations. These two elements are necessary for the 
coherence of the Historic Bloc and the definition of its political role. In addition, 
based on this awareness, the prospective hegemon can form alliances and defend its 
economic-corporate interests (Gramsci 1971: 77). 
Gramscian hegemony is promoted by various mechanisms, of which two are the 
most dominant. These are civil society institutions and intellectuals. Thus, the power 
of hegemony lies in its ability not only to produce but to constantly reproduce itself 
through its mechanisms. 
Civil society institutions facilitate hegemonic control (Hobden and lones 2005: 
236) by undertaking the expansion of the ruling ideas and their transmission to the 
masses, which at the same time are prevented from recognising their own interests 
from those of the Bloc. Thus, the education that is provided to the masses weakens 
any awareness and manipulation of abstract symbols like class struggle. In addition, 
along with education, all the other institutions that shape perception like religion, 
the mass media and political associations, function within the guidelines of the ruling 
class (Femia 1981: 44). Therefore, the superstructure contains the element of 
coercion, which works for the assimilation of the masses into the particular mode of 
8 For Gramsci the hegemony is also economic because its basis should be in the decisive function 
exercised by the leading group in the decisive core of economic activity (Gramsci 1995). 
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economic production that it operates. Hence, civil society is the consensual tool of 
hegemony (Femia 1981: 25-26; Gramsci 1971: 263). In addition, the two sides of the 
superstructure are interpenetrated from the moment that political society is using 
the institutions of civil society for promoting its policies. These institutions operate 
within a legal framework of rules that has been established by the state. On the 
other hand; parts of civil society such as political parties become components of the 
state apparatus, while civil society is the realm where political society is 'educated' 
(Femia 1981: 27-28). In other words, the state comprises the whole spectrum of 
political and theoretical activity by which the ruling class manages to justify and 
maintain its domination and to succeed in gaining the active consent of the ruled 
(Femia 1981: 28). 
An equally important role is played by the intellectuals that help in the 
construction of hegemony. Here we have to add that their role in creating and 
maintaining the intellectual, ideological and cultural values as well as the 
organisations which bind together the members of a class and of an Historic Bloc 
into a common identity (Cox 1983: 168), is primarily implemented by the 'political 
party. According to Gramsci, this is considered to be the collective intellectual (see 
footnote 6) (Gramsci 1971: 15-16). Their important role lies in the fact that 
hegemony is based on a core hegemonic ideology. Therefore, their actions support 
the hegemony (by justifying its political aspirations), unite the Bloc and impose the 
hegemonic ideas on other classes as common sense. A much more important task is 
to beat their opponents in the ideological struggle and to formulate the hegemonic 
politico-economic theory (Augelli and Murphy 1993: 131). 
The intellectuals and the mass media also provide moral credibility to the 
system by transmitting certain images (Gill and Law 1993: 122). Moreover, the 
control of intellectual production, which belongs to those who control economic 
production, prevents the other classes from counter-imposing their ideas (Fermia 
1981: 32). Within the framework of the mass media, printed capitalism has an 
important role because it can directly or indirectly influence public opinion, as 
through newspapers, libraries and schools (Gramsci 1995: 155; Anderson 1983). Of 
course today, intern et and global news agencies and the power of TV has broadened 
the means of propagation. Thus, every relationship of hegemony is educational, 
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because it involves the education of the subordinate classes by the hegemon and his 
class (Gramsci 1995: 157). This education extends from schools and includes the 
social interaction of the person. 
The final thing that the hegemon should do is to ensure economic development 
in order to solidify the hegemonic group and to consolidate its control over the 
subordinate groups. Subsequently, the hegemonic class must be primarily economic 
in the sense that it has an important role in the economy (Augelli and Murphy 1993: 
131-32). We have to remember that for Gramsci it is impossible to separate politics 
from economics. For Gramsci the separation is an artificial one created by the ruling 
class in order to keep the subaltern classes within the existing framework (Bambery 
2007). 
1.4. Neo-Gramscian theory of hegemony. 
The neo-Gramscian school transfers the Gramscian theory of hegemony to the field 
of international relations, in an almost perfect analogy with the 'domestic' arena. 
The Coxian interpretation of Gramscian hegemony in international relations, which 
we will follow, claims that contemporary world hegemony exists not in the coercion 
of a superpower, but in the general consent that the dominant powers manage to 
produce and reproduce and to make acceptable to everyone, and even by those that 
are less benefited by it (Hobden and Jones 2005: 237; Gill and Law 1993: 93; Cox 
1987: 7). Thus, in general, neo-Gramscian theory, as developed by Cox, takes for 
granted that power relations and institutions are subject to constant change. Hence 
the aim is to find out how existing world orders emerged and how dominant values 
and institutions were established (Bieler and Morton 2003: 2). 
A basic feature of neo-Gramscian theory in international relations is the 
supremacy of certain states and social forces within a global society. Firstly, 
according to Gramsci, a social group becomes hegemonic when it gains supremacy 
over a group of allies that accept the hegemon as leader and political guide (Augelli 
and Murphy 1993:130; Gramsci 1971: 173-75). The interpretation of this theory on 
an international scale takes the form of a hegemonic state (which in neo-Gramscian 
scholarship is the US)' with a hegemonic social class that, along with elite classes and 
social forces from other (allied) countries, forms the hegemonic Historic Bloc. 
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Moreover, the hegemon establishes its supremacy by using coercion and consent. 
The latter takes the form of certain modes of production and social relations that 
begin in the hegemonic state and become internationalised. In sum, the neo-
Gramscian view of hegemony on an international scale refers to the creation and 
protection of a hegemonic system, which is universal in conception and which the 
other states accept because it also promotes their own interests (Cox 1987: 357-58; 
Augelli and Murphy 1993; Gramsci 1971: 173-75). Of course, scholarly interest is also 
directed at regional hegemonies like that of US on Latin America (see Morton 2007) 
and it is this examination of regional hegemony that we will investigate in this thesis. 
The issue of a common culture, as referred to above, seems to be the case today 
with the elements of the creation of a global culture and of a homogeneous cultural 
and linguistic global society becoming evident. 
Subsequently this approach also includes the notion of an international civil 
society, with a global mode of production, that links all societies of the given 
hegemonic area, and also includes the need for ordinary management ofthat system 
(Cox 1983: 171; Augelli and Murphy 1993: 148-49). This consensual hegemony is 
based on a dominant view of the world that includes certain values that derive from 
a configuration of material power, and by the set of institutions that run the world 
order on behalf of the hegemonic state9 (Bieler and Morton 2003: 2).' Hence, a 
hegemonic relationship is also an educational relationship that occurs between the 
various forces of a nation. At the international level, this process is between 
complexes of national and international/regional civilisations (Gramsci 1971: 350, 
240-41). 
It is also interesting however, to see the form that international relations take 
for the neo-Gramscian theorists. For Gramsci, international relations follow 
fundamental social relations (as at the national. level), because any fundamental 
change in social structure brings changes at international level, by formulating 
specific technical-military expressions (Gramsci 1971: 176). What we mean is that 
any new development such as a new kind of regime after crisis, e.g. the October 
Revolution, or changes in the global economy such as the recent revival of state 
9 The term state refers to social forces and interactions between classes of different states. 
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intervention, bring changes in the international system. This happens because they 
bring changes in the mode of production and in the social structure and thus 
changes in the configuration of power and balance in the international system. 
Furthermore, applying Gramsci in international relations means that we refer to a 
global political system, with various components like international organisations, 
diplomacy, and international civil society institutions (Augelli and Murphy 1993: 129). 
We have to make clear that, in contrast to realist approaches, ' ... the essential 
entities of the international system are not states as such but state-society 
complexes, and that the international system should be understood not as an 
interstate system but as an articulation of social forces, forms of states and world 
order' (Harman 2007: 127). 
Cox's interpretation considers that changes in the balance of power and in 
international relations are due to military-strategic and geopolitical shifts, deriving 
from fundamental changes in social relations (Cox 1983: 169). Useful examples 
concerning the changes in the world system might be the October Revolution and 
the rise ofthe Nazis in Germany in the late 1920s. Moreover, neo-Gramscian theory, 
in a direct analogy with the domestic level, speaks of dependency relations at 
international level. That is to say, the great powers have certain flexibility in 
exercising foreign policy according to their national interests (Cox 1983: 169). In this 
thesis, this could be applied to Germany exercising strong economic diplomacy in 
favour of German capital. 
On the other side, the weaker and less-developed states (e.g. Albania) are 
arguably influenced in their foreign policy by great power preferences (e.g. 
Germany). Consequently, the economic and political life of the weaker state is totally 
connected with that of the powerful state (Cox 1983: 169). The process is clear and 
its most obvious form is financial and industrial investment and the interdependence 
that this creates. For example, the financial crisis in Asia, as well as the current 
economic crisis, was a product of this interdependence and reflects the way and the 
extent to which a big state influences a weaker one, even unintentionally. This 
dependency drives the weaker states to be net receivers of international hegemonic 
ideologies. As a result, the social changes in these states are by-products of 
international developments (Cox 1983: 170). Therefore, since the hegemony is 
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ethico-political (see p.13) and based on moral and intellectual leadership, it can be 
claimed that the hegemony is reproduced and that the hegemonic ideas within the 
subaltern territory become, in Gramscian rhetoric, common sense. In addition, the 
domestic intellectuals (see below) are considered to be the heralds of the hegemonic 
state rather than producers of genuine thought that respond to the domestic reality. 
Since this thesis deals with the Gramscian notion of hegemony, it is expected to 
refer to state-civil society relations. The type of hegemony that is employed contains 
an amalgam of ideas from different groups, which in the end participate in the 
construction of a global community (Rupert 1993: 169). Thus, the state as entity and 
not as actor is the basic element of international relations for Gramscian thought 
because it is the place where hegemonies at elite level are formed and then elevated 
to an international level. Moreover, the state has two further important functions, 
which are the formation ofa hierarchical class structure, while providing the 
ideological and legal support for these hierarchies and helping to form the social 
relations of production by interfering directly and indirectly in production (see Cox 
1987). 
Moreover, on an international scale, the state that wants to achieve 
. dominance has to pursue the maximisation of power in relation to other states. It 
also has to increase power vis-a-vis subjects. Therefore, 'a state may become world 
hegemonic because it can claim with credibility that the expansion of its power 
relative to some or even all other states is in the general interest of the subjects of 
all states' (Arrighi 1993: 151). This is something that can be equally claimed for the 
regional level, which can be considered a micrography of the whole. Consequently, 
the state is important for neo-Gramscianism since classes are formed within it. The 
role of the leading class is to mediate between state and production and to influence 
both of them through the Historic Bloc. The class formation mediates between the 
global economy and the interstate system. It is also significant that the national 
societies are demarcated from each other by preserving their national origins and 
links across borders (Cox 1987: 356-57). 
The ability to influence lies in the ability of the Bloc to affect the decisions of 
the state and the mode of production, particularly from the moment that the state is 
an active actor in the economic process. In fact, as in domestic society, here also 
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there is an international Historic Bloc. Due to the internationalisation of every 
economy/society, the elites of every state come into contact because of their 
common interests and together shape a specific Historic Bloc. Nevertheless, because 
hegemony always includes some of the interests of subordinate classes, global 
classes are also created. Hence, there are international organisations of workers or, 
as the anti-globalisation movement shows, there are several international counter-
hegemonic groups that produce a flow of ideas, which is also facilitated by 
technology and by the system itself that has created this level of globalisation. 
Therefore, a world society is established around a particular interstate system, 
where all the states are connected and adjusted to the modes of the world order 
(Cox 1987: 7). The dominant Historic Bloc is believed to be comprised of those who 
control the Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and, those who control the nation-
based corporations and regional capitalists (Cox 1987: 358). To this one must add the 
political elites in both 'dominant' and 'following' states, who are connected with the 
above mentioned groups. As Sklair has indicated, all these elites share common 
values and lifestyles and indeed constitute a distinct group (see Sklair 1997). 
As at the national level, the leader of the Bloc has to ensure economic 
development in order to unify its group and consolidate its control over the popular 
masses. Indeed, the Historic Bloc in power, according to neo-Gramscian scholarship, 
has a primarily economic nature in its declarations, in its claim to promote general 
economic development and well-being. In fact, according to Augelli and Murphy; this 
central role in production gives the hegemonic group its great influence in the world 
economy as a whole. However, this power is made reality by planned political action 
aimed at achieving economic development, in forming alliances and developing 
critical self-understanding (Augelli and Murphy 1993: 132). 
Furthermore, hegemony at the international level has its own hegemonic 
ideology, which provides the integration of a society into the world economy and 
which thus assists in the creation of a global civil SOCiety. This ideology, for neo-
Gramscian theory, is the neo-liberal economy of free trade, open markets, and 
consumerism, while the USA is considered the modern hegemon10 (Hobden and 
10 Again the term refers to elites. 
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Jones 2005: 237; Gill and law 1993: 113). Neo-Gramscian scholarship refers to the 
global hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism with transnational capital at the centre 
and with the hegemony targeting the promotion of capitalist modes of production. 
Nevertheless, for this thesis we have to narrow the analysis to the regional level by 
claiming a hegemonic role in the Balkans of Germany and by extension of the EU. 
This narrowing is possible because Europe will be treated as a smaller image of the 
world level, where the strategies of capital accumulation, uneven development 
relations and the promotion of a hegemonic ideology, will be seen through a 
regional lenses. 
This hegemonic idea became common sense, by claiming that free trade 
benefits everyone, whilst in reality it was beneficial mostly to the hegemon, who is 
the most efficient producer in the world economy (Hobden and Jones 2005: 237). In 
fact, hegemony is also beneficial to the weaker side but to a much lesser degree, 
because otherwise the subordinate state would not be willing to accept this 
hegemony. Once again, by narrowing the framework of this thesis, Germany 
arguably fits quite well into the role of hegemon, since even with current economic 
and structural problems, German capital is still the strongest and most efficient in 
Europe. On the other hand, the periphery, which in this case is the Balkans, is 
doomed to relative underdevelopment and exploitation by German capital. 
Therefore, also in the international arena, the power of the hegemon lies in its 
ability to produce and successfully reproduce its hegemony (Cox 1983; Hobden and 
lones 2005: 237). In relation to this thesis and, as will be demonstrated in the case 
studies, Germany and the EU are arguably producing and reproducing their 
hegemony in the Balkans through the enlargement policies that, as we will 
demonstrate in later chapters, reflect to a significant degree German preferences for 
. the regionll. 
In addition, world hegemony has the ability to assimilate any idea that can 
threaten its existence and dominance, in the manner of transjorismo. The process 
includes the assimilation of persons from opposing groups by offering places in 
international organisations and other prestigious positions (Cox 1983: 173) and 
11 For instance, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe is a German initiative. 
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counter-hegemonic ideas being eroded and adjusted in the hegemonic ideology by 
the mechanisms of global civil society. Hence, what hegemony manages by 
preserving its ideology as common sense is the total assimilation of the subordinate 
cfasses into the system and the repression of the opportunity of any alternative 
conceptions to emerge. 
Furthermore, the consolidation of hegemony also requires a set of supportive 
mechanisms, which internationally are parallel to those that exist at national level. 
Therefore, like the institutions of national civil society, the international institutions 
are among the main assistants of the hegemonic state at international level. Their 
main role is to promote the expansion of the dominant hegemonic economic and 
social forces and at the same time provide flexibility and tools for the inclusion of a 
subordinate's interests with minimal casualties (Cox 1983: 172). 
The international organisations are formed, at the beginning of their 
foundation, in accordance with the values and interests of the hegemonic state, 
whose support is vital for them (e.g. Germany and the beginning ofthe EEC/EU). The 
hegemonic state ensures discipline towards the institution, according-to the 
hierarchy of power among the states. In addition, the smaller states get disCipline 
through consent and coercion. The former takes the form of consultation, while the 
latter constitutes the solution in marginal situations (Cox 1983: 172). 
Apart from a hegemonic and disCiplining role, the international institutions 
perform an ideological role. This role is performed through defining policy guidelines 
in providing assistance, known as conditionality, and by legitimate domestic 
institutions and practices, which they favour. Therefore, they reflect certain 
dominant social and economic forces, as in the case of the IMF that would seem to 
have promoted neo-liberal ideas and the interests of western capital (Cox 1983: 172; 
Stiglitz 2002: 43, 45). 
Moreover, the role of intellectuals is also important for neo-Gramscianism. 
According to neo-Gramscian theory, the organic intellectuals are located in academia 
and knowledge-intensive labour, while the mass media perform a major role in the 
transmission of their ideas that give credibility to the hegemony (Gill and law 1993: 
119, 122). The difference with Gramscianism is that their actors have an effect at 
global level and therefore constitute international intellectuals. For instance, a 
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speech by Alan Greenspan has global reach as has a Hollywood movie that promotes 
a global culture and a particular reality. 
1.5. Application to the current thesis. 
According to the analysis so far, the examination of research outcomes from the 
neo-Gramscian perspective will rely heavily on the suggested methodology of Bieler 
and Morton (2003). For them there are four steps for the analysis of hegemony, 
which are based on the three spheres of activity within which hegemony is 
manifested, as Robert Cox has defined them. The first sphere, involves the sociol 
relations of production (Cox 1987: 11-12). These comprise, apart from the 
production of complete commodities, the production and reproduction of 
knowledge and social relations, of values and institutions (Bieler and Morton 2003: 
2). In that instance the analysis demands that these be distinguished and observed in 
relation to how the changes in domestic society are bringing new social forces, which 
constitute the bases of power on a global level and in the world order (Cox 1987: 4-
5). The 'interpretation' that is given in the case studies relates to the existence of a 
new ideology and thus to a new mode of production, the existence of new elites and 
how the change has occurred. In other words the first sphere provides the 
ideological framework within which the hegemony is constructed. The construction 
is part ofthe following sphere. 
The second sphere relates to the forms of state. This sphere is the most 
common form of hegemony that relates to the formation of a state on the basis of 
the relationship between state power and social forces. In particular, each state is 
created on the basis of certain configurations of power between social forces. 
Therefore, the focus lays on the historical construction of various forms of state as 
well the framework of the political struggle that brought about these outcomes. 
Such an effort is carried out through the examination of the Historic Bloc and state-
civil society relations. This is necessary because the Historic Bloc reflects certain 
state-civil SOCiety relations that define the formation of every state (Bieler and 
Morton 2003: 2-3; Cox 1987: 5). Hence, in each of the case studies, there will be an 
analysis of how the Historic Bloc is formed, how it functions and who is the leading 
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group. In this sphere we are dealing with counter-hegemonic forces and how strong 
they are. 
The third sphere relates to world orders, 'which not only represent phases of 
stability and conflict but also permit scope for thinking about how alternative forms 
of world order might emerge' (Morton 2007: 115). In other words, this sphere 
analyses the world order within which hegemony operates. As was mentioned 
previously, even though the creation of a hegemony is a national issue (from the 
moment that it is formed within a certain nation-state), it can move outwards and 
enter the world order; or if the leading class has a certain power, it can transcend 
the 'development of a particular form of the social relations of production' into the 
internatio'nal sphere and thus achieve the role ofa global class (Morton 2007: 121), 
something that could be claimed after the Second World War for the US elite. Here 
the conditions are quite complicated. Firstly, the fact that the thesis views hegemony 
from the point of the receiver, means that it is taken for granted that there is an 
outward expanded hegemony. Secondly, in this sphere there is reference to the 
transmission mechanism and the role of the media, which are basic in transmitting 
the hegemonic ideology. Finally, since we are referring to regional hegemony the 
global class has a distinct regional character, even though transnational capital as 
well as the US elite (in some of the cases) is also part of the Historic Bloc. However, 
as will be apparent in the case studies, the bulk of the transnational capital that is 
involved in the western Balkans has a strong European and thus regional basis. The 
diagram below might make the description of the three spheres easier: 
Figure 1: The dialectical relation of forces: 
Social relations of production 
Forms of state"~----- World order 
Source: Morton 2006: 115 
Based on the above, the Bieler and Morton methodology is divided into four 
steps. The first step considers the 'investigation of the production structure in order 
to identify social forces as the key collective actors'. The second step through an 
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empirical analysis examines which social forces are seeking to establish a hegemonic 
order and which is the hegemonic ideology around which hegemony is constructed. 
The third step relates to the way in which the hegemonic classes have formed a 
specific state. For Gramscianism and neo-Gramscianism, the state is reflected in the 
class formation and its struggles. The final step is the outward projection of the 
domestically established hegemony (Bieler and Morton 2003: 3-4). All these steps 
are incorporated in the three spheres analysis. 
On the basis of this methodology the outcomes of the thesis will be examined. 
However, the current thesis demands some alterations of this method, since it is 
intended to follow a reverse process and view the hegemony from the side of the 
ruled i.e. the Balkan states. Therefore, instead of looking at the suggested 
hegemonic society, at Germany, the thesis will focus on the Balkan societies and the 
effects of the hegemonic project (if such a project eventually exists) on them. 
First of all, the three spheres of activity seem to be well-established in the 
Balkans, in Germany and the EU. Thus, the social relations of production lay within 
the context of neo-liberal capitalism, as it is shaped in the EU, and as the dominant 
ideologl2 in the Balkans, Germany and the EU. There is a strong indication that the 
EU is promoting neo-liberal policies in the enlargement countries, like those in the 
Balkans. In addition, Germany has a well-defined economic system of thought that is 
rooted ideologically. in ordo-liberalism13, which constitutes a German variation of 
neo-liberal economic thinking (Padgett 2003: 126-27). These policies culminate in 
deregulation, privatisation and penetration of foreign capital in the local economies, 
with an associated hegemonic attitude. This economic ideology and these policies 
are also the ideology of the Historic Bloc, since according to the core hypothesis the 
existence of German hegemony requires a hegemonic idea that is of German 
inspiration or is serving German interests. Therefore, a European neo-liberalism 
based on German ordo-liberalism should be the hegemonic idea ofthe Historic Bloc. 
12 At this point we have to clarify the use of ideology. When we refer to economic ideology we are 
referring to the set of ideas such as free markets and market deregulation that underpin the ideology 
of neo-liberalism. Nevertheless, when we refer to the £U or western ideology, the definition goes 
closer to the Gramscian sense, since we view ideology as liberal conceptions of history that provide 
the intellectual legitimacy for specific political groups in everyday politics. Thus, ideology constitutes a 
set of ideas that describe a particular world order and mode of production and which aims at the 
domination of a particular group that promotes this set of ideas. 
13 More on ordo-liberalism and on the German model in section 1.8 
32 
----~~---------~~~ 
Furthermore, there are indications of distinct class formations in the Balkans 
between rich elites and relatively poor masses, and this new class formation is a 
recent creation after the collapse of the eastern bloc. Therefore, we can observe in 
the case studies how the change of the mode of production influences the social 
class formation. 
Regarding state formation, once again what seems to exist, through the 
particular configuration of power, is close to neo-Gramscian theory. Hence, we have 
to find what is the dominant Historic Bloc, which is the Bloc's dominant class and 
how it exercises its power, provided of course that a Historic Bloc exists. However, 
because we are dealing with the western Balkan states, German society will be 
considered as the stable variable. Thus, we refer to the 'weak' states that are ", 
undergoing a Gramscian passive revolution and are therefore recipients of foreign 
developments. Consequently, state formation in the case studies is not only the 
result of domestic processes but also a product of western influence. From the view 
of this thesis it will be useful to discover if this external influence has German 
elements as well as indicators of a hegemonic German role. 
Subsequently, the efforts are concentrated, on proving that Germany's politico-
economic elite is exercising hegemony by constituting the leading class of the 
dominant Historic Bloc. This thesis seeks in particular to demonstrate that the 
German politico-economic elite is the dominant class and therefore the core of the 
Historic Bloc. Such effort is warranted because, according to the initial hypothesis, 
the hegemony should be German. Certainly, a Historic. Bloc has a broader 
composition, which, as' will be obvious in the following chapters, includes the 
domestic politico-economic establishment, representatives of international 
institutions, global capital and other actors that share the same hegemonic ideology. 
Moreover, according to the theory, we have to clarify the composition of the 
Bloc as to whether it is based more on transjorismo, (in other words in the 
assimilation of the other participating groups), or if it is an alliance of groups with 
the same ideology and interests. For instance we' can search for consent or 
opposition to the imposed neo-liberal policies, or for evidence of class polarisation in 
the Balkan states in question. 
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Another variable that we have to take into consideration is German 
transnational capital14• For neo-Gramscians like Gill and Cox the contemporary 
hegemonic class is the transnational managerial class (Gill 1993; 2003; Cox 1987). 
Indeed, German capital plays an important role in German foreign policy; for 
instance Germany has a special government department for the promotion of 
German exports and Foreign Direct Investments (FOI) globally (Freund and Rittberger 
2001: 97; Conradt 2001: 271), and therefore can be considered a powerful class. 
Furthermore, in addition to the relations between economic and political elites, in 
German society there is a special relationship between transnational and domestic· 
capital. Hence, there is a hierarchy within German capital and a kind of hegemonic 
relationship between bigger and smaller capital (lea man 2004). The interconnection 
between the two kinds of capital, and for matters of simplicity, German capital will 
be considered as one under the title German economic elite or just German capital. 
For the third sphere,the Balkans are progressing within the current world order. 
The post-Cold war period has been shaped by the forces of globalisation. New issues 
have emerged such as climate change, international terrorism, and the issue of the 
economic regulation of global economic relations. In other words there is an era of 
global problems that require global solutions. It is also an era of regional 
competitions particularly between West (Le. western Europe and US) and East 
(notably Russia and China), with energy access and access to markets constituting 
the main issues of competition. It is an era, which since the early 1980s was 
confronted by an expansion of neo-liberal economic thought that up until recently 
seemed to be completely dominant, particularly in Europe. 
From a narrower regional perspective, the 'triumph' of the West in the post-
communist period must be underlined inasmuch as the post-communist states of , 
Europe have had to adopt the western ideology of neo-liberalism and western 
Europe has been able to establish its sphere of influence over the whole of a 
reconstituted united Europe. This is also clearly evident in the Balkans, which after 
decades of communism and years of armed conflict and destruction, are now under 
western influence, with the West and particularly the EU providing the ideological 
14 The term describes German capital that has global presence. 
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framework, neo-liberalism, and the context within which the states are progressing 
towards western integration .. In addition, states such as Germany have assumed a 
special role on the European continent and in the Balkans, instead of more powerful 
actors such as the us. At the same time, old links with Russia seem to have been re-
activated, challenging western dominance in the region. 
Nevertheless, the focus of this thesis is not on an analysis of the world order 
but on how the western Balkan states are receiving and processing hegemonic 
influence and how are progressing within this world order. Therefore, the world 
order will be taken as a given in the analysis. 
The assumption that the EU and Germany are the primary agents transmitting 
the dominant ideology, permits us to consider them as the core transmitting its ideas 
outwards to the periphery. In particular, as we will demonstrate in Chapter 2, 
Germany is the state that seeks to formulate to a very significant degree EU policy in 
the region (Hellmann 2001) and this allows the examination of Germany as the 
hegemonic state and the EU as the main institution which operates the hegemonic 
order. In addition, the operation and interference of other institutions like the IMF 
and the World Bank, which share a common ideology, permits their inclusion in the 
analysis as secondary hegemonic institutions in the neo-Gramscian sense. 
Here of course confusion might arise, regarding the heterogeneity of the Bloc, 
with actors that seem to have competing agendas. However, in the case of the 
Balkans, as will be explicitly presented, these actors are cooperating. The EU is 
coordinating the activities of the other international institutions, Germany is 
promoting certain initiatives with the support of US and other EU members states; 
while the economic elite, despite its heterogeneous character, is cooperating with 
the other actors, without their competition being more than purely commercial. 
From the analysis of the three spheres so far, the first step (Le. the 
identification of the changes at the level of the production structure) is almost 
covered. Thus we will describe the responses of the collective actors and social 
forces. This means that we have to deal with the productive classes (workers, 
industrialists etc), their interaction, and mainly their response to neo-liberal (Le. the 
hegemonic ideology) doctrine. For instance, we can try to examine the degree of 
consent, the discipline, and the coercive mechanisms, like the carrot- and- stick 
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policies of the EU. In addition, through the empirical analysis of financial and 
commercial exchanges, and of political agreements and decisions, we will show 
which social forces are involved in the establishment of hegemony. 
This also means that we have to examine the role of political parties in the 
Balkans. Gramsci clearly defined the political party as the collective will and the 
mechanism for the transmission of hegemonic ideas (Gramsci 1971). Hence, it is 
important to locate and analyse the political coalitions, their connections with 
certain social forces and their dynamics in each case study. Then we have to find the 
degree of control in the society and which forces make up the Historic Bloc. For 
instance, in the case studies, if the dominant political formations in the Balkans seem 
to be towards the West, then a certain policy can be expected which is closer to 
German and EU preferences and mentality, whereby they can be seen to represent 
the West in this region. 
Certainly, since Germany is considered to be the hegemonic state, the analysis 
should also include the role of German policy-making and the foreign policy 
orientation of the parties in office. For example, the Schroder government was 
arguably more interest-seeking than pro-European and as a result its policies in the 
Balkans exhibited many elements of national interests. Subsequently, the orientation 
of the Merkel government plays an important role in German foreign policy in both 
the EU and the Balkans. 
Therefore, the theSis should look at the mechanisms that would be seen to 
transmit German hegemony in the Balkans. These are located in organisations and 
institutions that deal with the Balkans, while at the same time Germany has 
substantial participation and influence on them. The latter can be financial, political, 
military or a combination of all three. However, as we mentioned in the introduction, 
German politico-economic interaction is such that the system and its corresponding 
internal relations remain largely stable. 
Regarding the third step, things seem to be a bit more complex, since there is 
not a single state that shapes the world order and we are interested more in the 
states that are subject to the imposition of hegemony. According to the main 
hypothesis, we have to deal with Germany and the Balkan states in the three main 
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case studies. Nevertheless, we have to make adjustments in order to fit in with the 
intentions ofthe current thesis. 
Firstly, instead of taking Germany, which is considered to be the hegemonic 
state for this thesis, and examining how its dominant classes established hegemony 
in Germany and subsequently how they influenced the formation of Germany, we 
will take a different approach. We wiil examine how the domestic elite in each of the 
three case studies is formed and is collaborating with the hegemonic group and its 
components; i.e. we are looking at the receiver of hegemony instead of the 
hegemonic provider. 
The application looks possible because both the elements of coercion and 
consent are employed by Germany and the EU in relation to the states examined 
here. Hence, as we will try to demonstrate in the case studies, both coercion and 
consent will be apparent in the decisions regarding financial assistance or the state's 
progress towards EU membership as well as in the military presence in the region, 
where Germany is among the largest contributors. 
Furthermore, with this modification of the third step, instead of looking from 
the perspective of the hegemon, which in this case we assume to be Germany, we 
are looking from the point of the recipient states, which for this thesis are the three 
case studies from the western Balkans. Thus, the configuration of power within 
Ger.man society is taken to be a stable variable. Thus, we can look at whether or not 
Germany is the hegemon by looking from the receiver's perspective, by looking at 
the kind of hegemony is being received and from whom it is being transmitted if not 
from Germany. 
To sum up, the research will look at the local, German and regional 
mechanisms and actors, then at how these actors are working and their influence on 
the local society. The difference from the original theoretical application that we 
presented above is that we do not deal with German society, which we assume to be 
the hegemonic society, but we take for granted the German societal setting, and 
therefore we examine how the putative hegemony is being received by the Balkans 
and what the implications/outcomes are. In addition, we are viewing each case study 
separately and are thus examining the hegemony in each case study individually. In 
this way the Historic Bloc is seen not as a general one but as particular for each case. 
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study. This allows us to test the existence of hegemony with the inclusion of the 
particular politico-economic circumstances of each case study. 
Finally, the projection of the domestically established hegemony outwards, will 
be ignored. This is because already assume the existence of an outward hegemony. 
From the above it is becoming obvious that the hegemony is primarily economic and 
it will be evident by the economic penetration of the Bloc that it will be mainly 
reflected in FDI and in trade relations, which are also carriers of the hegemonic 
ideology, as is part of their management mentality. Lastly, in purely technical terms, 
after the presentation of the three spheres will the German role in the case study in 
question will be presented and an assessment made of whether and to what extent 
Germany fits the role ofthe hegemon. 
1.6. Strengths and weaknesses of the theory. 
To complete the presentation of our theoretical framework we have to answer the 
crucial question of why we chose this theory. There are various reasons why. 
Firstly, we believe that in the contemporary world, which is characterised by 
global interdependence and the rapid flow of huge financial assets, we cannot speak 
of power games in a strictly nation-state framework as realist thinking does. New 
actors are appearing on the global scene. For instance, the decision to go to war 
today is not only linked with geopolitics or with balance of power considerations, but 
it is also linked to issues such as the reactions of world stock markets to such an 
event. Today, for example, China's most effective weapon against the USA is not a 
nuclear bomb but the Chinese stock of dollar securities which, if China decided to 
sell them, would deal. a big blow to the US economy since these capital imports are 
financing the huge US debt. 
Moreover, we cannot refer to hegemony in terms of the past, i.e. interstate 
bullying; the invasion of foreign armies; colonisation etc. Today hegemony should be 
embedded and indirect. In the contemporary world, those who have 'control' of the 
national economy and the flow of information are able to exercise hegemonl5• In 
the global economy the nation-state cannot impose total control on investments and 
15 Hence as it will be demonstrated in the Balkans, the Historic Bloc is assuming control of this two 
areas. 
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flows, as was possible in the past, simply because there is no closed national 
economy where economic assets are predominantly nationally based, and because 
technological advances allow the bypassing of national watchdogs through moving 
financial assets around globally. Furthermore, in the era of globalisation, there is a 
huge flow of information and the potential for cultural and ideology promotion 
through global media (e.g. the CNN effect). Thus, we have to refer to cultural 
attitudes and reasons, in order to have a full picture of international relations 
decisions. 
Referring to the Balkans16, we have two more elements to take into account. 
From one side, we refer to the EU, which is not a nation-state but has significant 
power that in some aspects resembles the power and function of a nation-state. The 
EU is also a structure which represents the collective interests of its members but at 
the same time is a more complex and united structure than NATO, another 
important multilateral institution. Moreover, the EU is exercising tremendous 
influence on the Balkans. The Balkans, from their side, are facing a difficult late 
transition, from the hegemonic context of communist patronage, to a new western 
context. At the same time, both the elites and 'subordinate' classes of the Balkan 
states are showing an unprecedented compliance and desire to be integrated into 
this new system and to accept this ideology, despite the hard measures that have to 
be implemented. What is also intriguing in the Balkans is the co-existence of old and 
new politico-economic elites, while in. the case of the other former communist 
societies of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs),· there was 
overwhelmingly a fundamental change of power. 
Hence, why does this theory explain all the above better than other IR theories? 
For us, the neo-Gramscian theory that we have outlined in previous sections, 
seems to be the most appropriate to provide answers to these questions. The theory 
that we apply refers to global political economy and therefore allows us to indude 
and analyse the global interdependence of national economies as well as the general 
role of the economy in world politics, while it can also be easily interpreted at 
regionalleve!. At the same time, as will become obvious later with the case studies, 
16 The terms refers to the western Balkans. 
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we have the necessary flexibility to refer to geopolitics and power games in classic 
nineteenth century and Cold War terms and thus to bridge (if the term is appropriate) 
the economic and 'strategic' explanations. 
Furthermore, with this theory we are able to refer to FDI; trade; privatisation 
and other contemporary economic terms and therefore to see the influence of 
globalisation on both 'weak' and 'strong' societies. We can search for a kind of 
hegemony that begins through the economic control of key economic sectors in a 
national economy by transnational and foreign national economic capital. 
Additionally, by referring to elites we can more easily explain the indirect aspect of 
hegemony, e.g. by focusing on the decisions of those economic actors that create 
the hegemonic conditions, such as EU decisions on the liberalisation of energy 
markets in transition states. We can also refer to the embedded aspect of 
contemporary hegemony, through reference to tools such as institutions that seem 
to exercise a larger influence than the mere use of politico-military force. 
Another advantage of our theoretical framework is the opportunity that it 
provides to use the EU and the member states as distinct actors whose actions are 
connected. The use of the EU as the hegemonic institution not only fits our 
hypothesis and the structure of our analysis, but also allows us to find a pattern 
between the EU and the EU-27 and overall EU policy in the western Balkans. In other 
words, who acts; who benefits; and who controls. 
However, the biggest advantage is that it helps us explain why the western 
Balkans are accepting what is actually being imposed on them. By dealing with elites, 
it is easier to establish connections, influences and personal interests that explain 
this compliance. In addition, the theory provides us with the ability to examine the 
cultural aspects and the hegemonic propaganda through agents such· as the global 
mass media, or the normative power of the EU. Finally, with the term 'passive 
revolution' we can provide an answer to the coexistence of old and new politiCO-
economic elites instead of the fundamental change of hegemonic control. 
Certainly all theories have weaknesses and the one that we use is not an 
exception. It is also understandable that in the limited space of an academic thesis it 
is not possible or appropriate to presentthe whole spectrum of the debate about 
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neo-Gramscianism and the Coxian interpretation. For the latter there is a huge 
literature, and thus here we will only refer to some key points. 
In a narrower sense one of the most common critiques of neo-Gramscianism in 
general and Cox in particular, is their connection with Marxism. Thus, the critics 
claim that Marxist limitations and particularly Marxist 'reductionism, focusing on the 
economic dimension - as based on the production of material goods - neglects 
cultural aspects (see Schechter 2002). Cox himself rejects the term Marxist and 
prefers the term historical materialist (Schechter 2002: 3). Moreover, as Sinclair 
. I 
notes, despite Cox's admission that material production is a fundamental activity of 
human societies, he expands the definition of production to include ideas, norms 
and institutions (~inclair 1996: 9). A similar critique is the deviation from Gramsci 
(see linklater 2001). This seems true since Gramsci referred to national hegemony, 
and thus the extension of the theory to the international level is something that is 
happening from scratch. Budd mentions also that neo-Gramscians are using only the 
pattern of hegemony and thus their approach is not identical to a Gramscian view 
(Budd 2007). 
Other critics refer to Cox's analysis over the role of the state. Schechter asserts 
that critics are divided since they are both critics concerned with the absence or the 
over-importance of the state (Schechter 2002). Nevertheless, the side that mentions 
the neglect of state power seems more valid. Indeed, Cox' analysis assumes that 
state power is eroded by globalisation forces and that new transnational actors are 
emerging. In addition, Cox describes a system without a central power. Critics insist 
that state power remains valid since it is the state with its elite that guides 
globalisation against the working classes, while at the same time particular class 
struggle is absent from the analysis (see Budd 2007). Straight describes it as: 
'The absence of formal super-power conflict and the emphasis on competitiveness within the global 
economy have decreased the leverage of stotes and seemingly increased that of corporations and 
other institutions of global civi/society' (in: Sinclair 1996: 5). 
The supporters of Cox mention that the world order has changed and thus any 
state should take into account international financial flows (Sinclair 1996). 
Furthermore, in relation to the absence of class struggle, the very concept of 
hegemony as defined by Gramsci and Cox contains the elements of class struggle. 
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Particularly in Cox' interpretation, the class struggle is broadened with the inclusion 
of normative aspects such as the collective image of world order and the inclusion of 
the institutions that administer the particular world order (Morton 2006). Morton 
continues by noting: 
'Class struggle is thereby faced rather than effaced in this historical materialist conceptualisation of 
critical theory - as an inquiry into distinct capitalist relations corresponding to forms of property 
ownership, state power and unfreedom' (Morton 2006: 65). 
From our part, the modifications that have been made provide a solution that 
bridges these two opposing positions about state power. As became apparent we 
include in our analysis both national and transnational actors (by incorporating them 
in the same Historic Bloc). A further outcome is the ability to refer to both class 
struggle and geopolitics, since instead of referring to the state as an actor, we are 
referring to politico-economic elites that operate with motives that range from 
domestic political games to the protection of foreign interests. Furthermore, the 
state remains central to contemporary capitalism (and actually the recent financial 
crunch illustrates the central role of the state) but not because of the state as it is 
but because of the relationship between public and private actors, which are 
frequently relations of mutual support and protection. This is consistent also with 
the state-society relations approach of Cox. 
1.6.1. Why neo-Gramscian theory? 
The above section, depicting both virtues and weaknesses of the neo-Gramscian 
theory of hegemony showed why this theory was chosen. In this section, we expand 
the analysis slightly and present other theories and approaches to the issue of 
hegemony. The aim is not to present the whole spectrum of each theory but, by 
presenting the key points of the alternatives, to justify the choice of neo-Gramscian 
theory. On the issue of hegemony, there are two theories that use the concept, 
namely the neo-realist and the Neo17-liberal and liberal theories. To these theories, 
we add constructivism which, even though it does not refer explicitly to the issue of 
hegemony, nevertheless offers interesting alternatives. 
17 For matters of clarity we will use capital when we refer to the neo-liberal school of thought. 
42 
Neo-realism is perhaps the most used theory on the issue of hegemony, it is 
also one of the dominant mainstream IR theories, and can be considered to be the 
main alternative to our theory. Neo-realism, as Waltz defines it, refers to an 
intemational system, whose units are sovereign states that act in a similar manner; 
thus unit-level variation is irrelevant (Waltz 1979). It is a system of brutal struggle for 
power with continuous military, economic and other forms of competition (Waltz 
1993: 45; Mearsheimer 1994/95). The structure of the system is defined by the 
ordering principle ofthe international system which is anarchy, the differentiation of 
units and the distribution of capabifities across states (Waltz 1979). Hence, 
international politics reflect the distribution of national capabilities (Waltz 2000; 27). 
In sum, neo-realism rests on five broad assumptions; First that the 
international system is anarchic in the sense that it consists of sovereign units, i.e. 
states without a central authority. Within this anarchy there is a rank order since 
there are great powers etc. Secondly, the state which has a certain military capability, 
. is the most obvious state power and the overall state power is based on its 
combined capabilities (Mearsheimer 1994/95; Waltz 1979). Hence, economic power 
is subordinate to military power, but economic power is necessary for the provision 
of resources and capabilities that enhance state power (Waltz 1993). A third 
assumption is that there is uncertainty among states about their intentions and 
actions and thus the states are always on the alert, while interstate relations are 
characterised by mistrust. The fourth assumption is that the most important motive 
of states is survival and maintaining their sovereignty (Mearsheimer 1994/95) or as 
Waltz notes '[TJhe first duty of the state is to defend itself' (Waltz 2000; 9). The final 
assumption considers the states as rational strategic actors in a worfd of imperfect 
information about the intentions of other states {Mearsheimer 1994/95}. The 
balance of power is the basic strategy for survival {Waltz 2000: 3D} and is apparent in 
the structure of the international system {Nye 2004}. 
In such a system, the states rely on self-help, which means that each state 
stands alone, is vulnerable in the international arena and has the primary aim of its 
own survival and the promotion of its self-interest (Waltz 1979). Cooperation and 
alliances are limited and short-term since they end when their purpose is fulfilled 
{Waltz 2000; Mearsheimer 1994/95). The states aim to maximize their relative 
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power position over other states as reflected in military capacity. At this point we 
have to mention that for neo-realists, the economy is secondary to security and the 
objective of enhancing capabilities and that governments are above the markets 
(Waltz 1993; 2000). Relative power considerations are evident in states' cooperation, 
where each part 'not only considers its individual gain, but also how well it does 
compared to the other side' (Waltz 1993: 59-60; 2000: 12). Hence, from the moment 
that a state is preoccupied with the balance of power it has to ensure not only that it 
is able to maximize its gains but 'more important to make sure that it does better,or 
at least no worse, than the other state in any agreement' (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 12; 
d. also Waltz 2000). In fact, balance of power offers the check on the system and 
this ensures peace (Waltz 1993). 
In neo-realism institutions are seen as reflections of state preferences and 
interests that cease to exist once they stop facilitating the interests of their creators. 
In other words they reflect 'state calculations of self-interest based primarily on the 
international distribution of power. The most powerful states in the system create 
and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power '" 
institutions largely mirror the distribution of power in the system' (Mearsheimer 
1994/95: 13). 
According to the parameters of the system with the competition among states 
and the search for relative gains and an uneven distribution of power, some states 
achieve higher ranking than others and some are elevated to great power status 
(Nye 2004). The hegemonic state is the dominant power, namely the state that 
controls or dominates the lesser states in the system (Nye 2004; Gilpin 2001). As 
such it brings balance and peace once primacy is established and the need to defend 
this primacy is lacking (Waltz 1993: 76-77). The supremacy ofthe dominant power is 
not only_in military capacity but also in the economic structures which favour its 
interests (Waltz 1993; 2000). In addition, the hegemon shapes the system in a way 
that favours it. For example, according to Waltz the promotion of democracy is a 
strategic choice to minimize the threats by creating images of the hegemon (Waltz 
2000: 12). Equally, the hegemon designs the institutions in order to promote its 
interests and abandons them when this is not possible anymore. For neo-realists 
NATO is such an example and is considered a tool to maintain and lengthen the US 
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grip on the foreign and military policies of European states (Waltz 2000: 20). 
Therefore, as it is stronger than any other state, it can bend international law when 
the latter threatens to thwarts its interest (Waltz 2000: 27). 
However, a unipolar power is capricious and this raises the concern of other 
states that try to balance this power. Additionally, this behaviour worries the other 
states that seek to balance this power. This along with the overextension of the 
hegemon brings its weakening. The limit of the hegemon's expansion is evident 
when the economic foundation is unable to sustain the hegemon's status and thus 
the hegemonic state tries to reverse the decline by economic reorganisation and the 
reduction. of imperial burdens (Waltz 1993; 2000). It has to be noted that the 
hegemon undertakes the cost of hegemony because it profits from this system. 
Hence, hegemony is located in a material approach based on the prevalence of 
material capabilities (Joseph 2008). 
The debate about the validity of neo-realism is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, we have to justify why we rejected this theory. Firstly, we agree with 
some of the general criticisms of neo-realism, namely that it is descriptive and thus 
fails to explain why and how the system and national interests and actions are 
formulated. It is reductionist since the basic prinCiples of the system like self-help, 
the character of the anarchy and power politics are taken as given (see Wendt 1992: 
396). Closer to our thesis, is that neo-realism considers states as the only actors of 
the system, something that contradicts our view of hegemony that pays more 
attention to elites and non-state actors. Another reason is the distinct absence of 
cultural and normative explanations, which we believe play an important role in 
foreign relations. Other reasons are related to the role of the economy. For us the 
economy is more important than military capabilities since governments do not 
control the markets but coexist and cooperate with them. Cooperation is another 
reason for rejection, since our thesis observes different national elites that 
cooperate without mistrust or imperfect information from the moment that they 
exercise hegemony together. We also disagree with the role of institutions that are 
considered tools for hegemonic control. We can see some elements of autonomy as 
in the case of the EU. Finally, we agree with Alexander Wendt when he refers to neo-
realism as a self-fulfilling prophecy since it solves the problems that it creates 
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instead of looking at how or why these problems occur and how the structural 
changes take place (Wendt 1992). 
The second theory is liberal institutiohalism or as some scholars like Moravcsik 
notes, institutionalism. It is a theory that, despite enjoying some neo-realist 
assumptions, such as the anarchic international system and rationality, refers to 
issues of cooperation, complex interdependence and institutionalisation of 
international relations (Keohane 1989; 2009). Hence, although states are unitary 
actors rationally pursuing their self-interests in a system of anarchy, they are 
cooperating and seeking their interests by using institutions, which give material gain 
and reduce competition on the basis of reciprocity (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). The 
states are not the only actors for institutionalists. Transnational actors such as 
transnational corporations and multilateral institutions are also important actors in 
the system. States seek to maximize absolute instead of relative gains (Axelrod and 
Keohane 1985; Keohane 2009). Under these circumstances, peace is achieved when 
the states form institutions, even if such action means that they lose some of their 
sovereignty. Thus, cooperation is effective and takes place when actors adjust their 
behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of others to promote mutual 
interests, but it is more difficult in cases where there are no mutual interests 
(Axelrod and Keohane 1985; Mearsheimer 1994/95). In this way, international 
cooperation is achieved despite the lack of central authority through reciprocity 
which enforces norms and values and 'civilises' the community of states. To this, free 
trade is an extra benefit because it enhances cooperation and brings mutual benefits 
(Nye 2004). It also creates the necessary interdependence and division of labour in 
the international economy that makes war very costly (Nye 2004). Institutionalism 
divides international politics into the security and the economic realm with more 
focus on the second (Mearsheimer 1994-95); hence soft and hard politics become 
equal. Finally, through reciprocity, cooperation is achieved in a situation of 
conflicting interests. 
Within this framework, institutions are accorded a central role since they are 
the mediators of cooperation. The biggest advantage of institutions is the 
minimization of misunderstandings by providing information about each actor's 
perceptions and indications. Misunderstandings can lead to conflicts since 
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'subjective interpretations by one side become objective reality for the other side' 
(Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 231). The institutions reduce the lack of knowledge (or 
shadow offuture, according to Keohane) and this enhances cooperation. An example 
that is used by Axelrod and Keohane is that jf Germany had known the reaction of 
the Entente in the First World War, it would never have initiated it (Axelrod and 
Keohane 1985; Mearsheimer 1994/95). A great advantage of institutions is the 
socialisation of states and the shaping of their behaviour. In addition, the principles 
and rules of institutions also include the elements of punishment for those that 
violate the 'law' (Mearsheimer 1994/95; Keohane 1989). Moreover, an alternative to 
the use of force as conflict resolution occurs by constituting international regimes 
that fare better on sanctioning problems. Finally, once an institution is created, it 
preserves a kind of autonomy similar to state behaviour (Waltz 2000). Therefore, 
regimes and institutions assist in governing the anarchic system and motivate 
cooperation and multilateralism as a means of securing national interests. 
Institutionalism was rejected because, like neo-realism, it considers many 
variables of the system as givens and is rather descriptive, and because the role of 
domestic and non-state actors is ignored. In addition, there are no references to how 
hegemony is constructed and we could not find a convincing explanation for the 
. state-transnational capital cooperation (see Jacobsen 2003; Joseph 2008). Moreover, 
there is no clear reference to norms and cultural aspects, and the use of the 
economy is slightly different from our perspective, because free trade is regarded as 
something essentially positive but can, according to many development theorists 
(Chan, Sen, and Rodrik) be seen as a means of exploitation. Accordingly, the 
institutions themselves are not used simply for cooperation but as a means of 
exploitation and for maintaining the status quo which is central to our analysis. 
Institutionalism is accused by some scholars of being closer to neo-realism 
than liberalism (see Moravcsik 1997; Waltz 2000; Mearsheimer 1994/95). Looking at 
writings that are more liberal, Moravcsik offers us some rich insights. In fact, liberal 
theory, with its three variations (namely republican, commercial and ideational 
liberalism) relies on three core assumptions. These are: 
1. Primacy of societa! actors. As in a bottom-up process, where socially 
differentiated individuals define their material and ideational interests in a 
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rational mode and then up load those interests through a political exchange 
and collective action (Moravcsik 1997: 517). 
2. Representation and state preferences. States are institutions that represent 
the social configuration of power whose interests they promote. Therefore, 
'state institutions alongside societal interests themselves are a key 
determinant of what states do internationally' (Moravcsik 1997: 518). 
. 3. Interdependence and the international system. State behaviour reflects 
varying patterns of state preferences and the variation is evident in 'the 
configuration of state preferences, while treating configurations of 
capabilities and information as if they were either fixed constraints or 
endogenous to state preferences' (Moravcsik 1997: 520). 
In brief, for liberals, conflicts and their prevention are not only subject to 
balance of power but also to the domestic structures of states, from the moment 
that a state preference is shaped by the interests, values and identities of the 
domestic group that has the power. In this way trade is important because it directs 
state competition to the realm of the economy instead of military action (Nye 2004; 
Freund and Rittberger 2001). It is worth mentioning that, for liberals, markets have 
superseded governments (Waltz 2000). Finally, in relation to institutions, liberals 
argue that they 'can help prevent conflict by stabilizing expectations, creating a 
sense of continuity and a feeling that current cooperation will be reciprocated in the 
future, providing information on whether states abide by international norms, and 
establishing mechanisms for conflict resolution' (Nye 2004:37). 
In relation to hegemony, Neo-liberals view it as the leadership (or hegemony) of 
the state which brings liberal ideas, rules and institutions of international society but 
forsakes short-run gains in return for a durable settlement that benefits all states. In 
addition, the hegemon is inclined to cooperation instead of the use of power. Finally, 
Neo-liberals accept formations such as the EU; where states cede part of their 
sovereignty for integrated communities and mutual economic gains (Ruggie 1982; 
Gilpin 2001; Nye 2004). 
Even though liberalism and particularly its commercial variation, is close to our 
ideas, there are certain elements that make us reject it. First of all, there is no 
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reference to class struggles and how the domestic groups achieve power, something 
which is basic to our view of hegemony. Another reason is the supremacy of the 
markets, which we reject, while the role of the economy and of laissez-faire policies 
is not benign in our opinion but aims towards exploitation and uneven development. 
Finally, some of the core arguments of liberalism, such as democracies not waging 
war on each other or the role of institutions in the international system, are in 
disagreement with our views. The same applies to the role of hegemon, which for 
thisthesis is not only a state, but is also not a benign leader. 
The theory of hegemonic stability in its liberal version as defined by Robert 
Gilpin is also interesting. According to this theory, the hegemon is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for establishing a liberal international economy and the 
hegemon has to be committed to the liberal economy. Furthermore, hegemony 
makes cooperation more feasible because the hegemon is not an imperial power 
that coercively imposes its preferences, but its leading role is in promoting collective 
goods for it and its allies (Gilpin 2001: 94-96). Moreover, the hegemon can enforce 
compliance to the rules, something that regimes cannot, because 'the leader or 
hegemon facilitates international cooperation and prevents defection from the rules 
of the regime through the use of side payments (bribes), sanctions, and/or other 
means, but can seldom, if ever, coerce reluctant states to obey the rules of a liberal 
international economic order' (Gilpin 2001: 97-98). The theory clearly refers to a 
liberal hegemon and to the establishment of the liberal world economic order. The 
hegemon sets the structure of the international liberal economy, firstly to satisfy its 
interests, and is the only actor that can use its resources in order to maintain the 
system and ensure free trade (Gilpin 2001: 99). 
The theory seems to fail to describe the connection between military and 
economic power and hegemony (Nye 2004). Moreover, the theory contains the main 
problems of liberal theory and particularly the role of the hegemon without insights 
involving class struggle and domestic actors. 
The final theory that we examine is constructivism. Like neo-Marxists, 
constructivists are concerned with how world politics are socially constructed. This 
leads to two claims: i) that the structures of international politics are social rather 
than materialistic and ii) that the structures shape identities and interests and not 
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only behaviour. Thus, both claims are opposite to neo-realism and institutionalism 
(Wendt 1995). 
Hence, state interests are largely constructed by systemic structures, which 
mean sociological structuralism (Wendt 1995: 73). The social structures are not only 
made by material capabilities but by social relationships as well and therefore have 
three elements, namely, i) shared knowledge such as shared understandings, 
expectations, . which show whether the actors' relations are conflictual or 
cooperative [therefore, the social structure is based on ideas, and what makes the 
ideas social is their intersubjective quality or sociality (Adler .1997)]; ii) material. 
resources, where the difference with mainstream theories is that, for constructivists, 
material capabilities have 'meaning for human action through the structure of 
shared knowledge in which they are embedded' (Wendt 1995: 73), [changes in 
material power therefore change social relations]; iii) Practices, i.e. 'social structure 
exists only in practice'; in other words the focus is on explaining how social 
structures affect practice (Wendt 1995: 74). 
What has to be mentioned is that constructivism tries to explain how the 
structure makes actions possible by attributing to actors certain identities and 
interests and material capabilities, in other words 'how agency interaction produces 
and reproduces structures of shared knowledge over time' (Wendt 1995: 76; Adler 
1997). The focus is not on explaining anarchy but on what kind of anarchy and on the 
perception that the system is not given but changes in relation to the practices of 
states (Wendt 1992). Another characteristic of the structure is the role of reciprocity. 
Each state reacts towards the other on the basis of each experience, knowledge and 
interdependence (Wendt 1992). For instance, if a state starts to militarise itself the 
others will follow, thus security dilemmas are acts of practice (Wendt 1992; 1995). 
The institutions are a stable set of identities and interests with formal rules 
and norms and thus cognitive entities that cannot exist apart from actors, ideas 
about how the world works (Wendt 1992). Thus, institutionalism is a process of 
internalising new identities and interests not something exogenous that affects only 
behaviour (Wendt 1992; Adler 1997; Checkel 2004). 
Constructivism seems similar to the theoretical approach that we are using, 
which might be natural since both neo-Gramscian theory and constructivism are 
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critical theories. However, there are a number of issues that made us reject it as our 
explanatory theory. The main reason has to do with the lack of reference to class 
struggle, the role of transnational capital and the exploitation strategies within 
societies. In addition, there is no clear reference to the role of hegemony and how 
this can exist. 
1.7. Developments in the field. 
Further to the explanation as to why we apply neo-Gramscian theory for 
investigating the case of hegemony in the western Balkans, it is usefu I to look at 
relevant efforts in the field in order to identify possible blind spots that this research 
comes to fill. In the introduction we mentioned the debate on German hegemony 
and that this research seeks to contribute to this debate illustrating a largely 
economic and indirect hegemonic policy on the part of Germany in the Balkans. Here 
we will try to show whether there are more reasons that can justify the conduct of 
this research. 
The vast majority of the available literature deals with the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and the role of the international community and particularly of the USA, 
Germany and Russia (c.f. McGrath 1999; Buckley and Cummings 2001; Ramet 1999). 
In most of these, the approach is either neo-realist within the framework of power 
games, geopolitical balance of power and fight for material capabilities and 
hegemony. For instance, Uvanios, Brownback and Norris see Russia and NATO 
indulging in games in the Balkans, while Howkins and Johnstone see US or EU control 
(Livanios 1999; Norris 2005; Howkins 2005; Johnstone 2000). Other scholars like 
Noctiummes and Page, as well as Bromley and M. Cox take a leftist approach, 
focusing on an anti-imperialistic and critical view, which mentions the design of a 
grand hegemony and dominance but nothing which corresponds to the framework 
of the neo-Gramscian view (Noctiummes and Page 1999; Pozo-Marin 2006; Bromley 
2006; Cox M. 2004). Research on the effects of globalisation is also extensive (see 
Steger 2004; Swyngedouw 2004; Chang 2002). 
Another branch of scholarship deals with the role of Germany in the EU in 
relation to the events in Yugoslavia and in the post-Kosovo period. Rippert and 
Gardner-Fe/dman are good examples of this (Rippert 1999; Gardner- Feldman 2001). 
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Of course the largest part of this scholarship is based on the debate about German 
foreign policy since unification. Thus, there are scholars like Erb and Harnisch and 
Maul, who believe that Germany is a civilian power, and those such as Hyde-Price 
and Bluth, who see Germany as a new actor in the global balance of power (see Erb 
2003; Harnisch and Maul 2001; Hyde-Price 2000; Bluth 2000). Within this framework 
the German role in the events of Yugoslavia and beyond is seen either as an example 
oHhe new German power (Pradetto 2004)· or as a multilateral protector of civil 
rights (Rathbun 2004). Others like Crawford see a German hegemony within the EU, 
whereas Ully Gardner-Feldman sees the German actor as a supplement to the 
American (Crawford 2007; Gardner-Feldman 2001). 
The role of the EU is also seen in a variety of approaches. Hence, there are 
scholars such as Pond, Olsen and Smith that see the enlargement policy towards the 
Balkans from the view of a community of values and Europeanisation (Pond 2006; 
Smith 2002; Olsen 2002; Pridham 2000). Others see a more 'sinister' role as one of 
dominance and hegemony (Bechev 2006; Savran 1999) or promotion of certain 
member state interests (Crawford 2007). There are also scholars that are researching 
this relationship from the view point of the Balkans and how they react to this 
integration (see Noutcheva 2007; Jileva 2004). 
Also interesting is neo-Gramscian scholarship itself. Most of the literature deals 
with the role of the USA in the post-Second World War and post-Cold War periods 
and how it is deploying its hegemony. Gill, Cox, Budd and Femia are good examples. 
(Gill 2003; Cox 1987; Budd 2007; Femia 1981). Close to them are Ryner and Cafruny 
that see a US hegemony in Europe through the transmission of US neo-liberal 
capitalism (Cafruny and Ryner 2007a; 2007b) as well as Gill and Bieler that deal with 
EU neo-liberalism, its impact and how it has been formulated (Gill 1998; Bieler 2003). 
There is also some literature on the role of international institutions and of neo-
liberal economic theory in the relations between developing and developed world 
(see van der Pijl 2007; Seabrooke 2007; Cerny 2006; Birchfield 1999). Here, we can 
identify a number of scholars like Morton who focus on the issue of passive 
revolution (see Morton 2007). Other scholars focus on the post-Soviet world (e.g. 
van der Pij11993), on east Asia (e.g. Gills 1993) and of course on Latin America where 
the literature is substantial (see Morton 2007). Of course, there are a number of 
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other left non-Gramscians, and even more mainstream scholars like laclau and 
Mouffe and 5klair who deal with the issue of hegemony (laclau and Mouffe 2001; 
Ski air 1997). For instance, Beeson examines the rise of China in a mainstream 
security account of hegemony (see Beeson 2009), while others like Rapkin and 
Braaten examine hegemonic legitimacy using the 'family resemblance concepts' (see 
Rapkin and Braaten 2009). Closer to our perspective comes Ruth Deyermond who 
examines the use of hegemony in Central Asia. Her approach uses the concept of 
'Matrioshka hegemony', which allows the coexistence of global, regional and local 
hegemons in a multi-levelled hegemony. Nevertheless, her insight is more at state 
level than at the elite level (see Deyermond 2009). 
So far, the closest research'to the approach adopted in this thesis were two 
articles. The first is by Turkes and Gokgoz, who apply the Gramscian theory to the 
role of the EU as hegemon. However, there are differences in the application 
method and to the findings. The most important of these are the consideration of 
the Commission as a central actor that sets the hegemonic project as well as the 
reference to the Historic Bloc for the whole region. Thus, they end up asserting that 
an Historic Bloc for the whole region is not feasible and that. the situation in the 
region is merely an example of the overall hegemony of transnational capital (Turkes 
and G6kg6z 2006). The second is an article by Dorothee Bohle that exalT!ines neo-
Gramscian hegemony in eastern and central east Europe. We agree with her findings 
of a Historic Bloc with participation of local forces including trade unions that see the 
EU as a panacea to their problems. Nevertheless, we disagree with the 
generalisation of the Bloc as well as with the use of the EU as an actor of the Bloc 
instead of a primary hegemonic institution. However, the only 'serious' difference is 
that we apply neo-Gramscianism and find similar conclusions in the western Balkans 
and not in eastern Europe. 
It is becoming obvious that almost all the aspects of this thesis have been 
mentioned before, although without all of them at once. However, this thesis 
contains elements that make it a unique piece of research. First of all, in this thesis 
there is a combination of all the above elements. The approach to hegemony in this 
thesis combines the German and EU role in the western Balkans and at the same 
time treats both actors individually and within the overall framework of the EU. In 
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addition, the application of neo-Gramscianism to the western Balkans is rather new, 
since the region has not to date received much attention from neo-Gramscian 
scholars. Particularly the connection of Germany with the western Balkans within the 
framework of neo-Gramscian hegemony is something new, since until now any such 
connection has taken place within mainstream theoretical approaches. Close to this 
is the fact that we are including Albania in this research, which is something new. 
Albania is a state that has not been researched much so far and thus this thesis is a 
step in this direction. Other novel elements of this thesis include the way that we 
apply the theory since the reverse method is not usual in relative research. A last 
element is our examination of each case study separately and thus testing the 
hegemony in each case as well as reducing the reach of hegemony to the regional 
level. For the latter the passage from Deyermond is revealing concerning the scarcity 
of academic references to the kind of regional hegemony that we examine. Hence: 
'Regional hegemony has received limited theoretical consideration; the traditional hegemony 
literature often identified such states os "rising challengers" to the global hegemon, rather than os 
states occupying a hegemonic position within a geographically limited area' (Deyermond 2009: 156). 
As will become evident for us, the hegemony is regional and, even though there 
is no reference in this thesis to other regional hegemonies, something which is not 
the purpose of this thesis, we believe that today there are no global hegemons since 
even the US, which is considered the superpower, acts as a regional power. 
1.8. Why Germany? 
1.8.1. The German model. 
We conclude Chapter 1 with an explanation of our choice of Germany as the putative 
hegemon in the western Balkans. The answer begins with Germany's overwhelming 
economic power in Europe and globally (third largest economy in the world and 
biggest exporter) and its ability to shape key EU policies such as the enlargement 
policy. This makes Germany at the very least a regional (at least in economic terms) 
leader and this fits the regional aspect of the hegemony that we seek to examine 
(see Crawford 2007). Moreover, Germany has a past in the Balkans, a past of control 
and influence. Furthermore, the German model seems to fit our theoretical 
framework pretty well. 
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The German system is unique. As Conradt describes it: 
'The Federal Republic is a complex political system characterized by the presence of several power 
centers. The national executive with its control over the civil service initiates the brood outlines of 
policy, but it cannot secure the approval of its policy proposals or their implementation without at 
least the tacit support of other actors in the political system: the major interest groups, the extra-
parliamentary organisations of the governing parties, the back benchers in the legislature, the states, 
the semi-public institutions such as the Bundesbank, and even the opposition party when it has a 
majority of the delegates in the Bundesrat' (Conradt 2001: 270-71). 
Hence, to understand and predict German policy in the Balkans it is necessary 
to examine the actions and the norms of the participating actors. This is important 
because through the examination ofthe actors' responses and the way in which the 
system takes its decisions, it is possible to explain both the actions of Germany in the 
western Balkans, and assess whether these actions are hegemonic. It allows us as 
well, to define the German politico-economic elite, which will be the basis of our 
framework. 
Such a decentralized system with so many different actors in the political 
spectrum involves a policy network in the framework of 'cooperative federalism'. 
This term describes German federalism, which focuses on achieving common 
standards among the Ltinder (Le. constituent states) by reducing their disparities and 
diversities and involves 'the interdependence and compromise-orientation between 
the federal level and the Uinder/Bundesrat' (Jeffery 2003: 38-42). The process of 
compromise and consensus-building between the institutions and 'sectoral 
corporatism' defines the institutional setting of German policy-making, which is 
characterised by linkages between economic interests and institutions within that 
decentralised structure (Padgett et 01. 2003: 3-4). Particularly, within 'sectoral 
corporatism' Germany's political actors typically preserve lasting and working 
relationships with private actors. Therefore, the system's policy outcomes lead to 
incremental changes, through negotiations and compromises within this setting 
(Freund and Rittberger 2001: 97; Sturm 2003; Conradt 2001: 271). For these reasons 
Germany has been described as a consensus democrocy (see Burkhart and Lehnert 
2008). 
From a neo-Gramscian perspective the connection is rather obviollS. The neo-
Gramscian model requires the cooperation of economic and political actors, with 
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both participating within the same Historic Bloc and with one underpinning the other. 
In this sense the German institutional setting fits perfectly because of the connection 
between public and private actors. Moreover, from the moment that this 
cooperation is formal and long-lasting, it allows us to treat them as one elite, i.e. the 
German elite and as such to establish it within the Bloc. 
It is worth mentioning that between private and public actors, the division is 
also expressed in terms of power. The former are more influential and active in 
economic matters, where their representation is stronger, and the latter are 
stronger in the political field. Consequently, the outcome of policy-making is based 
on balances and on consensus between different interests and on the balance of 
power in each of the policy domains, within a decentralised network of political 
power (Sturm 2003: 103-4; Hyde-Price 2000: 33-34). The extent of this lobby's power 
is also reflected in international agreements. Particularly in cases where German 
economic interests are opposed, the Chancellor tries to 'impose'. the necessary 
adjustments (see Crawford 2007). For instance, German interests in relation to 
Russia encouraged the construction of a pipeline between Russia and Germany, 
which bypasses Poland and the Baltic states and which was at the time against US 
preferences (The Economist 2008b:45) 
The representation of economic interests by the political world in the 
international arena is pressed even more rigorously by the current grand coalition 
between the two main political parties namely the Sozialdemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands (SPD) and Christlich Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union 
(CDU/CSU). This is based on the traditional link between CDU and German industry, 
which is represented by the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie e.V (BDI), as 
well as through the SPD via more neo-liberal channels as exemplified by Schroder's 
Neue Mitte (see Alien 2006). Indications of the above are numerous such as the case 
with the dispute between the German government and the European Commission 
about the former's 'state aid' protection for Volkswagen (Bryant 2008). 
In relation to this thesis, Germany is expected to be more active in pursuing 
national economic interests abroad, which in the Balkans can derive from the 
pressure of economic interests. In addition, it is becoming obvious that at the 
moment the basic economic ideology in Germany is neo-liberalism. This is expressed 
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and practised by Germany within the context of ordo-liberal theory (see below). The 
executive, therefore, is something that we have to take into account in the analysis 
as the promoter of certain policies and because it has the role of representing 
Germany within the EU and thus exercises influence from there as well. Speaking 
about links with political entities, the BDI is traditionally closer to the CDU/CSU but, 
during the Schriider government, it was well treated by the SPD's generally more 
business friendly policies (Conradt 2001: 133-35; Leaman 2004: 157). Hence, we can 
expect the political promotion of economic interests in foreign policy including in 
western Balkan states. 
After the description of the public elite, we turn now to th~ economic elite, 
which is best exemplified by the BDI. The BDI is most effective in lobbying at the 
political level and focuses on the government's economic policies in Germany but 
also on the international economic arena. It has powerful resources as a lobby and 
can influence legislation from committee stage to implementation level. It has an 
extensive research department that supplies information to its member associations 
and to societal actors like the media, schools and universities. The BDI has a distinct 
economic ideology, which is neo-liberal in orientation. Its lobbying towards the state 
policy thus reflects strong neo-liberal preferences (see Butterwegge et al. 2007). This 
is partly motivated by the simple fact that German industry is heavily dependent on 
foreign trade and thus favours any policy towards liberalisation of the local and 
global economy (Freund 2001: 242). 
As was mentioned, the interactions between state and interest groups are an 
embedded element of German political tradition and values. This very tradition and 
structure along with the consensus policy style of the political parties, and the 
structure of the Federal Republic, have all combined to make interest groups 
decisive actors in the policy-making process (Conradt 2001: 131). 
The successful interaction of economic interest groups in the policy-making 
process takes place through representation in parliament and a strong position in 
the bargaining process. These two elements provide them with the necessary tools 
to influence legislation. This can be done by the mobilisation of their parliamentary 
representatives or through their strong links with the ministerial bureaucracy 
(Conradt 2001: 131, 206). According to von Beyme almost 70% of ministerial 
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personnel have strong links with interest groups (von Beyme 2002: 29). Indicative of 
this is the fact that the process of pre-decision-making involves negotiation within a 
triangular network of politicians, civil servants and interest groups representatives, 
with the last two forming a powerful network themselves (von Beyme 2002: 29, 34). 
On the basis of the above-mentioned remarks, we can confidently expect the 
German political class to promote German economic interests. In addition, this 
connection between political and economic actors fits our theoretical model since 
we can add them to an Historic Bloc as the German elite and as one group within 
that group to use them in the analysis. The business groups have the resources and 
the expertise in lobbying at both domestic and EU level. Subsequently they can 
significantly influence German and EU economic policy towards the Balkans, in such 
a way that we can claim that it facilitates and promotes their interests. Such 
influence can happen through reforms, investments and more indirect actions such 
as military participation, 'democratic' institution-building and EU presence. These 
indirect actions provide stability and security for investment. later in the case 
studies this cooperation will become more apparent. 
Hence, so far the political/public actors are seen to be undertaking the 
promotion and protection of German economic interests abroad with the chancellor 
as the central actor in economic diplomacy. Another example is the role of Merkel in 
the current economic crisis and her robust defence of German interests. From the 
other side, economic interests support the political actors and at the same time (as 
will be demonstrated) are used as tools of foreign policy. 
After viewing the actors of the German politico-economic setting, it is necessary 
to define the economic ideology of the German system. We are 'trying to 
demonstrate that it is the hegemonic ideology and therefore that there is a case for 
asserting German hegemony in the westem Balkans. This is the task of Chapter 2. 
For the moment it is useful to examine this ideology. 
1.8.2. German economic ideology. 
Germany is a coordinated market economy, with market forces coexisting with 
interventionist economic institutions. Cooperative relations between firms are 
formed in the framework of corporate share holding where a company (often a bank) 
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is a shareholder in another company including non-banks. However, in the last 
decade the Anglo-Saxon model has been gaining ground in the German economy18. 
Moreover, the system has an export-orientation of high-quality industrial products 
that is based on highly skilled labour and technological excellence. The international 
orientation of the economy becomes visible from its position as the biggest exporter 
in the world (Padgett 2003; Crawford 2007). 
The German model can also be described as managed capitalism or as a 
coordinated market economy, which is based on the ordo-liberal school of thought. 
In fact, there are two opposing economic theories which coexist, according to Dyson 
and Padgett, in the system and constitute the German model, or 'model Germany' 
according to chancellor Schmidt (Dyson 2002: 135, Padgett 2003: 122, 125). The 
dominant party in early years of the Federal Republic, the CDU, summarizes the role 
of the state in the economy in its seminal party programme of 1949: after the 
establishment of a competitive market order with the help of monopoly control: 
'the state is .. .freed from the worry of central direction. There remains the task oJ making and 
protecting the law, of encouraging competition and organising monetary affairs' (quoted in: Leaman 
2009:xvi). 
The theory of ordo-liberalism belongs to the neo-classical economic school. The 
theory supports, apart from the general neo-liberal ideas of the free operation of the 
market, the view that the state has only to provide the framework for economic 
activity and to supervise it in order to protect normal operations and competition. In 
addition, the state exercises fiscal poliCies of balanced budgets as part of the process 
of achieving a stable macro-economic environment. Monetary policy is conducted by 
an independent central bank that is focused on monetary stability and low inflation 
(Dyson 2002: 141, 126). The independent central bank is a core element of 
Germany's ordo-liberal economic order. 
This bank in Germany is the Bundesbank, established in 1958, which has been 
subsequently used as the blueprint for the European Central Bank (ECB). Ordo-
liberalism is evident also in the social aspects of the German system, since the 
executive is only a neutral arbitrator where employment relations in the broad sense 
18 Even though under the effects of the current financial crisis we are witnessing a reverse process. 
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are conducted through processes of bilateral bargaining between employers and 
employees (see Leaman 2009: Introduction). 
The German model has an orientation towards exports and Germany is a 
powerful trading state and as such is dependent on exports for material prosperity. 
This compels it to support the'liberalisation of world trade, which entails the 
necessity to lobby for this goal within the EU and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (Cole 2001: 57). As a trading state its economic supremacy underpins its 
political influence in the global arena, which weighs heavily upon the strategies of its 
neighbours. This becomes apparent in its foreign trade policy. This policy comprises 
all public measures taken in order to influence foreign trade. German foreign trade 
policy is both multilateral and bilateral within the framework promoted by the EU 
and the WTO. Germany conducts a dynamic set of bi-Iateral relationships with other 
states involving export credit guarantees and assistance with ml etc. 
German foreign trade policy is further enhanced through the EU, which 
amplifies its trade power through EU trade links and the Union's weight in 
international negotiations. At the same time Germany appears able to dominate the 
EU itself and thus to exploit the current economic setting of the EU for its own 
benefit. The biggest example of the influence of German economic preferences is 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), which was devised and based on the German 
model. Even though in Chapter 2 the role of Germany in EMU is analysed, we need 
to note two things here. Firstly, the stable prices and currencies that EMU offers 
favour those states that base their economic machinery on exports. Secondly, the 
single market of the EU provides German companies with the playing field to 
compete and gain the largest share ofthe EU market (Crawford 2007). 
1.9. Concluding remarks. 
The aim of this chapter was to present the theoretical framework that we will apply 
to the rest of the thesis and to outline how this application will take place. This 
theory is neo-Gramscianism as was defined firstly by Cox. This theory seems to fit 
best with the kind of hegemony that we want to research, namely a politico-
economic hegemony at elite level. However, we had to conduct certain 
60 
modifications in order to make this theoretical approach completely compatible with 
our aims. This makes the application novel. 
In addition, -we try to provide a valid justification for the choice of the neo-
Gramscian theory against other relevant theories, where the main reason is the use 
of elites within a politico-economic framework instead of a more statist approach 
which employs theoretical structures concerned with the balance of power. 
Nevertheless, there is one remaining issue that has to be addressed before being 
in a position to apply the theory in the case studies. This has to do with the role of 
the EU as the hegemonic institution that acts as the main tool for the consolidation 
of hegemony. This is the theme of the following chapter. 
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Chapter 2: The role of the EU in German hegemony in 
the Balkans. 
2.1. Introduction. 
As was mentioned in Chapter 1, because ofthe nature ofthe neo-Gramscian theory, 
we have to identify a hegemonic group, which has a distinct hegemonic ideology and 
which uses its own institutions to promote this ideology. In this chapter, we will try 
to conclude the theoretical framework by answering one crucial question, namely 
whether the EU is the vehicle for the promotion of hegemonic ideas or whether the 
EU is an independent actor in the western Balkans19. More specifically, the main aim 
in this chapter is to justify the claim that EU is a channel for and expression of 
potential hegemony, used by elites to achieve their aims. These elites as was 
suggested in Chapter 1 are the politico-economic elites of the member states and 
particularly the German elite as well as the representatives of the transnational and 
particularly regional European capital that interact with the EU and the Balkans. 
The question is crucial, because EU membership is the biggest national target 
of all western Balkan states and because the EU as a result is the source of norms 
and values which influence these countries. The EU would also seem to be the main 
source of policies that these states are implementing and which are shaping their 
politic07economic life. At the same time, EU policy in the Balkans has been largely 
shaped by the preferences of its member states, with Germany one of the most 
prominent actors shaping EU enlargement policy. The reference to enlargement 
policy is crucial because, as will be shown, it is the main policy through which the EU 
is operating in the western Balkans. Overall, we have to clarify whether EU policy is 
an extension of member states' preferences (mainly of German preferences) or 
whether the EU as a bureaucratic autonomous actor is acting independently or 
whether it is a bit of both. Moreover, trying to avoid an overexpansion of the issue of 
EU governance, which is not central for this thesis, we will focus on enlargement 
J9 We have to clarify that in this chapter we will refer to the whole Balkans. However, after the 
accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the part of the Balkans which remains outside the EU is the 
western part. Thus, in this chapter the terms western Balkans and Balkans will mean the same thing, 
namely the Balkan st"tes which remain outside the W. 
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policy which is the one that most affects the western Balkans. This chapter begins 
with a presentation of EU policy in the Balkans in an effort to demonstrate the 
influence of the EU in the region, as well as the rationale of this policy. Then we will 
see which actors have the upper hand in this policy domain and thus whether the 
claim that the EU is the channel for the promotion of member state elites' 
preferences is valid. Then we will refer to the role of Germany in both the EU and in 
EU enlargement in order to depict those elements that can justify the claim that 
Germany is the leader of EU enlargement. The justification· of our aims in this 
chapter will be based on an attempt to demonstrate that the EU has an ideology 
which it is promoting in the Balkans and which is the ideology of member states 
(preferably of Germany), and that the formation of EU enlargement policy is an 
action driven by a particular member state. 
2.2. EU policy in the western Balkans. 
Western Europe began to interact in the Balkans with the expulsion of Yugoslavia 
from the Communist Bloc in 1948, which was shortly followed by the establishment 
of diplomatic and economic relations (Crampton 2002: 108). The EEC strategy had 
been to reward every state that wanted to be more independent of the Eastern Bloc, 
and in Yugoslavia the reward was in the form of economic relations such as joint 
ventures between western and Yugoslav businesses and diplomatic relations. In fact, 
Yugoslavia was not considered to be an enemy of the West and this mutual amity 
reached a climax with the trade agreement of 1968. 
Yugoslavia was one of the founding members of the IMF and has been assisted 
by the Fund with substantial aid. However, the policy measures that followed this 
assistance, created a number of economic problems that triggered Yugoslavia's 
disintegration. Particularly, the reform of economic structures and state planning, 
demanded by the IMF in the 1980s, helped to disrupt the Yugoslav economy. 
Moreover, the accumulated· debt raised social tensions and stimulated the 
nationalist moves towards secession, since the rich republics of Croatia and Slovenia 
had, in the old system of fiscal federalism, to pay the others as part of Tito's regional 
compact relating to economic modernisation (Sedelmeier and Wallace: 431; Gervasi 
1993). 
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The imposed reforms and the enhanced politico-economic approach towards 
Yugoslavia of the late 1980s and early 1990s, was consistent with the wider policy of 
the western bloc (under the Reagan doctrine) towards Eastern Europe, as depicted 
in the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 54 of 1982 as well as in the NSDD 
133 of 1984 according to which Yugoslavia was the key to the West's strategy for the 
destabilisation of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe (The White House 1982; 1984). 
Furthermore, the paper describes the policy towards Yugoslavia as follows: 'US 
policy will be promoted the trend (sic) toward an effective, market-oriented 
Yugoslav economic structure ... to expand US economic relations with Yugoslavia in 
ways which benefit both countries and which strengthen Yugoslavia's ties with the 
industrialised democracies' (The White House 1984). In the meantime, contacts 
between member .states and countries of the western Balkans were already 
established, such as at the London conference in 1951 where France, England and 
USA agreed to provide annual financial aid to Yugoslavia in order to carry out its 
reforms (Crampton 2002: 118). 
At this point it is worth mentioning that the EEC was also to a certain degree 
responsible for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, since according to Zimmermann, it 
can be argued that Europe dragged the US policy into the Balkans (due to its failure 
to solve the crisis),. while with its statements it convinced Bosnia, Croatia and 
Slovenia that they should leave the federation in exchange for economic aid 
(Zimmerman 1996). 
A more active EU approach towards the Balkans has emerged with the 
beginning of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian wars coincided with 
the establishment of the Community as the EU, with its three-pillar structure20• 
Furthermore, the extent of the aggressiveness and of the atrocities of the Yugoslav 
crisis shocked the Europeans who, with the establishment of a common foreign and 
security policy, intervened, initially at the diplomatic level, in order to stop the 
hostilities. Joscha Fischer for example, admitted that Srebrenica had changed the 
German approach towards the Balkans because it was a blow for a society that has 
strong norms directed against the abuse of human rights and against actions that 
20 These are: 1. European Community; 2. Common Foreign and Security Policy and 3. Police and 
Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters. 
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resemble the NAZI era and its atrocities (see Rathbun 2004: lOG), something that 
was true for many of the EU member states. The intervention was supported by the 
US, which had been reluctant up to that point, and was marked by the (in)famous 
statement of the Luxembourg foreign minister and chairman of the General Affairs 
Council (GAC), Jacques Poos, that 'this is the hour of Europe, not the hour of the 
Americans' (pinder 2001: 134; Smith K. 2005: 275). 
The events in Vugoslavia are known. What is interesting, however, is that with 
the US intervention not only was the Bosnian war ended, but with the Dayton 
Accords of 21 November 1995, the EU began to link its Balkan policy with the EU 
enlargement policy. Before Day ton the EU response was targeted mainly at crisis 
management, reconstruction and development assistance, totalling €5.5bn in 
assistance programmes21 (European Union 2001; Kotios 2001: 241). Thus the non-
Yugoslav, Balkan states (i.e. Romania, Bulgaria and Albania) entered the Poland-
Hungary: Aid for the Reconstruction of Economies (PHARE) programme which the 
new republics of Yugoslavia joined later, except for Serbia-Montenegro, which was . 
excluded due to pressure on the Milosevic regime (pinder 2001: 129; Stability Pact 
200Gb; Kotios 2001: 239). Furthermore, from that moment, the European 
Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and international organisations like IMF and the World Bank became involved. 
In the post-Day ton period, important roles have been played by international 
donors, such as the Paris Club, while the Contact Group has reached important post-
war settlements. The Contact Group was created during the Bosnian war in the 
spring of 1994, with four members from the EU (i.e. Germany, UK, France and Italy) 
and with the EU joining later as a single actor. During the Bosnian war the Contact 
Group had worked for a peace-solution and post-war settlement. The actions of the 
Contact Group brought about the Dayton agreement and since then established the 
Group as an active actor in Balkan affairs (see US Department of State 2005). In the 
Dayton negotiations it was also decided that the EU would undertake the main cost 
of reconstruction and stabilisation, something that. was first made explicit by the 
statement of the EU high Representative, Mr. Carl Bildt, in Dayton on 1 November 
21 During 1991-1997 the EU spent €17 billion in the region. 
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1995 (Gadner-Feldman 2001: 3; Pradetto 2004: 214; Office of the High 
Representative 2006). 
The post-Day ton era made the European Union realise that any stabilisation 
strategy should include the whole of the western Balkans. The Regional Approach 
was launched in order to underpin the implementation of the Dayton/Paris 
agreements and to bring stability and prosperity to the region. This was supposed to 
happen through the establishment of closer contractual ties with the target 
countries conditional on their willingness to cooperate amongst each other on all 
fronts (European Commission 2004b; 2006a; Welfens 2001: 34; Bechev 2006: 32). In 
particular, the Regional Approach was decided after the Rome conference of 
February 17-18, 1996, which had consolidated the peace accords with the hope of 
setting the basis for a process of lasting stability and good neighbourly relations in 
the region. This was expected through full compliance with the peace accords which 
is intended to provide development through the cooperation of the states (European. 
Commission 2006a; 2004b). The Regional Approach had applied conditionality to the 
western Balkans taking the special nature of each country's individual situatron into 
account while the conclusion of these agreements depended on the willingness of 
the countries concerned to work towards consolidating peace and to respect human 
rights, the rights of minorities and democratic principles (European Council 1996; 
1997). In this decision, we have to locate the role of Germany that sees EU 
integration as a means for establishing regional security (Pradetto 2004: 211). 
The conditionality clause was finally adopted after the Commission's strategy 
paper of 24 February 1997 GAC, followed by other measures that are still in force 
today (European Council 1997). These measures were autonomous. trade 
preferences, financial assistance, economic cooperation and contractual relations 
which we will analyse later. Conditionality is important for the analysis because it 
'secures' the candidate states within a set of rules and reforms that they have to 
follow. Conditionality means that those states that are progressing faster on the 
implementation of reforms are going to sign agreements with the EU first. This 
process was designed to encourage the states to implement reforms but in practice 
it confines the actions of the candidate states to a framework which is setby the EU. 
As Grabbe notes, conditionality is a powerful tool that promotes the Europeanisation 
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of the candidate state, which has to implement the whole acquis (Grabbe 2003). 
Therefore, in relation to this thesis, conditionality can be seen as another tool for the 
consolidation of hegemony over the western Balkan states. 
The current shape of the EU approach in the region is an outcome of the 
Kosovo war and its aftermath. During the war the EU took an active position, but in 
contrast with its actions in Bosnia, has accepted US leadership (Crampton 2002:276; 
Smith K. 2005:284-285). The Contact Group played an important role in the 
settlement while the. EU undertook the cost of post-war reconstruction. It was 
decided then that Kosovo would become an international protectorate under the 
auspices of the UN. In addition, during the interim period the UN mission, namely 
the United Nations Mission Kosovo (UNMIK), undertook the administration of the 
province in accordance with UN 1244 resolution (Crampton 2002: 275). The EU from 
the first moment declared its willingness to cooperate closely with UNMIK and it did 
so, while, according to the final agreement, once independent the EU would 
undertake Kosovo's administration (Woehrel and Kim 2003: 44, 49; Welfens 2001: 5). 
Indeed the EU force undertook the control of Kosovo, with the European Union Rule 
of Law (EULEX) mission, after the declaration of Kosovo's independence on 17 
February 2008. The aftermath of the Kosovo war brought rapid changes in the EU 
approach towards the region, and helped to formalise EU policies. It became 
apparent that the EU needed 'a policy based on a combination of integration into its 
structures and cooperation at the SEE level' (Bechev 2006: 34). 
Hence, as became clear at the Lisbon European Council of 2000, the main tools 
for the stabilisation and integration of the western Balkans into the EU would be the 
Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) and the SPSEE. At the Lisbon summit, it 
was also stated that the western Balkans represented a strategic priority for the EU 
(European Council 2000; European Parliament 2000). 
The Pact was initiated in 199&, but the Kosovo war (Stability Pact 2006b; 
Welfens 2001: 34), had accelerated its implementation and in the Cologne European 
Council in June 1999 the definitions and the actions of the Pact22 were adopted. The 
Pact is a novel initiative that combines leading states with international 
22 Paragraphs 71-77 of the presidency conclusions. 
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organisations within a networked approach. Among its general guidelines it was the 
will of the EU to assume the leadership and to appoint the special coordinator of the 
Pact, while it made it clear that it would help the countries ofthe region to fulfil the 
goals of the Pact and that it would cooperate with the IMF, the World Bank and 
bilateral donors, with the special coordinator playing an important role (European 
Council 1999a; Welfens 2001: 29). The Pact was formally adopted on 10 June 1999 at 
the Cologne Council (Stability Pact 2006b; European Council 1999a: 25). In that 
founding declaration the Pact defined its principles and objectives that can be 
summarised in the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights, economic 
reforms and long-lasting stability in South Eastern Europe (SEE) region, while it also 
defined its instruments and the role of the participant members (European Council 
. 1999b). 
The Pact took its final shape in Sarajevo on 30 July 1999 (Stability Pact 1999; 
European Commission 2004b). Some of the interesting elements of the Pact, apart 
from the provisions for cooperation between international actors, are the 
framework of transatlantic cooperation and the Kosovo solution as a basic element 
of the Pact's success and effective cooperation and the concentration of almost all 
actions on Balkan cooperation (Welfens 2001: 30). What is worthy of note is that, 
while the Pact started as a separate presence in the SEE, it ended up after 2001 as 
complementary to the SAP (Bechev 2006: 38). The Pact arguably reflects Germany's 
desire to lead developments in the Balkans with the further aim of consolidating its 
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interests in the region (Pradetto 2004; Welfens 2001). In particular, 
'After the Balkan region had been stabilized with the leadership and support of the United States, the 
EU indicated with its stabilisation Pact for South-Eastern Europe that it considered itself the political 
authority qualified to determine the future of the Balkans, premised on the conviction that prospects 
for peaceful coexistence and the prevention of further violent conflict could only be. secured through a 
long-term commitment and the establishment of civil structures ... The Germans had initiated the 
Stabilisation Pact for South-Eastern Europe even before the end of Kosovo war, and under their 
leadership, the EU accepted a political role that complemented the military one carried out by NATO in 
the settlement of the conflict' (Pradetto 2004: 214). 
At the Feira Council in 2000 the EU sent the political message to the countries of 
. south eastern Europe that they were not excluded from the enlargement process, 
and that they are recognised as potential members. Equally, a decisive moment for 
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the EU prospects of western Balkan states was the EU-Western Balkans summit of 
2000 in Zagreb. At this summit, both the EU and the SEECs confirmed their mutual 
commitments. This gave a boost to the SAP that subsequently became the leading 
strategy of the EU in the region (Bechev 2006: 36-37}. The final formalisation of the 
SAP arrived with the Thessaloniki and Madrid European summits of 2003. In 
particular, in Thessaloniki the EU adopted the Thessaloniki Agenda for the western 
Balkans which represents the road map for EU policy in the region, in which for the 
first time it is stated that: 'The Western Balkans and support to their preparation (sic) 
for future integration into European structures and ultimate membership into the 
Union is a high priority for the EU' (European Council 2003). Therefore, the aim of 
the EU became explicit, namely the future inclusion of these states into the EU, even 
though there is neither timetable nor guarantee of results due to conditionality and 
especially to the fourth Copenhagen Criterion (European Commission 2004a: 5). 
The Copenhagen Criteria were adopted by the Copenhagen European Council 
in June 1993. Their adoption was a response to the new environment after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and marked by German backing (see Sedelmeier and 
Wallace 2000). The European Council in Copenhagen urged the EU to fill the power 
gap in central and eastern Europe by 'absorbing' these states into the Union (see 
Smith K. 2005; Sedelmeier and Wallace 2000). The Criteria are (i) stable institutions 
(guarantee of democracy, rule of law, human rights, minority rights), (ii) functioning 
market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressures inside the EU, 
(iii) the ability to adopt the acquis; accepted aims of political, economic, and 
monetary union and (iv) the capacity of the EU to absorb new members without 
endangering the momentum of European integration (European Council 1993: 13). 
The Copenhagen Criteria are extremely important because they provided the ability 
to apply conditionality. Conditionality is the tool that motivates change in domestic 
, 
policies and institutions in order to meet EU standards, since each country is 
assessed on its merits (Glenn 2003: 216; Jileva 2004: 13; Welfens 2001: 34). 
It becomes obvious that the enlargement policy, which was described above, 
reaches into all aspects of the politico-economic life of a candidate state· for EU 
membership. Even foreign policy, that is the right of each state, is not fully free from 
the broad EU preferences, something that will become more explicit in the case 
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studies. At this point and as an introduction, it has to be noted that enlargement is 
the policy framework within which the EU is transmitting its ideology in such a 
manner that this ideology is received as common sense by the candidate states and 
thus it is the policy framework that helps the consolidation of hegemony. Moreover, 
enlargement by 'enforcing' the candidate states to implement the entire acquis 
leads to the Europeanization of domestic institutions and the promotion of its values 
to the population and this adds to the consent towards the hegemony (see Grabber 
. 2003; alsen 2002). Certainly, this claim has to be proved in this chapter as well as 
the contention that the specific mindset that theEU is transmitting in the region is 
hegemonic. 
Hence, turning to Balkan integration, the SAP is the framework of enlargement. 
It contains three components, namely the Stabilisation and Association Agreements 
(SAA), trade measures, and programmes of financial assistance, whilst the European 
Partnerships also have great importance. At the beginning the process aimed at 
reconstruction and crisis management, through an aid programme of €S.5billion, but 
now the priorities have changed to those of development and institution-building 
(e.g. democratisation) (European Commission 2004a: 5-6). In addition, the SAP 
follows three lines that are: 
The recognition that EU membership is the only efficient tool for reform and 
stability. 
The factthat bilateral relations between the countries are crucial for greater 
economic and political stability and 
A need for an approach that provides the necessary flexibility in order for 
each country to move towards EU membership at its own pace. 
The process also contains provisions such as intra regional trade and economic 
cooperation, democratisation, rule of law etc, and contributes to the work of the 
Stability Pact (European Commission 2003a; Bechev 2006: 36, 38; Welfens 2001: 33). 
Successful implementation of the SAP qualifies the country to sign a contractual 
agreement with the EU, which is one step from membership. These contracts are the 
SAA. The SAA aims to introduce the necessary politico-economic reforms into the 
candidate state in order to be in a position to absorb the acquis communitaire and 
thus to become an EU member state. Also important is that each agreement is 
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tailored to the needs of each country (European Commission 2004b). Finally, the 
successful completion of the SAA qualifies the state to move from 'potential 
candidate' to 'candidate status' that leads to the start of membership negotiations. 
Again it becomes apparent that the provisions of enlargement are directing the 
western Balkan states along a certain path that accommodates the preferences and 
interests ofthe EU and which ties these states into an EU web. 
In relation to trade, the EU introduced exceptional trade measures for the 
western Balkans in September 2000, providing the region with uniform and wide-
ranging free access to the Union's market for almost all goods. These measures, in 
combination with reconstruction assistance and the transition to a market economy, 
have boosted the exports of the region to the EU, its greatest trade partner 
(European Commission 2004a: 9; Bechev 2006: 36). The EU through strong 
assistance from the Pact has created a network of bilateral Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) among the western Balkan states (which were obliged to sign), and now all of 
them are part of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA). However, the 
SEE countries are running huge trade deficits with the EU, that betoken both the 
absence of an appropriate institutional and physical infrastructure and possible flaws 
in EU strategy. Finally, the assistance was provided by the Community Assistance for 
Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation (CARDS) programme. The 
programme ran between 2000 and 2006 with a budget of €5 billion. Its main targets 
were the reforms that are dictated by the SAA, notably, institution-building and 
administrative reforms. CARDS was followed by the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA), which gathers all the EU programmes in the region into one. 
Moreover, 10% of IPA funds is devoted to regional cooperation that is considered a 
central issue for the EU (Bechev 2006: 36; European Commission 2004a: 10-11; 
European Union 2001). 
In addition, the Thessaloniki agenda had also introduced the so-called 
European Partnerships. These Partnerships are based on assessments from annual 
Commission reports and identify short- and medium-term priorities that the 
countries have to adopt, reflecting in this way the particular level of development of 
each country. The implementation of these priorities, according to the EU, is based 
on political will and a substantial allocation of financial resources. Within that 
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framework the Commission monitors the progress of each state and penalises any 
non-agreed actions, usually by reducing the volume of economic assistance 
(European Commission 2004a: 5-6). 
Outside the SAP framework there are some other assistance tools, such as 
Macro-Financial Assistance (MFA) that provides grants and loans in cooperation with 
the IMF's suggestions. The MFA grants are provided only after IMF approval, which is 
given once the recipient state agrees to implement the reforms proposed by the 
Fund. Moreover, there is co-operation with the World Bank that implements joint 
actions with the IMF (European Commission 2004d: 6). The following table give us a 
more detailed picture: 
Table l' The main EU programmes in the western Balkans 
Programme Duration Budget 
CARDS 2000-2006 €S billion 
OBNOVA 1996-1999 €400 million 
PHARE 1990-1998 €562 million 
TAIEX 2003-2006 €10 million" 
MFA 1992-present €I billion 
IPA 2007-2013 €ll.S billion 
Source: European Umon. 
It is obvious that the EU assistance is substantial and constant and covers a 
wide range of activities but that it also focuses on institution-building and civil 
society. It is also useful here to note that the EU is the biggest provider as well as the 
coordinator for other international donors. Moreover, according to one of our 
interviewees, the proposed projects are implemented by this agency or by private 
contractors from big countries like Germany and Greece (Confidential Interview 1). 
This means that EU policy in the Balkans is offering profit opportunities to EU-based 
companies, since the projects are implemented by them and not by the recipient 
states. The reason that aid is mentioned is because it represents another of the EU's 
encouragement 'carrots'. The assistance is linked with reforms (either as 'no reforms, 
no assistance' or as direct aid for particular actions), which in turn contain a certain 
ideology and are aimed at certain interests. In addition, since an important part of 
the aid goes to institutional building and civil society it is normal to claim that the 
assistance is also aimed at gaining the assent of the population and in creating a pro-
23 The total budget is decided annually. 
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EU institutional framework that will be more committed to the EU and will operate 
with the norms and values of the EU. 
Hence, with EU enlargement policy and particularly with the conditionality 
clauses and the Copenhagen Criteria, it can safely be claimed, as postulated above, 
that the EU is 'controlling' or influencing almost every aspect of the politico-
economic life of candidate states in the western Balkans. In particular, the economic 
policies of candidate states correspond entirely to EU preferences since they have to 
comply with the Copenhagen economic Criteria. As regards the foreign and security 
policy of these states, the case of Serbia is indicative (see Chapter 3) of the 
implications where a candidate state pursues an approach opposing the EU in the 
international arena. Finally, the SAP contains policies that affect all the policy areas 
from environment and energy through to human rights. There is thus only a small 
proportion of policies that the Balkan states can implement independently without 
colliding with EU preferences. Furthermore, the EU policy of establishing regional 
agreements also create a web in which the candidate states are integrated with the 
EU and therefore 'forced' to follow the EU's preferences. What are also very 
important are the carrot-and-stick poliCies. The EU dictates policies and provides 
assistance while, in case of non-compliance, the EU· - which monitors the 
implementation of its programmes - is ready to impose penalties. On the other hand, 
the Balkan states have accepted this situation because of the prospect of 
membership and financial assistance, without, however, membership being 
completely certain. 
In relation to the existence of hegemony, the above presentation 
demonstrated that the EU is transmitting a certain set of reforms and policies in the 
region of the western Balkans, which reflect a neo-liberal mindset, such as the 
economic reforms and the creation of free trade regimes as tools of economic 
development. From the other side the western Balkan states are not only unable to 
resist but, with the prospect of future membership, are fully committed to the will of 
the EU. Therefore, at this point we can note that the role of the EU seems to match 
that of the hegemonic institution which, as was described in Chapter 1, is the 
mechanism which transmits the hegemonic ideology and gains the consent of 
society. Nevertheless, whether this similarity means that indeed the EU is the 
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hegemonic institution or not, we have firstly to demonstrate that the EU has a 
hegemonic ideology that is being transmitted and if so, who is using the EU as 
hegemonic institution. The answer to the latter will largely define who the 
hegemon/leader is. 
2.3. Actors in EU enlargement policy. 
After examining enlargement policy and its formulation, the next step is to define how it is 
operated and who has the upper hand, as this is defined by decisions, policy-formulation 
and ideological orientation. As was mentioned above, the focus is on enlargement policy 
because from the moment that this policy becomes the hegemonic framework, the actor(s) 
ti1at exercise influence in this framework is (are) first candidate(s) for being dubbed the 
hegemon. Thus, we will not expand on issues of Europeanisation and EU governance. 
Neverti1eless, we have to justify this decision by referring to what the term 
Europeanisationindicates. As Olsen noted in his seminal work on Europeanisation, 
the term contains many definitions and many applications which often change in 
relation to the framework of research of the time (Olsen 2002). Hence, scholars like. 
lawton (1999) and Biirzel (1999) stress the transfer of sovereignty or policy making 
from national authorities to the European Union institutions. ladrech follows the 
opposite path and defines Europeanisation as incremental process of policy making 
to the degree that the European dynamics become part of the logic of the national 
political . structures (ladrech 1994:69), while Buller and Gamble as the 
transformation of the domestic politics in accordance-to European modes of 
governance (Buller and Gamble 2002). In our opinion the most concrete definition is 
provided by Radaelli as a sum 
'of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, 
procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ways of doing things and shared beliefs and norms which are 
first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic 
(national and sub national) discourse, political structures and public policies' (Radael/i 2000). 
On the same manner the term is used in various functions. Most popular in 
scholarship is the view from the point of power transfer to the EU from national 
authorities and the reverse down loading of Community norms and rules to national 
and sub-national levels of governance (see Bulmer and Radaelli 2004; ladrech 1994; 
Buller and Gamble 2002; Schmidt 2001). The popularity of this field could be 
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explained by the fact that at the beginning the term aimed to cope with the changes 
inside the EEC/EU and on its member states (Anastasakis 2005:78; Bulmer and 
Radaelli 2004). alsen has separated the different aspects of Europeanisation into five 
domains. These are: 
• 'Europeanisation as changes in external territorial boundaries': this aspect 
refers to expansion of EU models through enlargement 
• 'Europeanisation as the development of institutions of governance at the 
European level': namely political coordination and cooperation and forms of 
collective action 
• 'Europeanisation as central penetration of national and sub national systems 
of governance': which refers to the division of powers and responsibilities 
within different levels of governance 
• 'Europeanisation as exporting forms of political organisation and governance 
that are typical and distinct for Europe and beyond the European territory': 
this aspect refers to the export of EU norms and models outside its borders 
• 'Europeanisation as a political project aiming at a unified and politically 
stronger Europe': which refers to the homogenisation of the Union and its 
development into more federal structures (Olsen 2002:3). 
Equally, Bulmer and Radaelli define three forms of Europeanisation namely: i) 'the 
impact of European policy within member states'; ii) the role of norms and values 
and; iii) as a process that derives from different stages of policy making such as 
policy formulation and implementation (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004). 
As it is obvious for this thesis the only aspect of Europeanisation that seems 
relevant is the one of the export of EU norms and modes of governance through the 
enlargement process. In fact, Bulmer and Radaelli have described the enlargement 
as the best example of Europeanisation Since the candidate state is receiving all the 
institutional and normative aspects of the Union (Bulmer and Radaelli 2004). Olsen 
views the enlargement as normative change but with compulsory action (Olsen 
2002). Anastasakis describes this process, with focus on the Balkans, 'as an 
increasingly demanding, externally driven, and coercive process of domestic and 
regional change brought about by the EU' (Anastasakis 2005:77). He goes even 
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further to describe that the Balkans are viewing the enlargement as the 
westernisation of their countries, with the term westernisation to translate as 
progress (Anastasakis 2005: 80) . 
. What are also not hard to figure out are the reasons for not pursuing the issue 
of Europeanisation further. Firstly, our theoretical perspective is different. 
Europeanisation mostly used for showing the European dynamics compare to other 
forms of governance (see Olsen 2002). However, for this thesis the interest is not on 
how the EU is transforming the local societies both culturally and politically in 
accordance to EU norms and rules, but whether the EU poliCies are creating a 
framework for economic control and hegemony. In other words we are looking the 
relation between Balkans and the EU from a primary economic point of view. Within 
this framework enlargement is a tool and the export of EU models and norms a part 
of it. Another reason has to do with the role of Germany. For this thesis, Germany 
has an important role is shaping the policy and taking advantage from it. In that case 
a deeper analysis of Europeanisation forces would conflict with the role of Germany 
because it would mean the Germanisation of the EU and indirectly the 
Europeanisation of the Balkans. Furthermore, as scholars such as Radaelli, Olsen, 
Bulmer, admit is very hard to prove that changes are sole result of Europeanisation 
from the moment that globalisation and actors such as US and Russia are having 
influence in the region. To this we can add the imperfect adoption of EU rules by the 
Balkan states (more in later chapters) which according to the relevant scholarship, is 
diluting the impact of EU (Bulmer and Radaelli 2005; Anastasakis 2005). Hence, even 
though Europeanisation offers interesting ways of research, an expansion on that 
field it will take us away from our central pOSition. Nevertheless, is part of the 
explanatory framework since it is embedded in conditionality and thus it represents 
a supportive but not central element on the issue of hegemony. 
Turning again on enlargement, it could be argue that it certainly has 
supranational and intergovernmental elements and therefore we have to clarify the 
actors. Specifically, if we demonstrate that the member states are those that control 
enlargement policy, then the role of the EU is that of the institution that promotes 
the interests of its member states. In different cases, the EU becomes another actor 
that participates in the hegemony. 
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Put simply, Pinder describes the enlargement process as follows: 
'When an application is received, the Council asks the Commission for its 'Opinion', on the basis of 
which the Council may, unanimously, approve a mandate for negotiations. The Commission negotiates, 
supervised by the Council; and an eventual treaty of accession has to be adopted by unanimity In the 
Council and with the assent of the Parliament, followed by ratification in all member states' (Pinder 
2001: 124) . 
. The history of enlargement as well as the current process of enlargement 
demonstrates a complex interaction between the Commission and the Council. The 
Commission with its expertise has been able to assume a leading role in managing 
enlargement (Sedelmeier and Wallace 2000). This has been possible so far because 
the Commission is the institution that interacts with the candidate states and 
monitors the implementation of the agreed reforms (Smith 2002). Actually, the 
Commission carries out the negotiations and the enlargement as such and is 
responsible for issuing progress reports and opinions. We have also to add that the 
Commission is the institution that has taken the political initiative so far, like the 
Action Plan on Enlargement. The Agenda 2000 and even the Copenhagen Criteria 
were also an outcome of the Commission's work and advice to the Council (see 
Sedelmeier and Wallace 2000; Smith K. 2005). 
Despite its importance, the Commission negotiates on behalf of the Council and 
the Council is the one that decides to enforce or not the enlargement strategy (see 
Sedelmeier and Wallace 2000; Smith K. 2005). The Council has the last word on 
which candidate will enter the Union. For instance, FYR Macedonia's membership is 
under threat of the Greek veto (see Chapter 4); Serbia's membership depends on the 
removal of, Dutch reservations (see Chapter 3). In the previous enlargement, 
Germany was in favour of the.easterl) members and France in favour of southern, 
with Greece advancing the case for Cyprus. The bargain between Germany and 
France is emblematic, with the latter gaining the candidacy of Romania for 
concessions in the Eastern enlargement and particularly Poland (see Hendriks and 
Morgan 2001: 152). The member states are those who adopt the strategy that the 
Commission proposes and they set the broad guidelines of the strategy according to 
their preferences (see Smith K. 2005; Smith 2002). Of course some member states 
play a more crucial role than others. If we view the evolution of the fifth 
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enlargement (1 May 2004) and sixth enlargement (1 January 2007) as well as the 
evolution of the western Balkan integration, then we will end up seeing that most of 
the decisions were adopted under EU presidencies that had a strong interest in 
enlargement. These states are Germany, along with Austria, Greece and Italy. 
It is obvious that the member states, through the Council have the final word 
on enlargement policy. The role of the Commission is to carry out the member state 
decisions and to deal with the implementation of the requested reforms. Therefore, 
the Commission, and thus the EU, acts as the hegemonic institution that promotes 
the preferences of the member states, in this policy domain. This conclusion is 
reinforced by the particular issues of EU member states in the Balkans. For instance, 
Greece has problems with FYR Macedonia; Netherlands demands the arrest of 
Mlandic before allowing Serbia to enter (Confidential Interview 7); Italy supports 
Albania; Austria is concerned about the fourth Criterion (Confidential Interview 2); 
Germany is particularly in favour of Croatia; and the majority of the other member 
states are either indifferent or just concerned about the overall value and the need 
. for further enlargement. Therefore, the decision as to which state shall enter the EU 
is political and the outcome of political interaction among the member states that 
reflect which states are more interesting in the western Balkan enlargement and 
thus which have more interest in influencing this policy. 
2.4. EU and neo-Gramscianhegemony. 
The next step that we have to take is to show whether the EU is used as a hegemonic 
institution in the Balkans with some (if not all) EU member states as the members of 
the Historic Bloc. Once again the term 'states' refers to their politico-economic elites. 
In the previous section, we made the case that particular member states have the 
upper hand in enlargement. Now we have to show three more things if we want to 
illustrate that the EU is the hegemonic institution, and first, whether the EU has a 
distinct hegemonic ideology. Then we have to demonstrate whether this ideology is 
of the EU as a whole or an ideology of a particular member state and especially, in 
our case, of Germany. The third step is to show whether EU policies in the western 
Balkans, deliberately reflect the interests of certain member state(s) or are policies 
that have as their only purpose the normal transition and the final integration of the 
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western Balkan states into the EU. For this step, we have to study not only the 
facilitation of economic penetration, or the disciplining of local elites towards the 
hegemonic idea, but also the degree to which the EU as the primary hegemonic 
institution is ensuring the consent and the discipline of the domestic elites and 
subaltern classes. This is because the management of consent is the basic element 
for establishing hegemony and a basic function of a hegemonic institution. 
2.4.1. EU and hegemonic ideologv. 
It is more than obvious that the EU has a distinctive neo-liberal mindset as· this is 
apparent from the EMU and Maastricht arrangements (Gill 1998; Bieler 2003). The 
EMU conditions such as the focus on low inflation and budget deficits which are 
measures directly linked to the measurement ofthe money supply and to monetarist 
. theory. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is monetarist in nature, with provisions 
such as the close-ta-balance government budget clause and reductions in public 
spending, in order to avoid inflationary pressures from increased money supply. EU 
·neo-liberalism is obvious in the EU directives concerning competition and the 
deregulation and liberalisation of national markets with the establishment of the 
free flow of labour, goods and services (Bieler 2003; Gill 1998; Gowan 1995; 
Rothschild 2009). 
These policies are even more obvious and intense in the western Balkans, 
which are still on the transition road and are candidate (or potential candidate) 
states. Thus, as becomes obvious when looking at the Copenhagen Criteria or by 
reading one of the annual progress reports of the EU concerning a candidate state, 
that the EU proposes wide scale privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation as well 
as markets that are completely open to international trade. As we will discuss later in 
the case studies, the EU is very strict about the implementation of these reforms and 
is assisted in this regard by other International Financial Institutions (iFls) with 
similar agendas such as the IMF and the World Bank. In particular, the IMF has been 
frequently criticised as extremely neo-liberal (see Stiglitz 2002), while for Gill the IMF, 
DECD and G7 are responsible for the restructuring of the state civil society activity of 
the European Union within a neo-liberal framework (Gill 1998: 8). In all cases the 
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'neo-Iiberal reforms are linked to assistance and to membership as in the case of the 
EU. 
But how different is EU neo-liberalism from global neo-liberalism (i.e. as 
exercised by the US) which since 1990s has prevailed as the global economic 
doctrine. Can we claim the existence of the specific hegemonic ideology that is 
transmitted by the EU? 
For some scholars like Gill, Bieler, Cafruny and Ryner, the EU has. been the 
recipient of US neo-liberalism and is thus being hegemonised by the US (Gill 1998; 
Cafruny and Ryner 2007a; 2007b; Bieler 2003). Cafruny and Ryner go even further to 
claim a minimal US hegemony in the EU by the transmission of neo-liberal economic 
doctrine, with this doctrine being endorsed by the EU (Cafruny and Ryner 2007a). 
The argument can be seen as valid since neo-liberalism was formulated in the US, 
where it is exercised in its purest form. Then in the UK under Thatcher, this economic 
doctrine reached Europe (Cafruny and Ryner 2007b; Gill 1998; Bieler 2003). However, 
all these scholars acknowledge thatthe European economic structures that contain 
distinct social provisions, have yet to be diminished and converted to US style neo-
liberal capitalism and therefore strong social clauses remain in European economic 
structures (Bieler 2003; Gill 1998; Cafruny and Ryner 2007a). This is evident from the 
opposition to the Lisbon agenda that contains stronger neo-Iiberal elements such as 
the complete flexibility of labour. Hence, in Europe there is a distinct kind of neo-
liberalism, something that Gill describes as neo-constitutional 'disciplinary neo-
liberalism' (Gill 1998). 
The virtues of this model were apparent in fact, when the latest financial crisis 
showed that the more cautious approach of the European economies left them less 
exposed to the financial crisis which created havoc in the US economy. At the same 
time EU member states are taking measures to protect their economies from foreign 
competition, e.g. Germany declared its will to 'protect industries in 11 areas from 
foreign takeovers' (The Economist 2006a), or they would refuse to implement the 
complete neo-liberal agenda of the EU. Other examples include the support of the 
Italian government in the campaign opposed to the privatisation of Alitalia and the 
case of Germany's protection provided for Volkswagen against EU competition policy 
(Williamson 2008). In some other instances they are able to 'bend' the regulations as 
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with the SGP and Germany. This contrast is also indicative of the hegemonic 
approach ofthe EU member states since neo-liberal hegemons protect their markets 
but try to open the 'opposite market' (see Gilpin 1987). In Chapter 1, it was 
mentioned that even though the ideology is different, the US (i.e. the economic elite 
in this case) is part of the Historic Bloc and in fact is acting in accordance with the 
economic logic of the EU, which is the framework of economic activity in western 
Balkan economies. 
The EU approach towards the western Balkans has a clear neo-liberal character 
in relation to the proposed (and implemented) economic policies towards the states 
of this region. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, EU neo-liberalism contains distinct 
elements that are also transmitted into the region of the western Balkans. This 
ideology brings certain outcomes. Firstly, the EU is opening and liberalising 
economies which lack the monitoring mechanisms and the culture to operate such 
mechanisms in a market economy, such as stock market supervision. The result is 
underdeveloped and non-transparent financial markets that leave the states 
exposed to financial crises, because they are unable to prevent the existence of 
speculative bubbles and of course are unable to allocate the economic resources in 
an efficient way, which is a basic precondition for economic development. 
Additionally, they allow the easy penetration of foreign capital, because local 
economic structures are unable to produce the resources and the investment which 
are necessary for development and thus seek these resources from foreign capital. 
This penetration is facilitated by the idea of FDI as panacea that has become 
'common sense' in the Balkans and which leads to even more favourable regimes for 
the attraction of FDI. In addition, by observing the economic balance sheets of the 
Balkan states we can see huge trade deficits that vary from 11% of GDP in Bosnia to 
24% of GDP in Albania. This means that these economies are forced to open 
themselves up to global (actually EU) competition without the necessary economic 
foundations and protection, and thus their integration into the EU is uneven and 
creates economic dependencies. One has to add to this the fact that whole sectors 
of the economy have been sold to EU companies, particularly in the banking sector. 
Emblematic of this is the total control of the Albanian banking sector by foreign 
banks and the 59% foreign control in Serbia. Therefore, economic dependence is 
81 
total since the banking sector, given the lack offinancial markets hitherto, is the only 
'steam engine' of the economy. At the same time, the current member states are 
protecting their economic sectors from foreign competition as in the case of Mittal's 
bid for the French Arcelor opposed by the French government24 (The Economist 
2006a), which is to be expected if there is reference to hegemonic attitudes. For this 
thesis these outcomes, which are derived from the imposition of the EU economic 
logic-ideology, constitute part of the hegemonic project because not only are they 
creating the conditions for EU economic penetration but they are also creating 
dependency conditions that enhance further hegemony. At the same time, as is 
noted in the scholarship on hegemony, the hegemon(s) protect its (their) own 
market (Crawford 2007; Arrighi 1993; Gilpin 2001; Nye 2004). 
2.4.2. Member states and EU economic ideology. 
Hence, we can claim that the neo-liberal model that the EU imposes on the 
candidate states is distinct enough to be described as European capitalism and 
therefore to constitute a distinct European hegemonic ideology. It is a system that, 
even though based on US neo-Iiberal principles, has been distinctively influenced by 
European member states. The state that influenced this ideology most profoundly is 
Germany. This is an outcome of Germany's general economic supremacy in Europe 
and of the specific conditions that led to the creation of EMU. In Chapter 1 there was 
a reference to the German model; here we will see the signs of this model in EMU. 
Central to EMU is the existence of an independent central bank, namely the ECB. 
The ECB has been designed in accordance with Bundesbank preferences. Thus, it is 
beyond political control and its priority is price stability. The latter, as we saw, is 
central to the post-war German economic mentality of ordo-liberalism. Even though 
the ECB is the main evidence of German economic dominance, the SGP, which 
represents the fiscal branch of EMU, is also an important example. Germany as an 
economic regional leader devised the SGP in a way that protects its interests and 
preserves its power. In fact, the blueprint of the SGP was presented in 1996 by the 
German Finance Minister, Theo Waigel. 
" In the end the takeover took place but the French government has indicated its will to bloc further 
mergers (The Economist 2006a). 
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Firstly, after the oil shocks of the 1970s and the collapse of the Exchange Rate 
System, German economic stability and the Deutsche Mark's credibility became very 
attractive to the other member states, which were facing huge deficits, rising 
inflation and economic recession (see lintner 2001). France for instance, pegged the 
Franc to the Deutsche Mark. Moreover, monetarism was becoming popular and 
therefore the need for a coordinated monetary policy and macro-economic policies 
for managing deficits and inflation grew (De Grauwe 2003). Furthermore, EMU was 
desirable for the other member states because it gave them a voice that would 
dilute German economic supremacy. 
On the other hand, Germany, which was maintaining a huge trade surplus and 
was enjoying the credibility of the Deutche Mark, accepted the role only under its 
own conditions. Therefore, the core values of EMU were 'constructed in Germany's 
image and according to Germanys preferences' (Crawford 2007: 135; Gill 1998). Thus, 
as a hegemon it created a monetary system that. both protects and promotes the 
German economy. Evidence for this are the Maastricht Criteria, which aim to protect 
Germany from imported inflation and trade"dumping. Furthermore EMU gives 
Germany the opportunity to spread the cost of the system. As Crawford notes, 
Germany through the ECB and EMU. managed to upload 'its domestic institutional 
arrangements to European monetary policy-making' (Crawford 2007:137; Cafruny 
and Ryner 2007b). Moreover, as economic hegemon Germany has been able to bend 
the rules of the system when it found that it could not cope with them or that they 
were against its interests, as in the case ofthe German violation ofthe SGP between 
2002 and 2005. Hence, it is also obvious that EMU contains the elements of German 
monetary culture and the power of the Bundesbank. Further confirmation of this is 
found in the statement of President von Weizsacker that 'our monetary concept [ ... J 
becomes part of the European constitution and our social market economy the basic 
law of European economic policy' (quoted in Crawford 2007: 128). A further element 
of the German desire to bend the system as hegemon is expressed in Helmut Kohl's 
statement that the single currency was a step towards a stronger political union, 
with the Euro as a symbol of solidarity and Germany playing the central role (Cited in: 
Crawford 2007; Gill 1998). 
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According to the above and the previous sections, it is possible to conclude that 
the EU has a distinct economic ideology, which is part of the hegemonic ideology 
(the other parts are political and cultural) and that this economic ideology has been 
largely shaped by Germany or reflects German preferences. This was also mentioned 
in Chapter 1. This ideology can also be seen to be transmitted unequally to the 
western Balkans through EU policies in the region. 
2.4.3. The EU and the impact of the hegemonic ideology in the western Balkans. 
How is this ideology applied to the western Balkans? In other words, how is the EU 
transmitting the hegemonic idea to the western Balkans and thus how does the EU 
succeed in ensuring the consent of the local population? As was mentioned in 
Chapter 1, the discipline of the 'masses' is a basic function of a hegemonic institution. 
Furthermore, we need to see the implications of the EU's function (and of other IFls 
as well), which can be expected to create a favourable environment for foreign 
economic capital penetration. This last point will also reflect how deliberate this EU 
transmission of the hegemonic ideology is because, if indeed the economic capital 
from states that have an active role in enlargement is overwhelming, then it is logical 
to claim that the EU role contains the preferences of the hegemonic states and aims 
at the consolidation of the hegemony over the western Balkan states. 
The transmission process looks quite straightforward (particularly during the 
analysis of the case study chapters). The EU brings a 'package' of reforms to the 
candidate states. For instance, in the case of CEECs, the European Partnerships and 
the single market were the main tools of the EU for consolidating the liberalisation 
and deregulation of the CEECs' political economies, and the EU requirements 
became central engines for domestic reforms. According to Bohle '[Tlhe 'accession 
partnerships' were very all-encompassing, affecting, amongst other things, 
macroeconomic, budgetary and monetary policies, and administrative, regional, 
industrial and welfare reforms' (Bohle 2006). It is also interesting that these 
economies, like those in the Balkans had to complete the reforms prior to 
membership without any linkage between liberalization and membership. The 
receivers accept and implement them because of their desire to join the EU and to 
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integrate into western institutions. From the above it can be asserted that the EU is 
not applying these policies without an 'invitation' and that therefore the recipient 
states are the ones wishing to implement these reforms. The reality, however, is not 
so simple. 
The Balkan states, like every post-communist country, are entering the 'painful' 
period of transition from such a low level that they cannot manage their transition 
without external assistance, especially financial. As in the case of central and eastern 
European states, the IMF, the World Bank and the EU moved in the direction of 
offering financial and administrative assistance, with a particular price attached such 
as the imposition of certain economic policies, while the EU exported an even more 
market-radical variant of neo-liberalism to the new member states, which were not 
granted immediate labour mobility and full access to the EU's redistributive policies 
(Bieler 2007: 93). Each state in the western Balkans had to implement the reforms 
that the above mentioned institutions were demanding. In brief, these are measures 
of a clearly neo-liberal nature, that urged the privatisation, deregulation and 
liberalisation of local economies, and which make the local economies dependent on 
foreign capital for their survival. The economic conditions in the western Balkans in 
the current crisis are indicative of the economic dependence of the local economies 
on foreign capital. The IMF, the EU and other IFls (e.g. EIB) cooperate with each 
other (Confidential Interview 7), which increases their clout, since through the 
division of labour, each institution has special importance for the recipient state. In 
this division the EU has the coordinating role, since even the IMF provisions are 
consistent with the SAP provisions. This, in our opinion, represents further evidence 
of the hegemonic character of the EU, because it demonstrates the ability of the EU 
to 'impose' the agenda on other institutions and thus to play the role of the leading 
hegemonic institution. 
Apart from financial assistance, the recipient states also receive the promise of 
joining the EU. However, even this is not secure. Membership is not certain because 
the candidates have to fulfil political criteria and of course because the fourth 
Criterion of Copenhagen refers to the ability of the EU to absorb new members, in a 
period where there are voices against further enlargement. This argument is based 
on the need for institutional reform of the EU before accepting new members. This 
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includes the 'old' member states such as France (e.g. Sarkozy) and Austria (e.g. 
Schiissel) (see Judah 2006; Welfens 2001; Bohle 2006). As Judah notes, at the 
Salzburg Council of 2006 the EU expressed its commitment to Balkan enlargement 
but also stressed that the fourth Copenhagen Criterion, i.e. the ability of the EU to 
absorb new members, will be taken into consideration (Judah 2006:7). This stance is 
supported by the comments of Mr Erhard Busek, the special coordinator of the 
Stability Pact, that the EU is not interested too much in SEE enlargement. As proof he 
mentioned that during the EU-western Balkans summit in November 2004, instead 
of the scheduled 45 minutes it took only 25 minutes (Busek 2005: 30). In case of no 
membership agreement, the hegemonic character of the EU-western Balkan 
relationship, becomes even more evident because the EU would have managed to 
make these states dependent on it and to have fully accepted the hegemonic 
ideology, but without having the benefits of membership, which would make this 
relationship one between a metropolis and a colony! 
Furthermore, the integration of the western Balkan states into the EU (and the 
global economy to some extent) starts at a disadvantage. This is because the 
western Balkan states are exposed to international competition without having 
economic sectors strong enough to sustain competition, such as the western 
economies have developed after decades of protectionism. They also lack a capitalist 
background of. strong supervisory and regulatory institutions. We justify this 
argument by noting, apart from the trade deficit, which we mentioned above and 
shows the inability of local economy to produce competitive goods; the fluctuation 
of inflation rates between 1.4% (FYR Macedonia) and 11.7% (Serbia), which is also 
result of imperfect market supervision and structure; and the high rates of 
unemployment that range between 13.8% (Albania) and 36% (FYR Macedonia), 
which also indicate deep structural problems. Thus, in neo-Gramscian terminology 
the western Balkans are entering the Historic Bloc and a hegemonic relationship not 
just in a subordinate position but also with a marked uneven development of their 
economies. 
Can the Balkan states resist this process? The first answer is 'yes'. As 
Noutcheva notes, the Balkan elites have frequently delayed or refused to implement 
certain EU policies, when the latter threatened certain interests (see Noutcheva 
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2007). In addition, as a Brussels senior official stated when personal interests are in 
danger, or when the implementation of certain policies does not include financial 
gains, they simply ignore them (Confidential Interview 6). Finally, as another senior 
official noted, the. EU has to make disciplinary threats to these states and therefore 
force them to continue the reforms, even if most of the time this occurs with a 
considerable delay (Confidential Interview 5).25 The local population also shows 
some small signs of opposition but so far these incidents are responses to national 
problems or as a result of the liquidation of firms and the low level of wages as was 
the case in Serbia and Croatia (see B92 2008e; 2008g).These two last problems are 
also used during election periods by the political elite, as in the case of FYR 
Macedonia, when the leading party stated that they would not 'sacrifice' their name 
to qualify for admission to the EU (Elefterotipia 2008c). 
This phenomenon should not be a surprise given that trade unions in these 
countries have also embraced neo-liberalism in the hope that it will serve their 
interests as well, having fresh memories ofthe communist past (see also Bohle 2006). 
This support for the EU might change as the years pass and the economic situation 
remains the same or deteriorates, as is happening with the western EU member 
states, which are becoming increasingly Eurosceptic because of the economic 
conditions. Furthermore, the only serious opposition that we observe in the Balkans 
is in the shape of nationalist and xenophobic forces that, as we will see in the case of 
Serbia and FYR Macedonia, are linkingEU integration to national cause"s. This 
populism is consistent with the trend that has appeared in the EU European 
elections that empowered nationalist forces. 
Hence, the Balkans look as if they are caught in a web, where they are forced 
to follow certain reforms that are integrating their economies with the international 
economy but at the same time are condemning their economies to west European 
control, since whole sections of the economy are in west European hands (more in 
following sections). But how does the EU manage the consent of both elite and 
masses? 
25 The pace of implementation is also an indication of the resistance of both domestic administration 
and population to the Europeanization process that follows the enlargement criteria (see Olsen 2002; 
Radaelli 2003). 
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Starting with the elites, it is interesting to note the existence of pro-EU political 
elites in all western Balkan states. The best evidence of this can be found in the 
election campaigns of the pro-EU political parties as in the case of Serbia and FYR 
Macedonia. Unquestionably, the EU is providing support (both moral and financial) 
to these elites. For example, as we will see in Chapter 3, the EU has openly 
intervened in the last Serbian elections on behalf of the pro-EU elite. The pro-EU 
elite is not motivated simply by material concerns but in various cases there are 
ideological reasons as well, as in the case of Djindjic who promoted Serbian 
membership to the EU unquestioningly (see Pond 2006). Therefore, there is a 
political elite which cooperates with the EU and which promotes EU interests and 
policies. As we will see later in all three case studies there are pro-EU political 
coalitions. The few domestic economic elites are connected with the international 
system and they are in full support of the EU as we will see in later chapters. 
However, the real work of the EU as a hegemonic institution involves the 
obedience of the working classes, which are the classes over which the hegemony 
will be exercised. In'annual opinion polls popular support for the EU seems massive 
(see Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), while in all opinion polls the target of EU membership 
appears as a 'national cause'. In 2008 the Balkan Monitor published an opinion poll 
from the Balkan states according to which the support for EU membership varied 
from 28.5% in Croatia (plus 36% that are neutral) to 83.1% in Albania, with Serbia 
and FYR Macedonia at 58% and 66.1% respectively. in answer to the question 
whether the majority supports EU membership the variation is between 39.2% in 
Croatia to 84.6% in Albania, with Serbia and FYR Macedonia scoring 73.5% and 82.9% 
respectively. Furthermore, 84.3% of FYR Macedonia respondents believe that EU 
membership is essential for peace and stability with the scores of 57% for Serbia and 
74.6% for Albania. Finally, to the question 'How much you identify with Europe?' the 
response was 72.5% in Albania, 63.7% in FYR Macedonia and 56.9% Serbia (Balkan 
Monitor 2008). 
The opinion polls explain this in terms of the prospect of better economic days 
and of course the ability to travel around Europe, especially for work. The latter is 
obvious in Serbia (Confidential interview 2). Another indication of popular support 
towards the EU is found in the electoral success of pro-EU political parties. if we 
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want to find more reasons for this support we can start from the normative power of 
the EU, which is managing to transmit its norms and values and thus also to become 
attractive to other societies, by projecting an ideal image (see Nikolaidis and Howse 
2002; Olsen 2002). It has to be noted that, as in every post-communist society, there 
is a strong feeling of belonging to Europe and that for too long they had been cut off 
from it. To this is added the belief among the population that they will become as 
'rich' as EU citizens. In some cases, the West is seen as the only guarantor of security 
(e.g. in Albania). 
Hence, the EU manages to' transmit the hegemonic idea and ensure the 
consent of the domestic population as a hegemonic institution should do. The next 
step is to depict the outcomes of the EU policies as outlined at the beginning of this 
section. 
Starting with the economy, the EU is promoting European capital by creating 
the environment for its penetration in the region. For instance, while the region is 
seen as a market of 150 million consumers living in small countries, the EU through 
its regional cooperation provisions and with the FTAs between the western Balkan 
states has largely unified this market (World Bank 2006c: 1), permitting the creation 
of scale economies .and profitable investments for European companies. This is 
achievable because even though these companies are producing in fragmented 
states they have a regional market to distribute their production lines and establish 
commercial networks and thus maximize their profits .. 
Another area where efforts towards EU economic integration can be asserted 
is the Euroisation (Le. the use of Euro as national currency) in the Balkan economies. 
According to a CEPS study, Euroisation is the only measure that allows complete 
integration into the payments system, the money and capital markets of the Euro 
area. Of course for the achievement of such integration the CEPS study showed that 
it required a large presence of EU-25 banks with 60-70% control of the region's 
banking sector (Emerson 1999: 18). The current presence of the EU Banks in the 
western Balkans is approaching that level. Such market shares mean that foreign 
investors are 'controlling' the national economy, since the banking sector is the 
steam engine of these economies that still have very underdeveloped and small 
financial markets. In particular, the share of foreign bank assets in the western 
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Balkans in 2002 ranged from 44% in FYR Macedonia to 90% in Croatia and 77% in BiH 
(Waiter 2004: 373). Furthermore, at least three states - BiH, Montenegro and 
Kosovo - have completely Euroicized economies. Moreover, as Professor De Grauwe 
showed in his book 'The Etonomics of the Monetory Union', a monetary union like 
EMU is rather to the disadvantage of economies without a certain level of economic 
development, particularly if these economies are small in size (De Grauwe 2000). To 
the above we can add the US .perception that the Europeanisation of the Balkans is 
the only solution for a final settlement of Balkan problems (Gardner-Feldman 2001: 
5-6; Pridham 2000). Here the role ofthe EU is evident because EU policies favour and 
create the conditions for such foreign penetration in the Balkan banking sector. 
Equally important is that the EU today represents a significant actor in conflict 
prevention and crisis management in the western Balkans, sC?mething that is 
confirmed by the transfer of police and military operations from NATO to the EU like 
operation ALTHEA and the. current European Union Force (EUFOR) that have 
replaced the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) and the operation CONCORDIA in 
FYR Macedonia. The above position that the EU itself might seek control in-the 
Balkans, is reinforced by the position of the CEPS, that in its plan for the Balkans 
speaks of the need for permanent EU military and police forces in the region and 
complete EU control of customs and border controls, with the latter viewed also as 
appropriate for the 'association' criterion (Emerson 1999). An example of this is the 
situation in BiH where the UN High Representative has supreme powers and 
effectively governs alone (Gervasi 1993; Emerson 1999). 
In summary, it seems that. the EU is implementing the advice of its member 
states as they are formed in the bargaining process, whilst in terms of institutions it 
works normatively, on the basis of human rights etc and towards stabilising its 
backyard. For example, in the case of the Euroisation of the Balkans we can claim 
that member states and especially Germany as a leading EMU country, is promoting 
its interests. What we have to make clear is that hegemony is primarily economic 
and is evident from the level, kind and direction of FDI and from trade integration 
because these parameters are those that reflect the penetration of foreign capital 
and are those that create dependency relations. For instance, as we will see in 
Albania' (Chapter 5) the massive penetration of Italian capital has made Albania 
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extremely dependent on italy. The economic means of hegemony are supported by 
political and military means. The former has mainly the role of facilitating the 
economic penetration and the latter of safeguarding it. 
2.5. The German role in EU hegemony. 
The core of our thesis is the role of Germany in the western Balkans as a neo-
Gramscian hegemon. Thus, to conclude the analysis on the EU's role as the 
hegemonic institution, we have to look into the German-EU relationship and 
particularly the role of Germany in EU enlargement policy. This is important because 
to establish Germany as the leader of a hegemonic group, which operates the 
hegemonic institution (Le. the EU), requires us to prove or indicate that Germany 
influences the EU or at least EU enlargement policy to a significant degree. At the 
same time, it is necessary to show that Germany benefits more than any other 
member state from this influence. We mentioned above the impact of Germany on 
tlie economic mentality of the EU that reflects German preferences. Now-the focus 
will be on more general aspects and of course on enlargement policy. 
From the very beginning of its creation, the EEC had Germany at its core, 
particularly since its priority was to consolidate peace and stability in western 
Europe by solving the German problem, i.e. the accommodation of Germany's 
economic size and geopolitical position in Europe, which had contributed to the 
previous wars (Dinan 2004: 13; Hyde-Price 2000: 180). Equally, for Germany, the EU 
is the most important domain of its foreign and economic policy. The EU was part of 
Germany's Westpolitik, namely the simultaneous integration and deepening of the 
EU. This target was consistent with the Article 25 of Basic Law (i.e. the Federal 
constitution) according to which Germany should work for the political unity of 
Europe. The EU was the vehicle for bringing the country once again into the 
international community and for restoring its sovereignty. it also allowed Germany 
to pursue its national interests within a multilateral framework by granting it 
important posts within the Union, without raising suspicion among its allies. The EU 
assisted Germany in achieving its economic supremacy both by providing a market 
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for German industry and a forum for the promotion of German industrial as well as 
general economic interests (Cole 2001: 24; Pradetto 2004: 210) and thus to 
constitute Germany as a regional leader (Padgett et 01.2003: 14). 
The White Paper on German Security from 2006 provides a clear view of the 
EU's importance for Germany. According to the paper: 
'the European Union stands for political stability and prosperity in Germany and its other member 
states ... it remains the pre-eminent political goal of Germany, therefore, to strengthen the European 
Union as the core of the European area of stability and to push ahead with the process of European 
integration ... Germany's national interests can best be asserted in a capable European Union' (BMVG 
2006: 33). 
Germany influences the EU indisputably by dint of its power and resources, and 
it has an important part in shaping the future of Europe and beyond, given its 
geographical location at the heart of Europe (Mitteleuropa) (BMVG 2006: 5-6, 15). 
Germany was able to upload certain elements of its federal institutional setting (Erb 
2003), the most obvious being European Monetary Union. EMU along with the single 
market demonstrate the 'way in which German industrial standards dominated the 
forming of European standards' (Paterson 2003: 210-11). Apart from the realm of 
economy, the central role of Germany is also evident in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and in European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that are 'a 
constitutive element of German foreign and security policy' (Pradetto 2004: 209). In 
addition, for some other scholars like Crawford, Germany manages to hegemonise 
Europe indirectly through the EU setting (Crawford 2007). 
Furthermore, because GenTian capital has an important influence in the German 
political setting, the EU is also a forum for the German political elite either to 
promote sectoral interests or to defend them. Therefore, it is normal to expect some 
decisions over enlargement to favour German enterprises, especially since there is 
an important lobbying presence of German firms in the EU (Auswartiges Amt 2006; 
Deutsche Auslandshandelskammern 2006), and with the German government 
explicitly stating that one of its purposes is the promotion of German capital abroad 
(Auswartiges Amt 2006). 
The latter is of primary importance. According to the Auswartiges Amt, foreign 
trade provides one quarter of German GDP and employs a fifth of the German labour 
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force. The German economy is so dependent on foreign trade, because - typically for 
many advanced industrial economies - domestic demand is unable to sustain the 
growth ambitions of German companies; this means that international economic 
crises can have severe effects (Padgett et al. 2003; Hubner 2004). Thus, trade is vital 
for the German economy. Consequently, the German government states that: ' ... the 
task of Germany's foreign policy is to both promote and protect German economic 
interests in the world and to help foster the further development of just and 
sustainable global economic cooperation' (Auswartiges Amt 2006). This element, 
along with the admission that government and industry are working closely for the 
promotion of the German economy by combining their powers, especially with the 
Auslandshandelskammern (Le. Chambers of Commerce abroad), gives us the first 
indications that German policy in the Balkans is primarily connected to the needs of 
German capital. . 
In consequence, German capital has a say and its preferences are embedded in 
German foreign policy. A final element is the admission that: 'the state's task is to 
use bilateral and multilateral negotiations, e.g. in the EU, in the OECD and in the 
WTO, to work towards a framework through which competition and trade can 
develop as freely as possible. In addition to this, where high barriers make access to 
foreign markets difficult for German companies, it can endeavour to help dismantle 
them' (Auswartiges Amt 2006). Therefore, there is a clear statement that Germany 
uses the above mentioned institutions that have a significant presence in the Balkans 
and that these are the engines for the promotion of neo-liberal, market-oriented 
reforms. An example is the German agency Deutsche Gesellschaft fUr Technische 
lusammenarbeit (GTl) that financed various automotive cluster projects for the car 
industry in the Balkans (World Bank Group 2006a: 6, 36). 
So far we have seen that the EU is an important domain for the promotion of 
German economic interests, particularly from the perspective that it provides open 
markets and a forum for the promotion of German economic interests. These along 
with the role of member states in the EU and its enlargement policy create enough 
elements that indicate the role of the EU as a vehicle for the promotion of the 
German interests. To claim that Germany is the leader of the EU is highly debatable. 
Elements that might support this argument were noted above, such as German 
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dynamism and the country's position in the centre of Europe and its policy 
orientation since unification. Certainly, one could claim the leadership for any other 
member state that is active in the western Balkans. However, as was mentioned in 
Chapter 1 and will become more obvious in later chapters, Germany has those 
elements, which the other 'competing' states lack and which reinforce our claim, 
such as huge economic power, political influence in Europe, military presence in the 
western Balkans as well economic presence in the whole area ofthe western Balkans 
and traditional historical links with this region and is a regional power particularly in 
economic terms. 
2.5.1. Germany and EU enlargement. 
German enthusiasm for enlargement is well documented (Sedelmeier 2005: 407; 
Anderson 2006: 266) and is rooted both in the historical German interests in 
Mitteleuropa and the more recent dynamic process of Ostpolitik (Spaulding 1997: 
489f; Leaman 1988: 196ff). Spaulding's accurate description of Ostpolitik as 
'politicised trade' captures the essence of the new foreign trade policy of the 1970s 
which - in the context of European rapprochement - secured (west) Germany an 
unparalleled foothold in Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) 
markets long before the end of the Cold War. Anderson notes correctly that 'West 
Germany was often out front of its fellow EC partners on the question of relations 
with the Eastern Bloc; lacking the capability to formulate common foreign economic 
objective's, the EC did not seek to stand in for its member states in their evolving 
economic relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites. (Anderson 2006: 255). 
Eastward trade expansion represented a strategic choice to continue the policy of 
export-led growth in the 1950s and 1960s which was further reinforced in Germany's 
approach to managing the stagflationary crises of the 1970s and early 1980s. Allied 
to the security concerns of a reunified Germany bordering a potentially destabilised 
post-COMECON eastern Europe, Kohl and Genscher and later Schroder and Fischer' 
promoted the cause of both bilateral assistance to transition states and of a speedy 
and large-scale enlargement of the EU, binding first the EU-8 to the acquis and the 
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Copenhagen Criteria and later Romania and Bulgaria. The eastern enlargement was 
also considered a tool that would bring Germany and Russia closer (Harnisch. and 
MauI2001). 
The conditions of membership imposed on the CEE transition states also 
reflected German preferences, in particular in relation to market liberalisation and 
monetary 'stabilisation'. The accumulated body of EC/EU regulations and 
commitments, known as the acquis communitoire (80,000 pages of legislative text), 
included the most recent wave of deregulation and liberalisation measures 
. embodied in the Single Market Act which required all members to open their 
commodity, service, capital and labour markets to businesses in all other member 
states; Germany's consistently strong espousal of the Single Market Act was again 
based on the state's export-led growth strategy (Michalska 2006: 274). In the case of 
the transition states, advisors and monitors from the old EU-1S were 
programmatically deployed to ensure close compliance with EU standards in the 
gradual absorption of EU-directives into national law. A similar process is already 
under way in the Balkans as well. 
This support has followed the economic penetration of Germany which is 
evident in the following table: 
Table 2: German economic penetration in central and eastern European countries in 1995 and 1998-
2003 as a % of total FDI. 
country/Year 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Czech Republic 30% 20% 6% 23.7% 17.7% 5.6% -
Hungary 21.9% 43% 22.1% 41.5% 15.6% 6.6% 
Poland 11% 29.6% 32.4% 9% 22.8% -
Slovakia 7.6% 23.2% 54.1% 54.8% 28,8% 54.1% 66.8% 
Source: UNCT AD 2005c: 14; 2004b: 72 
The table confirms the strong economic presence of Germany prior to eastern 
enlargement since German FDI averages a quarter of the total. This presence is 
enough to justify the political interest of the German elite in the issue of 
enlargement which, beyond the security gains brought further gains to German 
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capital. In addition, it is useful to bear in mind that the fifth enlargement shows the 
connection between economic presence and political support for enlargement most 
clearly. Therefore, if such a connection exists in the west~rn Balkans then it will be 
possible to establish another argument in support of German interest in this region. 
Furthermore, in the process of CEECs enlargement, a 'stable economic and 
monetary environment' was added to the Copenhagen Criteria by the European 
Council (Michalska 2006: 275) which unsurprisingly led to all applicants establishing 
autonomous central banks, free from the influence of their respective Finance 
Ministries. Equally, they were expected to commit themselves to the parallel fiscal 
arrangements embodied in the SGP of 1997, which obliged all members of the 
monetary union to maintain strict controls on both annual public sector borrowing 
and overall state debt; the SGP was passed at the Dublin European Council at the 
insistence of the German administration, in the shape of Finance Minister Theo 
Waigel and the Bundesbank. The now established monetary arrangements of the 
Eurozone and the wider EU-27, together with their fiscal underpinnings in the shape 
of the Stability Pact, created the institutional basis for the optimal realisation of 
German trading and FDI strategies in the liberalised markets of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Under such conditions;the initial chronic capital poverty of these transition 
states could only by remedied by large-scale capital imports, i.e. by selling state-
owned assets in CEECs to foreign (predominantly German) corporations. 
Of course,one can claim that the case of the fifth enlargement was special 
since Germany had vested interests in the political development of its close 
neighbours in central and eastern Europe, while its economic capital was well 
consolidated in these states. Nevertheless, the same implications that apply to the 
CEECs seem apparent in the Balkans and to verify this we can try to trace German 
interests in the Balkans as well, in order to justify its interest in influencing the EU 
enlargement to the Balkans. The economic presence of Germany in the western 
Balkans is laid out in Tables 3-6. 
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Table 3: German FDI stock in the western Balkans, 2001-2008 in million Euros. 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Albania 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.9 nia n/a n/a 
BiH n/a n/a nia 196.8 206.6 225 227.5 
Croatia n/a n/a nia 1627.4 2153.1 1774.8 3786.5 
FYROM n/a n/a nia 70.6 64.1 64.1 85.9 
Montenegro" nla n/a nia nia 41 67.9 106.4 
Serbia n/a n/a nia 214.3 365.1 1085.1 1135.6 
Source: Wiener Institut fUr Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche (WIIW) 2009 
Table 4: Percentage of German FDI stock c ompared to the total and trade partners' ranking". 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Albania 1.8% i" 2.8% i" 1.2% 9 1% 9 n/a nia n/a nla n/a nia 
BiH n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n ia 9.6% 3' 8.2% 3 7.3% 4' 4.9% 6' 
Croatia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n la 17.9% 2 17.5% 2 8.5% 4' 12.3% 4' 
FYROM nia n/a n/a n/a nia n la 4.4% 6' 3.6% 6' 3.1% 8' 3.4% 8' 
Montenegro'" nia n/a nia n/a nia n la nla nla 7.2% 5' 5.6% 6 4.8% 7 
Serbia nia nia n/a nia n/a n la 10.8% 3' 11.6% 3 16.6% 2" 14.2% 4 
Source: WIIW 2009. 
At first glance the data dem onstrate a more modest partiCipation of German 
capital in the region, which in no way justifies the claim of a German hegemonic 
What is apparent instead is a particular interest of 
and Serbia and a complete absence from Alban ia. 
creasing level of investment that also proves that 
ely attracted German economic interest, which is 
are taken into account. Thus, more investments 
presence in the western Balkans. 
Germany towards Bosnia, Croatia 
In addition, the tables depict an in 
the western Balkans have only lat 
normal if the crises in the region 
might be expected with the norm alisation of life and greater security in the region. 
German percentage over time is a result of the Moreover, the reduction of the 
increase of overall FDI flows. 
However, this picture change s dramatically if we consider that most of the FDI 
e or eastern European countries, such as Hungary, 
any German affiliates. In fact, as we will see in the 
prefer to penetrate the western Balkans through 
stock is either from Austria, Greec 
which are countries that contain m 
case studies German companies 
their affiliates from the above men tioned countries. In addition, there are important 
levels of FDI from tax havens suc h as the Netherlands Antilles in FYR Macedonia. 
26 Montenegrin FDI are included in Serbia until 2005. 
27 The first column contains the percentag 
the ranking of Germany as trade partner a 
e of German FDI compare to the total. Column two shows 
mong all the trade partners. 
28 Montenegrin FDI are included in Serbia until 2005. 
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2008 
nia 
nia 
n/a 
n/a 
127.7 
nia 
2008 
nia n/a 
n/a nia 
n/a nia 
n/a n/a 
4.2% i 
n/a n/a 
Other FDI relate to single transactions of such volume that elevate some countries to 
the top of the list of investing countries, without having invested more than once. 
Finally, we decided to show the FDI stock at this point because the stock is the one 
ong-term commitment to the host economy. 
, 
that shows accumulation of FDI and I 
To enhance the case that we a re making here, it is important to view the trade 
he western Balkan states. integration between Germany and t 
Table 5.1": German exports to the Balkans 2001· 2005 in % of total recipients. 
2001 20 02 2003 2004 2005 
Albania '5.6 5 5.3 5.2 6.1 
FYROM 10.8 13. 3 12.7 13.3 12.3 
BiH 12.4 12. 7 12 12.6 12.6 
Serbia and Montenegro 13.5 14. 7 13.8 13.9 14 
Croatia 17 16. 3 15.6 15.5 14.7 
Source: WIIW 2006. 
Table 5.2: German imports from the western Bal kan states of % of the exporting country's total. 
2001 20 02 2003 2004 2005 
Albania 5.6 5. 6 5 4 4.3 
FYROM 18 17. 1 13.3 19.7 16.8 
BiH 10.5 10. 1 12.7 17 12 
Serbia and Montenegro 13 1 
Croatia 15.1 12. 
37-__ 1-__ -714~.7~--1_--~107·2~--+_--711~.2~__1 
1 16.3 11 10.7 
Source: WIIW 2006. 
The trade data reinforce the evi dent trends in the development of FDI. Germany 
er with an increased presence. Certainly, it will 
ermany is one of the top three trading partners 
tate that has an important presence in all states 
hegemonic, since it indicates that Germany is 
n a single country for reasons of lower industrial 
remains an important trading partn 
be obvious in the case studies that G 
in the western Balkans but it is the s 
apart from Albania. This might be 
interested in whole region and not i 
costs. 
Hence, if we want to comment 
has a significant economic prese 
on all the tables then we can say that Germany 
nce that might justify political support for 
hin which the EU is consolidating its hegemony. enlargement, which is the policy, wit 
This might also indicate that Germ any has an interest in influencing this policy in 
ver, it offers us the foundation for economic order to reap the benefits. Moreo 
penetration that might be hegemo nic in the case studies particularly taking into 
g affiliates for penetrating the local economies. account the German strategy of usin 
" Due to the lack of data, we are unable to p roduce the shares of other states as well. Nevertheless, 
ercentage of the total it can provide meaningful we believe that since the data represent a p 
indications of German-western Balkan relati ons. 
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One last comment relates to Albania. As will be presented in Chapter 5, Albania is a 
country that has only recently started to attract the economic attention of German 
investors and it is a country where the German presence is small but promising for 
the future. 
Beyond its economic presence, Germany is participating in the police and 
military missions in the western Balkans as we can see in Table 6: 
Table 6: German military presence in the western Balkans. 
Operations Duration Strength Area 
SHARP GUARD 30/6/1995-19/6/1996 Former Yugoslavia 
IFOR 20/12/1995- 4000 soldiers BiH 
20/12/1996 
SFOR 20/12/1996-8/1/2005 3000 soldiers BiH 
EUFOR 8/1/2005-present 1100 soldiers BiH 
Allied Force 24/3/1999-11/6/1999 Former Yugoslavia 
Extraction Force 4/12/1998-11/6/1999 Kosovo 
Allied Harbour 13/4/1999-10/6/1999 Albania and FYROM 
KFOR 10/6/1999-present 2875 soldiers Kosovo 
Allied Harvest 12/6/1999-24/8/1999 Adriatic' 
Essential Harvest 27/8/2001-23/9/2001 FYROM 
Amber Fox 27/9/2001 FYROM 
Source: Federal Ministry of Defence (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2005). 
These missions make clear that for Germany the regional conflicts in Europe are 
a matter of concern for German foreign policy because they threaten its stability. In 
this context the Germans justify their participation in Balkan military missions 
(BMVG 2006: 18, 47). It also indicates that Germany's interest in the stability of this 
region also has an economic rationale since stability is a necessary condition for 
economic investment. It also reflects wider German economic and geopolitical 
interests that are outlined below and which indicate that hegemony is primarily 
economic and that military operations are auxiliary. It also supports the argument 
that Germany wants a leading role in the security missions in the area; the number 
oftroops that it contributes to the various missions' underscores this. Certainly other 
states have an important presence but if one adds all missions to the economic 
presence, and then it is possible to advance the idea of leading German interest in 
the region. However, a safe conclusion has to be proved in the case studies. 
30 Even though this was in the Adriatic, the mission was linked to the blockade of the former 
Yugoslavia. 
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What was demonstrated up to this section is the strong interest of Germany in 
EU enlargement in the western Balkans. Furthermore, if one considers that most of 
the enlargement decisions were taken under German presidencies and that 
Germany has undertaken a very important role in the post-war Balkan reality, either 
by initiating actions like the Stability Pact or shaping the SAP, it can be claimed that 
Germany has influenced, to a large extent, EU enlargement policy. This is supported 
by the fact that the Balkans are following the enlargement blueprint from the fifth 
enlargement which was strongly influenced by Germany. In addition, according to 
the tables, Germany has an important presence that might be an outcome of the 
enlargement or a reason for it. The next step is to discover why Germany has an 
interest. In other words what motivates Germany in seeking a hegemonic position in 
the western Balkans? This is significant because if we establish the existence of 
German interests in the area then the search for hegemony can be justified as well. 
2.5.2. Germany in the Balkans. 
Previously we mentioned that Germany had an active role in the shape of the post-
war developments in the Balkans and that it took a leading role in shaping EU 
responses in this region. The main reasons were security but also economic 
considerations since, as in the case of the first eastern enlargement, economic 
interests were focused on 'a much wider market and greatly increased opportunities 
to evade the labour rigidities that have depressed German economic performance in 
a new division of labour where the low-value processes are outsourced by German 
firms' (Padgett et al. 2003: 11). 
Thus the question that arises is whether Germany is interested in the Balkans to 
such a degree that it makes itself a hegemonic leader, beyond general security and 
economic considerations. We have to note that for a long time, according to the 
statement of the representative of Auswartiges Amt, Mr Almer, Germany took a 
negative view of Balkan enlargement but in the end had to take the initiative and 
shape policy (Almer 2008). 
A serious answer may involve energy considerations. A heavy industrial 
country like Germany has a tremendous need for energy and raw materials in order 
to preserve its dominant economic position. According to a German White Paper, 'a 
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secure, sustained and competitive supply of energy is of strategic importance for the 
future of Germany ... Germany's and Europe's growing dependence on imported fossil 
energy resources calls for the intensification of the dialogue and cooperation 
between producer, transit and consumer countries, including trade and industry. To 
ensure energy supplies in the long term, it will be vital to have differentiated sources 
of energy .. .it is also imperative to ensure the security of the energy infrastructure' 
(BMVG 2006: 20). 
The need for secure energy resources becomes greater from the moment that 
the EU wants to differentiate its sources due to the insecurity that Russia's attitude 
brings. Russia still refuses to ratify the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty for energy and its 
transport between Eastern Europe and the EU (Elefterotipia 2006a; 2006b). 
Indicative of the volatility of EU-Russian relations is the fact that the new Partnership 
. and Cooperation Agreement between the two sides is yet to be ratified. We have to 
bear in mind that Germany's energy policy was always towards free access to it and 
not to control it (Perthes 2005: 6). A look at Table 7 reinforces the above argument 
by presenting Germany's important raw material and energy imports. 
Table 7: German imports and exports of selected products in tonnes. 
Imports exports 
Coal and lignite _+ ___ -7:20~0:=:7:-----t__---_:=1":96:,_---__1 
Crude petroleum and natural gas _+ ___ ....:5:::1::::75:::9=---___ t__----'3:,:6:..:1c::O-----I 
Metal ores -;-+ ___ -:=:36~1:::8:-----t__---_:_::9:::8:-:----__1 
Coke, refined petroleum products and 15278 12050 
nuclear fuel 
Basic metals _....L.:=:-_..:3:..:.7.::,50::;5:..-___ L-___ ..:4;,:1:::,07:..:9:..-___ .J 
Source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany 2006a. 
Table 7 underscores that Germany as an industrial power has a vital and 
considerable need for resources; this dependency is expected to lead to FDI in 
relevant sectors that will secure the necessary inflows. In relation to this thesis, if it is 
proved that the western Balkans contain resources that are in required by Germany 
or if they are in sectors that German companies are investing, then it is possible to 
explain German interest there as well as to explain certain German actions in the 
events of former Yugoslavia. In addition, the struggle for resources is a primary 
hegemonic motive, since a hegemon wants the needed resources in a secure and 
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stable environment, which is som~thing that EU enlargement and the EU missions 
can offer. 
The soil of former Yugoslavia is rich in minerals and raw materials such as iron, 
nickel and bauxite (aluminium) (see Appendix 1) that are necessary for industrial 
production. In fact, during both the First and Second World Wars, the region was of 
extreme importance for German supplies, due to the provision of nickel and iron for 
German tanks and aeroplanes (Rippert 1999). According to the Bundesministerium, 
fur wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) the resources of raw 
materials in Kosovo are among the largest in Europe (Bundesministerium, fUr 
wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung 2004a: 5). This becomes apparent 
if we consider that Kosovo has 17 billion tons of coal reserves and represents one of 
the biggest reserves of lead, zinc, gold, silver and lignite (Rippert 1999). It is known 
that the Trepca mines in Kosovo are among the largest in Europe, with 25% of the 
region's industrial production. Indicative of the energy importance is the World 
Bank's recent grant to Kosovo of$8.5 million for the exploitation of its large energy;' 
resources through the construction of a power plant and mine. The construction will 
be implemented by private investors that will be motivated by this grant (World 
Bank 2006c). Given that Germany as a trading economy 1s highly dependent on a 
secure supply of raw materials and safe transportation routes around the world', any 
problem in the free flow damages the national economy and its prosperity (BMVG 
2006: 19). The establishment of. hegemony could be a solution for securing these 
sources and thus the existence of the sources indicates an interest that could justify 
the efforts for hegemony in the western Balkans. 
The above fact underlines the importance of the Balkans for Germany, since 
the region is of great importance for the location of energy pipelines from the 
Caspian Sea towards Europe. Energy is one of the priorities of both German and US 
foreign policy. At the moment, the Caspian basin provides an alternative source of 
considerable magnitude for both German and US energy supplies (Rippert 1999; 
Emerson 1999: 19; Howkins 2005: 236). What makes the western Balkans an 
important region for German capital is its location on the energy supply routes of 
Central Asia towards Europe. The Balkans are located in the middle between the 
Central Asian energy sources, (particularly from the sources of the Caspian Sea), and 
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European markets. The location of the Balkans as the bridge between East and West 
gains further significance because the safest routes for the transfer of oil and gas are 
through the soil of a peaceful, stable and pro-EU Balkans (Erickson 2001: 236-37). 
Thus, it is imperative for the EU and industrial member states such as Germany 
to have a smooth supply of energy from these sources. The answer to this problem is 
in the form of pipelines. The existing pipeline projects that affect the region are the 
Baku-Cheihan, Blue Stream, the South Caucasus pipeline, the CPC and the 
Cosnstanza-Omisalj-Trieste. All these are directed to Turkey, while in the Balkans 
only Romania, Croatia and Bulgaria are the recipients of gas and oil. In addition, 
Croatia and Serbia receive oil through the Druzhba pipeline. Thus, there is a series of 
new projects such as the TurkeY-Greece-ltaly interconnector, the Nabucco project 
(which is sponsored and coordinated by the EU), the Bourgas-Alexantroupolis and 
the AMBO (Energy Community 2007; European Commission 2001:29; INOGATE 
2007). In summary, according to the Energy Community of the European Union, 
there 'are nine projects, with only the Bourgas-Alexantroupolis currently under 
construction (Energy Community 2007). The importance of the Balkans as iT transit 
region becomes greater given the fact that a secure Balkan region can be a c~rridor 
away from Russian interference. This importance as a transit region was also 
mentioned in the EU study from 2004, according to which the EU must ensure the 
security and stability of producer and tr.ansitcountries, something that enlargement 
is creating (European Commission 2004c:22). Therefore, the security of the Balkans, 
which is best promoted through their integration into the EU, is one of the key 
points for the EU's energy supply. The folloWing map is indicative of this: 
Map 1: The energy projects in Europe. 
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It will be interesting to examine who carries out these projects. At first glance, 
the main contractors are the EIB and the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) 
of the Balkans. However, despite the contribution of these institutions, that is 
considerable according to our first interviewee (Confidential Interview 1), the 
bilateral relations between donor countries and the beneficiary states also play an 
important role. In our case, according to the BMZ, Germany is directly financing 
certain projects that it believes will promote the economic development of the 
western Balkan region, (and consequently to the benefit of German capital). At the 
same time it contributes substantially to the work of organisations such as the World 
Bank and of course to the various EU programmes that are operating in the western 
Balkans. In fact, Germany is the second largest bilateral donor after the US and for its 
direct actions in the region uses special agencies like the German Office for 
Reconstruction and Development. This agency is based in Kosovo and operates as an 
advisor to the BMZ and as coordinator of its projects. The reason that we refer to aid 
has to do with the simple fact that most of the aid goes to projects such as 
institution-building and the road infrastructure that aims to create a favourable 
economic environment, facilitating investment by foreign capital in the host 
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economy. A lesser reason is that the direction of aid could indicate interest on behalf 
ofthe donor. 
Germany also supports the involvement of the private sector in the region, 
mainly through its agency the Deutsche Investitions-und Entwicklungsgesellschaft. 
Its scope is to promote the creation of joint enterprises between German companies 
and local enterprises, and with the provision of German financing. Two examples are 
the Micro Enterprise Bank of Kosovo that operates with the German Commerzbank 
and the public water utility of Albania, the Elbasan supported by the private German 
company Berlinwasser. In' addition, there are twinning projects of the German 
Chambers of Industry and Commerce that provide expertise to local firms. Finally, as 
the BMZ admits, 'the promotion of trade relations and the initiation of joint 
enterprises with German firms both play an important role' (BMZ 2004a: 83). 
Beyond energy considerations, the Balkans are the main location for the Pan-
European transport networks. In fact, Corridors31 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 that connect the 
main ports of Durres, Rijeka and Split with the mainland are currently under 
construction (European Commission 2001: 12; Howkins 2005: 192"93). Among them, 
the most important are corridor 8 that connects the Caspian with the Adriatic Sea 
through Bulgaria, FYR Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania, and corridor 10 that c~nnects 
Austria and Greece though the territory of former Yugoslavia. According to the EU, 
these corridors and the whole idea of the Pan-European network is for the regional 
integration of the area into the West and for boosting trade. The map below is 
indicative: 
11 Corridors are part of the Trans-European transport networks and relate mainly to roads. 
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What is also interesting in this case is the project for a corridor that will connect 
China with the EU through Turkey via a network known as the Silk Road. So far there 
is a route connecting China with Turkey and Iran. Therefore, the project wants to 
expand this to western Europe (Howkins 2005: 192-93, 194). The project thus has a 
geopolitical significance, because such a road connects industrial Europe with Asian 
energy resources. Thus, the transit areas (Le. the Balkans) have to be stabilised for 
the undisrupted dual flows between western Europe and Asia. 
The Balkans are also important because of their proximity to Russia. Russia 
shares strong cultural, historical and religious connections with the region. Serbia 
has the strongest link, while the other republics have a more western orientation. 
Nevertheless, from this relationship and taking into account the special relations 
between Germany and Russia, it seems that Germany is trying, through the Balkans, 
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to enhance its role as mediator between NATO and Russia (Paterson 2003; Timmins 
2007; Pradetto 2004). We saw this strategy in Kosovo, in the negotiations for the 
Energy Charter and even in the German response'to the invasion of Georgia. As a 
matter of fact, Russia always feared that the growing penetration of NATO and EU in 
the region could pose a threat to its position, especially during the wars of 
Yugoslavia (Baranovsky 2001: 9; Norris 2005). 
In order to support the above mentioned assumptions, we have to take into 
account that when the last Yugoslav prime minister, Ante Marcovic, visited 
Washington D.e. in 1988 in an effort to seek assistance and investments, the West 
asked for economic reforms in exchange, even though it refused the one billion 
dollars for these reforms (British American Security Council 2006; Gervasi 1993). The 
implementation of the reforms package without the required funds intensified the 
economic problems and the tension in the relations between the republics, which 
were also rooted in the economic problems of the federation and provided the 
emergence of the nationalist parties. This incident implies that the West exercised its 
power in order to promote its ideology (in the face of certain economic reforms) and 
to bring Yugoslavia under the western sphere of influence. 
In addition, before the outbreak of war the EU had blocked assistance in the 
name of minority rights violation. Nevertheless, the EU promised to support 
Yugoslavia's integrity but in a new institutional structure where the constituent 
republics would be virtually independent. As proven by the events such a promised 
structure motivated the republics to leave Yugoslavia. In an article in the New York 
Post, Mark Fisher notes that the EU was dealing with the unity of Yugoslavia, while 
the German government had an open communication channel with Croatia, and was 
provided assurances for of its recognition as an independent state (see Fisher 1992). 
This second incident shows that the plans on Yugoslavia were also European. More 
importantly it reveals the role of Germany as possible hegemonic leader. The role 
seems valid because the German attitude proved that Germany as true hegemon can 
impose its preferences on the other members of the group or, in case this is not 
possible, can move unilaterally as in the case of the unilateral recognition of Croatia 
and Slovenia (where there were strong German interests), which followed the initial 
German threat and which in the end forced the EU to follow, suit but without doing 
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the same for Bosnia which, although it was a similar case, had/ has no obvious 
interest for Germany. 
2.5.3. Interests of the German politico-economic elite. 
Certainly, someone might claim that these are speculations. Therefore, we have to 
provide evidence that there is indeed interest from the German politico-economic 
elite. In order to identify this, we have to look for actions of prominent members of 
the German economic and political elites and identify the actions of German politico-
economic diplomacy in the region. 
Starting from the actions of the German industrial world, we have to note 
the position of the chair of the Eastern European Committee (Ostausschuss), which is 
an industrial group for the promotion of business links with Eastern and South East 
Europe. The former chairman, Klaus Mangold, said of these states that 'it's our 
natural market...in the end this market will perhaps bring us to the same position we 
were before World War I. Why not?' (quoted in: Fisher 1992). This position by the 
Eastern European Committee is important because of its historical centrality to 
Germany's Ostpalitik and because it is supported by the major industrial, trade and 
banking associations in Germany whose interests it promotes. Additionally, this 
committee illustrates the interest of German capital in Central East and South East 
Europe by stating that its purpose is to bring German enterprise closer to these 
states through four actions: the network of contacts with government 
representatives and German business associations with SEEC; coordination and 
institutionalisation of dialogue between the two sides; information bn investments 
in the region and through the organisation of seminars conferences and delegations 
(East European Committee 2006). An interesting example is the World Bank-
European Commission conference in September 1999 on the Balkans that was 
sponsored by the Deutsche Bank. This can be viewed as an example of interference 
and lobbying by private economic interests in the work of an international 
organisation (Welfens 2001: 98). 
The position of the German political elite towards the western Balkans is also 
explicit. In particular, from the very end of the Cold War, the German political elite 
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had expressed its intentions towards Eastern Europe. Firstly, Kohl's response to the 
communist collapse was to stress Germany's responsibilities towards Eastern 
Europe, such as Germany's need to be able to intervene outside its area due to its 
new responsibilities matching its size and economic power (Kinkel 1997; Rathbun 
2004: 86; Hyde-Price 2003: 190). These statements in combination with the clear 
pro-Croatian and pro-Slovenian German stance, with the ensuing unilateral 
recognition of these two republics, may demonstrate a threat or actual desire for 
political and economic leadership in the region (Rip pert 1999; Gervasi 1993; Hyde-
Price 2003: 190). Statements over the future of the region took the form of 
integration into western structures namely NATO and the EU. Klaus Kinkel stated in 
1997 'we see ourselves as the spokesman for the young democracies of central and 
Eastern Europe on their way into the Euro-Atlantic structures' (KinkeI1997). German 
decisiveness in the western Balkans is also expressed, according to the last US 
ambassador in Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann, by the unilateral raising of Bosnia's 
recognition issue by the EEC, after Germany's demands relating to Croatia and· 
Slovenia, which led on 17 December 1991; to the EU offering Bosnia of a timetable 
for final recognition (Zimmermann 1996). 
This rhetoric continued with the SPD/Green coalition government, but in a . 
more normative way, since its leaders lacked an immediate memory of the Nazi era, 
having been at most children at that time, and thus they were not so normatively 
bound to the guilt of the Nazi era (Rathbun 2004: 82-3). Hence, they moved German 
policy forward, by assuming a more aggressive response towards the Balkans that, as 
we have seen,'was marked by the participation of the German army in out-of-area 
military operations for the first time since the end of World War 11. Moreover, during 
the Yugoslav crisis and particularly during the Kosovo criSis, the rhetoric of the 
SPDjGreens emphasised human rights and their protection, in order to prevent 
the're-emergence' of Nazi crimes. Indicative of this approach are the speeches of 
Joschka Fischer in order to convince the German political world of the value of 
German partiCipation in the intervention, deploying the slogan 'never again and 
never again Auschwitz' (Johnstone 2000; Rathbun 2004). In fact, the Red-Green 
government seems to have elaborated the Kohl plan for the future of the Balkans, 
and inserted it into EU policy, through the SAP and the SPSEE. 
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Today, Merkel seems to be continuing this policy but within the framework of 
transatlantic cooperation in a way that ensures German interests. This argument is 
repeated in the 2006 White Paper that states that German security policy is driven 
'by the values set forth in its Basic law and by the goal of safeguarding the interests 
of our country' (BMVG 2006: 6). This is reflected in one of Merkel's speeches at the 
Munich Conference for Peace and Security in 2006 where she stated that the current 
situation in the Balkans is proof of the efficiency of Europe in dealing with its own 
affairs, having of course the assistance of US (Merkel 2006; BMVG 2006: 7). This was 
also mentioned before with the 2005 coalition agreement that speaks of strategic 
partnership with the US (Guerot 2006: 52,) and the reform of the constitutional 
status of Germany's Bundeswehr (I.e. federal army) In order to be able to intervene 
globally in out-of-area missions (Breuer 2006: 206) 
Hence, what appears as a first example is that both the political and economic 
elite were in favour of an active involvement in the Balkans as well as around the 
world, in a way that might mean seeking a degree of control or at least safeguarding 
and promoting national interests. This takes the shape of the significant penetration 
of German capital in Central East and South East Europe and the presence of the 
German army and the political elite in key posts. What also seems to be the case is 
that Germany is more relaxed in regard to the use of force for interest-seeking, as 
well as the idea that the bigger the participation the better the post that it will 
receive (Breuer 2006: 206, 208). This has occurred particularly from the moment 
that the collapse of the Soviet Union created a gap that the EU and its member 
states raced to fill (Smith 2003: 135-38; Schweigler 1997). 
2.5.4. Further indications of interest. 
Dealing with the actions of German diplomacy for.the achievement of a dominant 
position in the Balkans, the best example is provided by the presence of Germany's 
Chambers of Commerce and the German embassies in the region. In addition to the 
role of the Eastern European Committee, valuable information is provided by the 
former Serbian and Montenegrin embassy in Berlin that shows how the meetings 
between politicians and the organisation of conferences by private actors, made 
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Germany the most important economic partner of Serbia and Montenegro32• In 
addition: 'During Chancellor Schroeder's visit, a Germany-Serbia Montenegro 
Economic Cooperation Council was established ... to develop appropriate projects to 
attract potential German investors. Chancellor Schroder announced that companies 
like "Hermes" a'nd other institutions will guarantee German investments in Serbia 
and Montenegro' (Serbian and Montenegrin embassy in Germany 2006). 
Moreover, there could be reasons that go beyond economic considerations, 
proving Germany's desire for intervention, something that Professor August 
Pradetto asserted in 1998 by saying that the NATO response in the Balkans had 
strong power-political considerations. These had resulted in the expansion of the 
western alliance into the previous sphere of influence of the Soviet Union and in 
conflict over the competence and extent of political decision-making and the 
influence of the Caspian oil reserves that were largely under Russian control 
(Pradetto 1998). The argument in Pradetto's article (written a year before the 
Kosovo war) was supported by the fact that NATO had offices in Albania and FYR 
Macedonia and had also conducted joint exercises with these countries, while NATO 
was expanding its influence to the whole SEE (Pradetto 1998). 
It is within this context (Le. of Germany's seeking to promote national interests 
and expanding its international presence) that German military participation in 
Kosovo during and after the war is located. It can be claimed that the German 
presence operates for the protection of certain economic interests. The fact that 
Germany is developing its army in order to be operational worldwide and that the 
former and current chancellor is ready to emphasize Germany's obligation to 
intervene wherever necessary (within multilateral frameworks, of course) supports 
this argument (Merkel 2006; Rippert 1999; BMVG 2006: 9). Furthermore, according 
to the 1992 strategy paper of the Federal Defence Ministry, the new responsibilities 
of the Bundeswehr include the maintenance of free international trade and access to 
strategic raw materials (Rippert 1999; Breuer 2006: 206). Once again the White 
Paper confirms the above quotation by stating that German economic prosperity 
depends on access to raw materials, goods and on an open world trade system with 
32 Furthermore, at the donors' conference in Brussels on 29-30 June 2001, Germany was the second 
largest donor with €78.23 million. 
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unrestricted transportation routes (BMVG 2006: 17). Hence, in connection to 
hegemony the development of security capabilities and their use in the Balkans, 
. might reveal an interest protection policy and thus an indication of the 
establishment of hegemony. 
Important indicators of Germany's active interest and role in the region are' 
the German responses to the Yugoslav crises. Germany was the first country that 
supported the secessionist movements of the former-Yugoslav republics while it was 
among the first supporters of the Kosovo liberation Army (KLA). We can find 
examples of this in the German press referring to the 'barbarian' Serbs and the 
'European' Croats and the representation of the KLA as champions of self-
determination. Another example is the view of the BM2 that the Serbs where 
operating a 'Serbian apartheid' in Kosovo (BMZ 2004a: 7; Gervasi 1993). Germany 
was also the first EU country to open an embassy in Kosovo on 27 February 2008. 
2.5.5. German military presence in the western Balkans. 
Beyond the evidence of ' German economic and associated security interests and 
their clear articulation, there is one last thing that supports our position about the 
existence of German interests in the Balkans. This links the EU to the German 
military presence (as well as to the wider EU military and police presence in the 
region). In the aftermath of the Yugoslav crisis, Germany appears in the region with 
growing economic penetration, a significant aid contribution and with a military 
presence in Implementation Force (IFOR) (with 4000 military personnel) and in SFOR 
(with 3000 military personnel). In SFOR the German troops were combat units, and 
here Germany demanded and received high ranking posts in SFOR and in Bosnia 
(Gardner-Feldman 2001: 19, Baumann 2001: 171-72), Thus, it undertook the 
leadership of SFOR and it succeeded in getting its candidate appointed to the 
position of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH33 ) (Baumann 
2001: 172). Germany also initiated the Stability Pact that we noted at the beginning 
of the chapter, once again with its own candidate in the leading position (Crampton 
2002: 277; BMZ 2004a: 9). 
33 We are using the same initials that the EU uses for 80snia and Herzegovina, 
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After the Kosovo war Germany demanded and obtained key posts like the 
leadership of Kosovo Force (KFOR), while the High Representative (HR) of UNMIK 
was also a candidate favoured by Germanl4, namely Michael $teiner, a German 
diplomat with experience in the former Yugoslavia, while in KFOR Germany took the 
leadership, with Klaus Reinhardt, and also provided one of the largest troop 
contingents (around 8500). Moreover, Germany took under its command one of the 
five sectors, while now along with the US are in command of sectors of KFOR in the 
borders with FYR Macedonia (Hyde-Price 2000: 119, 118; Crampton 2002: 276; 
Baumann 2001: 173). Steiner was praised for his focus on how UNMIK should work 
and the structure that he created. Moreover, UNMIK established the Deutsche-Mark 
as the Kosovar currency, until the Euro's arrival which in turn became the official 
currency (Woehrel and Kim 2003: 45-6). The German military presence is consistent 
with the growing expansion of the Bundeswehr in out-of-area missions and, as was. 
mentioned. in the introduction, Germany is the largest contributor of troops to UN 
missions globally (see Crawford 2007). 
This might mean that Germany appears in the western Balkans as a stability 
factor and is seeking a power role like that of France and the United Kingdom in the 
past; Hence in connection with hegemony, and for this thesis, the role of military 
participation can be closely linked with the above mentioned economic interests. 
The military and police presence is bringing the necessary stability that favours 
economic penetration and protects foreign investments, i.e. German and west 
European investments in this case. In addition, it could be claimed that the stability 
of the Balkans is strongly connected with the wider interests of EU member states, 
and particularly of Germany in Eurasia, as we will try to demonstrate in case studies. 
Thus, the military presence could be considered as part of the hegemony as well. 
2.6. Concluding remarks. 
Trying to make an assessment of this chapter, we have to focus on three key points. 
Firstly, in pure neo-Gramscian language the EU has all the 'requirements' to be called 
34 The German presence includes the Deputy Special Representative of the civil administrative pillar of 
UNMIK, Mr. Tom Koenigs and Mr. Haekkerup, the UNMIK chief, while the Germans control the justice 
and police administration pillar. In addition, in FYR Macedonia NATO appointed German ambassador. 
Hans-loerg Eiff to be its senior representative in the country. 
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a hegemonic institution. It has an ideology that reflects certain national interests and 
it transmits this ideology in the recipient states in such a way that it becomes 
'common sense' Thus the establishment of hegemony looks uncontested. In this 
s'ense it can be argued that the EU member states constitute a group that as we will 
show in the case studies is participating in the Historic Bloc, and that the EU as 
bureaucratic structure is a tool for the promotion of the Bloc's preferences. 
SecondlY,unquestionably the policies of the EU in the western Balkans are 
creating a favourable environment for the penetration of foreign economic capital 
(and as will be seen, of German capital in particular) as well as making the domestic 
societies look 'submissive' to EU preferences. This facilitates the 'control' of these 
societies and their economic exploitation by the Historic Bloc which, by having 
economic control, can gain political control as well. Finally, we can establish a strong 
German interest in the region as well as the existence of significant economic 
penetration, which give us grounds to move onto the case studies in an effort to 
discover if there is 'fire under the smoke'. Before this, however, there is a question 
that has to be"answered: 
Can this mean that Germany is the leader of an Historic Bloc that is 
hegemonising the Balkans? 
In this chapter, it was demonstrated that Germany. has an interest in 
enlargement and that it has shaped this policy. Particularly, in the western Balkans, 
the main framework of enlargement, i.e. the SAP was shaped under, the German 
presidency, while Germany was the state that created the Stability Pact. Moreover, it 
was demonstrated that Germany has an important economic presence, which is 
protected by participation in military and police missions in the western Balkans. To 
these is added a number of possible reasons that might explain the German interest 
in the region of the western Balkans. Hence, if we add the findings from the 
introduction and Chapter 1, about the influence of Germany on the EU and the 
formulation of EU economic logic, then there is a good case for considering Germany 
as the leader of the Bloc. This is supported by the fact that Germany is satisfied with 
the enlargement, which means that it was successful in the bargaining process and 
has effectively imposed parts of its ideology (Gardner-Feldman 2001; Zimmermann 
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1996). However, this hypothesis as well as the core hypothesis of this thesis has to 
be tested in the following three chapters. 
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Chapter 3: case study Serbia. 
3.1. Introduction. 
The aim of this chapter is to apply the theoretical framework that we formulated in 
the previous two chapters. Therefore, in this chapter, which is our first case study, 
we ,will investigate, in accordance with our theoretical assumptions, whether 
Germany is exercising politico-economic hegemony in Serbia. As becomes obvious 
we take each case study independently. Finally, in this case and in the following two 
cases, the chapter starts with a description of the politico-economic data of each 
case that will provide us the necessary data for the application of the theory and the 
analysis. 
3.2. Historical background. 
Serbia dates its existence as a distinct national entity, back to the sixth century and 
the arrival of the· Slav tribes in the Balkans (Ostrogorsky 1986: 81). The first 
independent Serbian kingdom was founded in 1217 by Stefan I. The medieval 
Serbian kingdom ended after the battle of Kosovo on 28 June 1389 that led to the 
gradual imposition of Ottoman rule in the region that was completed in 1459 
(Jelavich 1983a). Kosovo's historical burden starts then. Kosovo was not only the 
place of the 'final' battle of the last Serbian empire but also the centre of this empire 
and the stronghold of the Serbian patriarch. The latter's escape to the Hapsburg 
Empire in 1459 from the Ottoman menace has until today significant normative 
power for Serbs and signalled the mass advance of Albanian groups in the region of 
Kosovo (Glenny 1999; Ahrens 2007). Serbian independence was completed in 1878 
when the congress of Berlin gave international recognition to the Serbian principality. 
The Serbian kingdom was established on 6 March 1882 (Jelavich 1983a: 144-5, 163; 
Glenny 1999). 
The role of the Great Powers was decisive in the achievement of 
independence. It is indicative that the Austro-Hungarian Empire wanted Bosnia and 
not a strong Serbia; the Russians wanted a strong Serbia but also a big Bulgaria, and 
the British along with the French wanted a controlled Serbia and Greece as 
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counterbalance to the Ottoman Empire and Russia (see more in Glenny 1999; 
lelavich 1983a; Crampton 2002). Therefore, Serbian independence (as well as the 
independence of the whole Balkan region) resulted from the competition between 
the Great Powers. This competition also initiated the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, 
since Austria, Russia and Great Britain used their Balkan. satellites for solving the 
Eastern Question in Europe. These wars also enhanced the power and size of the 
Serbian kingdom. The role of the Great Powers was also evident in the First World 
War since Austria's demands on Bosnia and Russia's interests in Bulgaria initiated the 
Balkan front. 
After the First World War (and the dissolution ofthe Austro-Hungarian Empire), 
the Serbian kingdom became the central state of the first Yugoslavia, namely the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes on 1 December 1918. The Kingdom was the 
location for competition between Serbs and Croats with the former seeking to 
control the Kingdom. The internal divisions threatened the existence of the First 
Yugoslavia, which collapsed in 1941 after the German attack. However, the guerrilla 
war of the Partisans led eventually to the creation of the 'second' Yugoslavia on 31 
January 1946, formally known as Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with Serbia 
retaining the central role but under the leadership of the Croat, Tito (Crampton 2002: 
21-22; Glenny 1999). The death of Tito and the deep economic problems of the mid-
1980s brought the rise of nationalism and the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia. The 
term Yugoslavia was finally abandoned with the dissolution of the federation 
between Serbia and Montenegro. The period of wars until the late 1990s was 
marked by the activities of Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic3s, whose actions 
caused destructive armed conflicts among the Yugoslav people. Milosevic's arrest in 
April 2001 signalled a new era in Serbian history (Pond 2006: 215; Crampton 2002: 
281). 
From this historical presentation, we depict some crucial aspects for our 
research. Firstly, Serbia's historical development was always influenced by foreign 
powers and their preferences, with some of these powers such as Russia and 
3S Milcsevic was not the only 'negative' figure in former Yugoslavia. Tudjman, the eroatian head state, 
the Bcsnian Serb Karadzic etc were also important but since we are focusing on Serbia we have to 
exclude them from any of our analysis. 
117 
-------------------------------------------------------------- - - -- - -
Germany continuing this important role until today. Secondly, Serbia always had a 
dominant role in Balkan affairs and a central role in every plan that was related to 
the Balkans, such as the consolidation of Soviet rule after 1945 or now with the 
integration of the region into the West. Finally, Kosovo and Yugoslavia have shaped 
Serbian identity, .and were central for justifying Serbian actions during the war in 
Kosovo. In relation to this thesis, this identity is im portant because its manipulation 
by Milosevic brought a Serbian mobilisation towards war, and it is still in use by the 
current political forces for their interests and is thus possible for the Bloc to use as 
well. 
3.3. Political developments. 
The post-Milosevic era finds Serbia on the difficult path of transition to a liberal 
market economy and towards integration into western structures, notably the EU 
and NATO. The current political situation in Serbia reflects the Milosevic legacy and 
the difficulties of a fragile political environment. In 2000 the first democratic 
elections brought to power a predominantly pro-western elite under a coalition 
grouping with the overall title Democratic Opposition of Serbia. The EU, US and 
Germany along with international NGOs and IFls were the main forces for the 
organisation, promotion, financial backing and cohesion of the opposition seeking to 
overthrow Milosevic (Pond 2006: 213; McCarthy 1998). In fact, this was a central 
strategy oriented at regime change as was admitted by Germany (Welfens 2001; 
McCarthy 1998). The first democratic government with Zoran Djindjic of the 
Democratic Party as Prime Minister and Vojislav Kostunica as a president began the 
reforms towards integration into the western structures, notably into the WT036 
(still in negotiations) and the EU. However, the fragile political situation and the 
assassination of Djindjic on 12 March 2003, led to elections in that year and the 
minority government of Kostunica with President Boris Tadic, since the winners (i.e. 
the Radicals) were prevented from forming a government after strong western 
objections, notably by the EU and USA. 
36 The latest news mentions that Serbia is in the last stage before its admission to the wro (see 892 
2009). 
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The minority government that was formed faced many difficulties of which 
Kosovo was arguably the biggest. Consequently, the reforms slowed down and in 
2006 the EU put the SAA negotiation on hold, as a result of non-compliance with the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (lCTY) (The Economist 
2003; Pond 2006: 221-2). The internal political situation was in turmoil, with the 
federal system simply not functioning. It has to be noted that the federal system was 
created after strong EU pressure to sign the constitutional charter for the state union 
of Serbia and Montenegro in March 2002 (EBRD 2007a: 13; Elefterotipia 2002; Pond 
2006: 233; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2007: 149). 
Within this framework, crucial parliamentary elections were held in Serbia in 
2007. The Radicals won with 28.6% of the vote but Kostunica formed a minority 
government after strong pressure from the EU and Germany (EBRD 2007a: 14; 
Solana 2007; Confidential Interview 2; Heaney 2007: 543, 550). These pressures 
continued when the Radical Party was prevented from choosing the president of the 
Serbian parliament (Papadopoulou 2007; Euractiv 2007b). The government formed 
after the 2007 elections began the implementation of the proposed reforms and had 
substantially improved its record, even though it was still criticised because, in the 
long awaited constitution, Kosovo is referred to as a province of Serbia (Articles 114, 
182) and because of the hard line that it maintained in relation to the final 
settlement of Kosovo's status. 
The current political setting was formalised after the crucial presidential and 
parliamentary elections in Serbia in 2008. The elections were crucial because of (a) 
the Kosovo developments (b) the internal strife of the pro-EU elite and (c) the 
growing influence of Russia, which was (and still is) jeopardising both Serbia's path 
towards the EU, as well as the overall EU plan for the Balkans, and the finalisation of 
Kosovo's status (see ICG 2008). 
The importance of these elections rose after the previous success ofthe Radicals 
and the growing influence of Russia at that time due to developments in Kosovo. In 
this climate the West and in particular the EU intervened in favour of Tadic who won 
in the second round with 51.19% of the votes, after the Radicals had won the first 
round with 40%. Emblematic of the ambivalent outcome of the elections was 
Kostunica's support for Nicolic (who had Russian support as well) and on the other 
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side EU support for Tadic (Vatou 2008). The EU's support was reiterated by Solana 
on 21 January 2008, who stated that Serbia would be encouraged to have closer ties 
with the EU· (B92 2008a). On the opposite side, the pro-Russian position of Nicolic 
was reflected in his reference to the possibility of establishing a Russian military base 
in case of his victory (lCG 2008:4). 
The electoral result sent signals to the EU about divisions within Serbian society 
and made clear to the EU that Kosovo's independence will not bring Serbia to the 
point of abandoning the EU track, since the majority remains committed to EU 
membership despite the shock of the loss of Kosovo. In other words, it became 
apparent that even with only a small majority the Serbs were willing to 'sacrifice' 
Kosovo in favour of EU membership. What the presidential elections also revealed is 
the deep division within the pro-EU camp. Tadic's victory meant the continuation of 
the two-track approach i.e. both the status of Kosovo and EU membership, without 
the developments in two policies being linked. On the other hand, Kostunica was 
preserving the 'nationalist' pOSition that connects Kosovo's status with Serbia's EU 
membership, a pOSition which was supported by the Radicals (see B92 2008a) and 
which brought him into a clash with the pro-EU/West camp. 
Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence and the decision of the EU to 
send its EULEX mission to Kosovo, intensified the divisions and the rift within the 
pro-EU elite and led to the collapse of Kostunica's coalition government. Tadic's two 
track approach called for intense diplomatic actions with parallel progress in the EU 
'field' (B92 2008c). Kostunica from his side was diametrically opposed to such a 
strategy and in favour of a more 'aggressive' approach. Indicative of this approach 
was the rejection by Kostunica (during his premiership) of the Interim Agreement on 
trade and trade-related proposals between Serbia and EU in an effort to delay the 
EU recognition of Kosovo (Moshonas 2008a). This of course brought an open rift 
between Tadic and Kostunica, where the latter had Russian support and was willing 
to side with the nationalists (Elefterotipia 2008a; ICG 2008). An example of the 
magnitude of the crisis in the pro-EU camp was the statement by Tadic that 
Kostunica would not be a Prime Minister in a coalition government with his party 
(B92 2008d). The outcome was the collapse of the government and the calling of 
new elections, which were held on 11 May 2008. Hence, the situation created 
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strange alliances in the sense that Kostunica was supported by the Radicals, while 
Tadic remained the main champion of EU norms. In the elections that followed on 11 
May 2008, Tadic won with 38.4% (leaving the Radicals second with 29.46% and 
Kostunica's party third with 11.62%). The new PM is Mirko Cvetkovic 37 • EU 
interference in the internal political affairs of Serbia was once again explicit but this 
time as a statement of the importance of the election result for Balkan stability (B92 
2008f). 
In relation to this thesis, in these elections we can identify explicit interference 
by the EU in favour of Tadic, who personally asked for western support. There were 
also huge demonstrations by those opposing Kosovo's independence, involving 
fatalities (see ICG 2008) and the break-up of the pro-EU elite that had overthrown 
Milosevic. Hence, within a year and because of the Kosovo issue Serbia saw a change 
in the balance of political power, with an obvious impact on the formation of the 
Serbian Historic Bloc38 as we will analyse in a later section. Finally, the election result 
shows an apparent preference on the part of Serbian society for the target of EU 
membership. 
The result of the elections becomes important as well because of the power 
balance in the Serbian system. Serbia is a parliamentary democracy with the Prime 
Minister enjoying the dominance of executive power and the government reflecting 
the will of the Prime Minister. Furthermore, both the former and current 
government, were formed to a large extent by members that have a strong western 
background (Serbian Government 2007e). This fact will be useful in the follOWing 
analysis applying the neo-Gramscian approach because it indicates possible positions 
of the Serbian government. Another important outcome of these elections was the 
losses of the pro-Russia camp. As we will mention in detail in later sections, Russia 
has active and historical connections with Serbian society and is trying to use them 
whenever possible in order to increase its influence on Serbia and to 'drag' Serbia 
towards Russia. Hence, in this case study we expect to see an external confrontation 
to the Serbian Historic Bloc. 
37 More details in section 3.5.1. Nevertheless, the fact that he is a relatively new figure in Serbian 
politics, prevents us from having more details about his political actions. 
38 In each case study we will define the character of the Historic Bloc at the beginning but for the rest 
it will mentioned as Historic Bloc. 
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Having seen the configuration of political power in Serbia and the role of 
various actors, that will be analysed later, we move to the presentation of four main 
political challenges that Serbia faces. These are EU integration and economic 
transition; the status of Kosovo; the ICTV and the NATO membership. These are 
analysed below. The presentation of these challenges is necessary for several 
reasons. It allows us to see the various interactions among the actors that would 
probably form the Serbian Historic Bloc. Moreover, it explains certain attitudes of 
the actors and allows us to create a platform for the explanation of certain actions 
and particularly of the hegemonic consolidation. The latter is assisted by outlining, 
through these challenges, how the hegemonic ideology is transmitted and functions. 
3.3.1. Transition and EU membership. 
EU membership is the main political target of Serbia. It enjoys the support of a broad 
political and social consensus in the country something that is evident from public 
opinion polls like the 200S poll by the Balkan Monitor that found that 57.S% of Serbs 
are in favour of EU membership (Balkan Monitor 2009). This' is underscored, as 
noted in a confidential interview in the European Commission, by the fact that even 
the anti-West and pro-Russian Radical Party is in favour of EU membership 
(Confidential Interview 6), which means that almost the entire Serbian society wants 
membership of the EU. With this objective in mind, the Serbian government has 
created an arguably very efficient set of cooperative arrangements between 
ministries' and agencies with the most important being the EU integration office. In 
2005 the office published the National strategy of Serbia for Serbia and 
Montenegro's accession to the European Union which represented the main Serbian 
strategy for the EU membership process. The strategy paper stated that '[T]he road 
towards the EU is viewed as the road towards a modern society with stable 
democracy and developed economy' (Serbian EU Integration Office 2005: 7). 
Serbia joined the SAP in June 2003 (Le. during the Thessaloniki summit) and 
entered SAA negotiations in October 2005. However, the political instability of the 
country and non-compliance with the ICTV conditions led to the freezing of 
negotiations on 3 May 2006. The talks were resumed on 13 June 2007, during the 
German presidency of the EU, which played an active role in the negotiations 
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(German Presidency of the EU 2007b; 2007c). On 10 September 2007, Serbia 
successfully completed the SAA negotiations. The Agreement was signed on 29 April 
2008 and signalled a new era in EU-Serbia relations, which are now on a contractual 
basis. Currently Serbia is ready to sign the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-
related issues (Serbian Government 2008). This deve,lopment reflected the will and 
the careful planning of Serbia for joining the EU. The Serbian strategy is defined by 
the SAP and SAA (Le. the Thessaloniki agenda) and by the Copenhagen Criteria and 
the Lisbon strategy (Serbian EU integration office 2005:7; Serbian Government 
2008). Hence, in May 2008, Serbia replaced the National Strategy with the National 
Programme for Integration with the European Union (NPI). The new programme 
corresponds to the new situation in the EU integration process of Serbia after the 
completion of SAA and represents a programme for the adoption of the acquis. As 
. the NPI states: 
'NPI should become one of key documents of the Government in the years to come. It shall serve not 
only as a means of reforms coordination on the road towards the EU and a basis for drafting of ' 
Government's annual plans of work (sic), but also as a transparent and well prepared information on 
planned reforms, intended, on one hand, for the European Commission and EU member states, and 
the Serbian society on the other' (Serbian Government 2008). 
The new programme mirrors the EU progress report, and according to its 
authors, is designed to complete the adoption of the acquis cammunitaire in an 
efficient manner. It focuses on the Copenhagen Criteria and therefore the 
programme corresponds to the priorities set by the European Partnership 
programme and the EU Progress Report. Some of the political challenges refer to 
public administration and judicial reform and to the general prOVision for the 
protection of human rights and minorities (Serbian Government 2008). 
In answer to these challenges, the Serbian state has created an extensive 
network of ministries and agencies with the target of EU integration. The 
coordination of the Serbian accession process belongs to the Office for European 
Integration of the Government of the Republic of Serbia. In addition, the government 
is advised about strategic issues of the integration process by the Council for 
European Integration, which was established in 2002. This Council also established 
the Committee for Coordinating the EU Accession, with the main task of proposing 
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measures for improving cooperation between agencies and organisations and to 
'establish the priorities and most favourable manner of harmonising Serbian 
regulation with EU standards' (Serbian EU integration office 2005:14; 2007c). 
Moreover, the ministries have special European integration departments where the 
civil service is regularly trained by the EU. Two further features of the structure are, 
firstly, that Parliament has the European Integratian Committee oJ the Serbian 
Parliament. The whole structure is in tune with the Commission that monitors the 
integration process. Secondly, individual member states, such as Germany, are also 
'advising' Serbia e.g. in the area of police reforms, through regular meetings or 
exchange of missions (Serbian Government 2004a). 
In the 2008 programme, this network is expanded and now comprises the 
whole spectrum of agencies and ministries. This reveals Serbian determination and 
an organised plan relating to the target of EU membership. This determination is also 
obvious in the position of the Serbian elite (see below) towards the necessity of EU . 
membership. Furthermore, only two years after the launch of the Strategy and with 
the new programme, Serbia appears to have implemented a large number of its 
targets and to be on track towards membership. 
3.3.2. Kosovo. 
The status of Kosovo, (along with EU membership), remains the main political and 
national issue for Serbia. The Serbian position up to Kosovo's declaration of 
independence of 17 February 2008 was (as stated explicitly in the official website of 
the Serbian government for. Kosovo-Metohija, www.srbiia.sr.gov.yu/kosovo-
metohijaf) and in the 2004 Plan Jar the political solution to the situation in Kosovo 
and Metohija still is 'more than autonomy, less than a state'. This means enhancing 
autonomy within the Serbian borders. The term 'enhancing autonomy' is interpreted 
by Serbia as meaning that it would 'retain authority for foreign policy, guarding the 
borders and protecting Serbian cultural monuments' while the Kosovo authorities 
have absolute power in all other matters without Serbian interference (ICG 2007: 5, 
9; Serbian Government 2004a; Serwer 2004: 2,4). 
Serbia based this position on the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 that 
recognised Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, even though this sovereignty was for a 
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limited amount of time (Le. an 18 month interim period) (ICG 2007: 1; Serbian 
Government 2004a). Another of Serbia's arguments against Kosovo's independence 
was the threat that it would de stabilise the whole region because other ethnic 
minorities might try to do the same. In fact, such 'fears' exist for FYR Macedonia, 
Greece, Montenegro and Russia (see ICG 2007; Ahrens 2007). This position was 
explicitly defined by the former Prime Minister of Serbia, Kostunica, in his Brussels 
speech on 12 September 2007 (Kathimerini 2007; Serbian Government 2007c; ICG 
2007: 11; Serwer 2004: 4; Serbian Government 2007f). The scenario was also 
considered by the EU but from the opposing point of view, namely that if Kosovo did 
not become independent, then destabilisation was inevitable (ICG 2007: 12-13; 
Euractiv 2007c; German Presidency of the EU 2007a). The events since Kosovo's 
independence seem to justify the EU position, because the Balkans remains stable 
and Serbia remains on its EU path. Indicative of the former is the recognition of the 
independent Kosovo by Montenegro and FYR Macedonia, which are neighbours. 
Both have Albanian minorities. Therefore, as the EU predicted, an independent 
Kosovo seems to bring stability. 
On the other side and until 2008, the Kosovar39 position was in favour of 
immediate and full independence. This was an old demand dating back to the Berlin 
Treaty (1878) when the Albanian populations were divided into three states (Ahrens 
2007: 266, 484; Glenny 1999). During the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s, the 
Albanians pursued the goal of a Greater Albania (more in Chapter 5) but the negative 
response of the international community turned them to the solution of Kosovar 
independence (Ahrens 2007: 321-323; Sell 1999: 15). Then the Kosovar Albanians 
shifted to the idea of a Greater Kosovo, which was again stopped by the 
international community, which made it certain to the Albanian leadership that such 
an option was not acceptable (Pond 2006: 120; Ahrens 2007: 323-24). 
The final status of Kosovo was subject to long-term negotiations, with the 
international community (namely EU and US) to decide, on the basis of the Ahtisaari 
proposal of supervised independence, Le. in favour of an international protectorate 
under the control of the EU (Serwer 2004; ICG 2007). On the other hand, Russia was 
39 The term describes the Albanian ethnic community of Kosovo. 
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making it known in all instances that it would block the UN recognition of Kosovo 
and its admission to all international fora (lCG 2007; 2008). The Russian position was 
consistent with the position ofthe former Serbian leadership. 
The obvious deadlock of the negotiations and the tremendous internal 
pressure to declare independence, (something that the international community had 
realised and was trying to avoid initially, but later accepted), sowed the seeds of 
independence, with the political 'coverage' of EU and'US (ICG 2007: 14), since the 
Kosovar leadership knew that the West would protect them in the event· of 
independence. Hence, the long expected unilateral declaration of independence by 
the Kosovar leadership, which was followed by bilateral recognition on the part of 
several EU member states and the US. Germany was the first state to establish an 
official diplomatic mission on 20 February 2008. The EU as a whole preserves a 
position of de facto recognition since because of the veta of some member states it 
is not recognising Kosovo as an independent entity but at the same time has 
undertaken the 'control' of Kosovo with its EULEX mission (leG 2007; Portuguese 
Presidency of the EU 2007). 
As was expected, the EU and US were pushing Serbia for a solution' in 
accordance with the Ahtisaari plan. As a result, Serbia began to move towards Russia, 
which was offering support for Serbia's positions on Kosovo. This of course meant 
that Russia could gain access to Serbia and thus increase its expansion in the Balkans, 
which is of extreme concern for the West. Indicative of this prospect was a 
statement by the Serbian government which mentioned that economic relations 
with Russia should have priority (Serbian Government 2007a). In relation to this 
thesis and the issue of hegemony, this competition between the West and Russia 
over influence in Serbia could be the decisive factor for Bloc formation and 
hegemony itself. At the moment, the West has the last word in Serbia but a future 
rebalancing in favour of Russia, as a result of national events such as Kosovo's 
independence, could bring fundamental changes in the hegemony to such a degree 
that a new Bloc could be formed. The Russian actions during the latest Serbian 
elections are indicative of Russian interest in Serbia and the possibility of changes in 
the balance of power in Serbia. 
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The news of Kosovo's independence caused huge protests in Serbia involving 
some fatalities. At the political level it produced the above mentioned political rift 
and the current two-track approach. Serbia under Tadic's government is working 
towards preserving Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo (or at least over the Serbian 
areas of KOsovo) through the EU and international bodies such as the UN in order to 
preserve Kosovo. Thus, Kosovo plays an important role in Serbian politics and has 
changed the balance of power within Serbia in two instances so far. In addition, 
Kosovo reveals the traditional role of external actors in the Balkans, highlighted by 
the fact that western interference was the catalyst in the final developments in 
Kosovo. Therefore, for the formation of the Historic Bloc it is necessary to see how 
the domestic elite group is forming and how it cooperates with the foreign elite that 
seems to have a rather different approach towards Kosovo. The interaction of the 
two elites in relation to Kosovo's future could reveal the power relations within the 
Bloc, because in case the foreign elite has the power to impose its preferences on 
the domestic elite without the oPPosite being pOSSible, then obviously the foreign 
elite has more power in the Bloc. 
3.3.3. ,cry compliance. 
The ICTY was established by Security Council Resolution 827 of 1993. Its purpose is 
to bring to justice the war criminals of former Yugoslavia and therefore to facilitate 
the reconciliation of the nationalities of former Yugoslavia. Full cooperation with the 
ICTY is a condition for membership of the EU. From its side both the Serbian 
government and population regard the ICTV with suspicion, as a tool of Serbia's 
enemies that will prosecute only Serb heroes that fought for Serbia. Thus many 
Serbs believe that ICTV is biased (Pond 2006: 220-21; Ahrens 2007: 19-20). 
The Serbian government used to cooperate reluctantly and this stance was 
frequently criticised by both the EU and its member states (c.f. B92 2007b; 2007e). A 
good example was the explicit accusation of the former main prosecutor, Ms Del 
Ponte, aimed at Vojislav Kostunica and the Serbian government of deliberate non-
compliance (B92 2006a). Until Kostunica's 'fal/', Serbia had handed low ranking 
officers to the ICTV, while important suspects such as Mladic and Karadzic enjoyed a 
kind of protection (Pond 2006). This reluctance on the part of Serbia led to the 
127 
-------- ---------------
freezing of SAA negotiations. However, in the 2008 report of the European 
Commission and in the statements of EU officials, ICTY cooperation would seem to 
be of secondary importance for EU membership. The change of government led to 
Karadzic's arrest on 21 July 2008. It is interesting that the arrest took place only a 
few days after the change of government, which gives an indication of the 
orientation of Serbia under Tadic. In addition NPI stresses clearly that Serbia is 
willing to cooperate with the ICTV (Serbian Government 2008: 84-7). 
The role of the ICTV is not only important because it is a precondition for EU 
membership. The insistence of the Dutch government that it would block the Serbian 
candidacy until the arrest of Mladic and, on the other side the reluctance of Serbian 
society to hand over Mladic, creates a conflict that may affect Bloc cohesion. Lately, 
the Serbian government has revealed its plans to bypass the Dutch veto by 
unilaterally applying the trade provisions of the association agreement with the EU 
(Elefterotipia 2008d). 
3.3.4. NATO membership. 
NATO offered a Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement to Serbia on 29 November 
2006, which was signed on 14 December 2006. For Serbia, admission to NATO is the 
least important political area for Serbia but a necessary target for the complete 
integration of Serbia into western structures. Serbian President Boris Tadic noted, 
Serbia's entry into PfP means the end of its isolation (NATO 2006). From its side, 
NATO sees Serbia as another part of the jigsaw for the stability of the region and its 
expansion, while the ICTV cooperation is also a condition of the PfP (NATO 2006). It is 
also significant that NATO already has military bases in Kosovo and Bosnia. Germany 
is arguably the main supporter of the Balkan expansion of NATO (Schweigler 1998; 
NATO 2007). 
The events in the Caucasus as well as the close cooperation between Serbia and 
Russia make Serbia an even more important part of the Balkan puzzle. Hence, we 
expect conflict between elites within and outside Serbia about which camp (Le. 
Russia or the West) Serbia will choose. In addition, one might expect increased 
pressure from NATO on Serbia, as it is a key state not only for the stability of the 
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Balkans and of the security of FDI there, but also a factor against Russian 
'expansionism' . 
3.4. Economic developments. 
Serbia has faced severe economic shocks in the last 17 years; which have severely 
damaged its economy. The country has faced international embargos, a series of 
wars and internal turmoil. All these events (especially the NATO bombings of 1999) 
have destroyed much of the production and infrastructure capacity of the country 
(for instance, in 2006 the Gross National Income was 60% of the 1989 level), whilst 
the embargo brought hyperinflation and increased cross-border organised crime that 
profited from smuggling during the embargo. Added to this is the large number of 
refugees40 that have made the huge unemployment rate even worse and increased 
the size of the grey economy (Office for South East Europe 2007: 26; Heany 2007: 
550). 
Thus, Serbia has entered the transition process late, in 2001 when the coalition 
of 'opposition' parties formed the government and overthrew Milosevic. The 
international community and particularly the EU with its member states, the IMF, 
World Bank and the US have helped Serbia implement the reforms deemed 
necessary by them. Thus, since December 2000, Serbia has been in the process of 
reintegration into the international community by rejoining the World Bank and the 
EBRD. At the moment, Serbia is in the process of implementing the economic 
preconditions for EU membership and is in negotiations with the WTO. 
3.4.1. Basic economic data. 
Annual real GDP growth in 2007 accelerated to 7.5% from 5.7% in 2006, mainly due 
to private and public consumption. Industrial production also rose 6%, due to the 
production of a US Steel plant and per capita income has increased to 35% of 
average EU-27 levels, and inflation remains under control. However, unemployment 
is high at 18.3% and this is an outcome of the neo-liberal recipe of deregulation, 
privatisation and restructuring .of the economic base that Serbia is pursuing and 
40 There are 106,700 refugees and 207,923 internally displaced persons in Serbia (European 
Commission (2006b: 16). 
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which has led to job losses. Services represent the most important sector and 
particularly the areas of transportation, telecommunications and financial 
intermediation (European Commission 2008c). The European Commission, however, 
notes significant problems in the Serbian economy. The biggest problem is the size of 
the current account deficit and the external debt, which accordingly required inflows 
on the capital account to compensate. These inflows are mainly FDI from 
privatisation acquisitions and portfolio investments rather than greenfield projects 
which are those which produce new jobs and increase the economy's capacity 
(European Commission 2006b: 19). The following table is revealing about Serbia's 
economic situation: 
Table 8' Selective economic indicators 1999-2006 
Year/indicators 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Growth (Real GO? %) n/a 4.5% 4.8% 4.2% 2.5% 8.4% 6.2% 5.7% 
Inflation 43.5% 79.6% 93.3% 16.6% 9.9% 11.4% 16.2% 11.7% 
Unemployment rate 14.5% 13.3% 13.3% 14.5% 16.0% 18.7% 21.1% 21.0% 
General government n/a n/a n/a -n/a nla n/a 0.8% -1.5% 
balance (GO? %) 
Government debt (GO? %) n/a n/a 101.6% 69.5% 64.3% 53.3% 50.1% 33.2% 
Trade balance (in millions -1167 -1713 -2577 -3414 -3555 -5201 -4252 -4962 
€) 
Current account balance -427 -166 -318 -1319 -1255 -2307 -1788 -2912 
(in millions €) 
Exports (in millions €) 1452 1781 2033 2339 2934 3282 3995 5166 
Imports (in millions €) 2620 3494 4610 5753 6489 8482 8247 10121 
Source: European Commission 2008c 
The most striking information that this table gives us are .the effects of the war 
and of the Milosevic era on the Serbian economy. In fact, Serbia faced hyperinflation 
until 2002 and increased debts. In the post-Milosevic era, the neo-liberal policies of 
transition, privatisation, deregulation and restriction of public finances as well as 
strict monetary policy might have led to the reduction of inflation and of debts (the 
latter are still considerable) but have increased the unemployment rate. In addition, 
we see an increased trade deficit that threatens the economy, revealing its lack of 
competitiveness as well as the effects of trade openness without prior economic 
restructuring. 
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3.4.2. External institutional framework. 
The first part of our economic presentation involves the external institutional 
framework. As was mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, these institutions are expected 
to have an important role in the consolidation of hegemony, since according to neo-
Gramscian theory these institutions are instruments of hegemonic control. 
Therefore, it is necessary to examine what these institutions are and what their role 
is in Serbia. Once again, the EU has an equally important role in the economic realm 
as in the political, since two out of the four Copenhagen Criteria are economic. 
Additionally, Serbia is pursuing the Lisbon Criteria41 and according to the Serbian 
government and the National Bank of Serbia (NBS), the country is attempting to fulfil 
the Maastricht Criteria for admission to the Economic and Monetary Union (National 
Bank of Serbia 2007b; Serbian Government 2008). EU actions include primarily the 
implementation of reforms and the monitoring of the progress of the Serbian 
transition. 
The EU also influences Serbia as the largest donor that targets certain areas of 
assistance, namely the establishment of good governance and institution-building; 
economic reform and social development; the energy sector and transportation. This 
assistance comes through three channels. The main one is the IPA, which distributed 
€771 million for the period 2007-2010 and has as its main target transition assistance, 
institutional building and cross border cooperation. Another is the EAR, which also 
uses IPA funds and has an accumulated portfolio in Serbia of {lo13 billion. The third 
component of the assistance is bilateral assistance by the member states, where 
Germany is one of the largest (European Commission 2006b: 6; EBRD 2007a: 25). All 
these actors cooperate and the EU, through the Commission, has been given the 
leading and coordinating role. 
An important part of this network is the IMF. The IMF has a long history in the 
former Yugoslavia. The Fund policies and the Yugoslav debt towards the Fund were 
significant factors in the destabilisation of Yugoslavia in the 1980s. Serbia, due to 
balance of payments difficulties, rejoined the Fund on 13 May 2002 (initial 
membership on 14 February 1992). In February 2006 the Extended Arrangement was 
41 The criteria are the Lisbon Strategy objectives, namely "preparing the transition to a knowledge-
based economy and SOciety by better policies for the information society and R&D". 
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approved for Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of SO million (i.e. $937.2 rnillion) for the 
period of Serbia's 2002-2005 economic programme. The Arrangement was extended 
twice, on 13 May 2005 and on 21 December 2005 (IMF 2006a). The last part of the 
disbursement was signed on 7 February 2006 with the sixth and final review of the 
EA for the amount of $90 million (IMF 2008a). It is generally estimated that the Fund 
has channelled €2 billion towards Serbia up to today. Recently, Serbia asked for and 
received a 15-month precautionary Stand-BY Arrangement, in the form of a loan of 
SDR 351 million (about US$518 million), to cope with the recent economic crisis (IMF 
2008c). The Fund's main responsibilities are· macroeconomic policies and 
'consultation' on reforms and privatisation. The consultation is implemented 
through regular IMF staff papers (IMF 2008a; Heaney 2007: 550-1). It is important to 
stress that IMF funds come with a certain set of reform packages that reflect a 
certain economic ideology, i.e .. neo-liberal. 
The work of the IMF is supplemented by the World Bank. The Bank began its 
operations in Serbia in 2000 with $300 million pre-membership assistance 
(International Finance Corporation 2004: 1), and another $540 million up to 2004. In 
2004, the World Bank launched a three-year programme amounting to $400-$500 
million. The World Bank strategy since 2001 has remained stable and is organised in 
three pillars, namely: creating a smaller, more sustainable, more efficient public 
sector; creating a larger, more dynamic private sector; and reducing poverty levels 
and improving social protection and access to public services (International Finance 
Corporation 2004: 8; World Bank 2009). In this context the World Bank supports 
structural reforms and is leading the 'policy dialogue' in areas that are also of direct 
interest for the Fund (with which it cooperates closely) such as public expenditure 
management; energy sector reform and the privatisation of public enterprises (IMF 
2006a: 56, 58f). Moreover, since 2001 the Bank has been providing its services in 
Serbia and particularly in the financial sector and in the creation of a regional energy 
market (World Bank 2009). We have to note that the Bank's operations (as well as 
those of the IMF) are consistent with the SAP and the overall EU strategy in Serbia. 
Other institutions that participate in the economic transformation of Serbia are 
the EIB that is currently funding projects in Serbia in energy and infrastructure, and 
the EBRD. The latter is the largest institutional investor in Serbia since 2001 with a· 
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cumulative business value of €1 billion. Since 2004 EBRD commitments rose by 97%, 
involving 69 projects and with three main directions: in the corporate sector (Le. 
restructuring for privatisation), in infrastructure (mainly the transport and energy 
infrastructure42 in cooperation with the EU and the World Bank) and the financial 
sector (Le. further banking consolidation) (EBRD 2007a: 7-8; 2007b). The 
coordination is undertaken by the EBRD resident office in Belgrade and is based on 
dialogue between public and private actors and with the Foreign Investment Council 
of Serbia (EBRD 2007a: 9-10). 
Apart from that,the EBRD provides the framework for foreign corporations that 
wish to invest in Serbia, and helps to finance greenfield investments for this purpose 
(EBRD 2007b). In addition, in cooperation with the EU and the Serbian government, 
the EBRD is implementing projects that further enhance the attractiveness of Serbia 
as an investment destination. These are the infrastructure projects and particularly 
the Pan-European Corridor VII (Danube) and Corridor X (Hungary-FYR Macedonia), 
which according to the EBRD 'will further foster Serbia's ties with neighbours, its role 
as one of the key transit countries in Eastern Europe and its potential in attracting 
new FDls' (EBRD 2007a: 22). 
The Stability Pact plays an important role in Serbia's economic transition. The 
Pact operates through its Working Table 11, for the creation of regional actions in 
trade, infrastructure and investment, with a particular focus on trade and energy. As 
we saw, the Pact has initialised and managed the FTAs in the western Balkans that 
have created a unified market, which is seen as part of the solution for the problems 
of economic development and investment due to the small size of these states 
(Confidential Interview 2; Busek 2005: 32,33; Zakharov and Kusic 2003: 14). 
Moreover, the Pact assisted in the creation of the Energy Community (Confidential 
Interview 3; Stability Pact 2007) and has played a significant role in the coordination 
of projects by the IMF and the World Bank (European Commission 2006b: 18). 
In this context, there is a distinct division of labour. The IMF is dealing with 
Serbia's economic reforms towards a liberal market economy and is operating within 
the framework of the SAP with the cooperation of the Commission. The World Bank 
42 That receives the largest part of EBRD commitments. 
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for its part is assisting in the structural reforms, while cooperation with the IMF is u 
located in five policy areas (see Appendix 2). Furthermore, the EU and the Bank are 
cooperating jointly in the organisation of Donor assistance. A jointly sponsored 
World-Bank-EU Donors' Conference held in June 2001, raised $1.3 billion for 
economic restructuring. In November 2001, the Paris Club agreed to reschedule the 
country's public debt (which was $4.5 billion) as well as to write off 66% of this debt. 
In July 2004, the London Club of private creditors wrote off $1.7 billion of debt, just 
over half the total owed (Heaney 2007: 552). The cooperation between the EU and 
the World Bank is manifested through the Office for South East Europe whose main 
target is to facilitate the work of the European Commission and to jointly administer 
international assistance (Office for South East Europe 2007). 
Furthermore, the EBRD cooperates extensively with the EU, mainly through the 
European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR). In addition, the IMF is cooperating with 
the SPSEE, which works in parallel with the EU (the latter also has the leading role), 
while the former (i.e. the SPSEE) is coordinating the work of international donors 
(Welfens 2001; IMF 2006a). Hence, an extensive network that has three main 
characteristics is being established around Serbia. This network has a distinct neo-
liberal character or, to make it Simpler, it expresses a certain economic ideology. 
Furthermore, the main focus of the majority of their actions is the creation of a 
favourable economic environment that will be able to attract FDI. The final 
characteristic is the conditionality of actions, which keep Serbia 'under control' since 
no compliance means no assistance, and thus Serbia is forced to implement certain 
policies. Most characteristic was the freeze of SAA negotiations due to Serbian 
reluctance to cooperate with ICTV (cooperation is part of conditionality guidelines) 
as well as certain reforms of the judicial and institutional framework that attract the 
Commission's criticism and have led to pressure on Serbia towards their 
implementation (European Commission 200gc). In relation to this thesis there is a 
network of hegemonic institutions that promote the hegemonic ideology and at the 
same time gain the consent of the recipient society. The EU has a central role in this 
network, as coordinator. 
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3.4.3. Domestic institutional framework. 
Having achieved. most of the economic targets of the National Strategy (see 
Appendix 4), the following National Programme deals primarily with the economic 
Criteria of Copenhagen and Maastricht. Some of the key economic fields are macro-
economic stability and strengthening the institutional framework of economic 
activity. In particular, the focus is on price stability; fiscal consolidation; more 
financial control and enhancement of the overall institutional framework (Serbian 
Government 2008). 
In the 2005 Strategy one of the main targets was the accomplishment of 
competitiveness in EU markets 'since most of the Serbian foreign trade and capital 
flows, as well as the largest portion of its foreign debt are realised with the EU 
states' (Serbian EU Integration Office 2005: 56). The latter is supposed to be resolved 
by an increase in competitiveness and the full exploitation ofthe FTAs and CEFTA as 
well as with closer economic relations with Russia. Within the last three years 
Serbia's trade deficit with the EU has widened considerably. The Serbian answer 
comes with its Export Promotion Strategy, which plans to: 
'increase the volume, quality and diversity of export products, as well as to provide institutional 
support to Serbian exporters in placement of their products, identification of pertinent markets and 
their sustainability on them. The strategy plans to conquer new markets and increase the number of 
companies with the value of exported good' (Serbian Government 2008: 130). 
However, it is yet to be seen how effective the Serbian government will be in 
addressing these issues. Great importance is also placed on FDI attraction as the 
main source of both investments and development. Particularly for economic 
development, the Serbian government is planning to spend 1/3 of FDI receipts for 
the modernisation of its infrastructure. The importance of this is that it reflects the 
dominant modern neo-liberal economic ideology in Serbia, an ideology that 
considers FDI to be a panacea for economic development along with deregulation 
etc (European Commission 2006b; IMF 2008a; Serbian EU Integration Office 2005). 
For the implementation of its economic plans, Serbia has created a system 
parallel to the one that we saw in the previous section. The main agency here is the 
Serbian Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SIEPA)43. The role of SIEPA is to 
43 See Appendix 3 where we offer a summary of this structure. 
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attract FDI to Serbia and to promote Serbia as a business destination to foreign 
companies. It is the main such agency of this kind and is considered by domestic and 
external observers to be very successful. The SPSEE, in its joint report with the DECD 
on the Investment Reform Index 2006, declared SIEPA to be the best national 
investment agency in the Balkans after the Bulgarian investment agency (DECD 2006: 
64). Furthermore, apart from SIEPA, at ministerial level the Ministry of International 
Economic Relations takes the lead in all coordination. The efficiency of the whole 
structure is also noted in the Investment Reform Index, where Serbia is among the 
top countries in every category (DECD 2006). 
Despite the well-acknowledged progress, the EU notes a series of vulnerabilities 
of the Serbian economy. Dne of them has to do with the 2006 National Investment 
Plan, which the EU saw as ambitious and inflationary since the Serbian authorities 
had wanted to use privatisation revenue for public investments (European 
Commission 2006b; Heaney 2007). In December 2007, Serbia submitted an 
Economic and Fiscal Programme jor 2007, which the European Commission regarded 
as 'a generally coherent and ambitious macroeconomic and fiscal framework 
together with an ambitious agenda for structural growing level of external debt 
create (sic) important external financing needs requiring significant capital flows' 
(European Commission 2008c: 25). The data that were presented above seem to 
justify the EU critique, since Serbia reveals considerable growth but with growing 
deficits and unemployment. 
The overall assessment of the EU, as stated in the 2008 progress report, 
mentions the vulnerability of the economy and the existence of structural problems 
which it ascribes to the continued heavy interference of the state in the economy 
and to political instability (European Commission 2008c). The IMF agrees with the 
Commission and adds the vulnerability ofthe financial sector due to credit expansion, 
the increased Euroisation, loose fiscal control and underdeveloped capital markets 
(IMF 2008a: 5). 
There are some issues that arise at this point. In relation to the vulnerabilities of 
the financial sector, it is our firm belief that the implementation of neo-liberal 
policies in a transition economy, without the cultural background of a market 
economy, created tremendous problems by the very inability of the state to form 
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effective mechanisms of supervision. Contrary to logic, and to what happened in 
western economies, in the transition states there is firstly an impOSition of market 
economics and then the institutional framework which regulates the market. On the 
other hand such a situation offers almost unlimited opportUnities for foreign capital 
penetration and domination. 
Another point to note relates to the increased Euroisation of the Serbian 
economy. Interesting information that is also mentioned by the EU is that the 
widespread Euroisation of the Serbian economy distorts the transmission 
mechanism of the interest rate, which is important for the macroeconomic stability 
of Serbia (IMF 2008a; European Commission 2008c: 26). This is happening because a 
change in interest rates (e.g. assuming an increase in the interest rate) impacts upon 
the money supply of the domestic currency that in turn influences consumption, 
income, inflation and so on. However, when an economy is dominated by a foreign 
currency (e.g. the Euro) and particularly when the banking reserves are in Euros, the 
interest rate cannot work properly because the Euro is not influenced by the 
domestic interest rate but by the European interest rate. 
It has to be noted as well that the neo-liberal (or monetarist or neo-c1assical) 
school of economic thought, which dominates thinking in the IMF and the EU, sees 
the money supply and the interest rate as basic determinants of macroeconomic 
stability, even though an article in the Economist shows persuasively that the current 
economic orthodoxy seems no longer to be fully functional (The Economist 2007a: 
94). The current financial crisis is illustrative of this because the inability of the 
system to control the growth of the money supply along with the lack of 
transparency in the markets in the name of competition has created the conditions 
for financial collapse and proved that the manipulation of interests rates alone is not 
enough since not even close to zero US interest rates have proved helpful. 
Another of Serbia's characteristics is its culture in dealing with external actors. 
A good example of this is the attitude of the Serbian government after repaying an 
IMF loan that was demanding more control over its economic planning and thus 
ignoring the IMF suggestions. However, the economic problems of Serbia and the 
current crisis that forced Serbia to ask for the Fund's assistance might mean that 
Serbia is still in the IMF's grip. Finally, it is more than obvious that the EU operates 
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within an extensive institutional framework. This framework promotes certain 
economic principles, which create certain outcomes. This of course comes in perfect 
harmony with the definition of a hegemonic institution employed in this thesis and 
which demands from the hegemonic institution (i.e. the EU) to promote the 
hegemony and its ideology (mainly) by obtaining consent. 
3.4.4. The economic presence of European and foreign capital. 
looking at the data, the hegemonic presence of the EU becomes immediately 
apparent. The trade share of the EU-27 accounts for 56% and 54% of exports and 
imports respectively for 2007 (see European Commission 2008c). As the National 
Programme reveals, the vast majority of total exports are orientated towards the EU, 
while the most important import partner is Germany with 21.4% (Serbian 
Government 2008). This is an indication of the significant economic integration of 
Serbia with the Union. The next two tables are revealing: 
Table 9: EU and German trade with Serbia as a % of the total. 2001-2 OOS. 
Year/partner 2001 2002 2003 2004 200S 
IM EX IM EX IM EX IM E X IM EX 
EU-4"" - - - - - - 36 3 8.3 30.5 35.2 
EU 49.1 47 52 54 49.7 54.3 56.3 5 1.6 51.2 50.1 
Germany 13.5 13 14.7 13 13.8 12.3 13.9 1 0.2 14 11.2 
Rank"' 3'" 3'" 1" 3'" 1" 3'" 1" 3' 2" 3' 
Source: WIIW 2006 
Table 9 confirms the great importance of the EU for the Serbian economy and 
particularly the important rdle played by just four economies. The latter fact also 
indicates the role of regional proximity of the EU-4 in Serbia's trade relations and 
might indicate the fragmentation of production that seems to be directed towards 
four economies. Interesting also is the presence of Germany, which appears as an 
important trading partner and this is something that we have to take into account 
when we analyse the formation of the Historic Bloc, since the investigation of 
Germany's role in Serbia is the core of this chapter. 
44 i.e. Austria, Germany, Italy and Greece 
45 The rank refers to the ranking of Germany as trade partner of Serbia in comparison to the total 
number of trade partners. 
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Table 10: Serbian Imports and Exports in million €, and in % of the total for the period 2007-2008 
Units Year 2007 2008::-__ -. _____ -1 
Imports from Imports from Exports to Exp arts to 
Total 4728,9 (100%) 9642,6 (100%) 568 9,6 (100%) 11848,2 (100%) 
European Union 2699,1 (57,1%) 5306,9 (55%) 312 0,7 (54.8%) 6307,6 (53,2%) 
EU-4 1381,2 (29,2%) 2523,2 (26,1%) 154 8,9 (29,2%) 2965 (25,6%) 
Germany 514,9 (10,9%) 605,6 (10,6%) 112 8,1 (11,7%) 1402,2 (11,8%) 
Rank (Germany) 2'" 1st 3rd 1st 
Source: Statistical office of the Republic of Serbia 2008. 
Table 10 reinforces the results of table.9 and indicates the growing importance 
of Germany for Serbia. What is also important in Table 10 is Serbia's growing trade 
deficit, which reflects the lack of competitiveness of the Serbian economy and might 
indicate the 'exploitation' of Serbian production for the satisfaction of more 
advanced industrial economies like that of Germany. In addition, this growing deficit 
also reveals potent threats to the Serbian economy that requires external funding to 
adjust its balances. 
The well established 'dominance' of European capital is also obvious from the 
level of foreign ownership and FDI inflows. In particular, as SIEPA inform us, 
important '5ectors are controlled by European companies: agribusiness; automotive 
and component production; IT; electronics; textiles; pharmaceuticals (SIEPA 2007a), 
as well as financial services. Between 2003 and 2005 seven out of ten of the largest 
transactions in Belgrade were by corporations from within EU member states (one of 
them German). The exception that proves the rule is the purchase of the Serbian 
mobile company Mobtel by Telenor of Norway in August 2006 for €1.5 billion .(SIEPA 
2005a: 10; Heaney 2007: 552). Even though Telenor is not an EU company it has 
benefited from the rules that the EU is imposing on Serbia. The banking sector, 
according to the NBS is dominated by European banks, directly or through affiliates 
(NBS 2007a; SIEPA 2006). In particular, they control 72% of the sector with the top 
five holding 47% of Serbian financial assets (Serbian Government 2008). This trend is 
now apparent in the insurance sector, where the recent privatisation of the second 
largest insurance company DOOR, (and sale to an EU-based company), has raised 
overall foreign ownership in the sector to 62.8% (European Commission 2008c). 
In Serbia, the research encounters a quite popular phenomenon in the Balkans, 
namely the use by European companies (particularly German and Austrian) of their 
eastern European affiliates to penetrate the Serbian market. Examples include the 
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Hungarian MOL that belongs to the Austrian OMV and the Slovenian Nova 
Ljublianska Banka that controls the Serbian NLB Continental Bank and which is co-
owned by the Slovenian government, the Belgian KBC and the Austrian Erste Bank 
(NBS 2007a). An even bigger example is the case of Deutsche-Telekom- OTE. Until 
2007, the national Greek telecommunications company, OTE, had a dominant 
position in Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and FYR Macedonia. In 2007, the 
German operator, Deutsche-Telekom, bought OTE and consequently all OTE's 
affiliates in the above mentioned countries. 
In terms of FDI, the EU remains dominant with €2.3 billion in 2008 and it is 
impressive that the net FDI share ofthe EU has doubled in 2007 to 116% from 61% in 
2006 (European Commission 2008c). This means that the EU countries remain 
almost the only investors in Serbia. What remains to be found is which countries 
have the largest share, because those countries will be primary candidates for the 
role of hegemon, since the hegemony is primarily economic. The following table is 
indicative: 
Table n: Total FDI in Serbia 2001-2006 in $000. 
Year/Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Norway 2 74 280 
° 
29 1,546,993 1547,.378 
Germany 9,788 82,801 75,708 51,985 187,320 905,824 
1,319,578 
Greece 1,280 12,496 62,268 52,968 249,536 923,698 1,302,580 
Austria 1,421 33,876 93,747 146,104 201,189 520,356 996,876 
Netherlands 102 2,248 598,963 102,008 92,113 -214,119 581,315 
Slovenia 11,254 9,561 29,036 15,706 183,563 201,241 450,394 
France 81 87,489 7,858 24,022 62,347 159,085 340,882 
Great 1,225 6,618 20,631 79,620 63,330 135,915 307,339 
Britain 
Hungary 275 1,167 4,224 16,567 24,677 244,045 290,955 
eroatia 1,096 5,243 34,446 10,806 40,484 25,240 117,315 
Italy 594 7,553 21,325 10,149 18,316 52,752 112,695 
U5A 1,906 18,099 15,068 18,187 22,257 -29,612 46,248 
Russia 3,581 2,556 3,359 538 14,324 15,992 41,086 
Total 32,605 269,781 966,913 528,660 1,158,485 4,487,410 6,931,461 
Source: SIEPA 2007b. 
The table demonstrates the strong investment position of EU countries, while 
with Norway's addition to this group, the investment in Serbia from European 
countries is overwhelming. In addition, the investments are growing over time, 
which means that the more Serbia is integrating into the EU, the more investments 
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are growing. This of course has to do with privatisation since only lately Serbia was 
able to conduct serious privatisation and therefore able to sell key companies. The 
case of Norway is emblematic because the total FDI ascribed to Norway refers to 
only one purchase, namely the investment in Telenor. Equally important for later 
analysis is the fact that the EU-4 group and particularly Germany remain significant 
economic actors and this is consistent with the data that existed for trade. This 
shows the role of proximity and of trade and investment goes together, and 
constitute a serious interest in Serbia. One last element that has to be incorporated 
into the following analysis is that many German investments are indirect and 
channelled through eastern European, Greek and Austrian affiliates of German 
companies, with the result that the actual level of German investment in Serbia is 
much higher than these statistics suggest. Nevertheless, even without these 
. investments Germany remains the largest investor and this is an indication of the 
level of German interest in Serbia. SIEPA.data confirm that the German, Italian and 
US investments are bigger than the direct data show because of their use of their 
affiliates from other European countries (SIEPA 2007b). More indications for this can 
be seen from Eurostat that notes that 59.5% of EU-25 FDI stocks received by Serbia 
derived from the new EU members. The same applies to the 16.1% of EU-25 stocks 
held in Serbia that were ostensibly owned by the ten new EU members (Eurostat 
2006: 34, 47). 
It is important to remember in this context that the banking sector is extremely 
important for Serbia because it is the sector that is expected to allocate financial 
resources to areas that are important for economic development. Therefore, the 
expansion of European banks in Serbia also means the channelling of the resources 
towards those activities that are consistent with the wider economic policy that the 
EU is promoting in Serbia and the profit interests of European corporations. In 
addition, as the Office for South East Europe Report of 2007 has demonstrated, the 
banking sector is also responsible for intra-regional cooperation because it provides 
the means for cross-border actions and the homogenisation of financial markets, 
unifying the Balkan market in the process (Office for South East Europe 2007: 1,2). 
Here again we have to remember the advanced Euroisation of the economy and its 
effects that were described in Chapter 2. 
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3.4.5. German economic presence. 
Turning our attention to Germany, it is interesting to note the presence of German 
capital in almost all sectors, which does not apply to other investor countries and 
this could be element of hegemony because it reflects the economic 'supremacy' of 
Germany in Serbia. Nevertheless, one can note a particular focus on the food, 
machinery and raw materials sectors, such as copper and aluminium (UNCTAD 2004a; 
Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2006: 289-94). As noted above, Germany is 
Serbia's biggest trading partner. German companies such as Siemens and Deutsche 
Bank and their affiliates have extensive operations in Serbia. Germany is dominant in 
the pharmaceuticals sector; Stada recently bought Hemofarm, the biggest 
pharmaceutical company in Serbia (and among the biggest in the region) (Southeast 
European Times 2006). In 2007, the credit company Baufinanzierung-Bayern made a 
huge investment in the Serbian finance sector. According to SIEPA Baufinanzierung-
Bayern is expecting to make Serbia part of its global services group (SIEPA 2007c). 
Final evidence of the prevailing importance of Germany are the actions of the 
BMZ. According to the Ministry, from the moment that Milosevic was overthrown it 
started its operations in Serbia. The BMZ's main focus is on economic reforms and 
the reconstruction of the country with a special interest in the lignite mines and the 
power plants in Serbia (BMZ 2004b: 55, 56). The BMZ played an important role in the 
privatisation process in Serbia, by providing technical assistance and training to 
SIEPA. The Ministry also seems to express general German capital interests and 
makes known that it 'is supporting the privatisation of state-owned and nationalised 
enterprises ... The significance and difficulties of this process are clearly illustrated by 
the ongoing cooperation with Serbia' (BMZ 2004b: 37, 38). 
EU economic penetration is obvious from the above data. This significant 
economic presence seems to be the result of the politico-economic reforms in Serbia 
as well as an outcome of the region's relative stability. It is these two elements that 
arguably created the necessary environment for the attraction of economic 
resources from the private sector involving capital inflows from EU member states. 
What we have to find is whether this economic penetration is of hegemonic 
proportions and could lead to political hegemony as well. 
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3.5. Neo-Gramscian hegemony. 
In this section we will apply the theoretical framework to Serbia and we will have to 
answer the question relating to the existence of hegemony. Working according to 
the pattern described in Chapter 1, the analysis is divided into three parts, i.e. the 
three spheres of activity within which hegemony is projected. It is again import to 
note that we are referring to a regional type of hegemony, with a primarily economic 
dimension. 
3.5.1. First sphere: social relations of production. 
Since 2001, liberal economic ideology has become well embedded in Serbian society. 
This is apparent from the National Strategy and the NPI in which Serbian rhetoric is 
now clearly neo-liberal and monetarist in character. Indications of this are to be 
found in the emphasis on interest rates as tools for macroeconomic stabilisation, the 
great importance of FDr as development factors46 as well as the political rhetoric in 
favour of privatisation and deregulation. For instance, in the SIEPA impact 
assessment of investment, the neo-liberal policies of privatisation are considered to 
be the main vehicles of success (SIEPA 2005b: 28-32). Another element that we have 
to take into account is that Serbia is an economy in transition from a communist and 
self-management system to a free market economy (or liberal capitalism). This 
transformation, which started in the 1990s with the death of the Yugoslav doctrine 
of brotherhood and unity, brought new social forces that dramatically altered power 
relations in Serbian society. 
Thus, the communist elite was replaced by nationalists with Milosevic and his 
'court' and later by the pro-western elite that governs today. This new Serbian elite 
consists of the opposition to Milosevic, e.g .. Kostunica, Tadic et al. and the economic 
elite e.g. Miroslav Miskovic etc. (Jovanovic 2007; B92 2007h). Therefore, in 
theoretical terms, the change in the social relations oJ production, i.e. the first 
sphere, which took place with the dramatic events in Yugoslavia, has significantly 
changed the hierarchy of power and created an ideological as well as a pragmatic 
reality that seems consistent with the preferences of the EU (and of course of 
46 ln Keynesianism in contrast a greater role is accorded to national savings and public spending 
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Germany) and the US. This is a reality that according to the previously mentioned 
sections (mainly section 3.3.), is beneficial for western capital, particularly for 
German and Austrian capital, which would seem to have gained a dominant 
economic position in Serbia. Furthermore, within the first sphere we expect that the 
domestic elite, as part of the dominant Historic Bloc, is transmitting the hegemonic 
ideology (i.e. neo-liberalism) to the rest of the sOciety and this is expected to happen, 
since this elite is deploying all these policies, promoting neo-liberalism as well as the 
interests of European capital. 
Official positions that support this argument can be located anywhere across 
the spectrum of Serbian political opinion (except the nationalists) such as in the 
statement of the former Minister of Economics Mr Dinkic that Serbia will do 
everything to join the EU (Serbian Government 2007b) or Tadic's pOSitions on this 
matter (ICG 2007: 10). The creation of a pro-EU political elite is performing the 
function of transmitting hegemonic ideology and, by exploiting the hegemonic 
institutions, gaining discipline over domestic society. Thus, this domestic elite looks 
hegemonic inasmuch as it seems to assist in the consolidation ofthe hegemony and 
of the hegemonic ideology. Furthermore, we have to consider that the current 
political elite was financed by the US and EU when it was opposing Milosevic, 
something which is stated in USA Senate archives (see US Congress Senate 
Comm ittee of Foreign Relations 2000) and, as Elizabeth Pond notes, this created an 
American-trained resistance, with unity around one chosen leader, namely Vojislav 
Kostunica, who was also viewed by the West as the hope for putting Serbia on the 
EU integration path (Pond 2006: 213-14). This support (which continued in the latest 
2008 elections) is a testament to the pro-western preferences, not to mention of 
course the open interference of the EU and its member states in the last Serbian 
elections, on the side of the pro-EU elite led by Tadic. 
The formation. of the pro-EU group began during the period of the Yugoslav 
crisis, aimed at the overthrow of the Milosevic regime. It was a heterogeneous group 
linked by their common opposition to the Milosevic regime, a link created for a 
variety of reasons. Prominent personalities in this group were Zoran Djindjic, Vuk 
Draskovic, Boris Tadic, and Vojislav Kostunica. All of them were leaders of opposition 
parties and all of them came together in one group with the active encouragement 
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of the Wese7• Therefore, we are speaking of a group whose formation was largely 
influenced by outside forces. Typically the US government spent significant time 
uniting these groups against the common opponent (BBC2 2003; Pond 2006). 
Furthermore, it is a group that has received substantial financial, technical, moral 
assistance and training (particularly during the election campaign). In other words it 
owes its victory in part to the West. The archives of the US Senate are revealing since 
according to ambassador Pardew: 
'We are working (i.e. the US) with. our allies in Europe in a range of measures to undermine the 
Milosevic regime and to promote those forces that support democracy. We are pursuing 0 number of 
initiatives. We are supporting independent media in the FRY. We are working with the Serb opposition' 
(US Congress Senate Committee of Foreign Relations 2000). 
A very revealing background detail about the role of the US and EU in the 
creation of a unified opposition against Milosevic (who was right to insist that the 
opposition was built with foreign money), is provided by the Hearing of the European 
Affairs Subcammittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on· Yugoslavia. 
There are four pOints from this hearing of key significance. The first has to do with 
the US and European efforts to unite the opposition. Characteristically one of the 
participants and chair of the hearing, Mr Gordon Smith admitted that: 
'opposition forces ... must put aside personal differences and political ambition and for the sake of their 
country to work together' (US Congress Senate Committee of Foreign Relations 1999) 
. later a second spokesman, Mr Gelbard (who was the special representative of 
the President and Secretary of State for the implementation of the Day ton Peace 
Accords) reveals that: 
'In all our dealings with Serbian oPPosition leaders - and I am in regular contact with every segment of 
the democratic opposition - we have urged them to overcome the politics of ego and to work together 
instead' (US Congress Senate Committee of Foreign Relations 1999). 
The second point has to do with the mechanisms of support. According to 
Gelbard, the strategy for supporting the opposition democratic forces of Serbia had 
five pillars. One of them was related to the support of the independent media of 
Serbia and to the creation of 'a network of transmitters that permitS us to broadcast 
Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, ... throughout the country' (US Congress Senate 
Committee of Foreign Relations 1999). The strategy included funding of NGOs, 
47 With the term Is Implied EU member states and the USA. 
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political parties, independent labour unions etc., with an overall budget of $100 
million. In an article in the New York Times, there is confirmation of the amount (five 
days before the hearing) and a note of the refusal of US aid officials to reveal the 
names of the recipients of this money (Becker 1999). The final pOint is the 
reassurance that US actions have the approval of Europeans according to the US 
Senate (see US Congress Senate Committee of Foreign Relations 2000). 
Hence, we have strong indications that the domestic dominant elite has strong 
links with the foreign elite and its institutions. Therefore, this elite is part of the 
Historic Bloc since it shares the same hegemonic ideology and cooperates with other 
groups in the Bloc. In addition, the use of the media is significant since they 
represent a key tool for the transmission of the hegemonic ideology and the cultural 
accommodation, through their promotion, of certain behavioural values and norms, 
something which is consistent with the neo-Gramscian perspective. This is obvious in 
the westernisation of Serbian society as well as the great appreciation of western 
Europe, which is also promoted in the Serbian media. 
Moreover, the fact that its formation was provoked from outside, also meant 
that its leadership was artificial. In fact, as is known today, Kostunica was selected as 
leader because he was unharmed by state propaganda, because he was representing 
a small party and therefore was acceptable to the larger parties (Draskovic and 
Djindjic were political enemies) (see BBC2 2003); and because he was balancing 
between nationalists and 'westerners' (Pond 2006; BBC2 2003). As is expected, such 
artificial cohesion of the opposition coalition often erupts into disputes. The biggest 
example were the disputes between the first post-Milosevic president, Kostunica, 
and the first Prime Minister, Djindjic, about Serbia's path towards integration with 
the West (see The Economist 2001; 2002). Then as now, with the rift between Tadic 
and Kostunica, the response of the West was either to intervene and impose 
cohesion or to find a new candidate, like Tadic who won the leadership of the 
Djindjic party in 2004 and since then remained committed to the West and 
integration into the EU (see BBC 2004). As we will see, Tadic remains a favoured 
personality of the EU and USA. 
In the aftermath of their victory the pro-EU elite began its western orientated 
reforms and the integration of Serbia with the West. From this group the main 
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political personalities, until the 2008 general elections, were Zoran Djindjic - until 
his assassination - and then Boris Tadic and Vojislav Kostunica, who as we saw 
above played an important role in the political life of Serbia. Kostunica, despite his 
EU programme, had caused problems because his nationalism stood out against any 
thought of an independent Kosovo. His policy also brought Serbia closer to Russia, 
adding to the dissatisfaction of the West. Another problem was Kostunica's attitude 
towards ICTV which also caused many problems for Serbia's EU integration (see 
Gowan 2007; Reljic 2007) .. 
For Tadic, it is worth noting that he is considered the most pro-European and is 
rewarded for that, not only formally - with prizes for example, such as the Europe 
Prize for Political Culture - but also by receiving the confidence of the West. An 
example was the support for Tadic in the previous elections (Serwer 2004) as well as 
the support that he received for the presidential elections in both 2007 (ICG 2007) 
and 2008. Tadic is considered the person who can reduce Russian influence in Serbia 
and who will help find a solution to the Kosovo impasse. In the past he had 
supported ICTV and he called on the Serbs not to boycott the Kosovar elections. An 
indication of Tadic's procEU attitude was the arrest of Karadjic soon after his victory 
in 2008 and keeping Serbia on the EU track despite the (for, Serbia) negative 
development in Kosovo. However, until the 2008 elections, Tadic depended on 
Kostunica's support in order to beat the Radicals and this of course limited his pro-
EU rhetoric (Pond 2006: 139,230; leG 2007: 10). Hence, the split with Kostunica and 
the narrow victory of his coalition have strengthened his power. Serbian SOCiety is 
still divided and thus delicate actions are needed. Hence, within this framework we 
have to add Tadic's speech on 27 September 2007 at the UN where he mentioned 
that Kosovo independence is unacceptable. 
All these events indicate important hegemonic elements. Firstly, it becomes 
obvious that there is a strong connection between the pro-EU Serbian elite and the 
EU, as well as the latter's interference in Serbian affairs in favour of 'its' supported 
elite. This subordinate elite seems to base part of its legitimacy and cohesion on EU 
support, which proves that the elite's cohesion is to certain degree imposed from 
outside. Additionally, the actions of Tadic and the interdependence between the 
domestic and foreign elites elevates the former to the level of the Historic Bloc since, 
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as has been often repeated in this thesis, this group shares the same hegemonic 
ideology and aims and it demonstrates active cooperation with other members of 
the group. 
The new Prime Minister, Mirko Cvetkovic, is a pro-western personality but is 
. considered a low-profile technocrat (see International Herald Tribune 2008). He was 
also a consultant of the World Bank, director of SIEPA and minister of finance in the 
Kostunica government. Hence, he is a personality that has connections with the 
West and its institutions and of course with the particular economic ideology which 
is the basis of the hegemonic ideology. 
Hence, there are obvious links between the local and the foreign elite. The latter 
uses the former for the establishment of a certain politico-economic status quo. The 
former has used the support of the latter to remain in power. Further evidence is the 
formation of the recent cabinet which is made up largely of people with close links 
with the West and western capital. In addition, in contrast to other states in the 
region (e.g. Albania) the old elite is not participating in the Historic Bloc, which 
indicates the fundamental change of power in the domestic elite. 
3.5.2. Second sphere: forms of state. 
The next step is to examine the forms of state that give us the formation of the 
Historic Bloc and state-society relations, by identifying the dominant Historic Bloc 
and the hegemonic class. Within Serbian society the important class is the above 
mentioned politico-economic elite, but this position does not mean that it is the 
leader of the Serbian Historic Bloc. The rest of the Bloc can be considered to consist 
of the officials of multilateral organisations such as the IMF, the World-Bank as well 
as NATO, the representatives of foreign capital48 (both transnational and national), 
and EU officials49• At this point two questions can be addressed. Firstly, what are the 
criteria that make someone part of the Bloc and secondly why are other actors such 
as Russia excluded? 
48 To this group we include the politico-economic elite of states that are active in Serbia such as 
Germany. 
49 It is obvious that the institutions have a dual role. They are hegemonic tools but also their staff have 
the role offorming policy and action. 
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The answer to the first question is found in their common values and common 
goals, their ideology, their communication, cooperation and their coordination. The 
answer to the first question is the answer to the second, namely that the excluded 
'actors have a different ideology and agenda. Russia traditionally has the role of the 
protector of the Serbian people. Russia's influence in Serbian society has increased 
during the Kosovo war and even more in the post-Kosovo war period where Russia 
has been promoting the Serbian positions over the status of Kosovo in the 
international arena, mostly by veto the UN recognition of Kosovo independence. This 
Russian influence finds expression in economic links and in the nationalist party 
which is the mouthpiece of the pro-Russian section of Serbian society. Hence in 
Serbia there are two opposing camps: the pro-western and the pro-Russian with 
both having different ideas and agendas. At the moment the pro-western camp has 
the power and is part of the Historic Bloc. Therefore, Russia and the pro-Russian 
camp remain an opposition anti-hegemonic force ready to take power when the 
circumstances allow it." As such Russia remains an important factor in the 
developments in Serbia and in the establishment of hegemony and we can account 
for the Bloc reaction during the last Serbian elections in this framework. 
A second actor that we exclude is the 'powerful' Serbian church. The Serbian 
church played a crucial role in the Yugoslav wars and particular in Kosovo, since it 
was providing moral support for the Serbian actions, and here its influence within 
Serbian society was Significant. The reason that it is excluded is its severe weakness 
after the Yugoslav wars, which reduced its moral power, and marginalised it from the 
political arena, while its views are consistent with the Radicals and not with this Bloc. 
Returning to the description of the Bloc, the firstSO group (Le. the multilateral 
organisations) influence the political and economic life of Serbia to a significant 
degree. As we saw earlier, they are imposing certain reforms on Serbia by linking 
their policy preferences with economic assistance that is badly needed by Serbia. 
This is especially significant as we have been informed that international donor 
assistance finishes soon and thus Serbia has to find other financing sources 
(Confidential Interview 2). This imposition takes place through formal meetings, 
" The numbering has to do only with issues of writing. 
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informal consultation (e.g. IMF staff proposal papers) and country assessment 
reports. The latter are important because they influence foreign investment in the 
country, which is the main revenue source according to neo-classical (i.e. neo-liberal) 
economic policies that are pursued. The foreign capital elite (better known as 
transnationalcapital) has interests in Serbia and represents a vital element of 
Serbia's economic development. Evidence of this mutual rlilationship can be tracked 
through the investments of this class in the Serbian economy, and their positions, e.g. 
according to Klaus Mangold of Germany's Eastern European Committee, Serbia has 
. significant economic potential, which supports the continued cooperation between 
Germany and Serbia (Invest in Serbia 2005). This mutuality can also be traced from 
the policies for attracting investments and from declarations by the Serbian elite in 
support of transnational capital. Therefore, their influence in policy-making and their 
influence in Serbian society constitutes part of the Bloc. In addition, the good 
relations with the other two groups (i.e. international institutions and the EU) also 
allow their inclusion into this group. 
The third group appears to be the most influential. In Chapter 2 the EU was 
defined as the hegemonic institution, the vehicle which promotes European capital 
in the western Balkans and ensures its hegemonic consolidation. Particularly in the 
. EU-Serbia case, the role of the EU is to impose poliCies, monitor their 
implementation and punish any signs of non-compliance. Two examples that we saw 
earlier were the freezing of SAA talks due to Serbian reluctance to cooperate with 
ICTV, and the Serbian elections. For instance the German presidency mentioned that 
the formation of a pro-European government was welcomed and that it would keep 
Serbia on a European course (German Presidency of the EU 2007b). Another 
example is the pressure from the EU to prevent the party that won the 2007 
elections from choOSing a president in the Serbian parliament. For the latter, Angela 
Merkel expressed her concerns personally to Kostunica and 'urged Serbia ... to take 
action that would maintain the country's European perspective' (B92 2007a). 
Following this direction, the German presidency of 2007 urged the 'democratic' 
parties of Serbia to form a government, while at the same time the visa agreement 
with the EU was postponed (European Commission 2006b), until its signing on 18 
September 2007. In addition, the EU played an active role in determining the status 
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of Kosovo and overall Balkan stability. Certainly, one can assert that the EU is not 
going into a country without an invitation, but the fact that EU financial assistance in 
transition countries (and in the case of Serbia, a country devastated by war) is 
connected with certain policies within the framework of conditionality, constitutes a 
kind of imposition. Particularly, when this assistance and these policies are covered 
with the veil of membership in a powerful institution such as the EU. We say 'veil' 
because there are growing voices from the EU insisting that any new enlargement 
shall wait until institutional reform ofthe Union is agreed. This was supported by Mr 
Barroso's statement on 26 September 2006 that until the new constitution is agreed 
enlargement stops with Romania and Bulgaria (B92 2006b). A similar position was 
expressed by a representative of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Almer 
2008). Furthermore, the existence of the Copenhagen Criteria gives a formal 
dimension to this situation, while in 2008 Mr Barroso again indicated that Serbia 
could receive candidate status provided that it remained committed to reform and 
cooperated' with ICTV (see B92 2008h). Nevertheless, the delay in the adoption of 
the Lisbon Treaty on the part of the EU poses a great obstacle for any future 
enlargement, since the EU seems unable to deal with the extra institutional demands 
of such action. 
Hence, within the Bloc there is a distinct division of labour that demonstrates 
how it is using its power. The multilateral fora are proposing reforms, policies, the 
foreign economic elite along with the domestic elite are implementing them, and the 
EU, as was mentioned in Chapter 2, proposes policies, coordinates the activities of 
the other groups and monitors the implementation of a certain package of policies. 
The question that arises, therefore, is who is leading this Bloc. 
At first glance the overwhelming and leading presence of the EU can be 
claimed to represent this leadership. However, as was mentioned in Chapter 2, the 
EU appears as a 'facilitator' of member states' interests in regard to enlargement 
and therefore it is the member states that are behind these actions. However, the 
Kosovo status question is weakening the influence of the EU on Serbia which in turn 
has approached Russia. In other words the position of the EU in favour of Kosovo's 
independence is turning part of Serbian society away from it and in favour of those 
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actors that support the idea of Serbian Kosovo as Russia does. This argument is 
mentioned also by Pierre Hassner, emeritus research director at the Centre for 
International Studi'es and Research in Paris (Euractiv 2007a). Perhaps the victory of 
Tadic will reduce Russian influence but we have to take into account that more than 
40% voted for the Radicals, which means that there is still a strong pro-Russian 
group within Serbian society. Lavene~ and Schimmelfennig argued that 'the EU's 
hopes that its European perspective would make the loss of Kosovo acceptable to 
Serbia have not materialised so far' (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2007: 150) but this 
seems partially true since Serbia is still on the EU track. Therefore, the EU is 
dismissed as the leader of the group not only because it is operating as a 'means' of 
member state interests, but because its grip around Serbia is not absolute. The fact 
that Serbia remains on the EU path does not mean that the threats of a deterioration 
in EU-Serbian relations have ended but that at the moment, for the Serbs, the EU 
choice is still better. 
This very balance between Kosovo's status and integration into the EU arguably 
indicates who the leader of the group is, because in the end either the side that 
supports the western path despite Kosovo's loss or the side which links the western 
path with the Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, will prevail in the political terrain of 
Serbia. The argument is based on the fact that, for Serbia, Kosovo cannot be 
relinquished, while the West is pushing for Kosovo's secession in favour of the 
integration of the region (the statement of US assistant Secretary of State for 
European affairs, Daniel Fried, in 892 in 2007 is indicative of this) (892 2007f; leG 
2007; Sell 1999). 
The Serbs, however, are managing to maintain steady positions in relation to 
ICTV and Kosovo, and with popular support for these policies it is difficult to change 
because no-one wants to incur the political cost of accepting the independence of 
Kosovo (see 8i1andzic 2007; KojenS1 in 892 2007g; Deutsche We lie 2007). This 
political cost along with some nationalist positions in parts of the Serbian pro-EU 
elite and the Russian willingness to interfere in Serbian .affairs have made Serbia 
defiant in relation to the EU and give the impression that the Serbian elite could 
" Former Kosovo team coordinator. 
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even play the central role in the Bloc, since they seem to be in. a position to 
formulate an autonomous policy having the other classes on their side, which are 
receiving the hegemonic manipulation directly from this elite, since the domestic 
elite has direct communication with the subaltern classes. However, there are some 
factors that cast doubt on this conclusion. 
Serbia is largely dependent on foreign funds; it aims to achieve full integration 
, 
and to create a competitive market economy with the ultimate objective of EU and 
EMUS2 membership. To this end, it relies on the EU and foreign capital in a way that 
(separate from the political sphere), establishes an economic hegemonic situation 
that is expressed by policies, actions and economic penetration. All these together 
are creating dependency relations. Therefore, since the reference is to a hegemony 
from the view of political economy, the latter (i.e. Serbia's economic dependence) 
opposes the view of the power of the Serbian elite as the hegemonic class. 
Furthermore, Tadic's victory erodes this defiance against the EU, since the EU 'made' 
Tadic President. Add to this political patronage, the economic assistance of the EU 
. towards the government elite (that creates further dependencies) as well as the 
connection between Serbian political actors with foreign capital, which along with 
the EU is providing the necessary legitimacy and power consolidation of the 
domestic elite towards the rest of Serbian society. 
The group of international institutionsS3 for its part has the role of the political 
institutions that are creating those structures which are necessary for the facilitation 
of economic penetration and dominance of western (European in this case) capital. 
Therefore, they are seen as 'junior' partners of the transnational capital elite (see 
Chapter 1). Transnational capital and its representative elite in Serbia present an 
interesting case. Economic capital always has the means to combine independent 
economic actors and to form a common front without the need for an organised 
plan. In this case, the large presence of foreign capital is 'socialising' national groups 
(e.g. the German Auslandshandelskammern office in Serbia) and preserves a 
'national' character, in a way that form national associations that with the support of 
52 As it is known the membership process contains the commitment to the eventual adoption of the 
euro (Uebscher 2005:3). 
53 Obviously we are referring of course to the officials in these institutions. 
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parent economies, promote their interests. Within a capitalist system, the 
companies are competing with each other. This competition, it could be claimed, has 
nationalist characteristics since only companies from a handful of countries are 
investing in Serbia and within this, particular companies from the EU-4 group. This 
character is preserved even 'though the use of affiliates from other countries is 
diluting the national character of the foreign economic elite. Indicative of this is the 
position of the Union of Greek banks that demanded that the Greek government 
help them to finance their affiliates and customers in the Balkans because otherwise 
Greece was threatened with losing its position to other countries (see Zioti 2009). 
Despite the national division, it is possible to find common lines in terms of 
demanding the same reforms, either directly or through national governments and 
international associations. An example of this is the Council of Foreign Investors in 
Serbia that publishes its recommendations annually or through its survey poll 
according to which the foreign investors state what has to be done (SIEPA 2007c). 
The reality, with or without the existence of common lines, is that foreign capital 
influences the decisions of the Serbian elite, since the foreign inflows are of great 
importance for the Serbian economy, but we have to clarify how this influence is 
expressed. The obvious way that relates links to direct external' influence is 
expressed through interviews and conferences of economic elites and with meetings 
with government officials, but these efforts remain at an advisory level and 
sometimes reflect personal opinions. For instance, in April 2009, the Council of 
Foreign Investors presented the draft bankruptcy law of the Serbian government, 
while 'at the end, Ministry was informed that FIC would send the revised comments 
in written, based on the input received at the meeting' (sic) (Council of Foreign 
Investors 2009). Foreign capital has also in the past advised the government on 
legislation, for instance, in 2006 when Council members confirmed the good 
cooperation between business and the government in producing legislation (Serbian 
Government 2006). 
Indirect implementation is fully operational, less visible and more powerful. 
National governments such as the German government are pushing the reforms or 
explicitly promoting their companies. The same applies to the EU in that it urges 
reforms and policies for attracting foreign capital (see Rehn in B92 2007d; Merkel in 
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B92 2007a). The consultation of international institutions should be seen in that 
framework. Both indirect and direct influence focus on the economic sphere, while 
in the political sphere they express their support for issues that best accommodate 
their interests, such as the stability of the region and the need for a European 
perspective in Serbia, with the further objective of facilitating economic penetration. 
Add to this the partisan external intervention in the last Serbian elections and the 
power of the indirect form of influence becomes obvious. Thus, from the perspective 
of political economy, the foreign economic elite can be considered to be the 
prominent class of the group. However, two issues remain to be addressed. Firstly, 
how coherent is the Bloc? And, secondly, since foreign capital is using its national 
governments as a conduit, who has the upper hand? 
For the former, as was stated in previous chapters, the fact that there is a 
common ideology, common objectives and common ways of achieving the objectives 
provides adequate cohesion. In addition, the fact that there is cooperation among 
the Bloc groups in terms of the division of labour that was mentioned above, secure 
the necessary evidence to claim the Bloc's coherence. We will deal with the latter 
later, but it is clear that if we manage to distinguish the German economic elite as 
the most powerful and influential in Serbia then we can speak (from the perspective 
of neo-Gramscian theory) of the economic hegemony of the German (economic) 
elite. 
3.5.3. The subaltern reaction. 
An analysis of the second sphere (Le. forms of state and state-society relations) 
requires that we shed light on the subaltern classes as well, and how they receive 
this hegemonic situation, in other words how efficiently the coercive mechanisms 
work. Serbian society is pro-EU as the latest opinion poll by the EU Integration Office 
of Serbia showed: 69% of the population.is in favour of EU integration, while 42.1% 
feel like citizens of Europe rather than the Balkans (Serbian EU Integration Office 
2007b), which demonstrates the desire of the Serbian people to enter the EU family. 
In the survey of the Balkan Monitor, 67.4% of the age group 15-24 and 61.49% of 
those between 24 and 39 supports EU membership as something very good. The 
smallest support comes from those above 55 where the support is 49.7% (Balkan 
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Monitor 2009). These results indicate that the young generation and especially the 
one with no experience of communism and with a vague experience of the Kosovo 
war is pro-EU, while the older and probably the generation that was the backbone of 
Titoist Serbia are against. Another thing that we can mention is that the pro-
western camp will become stronger in the future because the balance between pro 
and post communism people would be in favour of the latter. Also interesting was 
that both rural and urban populations support EU membership at the same rate, 
. namely 57.3% and 58.2% respectively (Balkan Monitor 2009). Nevertheless, the fact 
that the support is below 60% might reflect the division of Serbian society that was 
evident· in the election results. These responses also show that the Bloc is 
successfully imposing its ideas. Supporting this is the fact that painful reforms have 
been implemented without massive social discord (for example the closure of 
Zastava directed the protests of the unemployed at the inability of the government 
to find them a job and not to the reason for the closure (B92 2007g). 
However, another four responses in the 2007 poll by the EU Integration Office 
are significant. Firstly to the question 'which of the following factors obstruct 
integration of our country with the EU most?' 49.1% responded: 'policy of constant 
conditioning and blackmailing of the EU towards our country'. In addition, 45% 
believe that the EU is preparing Serbia to give up Kosovo for membership, and 40% 
believe that the EU is deciding the status of Kosovo. Finally, 71% believe that if 
Kosovo leaves, Serbia would continue to fight but maintain relations with the EU 
(Serbian EU Integration Office 2007b), which was exactly what happened. What 
emerges from these responses is the strong commitment of Serbs towards the EU as 
policy objective, a commitment that is strong enough to by-pass the emotions 
surrounding the loss of Kosovo. They also show an awareness of the role of the EU 
and its influence, and confirm the belief that the Serbian elite has enough popular 
support to continue down the EU path despite the cost. In relation to the theme of 
the thesiS, this opinion poll reveals two important factors. Firstly, it is evident that 
" 
the hegemonic elite is managing to promote its interests and to 'sell' the EU and the 
ideology that the EU carries as something important and necessary. This links up 
with the second aspect, namely the reception of the hegemony by the subaltern 
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classes without objection, which reveals the power of the hegemonic machinery to 
impose its preferences and to transmit its ideology in a very effective manner. 
The fact that the Serbian elite has the popular support to continue down the EU 
path despite the cost, is reinforced by the positions of Serb officials that there is a 
dilemma between Kosovo and the EU (B92 2007c). The first responses also 
demonstrate the ideological penetration of a European identity and the need for EU 
membership, and thus for reforms, while the last answer in the latest opinion poll 
also shows the need for the EU in spite of a serious national loss, like the loss of 
Kosovo. In addition, once again it is evident that, as in the economic sphere with the 
hegemonic penetration of EU capital in Serbia, there are hegemonic elements of a 
neo-Gramscian nature in cultural terms as well. These elements are apparent in the 
adoption (or better penetration) of Serbian society by a certain culture, which is the 
western European culture that is promoted by the EU. The sense of feeling part of 
Europe that was mentioned above is indicative of thi's cultural penetration. Thus, 
from a neo-Gramscian perspective the cultural aspect of hegemony, which is the 
transmission of certain cultural images and values that are adopted by the 
subordinate society and thus facilitate the consolidation of the hegemony and of the 
hegemonic ideology is evident. The same pro-European attitude is apparent in the 
2006 opinion poll (Serbian EU Integration Office 2006). Despite the pro-EU tendency, 
we have to note the division of society over Kosovo, with the riots that followed the 
latter's recognition, proving that the pro-EU trend can be reversed due to issues such 
as Kosovo. 
The OPPOSition so far was coming from nationalist and xenophobic forces, 
something that Bohle had indicated in the case of CEECs (Bohle 2006), and from 
those interests that are feeling threatened by the EU reforms. On the other hand, 
trade unions and the working class seem to support the Bloc and to base their hopes 
for a better future there. Both the election results and the popular demonstrations 
against the EU were stimulated by nationalist issues such as Kosovoan independence 
and not by the neo-liberal policies that were being imposed on Serbian society. 
Trying to interpret these developments, we are remember that the ordeal of 
communist rule was still fresh and thus neo-liberalism, that has only fifteen years of 
practice, is still viewed as a solution. In addition, Serbia, as well as FYR Macedonia, 
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has open national issues that fuel the nationalist forces particularly when the Bloc 
interests are against the nationalist aspirations of Serbian people. 
Judging from the above we can say that the Bloc is successfully imposing 
hegemonic ideas on Serbia (since even a national loss is not enough to distract its 
people from the vision of Europe) and that in the economic and cultural dimensions 
its force is working efficiently through the familiar mechanisms of punishment for 
non-compliance with their preferences. 
3.5.4. The third sphere: world orders. 
The third sphere is the contemporary world order within which Serbia functions. In 
summary, the Balkans have adopted a certain set of ideas and the ideology which is 
promoted by the Historic Bloc and which was initially developed by western 
economic powers and reproduced in the western Balkans by Germany and the EU, as 
we defined them in Chapter 1. The question here is how Serbian society is receiving 
these ideas. The means of transmission· are simple, notably through cultural, 
economic and political developments. The first involved the media's promotion of 
western culture and the need to belong to Europe. Firstly, during the struggle against 
the Milosevic regime, west European actors such as the German government, the US 
and western NGOs were financing the Serbian opposition media. Since 1994, the EU 
has committed €6million, while currently in the IPA a significant part goes to the 
media (European Commission Delegation on Serbia 2007). Also important is the 
contribution of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), which is largely funded by the 
German government.54 Particularly in Serbia, one of the projects of the KAS is an 
economic broadcast on Serbian TV that relates to issues of the economic transition 
based on foreign examples. The programme is broadcast weekly and the KAS 
54 Quoting from KAS website: 97.3% of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung's funds come from public 
remittances, while 2.3% are derived from admission charges and miscellaneous revenues. In 
addition, private revenues (income from funds and donations) account for another 0.4% (status: 
budget of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung for 2004). Most public remittances are project-related funds. 
Thus, project-related remittances account for 61.8% ofthe entire revenue of the Konrad-Adenauer-
Stiftung. 
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estimates that 13% of the population watch it (KAS 2008b). The KAS is also 
organising events such as the EU-day in Belgrade during 2007 (Serbian EU 
Integration Office 2007a) and the seminar series for state officials in Serbia in 
summer 2008 (KAS 2008a). 
In addition, USAID, through its media section, the International Research and 
Exchanges Board, has been supporting the 'independent' media in Serbia since 1997. 
In 2007, it assisted in the reform of the Radio-televizija Srbije, the national 
broadcasting agency of Serbia (International Research and Exchanges Board 2007). 
The main independent station, B92 TV and radio, is one of the success stories which 
USAID supported during and after the Milosevic regime (International Research and 
Exchanges Board 2007). In 2006 USAID expenditure in Serbia was $57.8 million of 
which $12.9 million went on democratic governance (USAID 2006). At the level of 
NGOs the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is important. Since 1988 (along 
with the Soros Foundation and European agencies and governments) it had been 
financing the Serbian independent media with the aim of toppling the Milosevic 
regime (McCarthy 1998), while taking a look at its projects database we can see a 
stable presence in Serbia since then, with proj~cts such as the broadcast of policy 
debates in 2007 for the Serbian elections (NED 2008). 
As was mentioned in Chapter 2, these organisations and NGOs are operating 
within the framework that is set by EU enlargement policy, where the Commission is 
coordinator and their operations demonstrate how the West has deployed 
considerable resources for the creation of 'independent' and 'democratic' media. It 
could be claimed that the message that they transmit is different from the 
hegemonic one, but this is not so simple. No matter what the source of funding, the 
message is quite the same and has to do with the promotion of liberal market 
economics and western type democracy. In addition, the integration with western 
structures is a shared aim and therefore there are no messages that obscure the EU 
actions or the adoption of certain cultural values. 
Hence, we can see a significant mobilisation of the international community in 
support of certain political positions through the media. The cultural transmission is 
also through bilateral agreements. Germany for instance, has signed a series of 
cultural agreements with Serbia, which include cultural and educational projects 
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(Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2006b). This (within our theoretical framework) is 
facilitating the German influence since language is a powerful tool for the creation of 
a pro-German population. This is not something new, since Britain with the British 
Council, France with the French Institute and Germany with the Goethe institute are 
trying to create a favourable image for themselves abroad. 
The economic mechanism of transmission of the hegemonic ideas involves the 
introduction of foreign capital and the impact that it generates in Serbian society, e.g. 
marketing new products, new modes of production etc. The political mechanisms 
were covered above. However, despite this overwhelming influx of western 
influence, Serbian society has shown elements of resistance, as we have seen. 
3.5.5. Germany and hegemony. 
The core of this thesis is that of a German hegemony in the Balkans. In Chapter 2 we 
demonstrated that Germany has been highly influential in policies towards western 
Balkan integration into both the'EU and of NATO. We also showed that the German 
elite has imposed its ideas onto the EU while German capital has profited 
considerably from EU policies in the region. The latter was acknowledged by 
Chancellor Merkel at the G8 summit in Heiligendamm in 2006 (Merkel 2006). 
Considering this, we have to apply the three spheres of activity in our analysis of 
German-Serbian relations. Firstly, Germany has a prominent economic presence, 
which is an indicator of the interest of the German economic elite in Serbia. In fact 
the tone was already evident in 2000. The then Foreign Minister, Joschka Fisher in 
his speech for the SPSEE noted: 
'private economic commitment, know-how and capital transfer also have a key role to play in the 
creation of permanent economic structures in the region ... The German government therefore 
considers practical advisory services from business and industry to be indispensable ... The goal is to 
establish efficient, self-reliant market economy structures to create a regional, outwardly open, 
market' (Fisc her 2000). 
After him Gerhard Schroder, in his meeting with Kostunica, mentioned that 
'continued and improved economic cooperation between Germany and Serbia will 
contribute to the improvement of the two countries' political relations', while he 
160 
also noted the good economic cooperation between the two countries for decades 
(i.e. even during Yugoslavia's time) (Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004). 
In addition, Dr Merkel in 2007 promised the Serbian president, Mr. Tadic, that 
'the German government would therefore encourage German business to become 
more involved in Serbia' (Bundeskanzlerin 2007b). The German economic elite has 
also repeatedly showed an interest in the Serbian economy. An example was the 
2004 statement of the Serbian Economics Minister about German bus,iness interests 
in Serbia (Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2004) and the much more important 
visit of the president of the Eastern European Committee, Klaus Mangold along with 
twenty representatives of German industrial associations and companies to Belgrade 
in 2005. In that visit the German delegation stated: 
l ... German businessmen are interested in cooperation in all areas, especially privatisation, energy, 
trade cooperation, infrastructure and agriculture' and ' ... Ger';'any has found considerable economic 
potential in the Serbian business community, which has promised its support towards useful 
cooperation ... Germany is interested in gaining additional benefits from using the tax-free trade status 
of Russia and Serbia' (Serbian Government 200se; 200sd). 
In the same meeting we saw an example of how the German economic elite is in 
a strong position to influence Serbian policy, since the German delegation demanded 
reforms and favourable policies in order for German capital to invest (Serbian 
Government 200Sc). We have to mention here the role of the Eastern Committee in 
the eastern enlargement and the acknowledgement at that time that Germany will 
reach the position that it had in the Eastbefore the First World War (cited in Fisher 
1992). Moreover, within the framework of relations between the German and 
Serbian elites we have to mention the award to Mr Tadic of the Europe Prize for 
Political Culture for his efforts in the democratisation of Serbia and for keeping 
Serbia on the European track (Auswartiges Amt 2007b). This is an example of a 
reward for the pro-western elite in instilling the hegemonic ideals. Another example 
is the 2006 meeting of the Serbian and German Economic Ministers, where the 
Serbian Minister stated that Serbia is planning a series of projects, particularly in the 
energy sector and was seeking the participation of German companies. His German 
counterpart mentioned political instability as the main reason for .the low level of 
German investments hitherto and he expressed German interest in the Serbian 
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energy sector (Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 200Gb). We have of course to note 
that Germany had invested much time and money during the Yugoslav period in 
order to re-establish its relations with Yugoslavia and, as Ahrens mentions (he was 
one of the diplomats in Belgrade for this purpose), the cultural and economic links 
were greater with Serbia than with Croatia(Ahrens 2007: 510-12). 
Moreover, the economic interest in Serbia can be explained by the wider 
economic interest of German capital In the region. Examples here are the energy 
projects in the region for the supply of energy to the EU in which Germany has 
declared its interest. Of course the supply is secured by the stabilisation of both 
transit and producer countries, something that seems to be the case with Serbia (i.e. 
a transit country) (German presidency of the EU 2007b). According to the current 
Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs, Steinmeier, if Germany wants to safeguard its 
interests in energy supply security it 'must become more involved in the exploration 
and recovery of new reserves. In order to make this move into the production side of 
the sector, Germany needs global players who are able to make large investments 
and cooperate with companies in the producer nations' (Auswartiges Amt 2007c). In 
addition, German companies such as Siemens Hellas are participating in the 
construction of energy installations (HMFA 200G). To this is added the information 
that was obtained from a confidential interview in Brussels that Serbia, due to the 
geological advantage of its depleted mines, will become a major location of gas 
storage in Europe (Confidential Interview 2). In addition, Serbia enjoys a central 
location in the trade transportation routes in South Eastern Europe with four 
navigable rivers and connection to the main EU transport corridors (Aherns 2007: 
237). Added to this, the free trade regime between Ukraine, Russia and Serbia 
creates a potential market of 300 million consumers (Ahrerns 2007) for German and 
other EU corporations. 
Finally, at this moment Serbia is a central factor for the stability of the region 
and consequently for the continued economic presence of Germany and the EU 
there, something that the German Chancellor has noted by stating that 'we want 
Serbia to be an anchor of stability in the western Balkans' (Bundeskanzlerin 2007b). 
A similar statement was made during the German presidency of the EU in 2007 
according to which, '[AJs the largest country in the Balkans, Serbia is crucial to the 
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region's stability' (German Presidency ofthe EU 2007a). Consistent with this rhetoric 
are the German actions on the ground for promoting this stability where these 
actions aim to incorporate stability into the regional programmes and the agencies 
that operate in the area, such as with the Stability Pact. The Stability Pact works for 
the integration of the region and for its interdependence that will enhance stability. 
This might mean that Germany is influencing Serbia indirectly and in a similarway to 
Germany's embedded hegemony in the EU as described by Crawford (see Crawford 
2007). In other words Germany exercises some 'control' in Serbia by controlling 
those institutions that obviously influence Serbian politico-economic decisions. 
Within this framework we have to place Germany's military presence in Serbia, 
which is located in Kosovo (Le. a former Serbian province). Chancellor Merkel 
mentioned in her speech at the 43th Munich Conference on Security Policy in 2007, 
Germany wants NATO to be a primary tool for Transatlantic cooperation and stated 
that they will try to ensure that NATO is adapted to modern needs, but at the same 
time Germany'is ready to assume a more active role outside NATO boundaries 
(Merkel 2007). 
3.5.6. Is Germany the hegemon? 
In order to 'translate' the German actions in Serbia into a neo-Gramscian hegemonic 
perspective, it is necessary to demonstrate that the German elite is the leader of the 
Bloc. Particularly, as we have demonstrated that the foreign economic elite group is 
i 
leading the Bloc, we now have to explore the extent to which the German economic. 
elite is leading this group and by extension the Bloc. The statistics on their own can 
provide a convincing answer, but unequivocally, because other national capital elites 
have an important presence as well. From the official Serbian position there have 
been repeated statements about the great importance of Germany. For instance, the 
Serbian Prime Minister Mr Kostunica mentioned that Germany is one of Serbia's 
biggest economic partners, something which was also expressed by the former 
deputy prime minister, Miroljub labu5, in 2005. In addition, on the basis of this 
acknowledgment of Germany's importance, the agreement was signed in February 
2005 concerning German assistance in the promotion of the Serbian economy in 
Germany (Serbian Government 2005a). 
163 
Moreover, in order to draw a conclusion we have to consider the 'competitors' 
to German capital in Serbia, namely Austria and Greece. The latter, is also used as a 
base for German capital (e.g. Siemens Hellas, Allianz etc), while German capital has a 
substantial presence in Greece as a whole. As for Austria, its importance (according 
to the size of Serbia) is limited to. the economic sphere (and only in certain economic 
sectors) and thus it lacks political influence. At the same time Germany's importance 
is demonstrated in particular in regard to Serbian international relations, as the 
assignment of Wolfang Ischinger as representative of the EU in the troika for the 
Kosovo talks (Auswartiges Amt 2007a), indicates. Furthermore, in cultural terms the 
Germanic-western influence is arguably more significant than Greek influence 
despite the latter's affinities with Serbian culture. However, due to national 
stereotypes in the region, Greece finds it more difficult to penetrate Serbian society. 
Germany moreover, is financing special training programmes and university chairs in 
business schools and universities (Welfens 2001: 72), an action that can be seen 
through the neo-Gramscian prism as a contribution to the reproduction of 
hegemony, particularly with Germany financing such programmes in the whole 
region (Welfens 2001: 73). To this we can add the indirect influence of Germany 
through the EU and its ideology which is applied in Serbia. 
3.6. Concluding remarks. 
The aim of this chapter was to apply the theoretical framework in the case of Serbia 
and to investigate whether Germany exercises politico-economic hegemony. 
Certainly, there are elements that could support this conclusion. Firstly, from the 
pOint of Serbia, there is a strong commitment to the West and a domestic elite which 
shows total willingness to cooperate. This commitment is also apparent at the non-
elite level, with the rest of the society viewing the hegemony as common sense. In 
addition, the connecting bond between domestic and external hegemonic actors is 
more than the level of cooperation, since the former's formation and legitimacy is 
based on the latter's actions. 
Secondly, we demonstrated that the West and particularly the EU is defining 
the policy framework and exerts huge influence on Serbia, in the context of the 
enlargement of the EU. This influence is manifested in the implementation of certain 
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policies and in the interference of the Bloc in Serbia's domestic political affairs. 
Nevertheless, the most important influence is economic, since the economic policies 
of the EU are leading to the huge penetration of EU-based capital in Serbia. The most 
important role of the EU, however, was matching the role of the main hegemonic 
institution and thus part of our theoretical assumptions were covered. 
Within this framework, we had to prove whether Germany is leading a 
hegemony. The data have showed a significant economic and political influence on 
Serbia by Germany. In addition, the data demonstrated active German interests that 
might justify an interest in hegemony. The German influence also has a strong 
traditional character. 
All these elements enable us to argue the existence of a neo-Gramscian 
hegemony in Serbia, with Germany as leader, even though a direct leadership of 
Germany is not very obvious, something that seems to apply for the 
indirect/embedded hegemony that seems more powerful. Hence, to give a first 
answer we have to support the existence of indirect hegemony by Germany .. 
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Chapter 4: case study FYR Macedonia. 
4.1. Introduction. 
In this chapter we examine the second case study of this thesis, with the same aims 
that we set in Chapter 3. Once again the structure and the application of the 
theoretical framework will allow us to compare the results between the case studies. 
4.2. Historical background. 
FYR Macedonia's history is very similar to that of Serbia. The Slav tribes arrived in the 
sixth century, where they mixed with the Greek-speaking tribes of the region 
(Ostrogorsky 1968). During the middle-ages the region was under Byzantine and 
then under Serbian control when finally in 1389 it was incorporated into the 
Ottoman Empire along with the Serbian kingdom (Parry et al. 1976; Heaney 2007). 
This strong connection with Serbia was also the reason for their characterisation as 
'south Serbs' in the first Yugoslavia (Jelavich 1983a; Glenny 1999). However, part of 
the region was also part of the Bulgarian kingdom which capitulated to the 
Ottomans in 1387 (Parry et al. 1976). During that time we also see the reinforcement 
of the Albanian Muslim elements in Macedonia (see Jelavich 1983a). The 
revolutionary era of the Balkans finds Macedonia contested among three states, 
namely Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. This made Macedonia a primary field of conflict 
in the Balkan wars, usually involving ruthless methods (Roudometof 2001; Prevelakis 
1996). 
Modern FYR Macedonia firstly appeared in socialist Yugoslavia as one of the six 
republics. That status changed in the 1990s when it became independent, with FYR 
Macedonia remaining the temporary name due to its dispute with Greece. In 2001 
the civil war between the two main ethnic communities (i.e. the Slovomacedonian55 
and the Albanian) demonstrated the fragility of the state and the subsequent need 
for the imposition of stability by the international community. Today FYR Macedonia 
is progressing towards its integration into western structures. 
55 The term is used to distinguish the Albanian from the Slav side. 
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4.3. Political developments. 
The presentation begins with the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) that ended the 
Tetovo crisis of 2001. The choice of starting in 2001, lies in the fact that since then 
the political framework of FYR Macedonia has stabilised; the international 
community started to pay attention to th is state, which until then was viewed 
through the lens of the Greek-Macedanian56 name dispute; and because, since 2001, 
FYR Macedonia is following steadily the path towards its integration into western 
structures. 
Hence, the OFA has set the institutional structure, which has as one of its main 
provisions the proportional filling of public posts in accordance with the ethnic 
composition of the state; respect for minority rights; the elevation of the Albanian 
ethnic community as the second constituent nation; and the establishment of 
coalition governments with the participation of parties from both Slav and Albanian 
ethnic communities (Kim 2003; ICG 2009). 
The OFA was an outcome of the cooperation between the EU, NATO and the 
US all of which continue to support its implementation (European Commission 
200Sa: 6; Ringdal et al. 2007). This support has been in terms of police and military 
missions to maintain stability and to ensure the implementation of the agreements, 
as well as in terms of political back-up for the leaders of both ethnic communities 
(see ICG 2009). However, the OFA implementation has not been uncontested. A 
good example here were the events that followed the 2004 presidential elections. 
These elections were highly contested by the nationalist opposition of the Internal 
Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMROs7 ), while the National Liberation 
Army (NLA) leader, Ahmeti, declared the OFA dead and called for partition of the 
country (Pond 2006: 182-83). There were also demonstrations of Slavomacedonians 
against the OFA reforms such as the establishment of Albanian as a second official 
language (Heaney 2007: 403-5; ICG 2009). This political instability increased the 
anxiety of the international community and particularly of the EU and US, because 
this state is located in the centre of the Balkans and had been involved in brutal 
56 Due to the open issue regarding the name of FYR Macedonia, when we refer to this country only as 
Macedonia we will use italics. 
57 Vatreshna Makedono-Odrinska Revolyutsionna Organizatsiya (VMRO) in the local language. 
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conflicts in the past such as the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. Within this framework, 
the US recognised FYR Macedonia as the Republic of Macedonia believing that this 
would stabilise the political situation and as a reward for its participation in the 'war 
on terror' (Pond 2006: 183; Crampton 2002). 
The political instability of FYR Macedonia and the rift between the two ethnic 
communities has been evident throughout the political history of this state up until 
the present day,. something that keeps the international community on the alert. 
Characteristic examples of this situation are the incidents that followed the rejection 
of FYR Macedonia's membership to NATO at the 2008 Bucharest Summit. The first 
was the steep rise in nationalist rhetoric in the face of Greek hostility which led to 
new parliamentary elections. The elections were held in a highly nationalist 
atmosphere and were marked by serious incidents and voting irregularities. The 
elections were stigmatised by nationalist radicalisation of the electorate since the 
name dispute with Greece was the main issue in the election campaign. This helped 
the nationalists to attract 48.8% of total votes against 23% for the socialists allowing 
them to form the government. As expected the end of the elections was followed by 
an aggressive foreign policy and by a period of difficult cohabitation with the 
President, who was the leader ofthe socialist party and hostile to the Prime Minister 
(ICG 2009; The Economist 2009). This hostility also indicates that the Slav elite as 
well as the Slav community is not coherent but in contrast there are rifts. If we look 
back in Macedonian politics, the dispute between the two main political parties has 
been bitter. For instance, in 2005 the nationalist opposition of IMRO forced a 
referendum of OFA implementation in order to bring down the socialist government 
and in fact it used nationalist rhetoric to achieve this, claiming that the socialists 
were traitors (ICG 2005). Similarly, in 2008 preSidential elections the President 
Crvenkovski took a position in favour of negotiation and compromise with Greece 
that came in complete opposition with the policy of the Prime Minister Gruevski and 
which used by IMRO during the election campaign in order to discredit the socialist 
as traitors and them as champions of the Macedonian cause (see Elefterotipia 2009; 
ICG 2009; The Economist 2008a). This division of course is also reflected in the 
electoral results. However, the division has to do more with the approach towards 
Greece and the Albanian community accommodation as well as in domestic policies 
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and less with the fundamentals, namely EU and NATO membership, in the economic 
orientation of the country. Hence, despite the disputes we can treat the Slav elite as 
one. Something that applies also for the Albanian side. Additionally, for the first time 
there was an armed conflict within the Albanian side, between the two Albanian 
parties, to a degree that was capable of destabilising the state. However, this dispute 
reflects personal matters (see The Economist 2008a). The cohabitation problem has 
been resolved after the last Presidential elections since the leading party managed to 
elect its candidate as President, while the Albanian problem solved with change in 
government's coalition. 
Despite its political fragility, since the late 1990s, FYR Macedonia is progressing 
rather well towards its integration into western structures, namely EU and NATO, 
and is implementing the required reforms, while on 15 November 1995 it entered 
the NATO PfP. FYR Macedonia has developed into a warm supporter of regional 
cooperation, despite the problems with Greece and Bulgaria. It has also developed 
linkages with all the countries of the region through Memoranda of Understanding 
and Free Trade Agreements, which are mainly motivated by the EU for the purpose 
of regional cooperation (European Commission 2005a: 13-15; 2004a). FYR 
Macedonia is also a member ofthe WTO, IMF and World Bank. 
A final element of this presentation is the political system which is a 
parliamentary democracy with the President as head of state and the Prime Minister 
head of the government (CIA 2008; Heaney 2007). The role of the preSident, who is 
elected through popular suffrage, is enhanced by the right to appoint three 
members of the Security Council of the Republic of Macedonia which he chairs. Thus, 
the cohabitation between the President and the Prime Minister is very important for 
the Macedonian political system. The current governing coalition is between IMRO 
and the Albanian party, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI), which received 
most votes from the Albanian community. It is interesting that the initial choice by 
IMRO of the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPAs), which was second highest in the 
Albanian vote, as a potential government partner created a 'split' in the Albanian 
community. However, in the end they formed a government with DUJ. 
Finally it is worth mentioning a few things about IMRO, which has a central role 
in Macedonian politiCS and thus in the Bloc formation. IMRO was first formed in 
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1893 in Thessalonica, with the main aim of creating an independent Macedonian 
state (Allcock 1994). It organised and implemented the uprising in 1903 that was 
suppressed violently by the Ottomans. The event took place on St Elijah day and for 
that reason it is named the lIIiden revolt and today is celebrated as a national holiday 
(Prevelakis 1996). The party reappeared in the 1990s with the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia and it maintained its nationalist position, especially against Albanian 
demands, although today it has conceded to OFA's demands towards the Albanian 
minority. Therefore, for the later analysis we have to keep in mind the fact that 
IMRO preserves its nationalist norms and these will define the foreign and domestic 
policy of FYR Macedonia under IMRO's leadership. 
Within this political framework FYR Macedonia has four political challenges 
ahead that will be critical for its existence as a state. These are the name dispute 
with Greece; Albanian integration; EU membership and NATO membership. As was 
mentioned in Chapter 3 and as will be the case in Chapter 5, the reason for this form 
of presentation is to view the various interactions among the actors that would 
probably form the Macedonian Historic Bloc and to explain certain attitudes of the 
actors. 
4.3.1. The name dispute with Greece. 
The name problem is part of the wider Macedonian Question, i.e. the creation of 
ethnic states in a multiethnic region. The problem appeared with the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire and the creation ofthe new Balkan nation-states (Poulton 1993: 2), 
that began a competition for Macedonia's population and land (Glenny 1999). The 
outcome of this competition were the two Balkan wars of 1912-1913, while the 
hostilities continued during the two World Wars. This competition is indicative of the 
nationalist norms and the minority problems of the Balkans, since none of the new 
states were able to include all the lands containing their ethnic populations. This was 
a key problem in Macedonia that was populated by various ethnic communities such 
as Greeks, Bulgarians and Slavs, and was contested by three countries (Bulgaria, 
Greece and Serbia) (Roudometof 2001: 180; Prevelakis 1996: 141). 
After the Second World War the Serbian territory of Macedonia became a 
Yugoslav republic under the name Macedonia. The newly formed republic lacked 
170 
I 
-- -----------------
national unity and a strong national consciousness, and thus the Macedonian literary 
language after 1947 was created as a solution (Crampton 2002: 22, 28). The new 
republic was utilised for Tito's expansionary strategies towards the Aegean Sea and 
in Yugoslav-Bulgarian negotiations. For the former, a characteristic of Tito's strategy 
was a conversation between Tito and Stalin with the former demanding the Aegean 
Macedonia and Thessalonica and the latter agreeing by claiming that Thessalonica 
was always a Slav city and that Yugoslavia needed access to the Aegean Sea 
(Crampton 2002: 35). The end of the C~ld War and the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
created the first independent Macedonian state, which was eager to use its 
constitutional name as any other independent state and this is the heart of the 
problem today. 
Hence, at first the problem seems to relate to nation-building. The very 
existence of FYR Macedonia as a nation, seems to lie in the name Macedonia. Any 
effort to use language as a connecting bond in Macedonia is doomed to failure 
because of the similarities with Bulgarian and because it is not the language of the 
Albanians. Therefore, they have to turn to national mythology, since religion was 
not also applicable (Allcock 1994; Anderson 1983). Thus, they have adopted 
historical figures of the region such as Tsar Samuil and Alexander the Great (All cock 
1994; McDonald 2002). Equally important is the fact that Macedonian identity has 
largely been shaped as response to Macedonia's four neighbours. This, as Balalovska 
explains, leads to stereotypes that solidify the 'nation' as well as making the outside 
acceptance of their identity necessary (Balalovska 2004: 195-96). 
The Greek side is concerned that this could lead to territorial claims, 
something which the Slavomacedonians 'foolishly' demonstrate with their 
propagandistic actions (see The Economist 2009). As many writers on the Balkans 
note, one of the characteristics of the Balkan population is suspicion and the fear of 
foreign power patronage, which makes the Greek worries understandable. These 
worries are also linked to the Albanian Question since the Greek political system has 
explicitly stated that FYR Macedonia is necessary as a buffer against any Greater 
Albania concept which is considered a worse outcome, as an interviewee reminded 
us (Confidential Interview 4; Glenny 1999: 656). 
171 
- ---.--------------------------------------------~ 
At the time of writing, negotiations between Greece and FYR Macedonia were 
in deadlock with neither of the two sides willing to compromise. Nevertheless, a 
short presentation is useful in order to define political lines and actors that could be 
useful during the theoretical application. 
FYR Macedonia continues its diplomatic offensive and territorial claims 
towards Greece and Greek history as can be seen from school textbooks, which still 
describe the Greek and Bulgarian territories as occupied lands, or the naming of 
Skopje airport after Alexander the Great (ICG 2009). The IMRO government is 
maintaining a hard line on the negotiations with seemingly no room for compromise. 
These actions and the hard position of the government are consistent with the 
electoral programme of IMRO, which in the last elections used the name issue as the 
core of its policy. Within this hard line framework, the Macedonian side puts more 
issues on the negotiation table such as the existence of a Macedonian minority in 
Greece; and the compensation for those Slavomacedonians who left Greece after 
the end of the Greek civil war. For instance, on 14 July 2008, the Macedonian Prime 
Minister sent a letter to the Greek Prime Minister, calling on him to recognise the 
rights of the Macedonian minority, which for Greece does not exist (Elefterotipia 
2008b). Consequently, the negotiations have stopped, while a public statement of 
the Macedonian Prime Minister Mr Nikola Gruevski on 24 August 2008, made clear 
that under the current framework the negotiations are meaningless. 
The main Macedonian argument is that every country has the right to choose 
its name and that similar cases exist elsewhere, without causing territorial threats. 
Macedonian diplomacy seems to rely on two things for pushing its agenda. The first 
is the explicit US support that has been expressed in a series of actions, with the 
unilateral recognition of the state under its constitutional name being the most 
notable. US patronage and support is such that in October 2008, the Greek 
newspaper Ethnos revealed a document detailing communications between the 
Macedonian president and the former US administration that was trying to ensure 
that Nimetz' latest solution package was in accordance with FYR Macedonia's 
strategy (Ethnos 2008). 
The second argument is the recognition of FYR Macedonia with its 
constitutional name ~epublic of Macedonia by the majority of UN member states, 
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but not by the UN itself. The latter fact was explicitly mentioned by the Macedonian 
foreign minister Mr Milososki on 21 October 2007 who answered to the Greek threat 
of a veto on Macedonia's candidacy to NATO and the EU, that FYR Macedonia is not 
changing its constitutional name and Greece can do whatever it wants! (Oi Neoi 
Fakeloi 2008). 
The Greek position speaks for a mutually acceptable solution with the term 
Macedonia included. The problems of the Greek side relate to external pressure, 
mainly from the US, and to domestic pressures, particularly from forces within the 
Greek Macedonian territory. The pressure has led to the 1992 joint agreement of all 
political forces that a solution, which contains the term Macedonia, is not acceptable. 
Since then the Greek position has been relaxed, even though the agreement is still 
active. Greece is moving towards the mutually accepted name and for that purpose 
is involved in a diplomatic race. Its main power is the veto against FYR Macedonia's 
NATO membership, which was used, and the threat that this will also happen in the 
case of EU membership if necessary. 
In the meantime, the tenSions between the two sides continue, with the last 
episode being the appeal of FYR Macedonia to the Hague against Greece on the 
issue of the Macedonian minority. This action means that the negotiations, would 
have been halted, at least, until 2010. Furthermore, the actions of the Macedonian 
government have created a rift between the Prime Minister and the President as 
was mentioned above. 
What is expected in the analysis section is a pro-US stance by Macedonian 
officials as well as an intensified approach towards Germany and other 'big' member 
states of the EU in relation to their diplomatic aims, in order to bypass the threat of a 
Greek veto. Therefore, we have to see whether the German elite is intervening in 
this problem and what it might gain from such action. Before reaching the relevant 
section it is worth mentioning that German positions are close to those of the US, 
since the German state cannot accept that a country is not free to choose the name 
that it wants, not to mention that both countries are in favour of Macedonia's 
stability as a requirement for regional.stability. Added to this, the name issue has a 
significant impact inside the state and it is the main barometer of the internal 
political balance. It is the issue that connects with Macedonian nationalism, which 
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would play a crucial role in Bloc formation. It is also an example of the role of the 
'Great Powers' which have used Macedonia and the name problem for their 
interests. This is something that must be investigated in the analysis. 
4.3.2. EU membership. 
EU membership is perhaps the most significant objective for FYR Macedonia and the 
popular support for this has reached 66.1% (Balkan Monitor 2009). The state, having 
escaped the Yugoslav wars, was able to start the integration process quite early 
despite Greek lobbying against a Macedonian candidacy (Heaney 2007; Pond 2006). 
FYR Macedonia entered the SAP on November 2000, and on 9 April 2001 successfully 
completed the negotiations for a SAA, an agreement that entered into force on 1st 
April 2004 (European Commission 2006c:4). In fact, FYR Macedonia was the first 
country of the western Balkans to achieve this. On 22 March 2004, FYR Macedonia 
submitted an application for EU membership and the Commission published its 
opinion on 9 November 2005 (European Commission 200Sa: 4). The opinion was 
based on the Copenhagen Criteria. On the basis of these criteria the Commission 
recommended to the Council that candidate status be granted as a political 
recognition of a closer relationship between the EU and FYR Macedonia on its way 
towards membership (European Commission 200Sa: 137-39). 
The Council granted FYR Macedonia candidate status but without setting a 
date for commencing the candidacy negotiations (Heaney 2007: 409). For this 
decision, there was a behind-the-scenes bargain. France connected candidacy status 
with the general enlargement process and the fiscal issues of the EU. This blocked. 
FYR Macedonia's candidacy. The government sent a letter to President Chirac 
pleading for French support on the European perspective of FYR Macedonia .. Finally, 
and after German support for the candidacy, and a compromise on the fiscal issues 
of the EU, the European Council granted this state candidate status (Elefterotipia 
200Sa; 200Sb; Moshonas 2005; 5teinmeier 2005). 
The opinion was followed by the Commission's European partnership 
programme in 2004, where the OFA implementation, fair elections and 
constitutional amendments were the main priorities (European Commission 200Sb). 
Most of the 2004 priorities are mentioned in the Accession Partnership of 2008. In 
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particular some of the key priorities are judicial and electorate shortcomings; OFA 
implementation and inter-ethnic dialogue, and good neighbourly relations, mainly 
with Greece (European Council 2008). In the 2008 Commission progress report, FYR 
Macedonia's satisfactory progress towards SAA implementation is noted. However, 
the shortcomings that are mentioned in the Accession Partnership remain, with the 
most 'serious' shortcomings being the elections, which failed to meet international 
standards, with a number of irregularities and incidents of abuse of the electorate 
(European Commission 2008b: 5, 7). The overall assessment of the Copenhagen 
Criteria looks positive even though both the Commission progress report and the 
position of Olli Rehn mention that the country is still not ready for membership, 
particularly as long as it follows its current foreign policy (European Commission 
2008b; Moshonas 2008b). 
From its side, the Macedonian government launched the National programme 
for adoption of the aquis communitaire in 2007. In the political criteria, the two main 
priorities are OFA and EU membership. For the latter, FYR Macedonia plans reforms 
regarding forms of governance and the relations between ethnic communities in 
accordance with the EU recommendations. Moreover, they plan to reform the 
national assembly in order to participate more strongly in the process of EU 
integration. For this purpose the Committee on European Issues was created in 
November 2003, which is responsible for the implementation of the national 
strategy. Its responsibilities also contain regional cooperation, which is necessary for 
EU membership and cooperation with other EU committees (Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia 2007: 6-7). The implementation of these measures is yet to 
be seen. 
Prior to this, the Macedonian government had launched a 2006-2010 strategy, 
where EU and NATO membership received special importanc~. The EU in particular is 
seen as the road to stability and prosperity, where the government stresses its will to 
undertake whatever steps are necessary for the accomplishment of this target 
(Government strategy 2006). An example is given in the following passage: '[Tlhe 
government is determined to intensify the reforms aimed at EU accession and to 
establish continuous cooperation with all political factors towards maintaining and 
deepening the national consensus for obtaining this national priority' (Government 
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of the Republic of Macedonia 2007: 7). Special care is also paid to decentralisation 
and a more equal representation of ethnic minorities, which is an OFA obligation as 
well (European Commission 2005c; Taleski 2005). However, the EU continues to note 
the slow implementation of reforms and of decentralisation (European Commission 
200Sb). 
What is obvious so far is that for FYR Macedonia, the EU is a priority and the 
only conceivable way of achieving economic, political and societal progress. The 
latter has to do with Macedonian identity that can be consolidated by integration 
into the EU (Balalovska 2004: 194). The Macedonian government seems ready to do 
anything to achieve this purpose, as the National Strategy reveals, and as its overall 
approach which tries to present the country as a positive force and an exception in 
the Balkans shows. Despite the pro-EU political rhetoric, the implementation of EU 
measures has not been not satisfactory. The main reason for this was political 
instability and of course the competition between the two ethnic communities. 
These facts could signal a very pro-EU position and cooperation at both elite and 
state level, since the EU is also a guarantor of stability. Considerable support is also 
expected from public opinion in both ethnic communities in favour of the EU project. 
4.3.3. The Albanian Question in FYR Macedonia. 
Even though the Macedonian government considers the EU to be the main priority, 
this target cannot be achieved without a sufficient solution to the Albanian Question. 
Its importance lies in the simple fact that it threatens the stability and cohesion of 
FYR Macedonia. 
The Albanian presence in FYR Macedonia is as old as in Kosovo. Its presence 
was artificially created after the Balkan Wars and the creation of Albania that 
. finalised the Balkan borders (Ahrens 2007; Glenny 1999). 'Macedonian' Albanians 
had the dream of unification with Albania proper, something that has been· 
repeatedly expressed (Ahrens 2007: 397). The Albanian issue became important 
during Yugoslav times and in the first period of independence when the polarisation 
of the two ethnic communities was intense (Crampton 2002; Ahrens 2007: 383). The 
existence of a nationalist Slav government in combination with a certain degree of 
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marginalisation and economic inequality of the Albanian minority would culminate in 
the 2001 conflict (Pond 2006; ICG 1998). 
Prior to this it was the Kosovo crisis that paved the way for Albanians to push 
their demands for more equal status, with actions such as the referendum on 11-12 
January 1992 and their support for a Belgian or Swiss model where the Albanians 
were supposed to be the second nation (Ahrens 2007: 397-98). However, all these 
plans were opposed by the Slavomacedonians and by IMRO that blocked the 
negotiations (Crampton 2002: 296). Before this, the Macedonian Albanians along. 
with the Kosovar planned unification in a Greater Albania (see Chapter 2), which was 
opposed by the international community (Ahrens 2007: 397; Kim 2003: 104-5). As in 
Kosovo, the international community ignored the Albanian issue in FYR Macedonia 
ensuring that the Kosovo war became the example for Macedonian Albanians who 
realised that only if they took up arms would they receive international attention 
and support (Ahrens 2007). This perception was enhanced by the attitude of the Slav 
majority as well. 
. Hence, in 2001, the situation reached a climax with one of the main 
provocations being the exclusion of the Albanian community from any civil post 
(Ahrens 2007; Ringdal et al. 2007). In 2001 KLA fighters penetrated FYR Macedonia 
and trained the Ahmeti's NLA. Albanian arms entered FYR Macedonia in vast 
quantities, which was rather easy as the Albanians had controlled smuggling in the 
area since the embargo in Yugoslavia (Ahrens 2007; Pond 2006; Willemsen 2006). 
The Tetovo (Le. the main Albanian area) conflict was sparked off on 26 February 
2001 (Heaney 2007: 403; Ringdal et al. 2007), with the newly formed Macedonian 
army too weak to restore order (Heaney 2007; Ahrens 2007). Nevertheless, the 
international community, having fresh memories of Kosovo, was concerned about 
regional stability at the moment that all the states of the region seemed to be 
following the path of western integration. Therefore, the US, NATO and the EU 
began a diplomatic race that ended with the OFA on 13 August 2001 (Ahrens 2007: 
460-2; Gardner-Feldman 2001: 10). OFA was followed by NATO peacekeeping 
missions Operation Essential Harvest that disarmed the NLA, and then Amber Fox 
(Heaney 2007; Kim 2003). In 2002 Amber Fox was replaced by Operation Allied 
Harmony and then by the EU-Ied mission Concordia which in 2003 was replaced by 
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the EU-mission Proxima. We have to note that Germany played a leading role in the 
first missions in FYR Macedonia (Erb 2003). The latest missions involved police 
reform and election monitoring with the aim of training local police and fighting 
organised crime and the instability of the country. Today the situation would seem 
to have improved but nationalist positions exist in both communities, while the OFA 
reforms are yet to be fully implemented (European Commission 2007a). 
In summary, the Slav side wants to remain the main power of the state, while 
Albanians want an equal share of power. Despite these grievances, the international 
community is firm in its commitment to maintain the stability of the region and to 
implement OFA. Even the US is playing an important role in Macedonian politics and 
is determined on this matter. A good example of how fragile and crucial the 
accommodation of the Albanian minority within FYR Macedonia is, was the short and 
bloody conflict between the two Albanian parties during the 2008 parliamentary 
elections, with Ahmeti's side stating that it would start a new guerrilla war if his 
demands were not accepted. 
Therefore, what we can expect is FYR Macedonia leaning towards the US, EU, 
Germany and certain member states in order to ensure its stability. Also expected is 
the use of the stability threat as a political tool in its foreign affairs. Furthermore, it is 
obvious that we have two different domestic elites that have to be taken into 
account in our analYSis. Finally, it is interesting that FYR Macedonia, rather 
unofficially, enjoys US protection, which gives the US an important role in Bloc 
formation. 
4.3.4. NATO and the US factor. 
NATO membership is another important target for FYR Macedonia. According to the 
Government Plan of 2006, NATO is the most important security organisation and a 
community of values. The latter of course, is in reference to the values of democracy, 
freedom etc, which are also shared by the EU and which are part of the hegemonic 
ideology, since both EU and NATO are western structures with common actors and 
almost similar destinations. NATO seems to link up with notion of hegemony in two 
ways. Firstly, NATO is another institution that promotes hegemony and which 
imposes certain policies on FYR Macedonia, while most NATO members are also 
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members of the EU such as Germany and in fact NATO has been used in the western 
Balkans in favour of European interests. The second reason has to do with the 
significance that FYR Macedonia gives to NATO. 
This is significant since NATO is vital for its security and stability. This can be 
explained by reference to the Tetovo crisis and the NATO missions. In the former, 
NATO and the us played the main role in achieving stability, particularly with the 
NATO-led missions and with their diplomatic actions during the Tetovo crisis. The US 
has an important role in keeping the nationalist aspirations of the Albanians under 
control and without US support it would be very difficult to prevent the dissolution 
of FYR Macedonia, since only the Americans were able to keep the Albanians at bay, 
exploiting the pro-US position of the Albanians in Kosovo and Albania (Ahrens 2007; 
Kim 2003). Furthermore, the US supported the Macedonian side from the very first 
moment of its existence, while it could be claimed that as a newly independent state 
it is tending towards the US like most of the Central and Eastern European states. 
These actions have also made Macedonian society and the political leadership 
extremely pro-US, which in relation to NATO is reflected in. the participation of FYR 
Macedonia in the War an Terror, in the Coalition of the Willing in Iraq and in 
Afghanistan. In fact, on 2 November 2007 the Macedonian government decided to 
double its troop numbers in Afghanistan as a gesture of its willingness to join NATOs8• 
In particular, according to an opinion poll conducted by USAID between 15-21 
December 2007, 90% of the population supports NATO membership (Government of 
the Republic of Macedonia 2006b; USAID 2007). 
Hence, in relation to hegemony, NATO is another tool for its consolidation and 
for gaining the consent of the population59• In addition, apart from the economy, 
security has also been 'delivered' to the West and of course to the Bloc. Furthermore, 
this political challenge reveals US patronage towards FYR Macedonia. Characteristic 
of this patronage was President's Bush opening speech at the 2008 NATO Bucharest 
summit in which he declared that FYR Macedonia would receive NATO status, 
58 More details can be found in the Macedonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs press releases, at URL: 
http://www.mfa.gov.mk/default1.aspx?ltemID=337&query=afganistan. 
59 As will become apparent the hegemonic institutions are more than one and NATO is one of them. 
Nevertheless, the EU is the central one and thus the main hegemonic institution. Later we will see the 
role of the EU in coordinating the other institutions. Gramsci was referring to the institutions of civil 
society and something equivalent we have at internationalleve!. 
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ignoring the. Greek opposition that led to the Greek veto against FYR Macedonia's 
membership. 
In conclusion, NATO is a means for the stability of FYR Macedonia as well as a 
tool for the Bloc to preserve the stability of the region in general. Therefore, NATO is 
also a tool of US influence in this.state and over the region in general. It is interesting 
that Germany is also a champion of FYR Macedonia's candidacy to NATO. For this 
thesis it is expected that a clear pro-NATO and pro-US position and the use of NATO 
as a security and foreign policy reference will be displayed by FYR Macedonia. 
Moreover, we have to examine the role Germany is playing as part of NATO as well 
as the implications of this Macedonian position on the interethnic relations in FYR 
Macedonia. 
4.4. Economic developments. 
Although FYR Macedonia, despite being a former Yugoslav republic, managed to 
avoid the Yugoslav wars, its economy was not in a better condition than the other 
economies of that state. In fact, FYR Macedonia was the poorest republic of 
Yugoslavia, and after the dissolution, it appeared even weaker. FYR Macedonia was 
not only a 'victim' of Yugoslav economic backwardness, but in its first steps as an 
independent state it faced the Greek trade embargo of 1994 that damaged its 
economy and later the Kosovo war that cut off FYR Macedonia from its main markets 
{i.e. Serbia and Montenegro} and which brought almost 200,000 refugees onto its 
territory: Therefore, the recovery of the country's economic growth was delayed and 
even today is stili modest compared to regional standards. For instance the per 
capita income is 29% ofthe EU-27, while Serbia's is 35%. 
4.4.1. Basic economic data. 
The annual rate of growth reached 6% in the first half of 2008 from 5% in 2007 and 
4% in 2006 {European Commission 2008b}. Exports have slowed down whereas 
imports remained high, which increased the current account deficit to chronic levels 
{13% of GDP}. In fact, the economy is so open that trade amounts to 130% of GDP 
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(see European Commission 2008b). As noted by Gligorov and the European 
Commission, growth was mainly boostE!d by the increase of domestic private 
consumption, which explains the high value of imports, and less by any growth of 
investments (Gligorov 2007; European Commission 2006e:23). Inflation remained 
relatively low at 2.3%, while the gross external debt remained under control at 50% 
, 
of GDP (government debt is only 21% of GDP (European Commission 2006e: 19; 
2008b: 24; 26; Gligorov 2007). This positive trend allowed the government to repay 
€78 million to the Paris Club (IMF 2007). 
Despite the initiation of structural reforms, unemployment remains high (33.8%) 
especially among younger workers (56%), even though the high level of informal 
employment redresses the problem in part (European Commission 2008b: 24). The 
problem is also intensified by the neo-liberal combination of privatisation and 
economic reforms that has contributed to an increase in the unemployment rate and 
thus makes economic recovery even more problematic. This happens for two 
reasons, according to basic economics. The first is the reduction of national income 
through a decline in domestic private consumption, which in FYR Macedonia is an 
important factor in GDP formation, the second reason has to do with the rise of the 
grey economy, which is considered very high in FYR Macedonia (European 
Commission 2007a). Finally, the existing greenfield projects are in non-tradable 
sectors like banking and telecoms and thus they do not create added-value for the 
economy (IMF 2007). The IMF concludes that 'the impressive fiscal consolidation 
reflects politically difficult measures undertaken by the authorities, such as utility 
price rises and reduced expenditure' (IMF 2006b: 62; c.f. also European Commission 
2007a: 19-20). It is obvious that FYR Macedonia is caught in the neo-liberal web that 
fails to address its real problems as a developing economy with its grave 
unemployment and societal problems. 
It was mentioned that FYR Macedonia is performing well in regional 
cooperation though intra-regional agreements in areas like trade and infrastructure 
(European Commission 20D6e). In particular, FYR Macedonia has completed 11 HAs 
and since 19 December 2006 and is a member of the CEFTA. The country has an 
active role in regional cooperation since by being open it can compensate for its 
small size (with a population of just 2,036,000 in 2006). This has great economic 
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value for the Macedonian economy, since it depends on the economic performance 
of the region due to its geographical position but also the formation of its trade 
relations. In spite of the importance of the region, the EU remains the main partner 
with 55% of total Macedonian trade (European Com~ission 2005d). However, the 
low added-value of Macedonian products and the lack of competitiveness of the 
Macedonian products (iron, steel, textiles, foodstuffs) leads to the marginalisation of 
its products which are failing to enter EU markets (OECD 2006). 
A clear picture can be obtained in the following table that shows some of the 
main indicators of the country for the period 1999-2006. 
Table 12' Selective economic indicators 1999-2006 
Year/indicators 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Growth (Real GDP %) 4.3% 4.5% -4.5% 0.9% 2.8% 4.1% 4% 4% 
Inflation 2.6% 6.1% 3.6% 3.4% 0.3% 1.3% 0.5% 3.2% 
Unemployment rate 32.4% 32.2% 30.5% 31.9% 36.7% 37.2% 37.3% 36.1% 
General government 0.3% 2.3% -2.5% -0.5% -0.1% 0.4% 0.3% -0.6% 
balance (GDP %) 
Central government 0.8% 2.7% -5.8% -5.3% -0.1% 0.4% 0.3% -0.6% 
balance (GDP %) 
Government debt (GDP %) 32% 48.1% 48.8% 43% 39.1% 37.6% 40.2% 35.6% 
Trade balance (in millions -465,4 -749,1 -588 -853,9 -750,2 -894 -853,4 -1,015 
€) .' 
Current account balance (in -30.4 -78.5 -272.1 -379.8 -227 -389 -114 -209 
millions €) , 
External debt (GDP %). 39.2% 40.1% 41.9% 39.4% 37.7% 40.2% 47.1% 45.7% 
Exports (in millions €) 1,117 1433 1290,7 1180,7 1203,2 1343,1 1642,2 1833 
Imports (in millions €) 1582,3 2182,1 1878,6 2034,5 1953,5 2237,1 2495,6 2847 
FDI (GDP%) 0.9% 4.9% 12.4% 2.0% 2.0% 2.9% 1.7% 
FDI in million € 30.7 189.4 493.2 82.6 81.4 127.2 79.4 
Source: European Commission 2007a; IMF 2008b. 
At first glance, the fluctuations in economic performance in response to the 
different political crises are obvious. For instance, the government debt was at high 
levels during the period 1999-2000. Furthermore, there is a very high level of 
unemployment and consistently huge external deficits, especially in the trade and 
current account balances. Inflation remains low and under control, largely due to the 
de facto pegging of the Macedonian Denar to the Euro that has at least provided FYR 
Macedonia with the required monetary stability and the credibility of a strong 
currency. Unemployment has not been reduced substantially, and one reason is the 
restructuring process of the economy that has replaced labour intensive with capital-
intensive activities. According to the CommiSSion, the figures will improve as a result 
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of the liberalisation of the labour market. Finally, the excessive trade deficit 
illustrates the significant demand for private and investment consumption. 
Nevertheless, in recent years we can observe an increase in export performance 
which, however, fails to improve the current account deficit due to huge imports. 
Again what is evident is that the neo-liberal recipe of tight fiscal balances does not 
appear to be helpful to the real economy as is obvious from the huge unemiJloyment 
rate. 
Another factor that explains" this economic performance is the business 
climate, which is important for the attraction of foreign investment, and which 
remains unfavourable due to political and security risks. The European Commission 
acknowledges progress but further problems of corruption, organised crime and 
shortcomings in the judicial system continue to damage the business environment 
(European Commission 200gb; 2006d:19). In sum and according to the Commission's 
2007 progress report, FYR Macedonia seems to be on the path of economic 
development but at a slow pace of implementation (European Commission 2007a; 
c.f also Demekas et 0/2005). 
Another aspect of economic policy in FYR Macedonia, which is following a neo-
liberal economic model and which is implementing the directions of the EU and IMF, 
is that it has to employ policies to attract FDI. Indeed, FYR Macedonia has a very 
favourable regime for the attraction of FDI and it has opened its markets to all forms 
of investment, and foreign investors receive the same treatment as locals in many 
respects. Moreover,various types of incentives including tax-exemptions are offered 
to investors, such as a corporation tax of 10% on profits and an average tariff rate on 
imported goods of 15%. Taxation is much lower than in the EU-27 and this could be 
expected to give Macedonia some advantage (UNCTAD 2005a: 13; IMF 2007). This is 
also the aim of FYR Macedonia's leadership as expressed through the Macedonian 
investment agency (see Invest in Macedonia website). However, FYR Macedonia's 
FDI remains low and up until now they have succeeded in covering only a quarter of 
the current account deficit with capital imports, with the rest being covered by 
international donors and private debt-flows (UNCTAD 2005b: 75; European 
Commission 2007a: 23). This development is also proof that the tax incentives alone 
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are not able to bring investments and boost the economy (Mavromatidis 'and 
Leaman 2008). 
The fluctuation of FDI is evident in Table 13: 
Table 13: FDI flows 1997-2006 in million € 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
FDI in million € 20.6 113.9 30.7 189.4 493.2 82.6 81.4 127.2 79.4 286 
Source European Commission 2007a; WIIW 2006 
Table 13 demonstrates the impact of political instability, since after the 2001 
civil conflict FDI suffered a steep fall, and also confirms the overall low level of FDI. 
However, FDI appears to be increasing which might imply further investments in the 
future, provided that political stability remains. Nevertheless, to have a clear picture 
about FDI it is necessary to examine whether the FDI are greenfield projects or just 
portfolio acquisitions and financial flows. It is also important to identify the national 
composition of these investments as well as the sectors into which they are 
channelled. The first is needed because, if they are greenfield projects then they are 
investments that add to existing capacity in the host economy, otherwise they are 
just speculative investments that could leave the country if they found a better 
market. The second is needed because it will indicate the interest of certain 
countries in FYR Macedonia, and the last because some sectors, such as banking, are 
so central that their control affords extensive control of the rest of the economy. 
Another point that we have to mention is that most of the foreign direct 
investments are speculative and thus subject to fluctuations in accordance with the 
global economic climate. Moreover, a large number of these investments produce 
privatisation revenues, which are one-way payments without added-value. Thus, FYR 
Macedonia faces the same problem as Serbia, namely that in a period of economic 
recession, FDI inflows are not secure. Here the problem is intensified because the 
economy is considerably smaller than that of Serbia and FDI represents the main 
revenue source. This reveals a 'flaw' in the IMF and EU policies and their economic 
mentality, because instead of focusing on the development of a domestic productive 
base, they insist on an open economy in which FYR Macedonia obviously cannot 
compete. The net outcome is a deterioration of economic indicators since FDI 
revenues are declining and there is nothing else to cover these losses. 
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The bulk of the FDI during 2000-2001 was in the tertiary sector ($129 and 
$402.1 million respectively) and in particular in 2000 the largest element was in 
finance ($104.7 million) and in construction ($19. 1 million). In fact, the banking 
sector is 100% privatised with most of the banks and assets belonging to foreign 
owners (UNCTAD 2005a). In 2008 the main FDI was channelled towards the banking 
sector and some greenfield projects (European Commission 2008b). Furthermore, 
according to the Greek ministry of foreign affairs there is a process of privatization 
and greenfield projects in the area of energy which are forecast to yield several 
hundred million Euro (Hellenic Ministry Foreign Affairs 2006). 
4.4.2. External institutional framework. 
The IMF, World Bank and EU are the main players. Their role is not very different 
from that in Serbia and therefore, in order to avoid repetition, we will focus on the 
most exclusive arrangements as they obtain in FYR Macedonia. 
Beginning with the IMF, it is obvious that it is concerned with the 
macroeconomic stability of FYR Macedonia and its economic reform within the 
hegemonic ideological framework. Additionally there were three financial 
arrangements between 2000-2008 with a total value ofSDR31.65 million (IMF 2007: 
42). The interests of the Fund are facilitated in cooperation with the World Bank, and 
in FYR Macedonia they are cooperating in five areas. These are judicial reform, 
labour market reform, health sector financing (which makes up 15% of Government 
spending and is considered corrupt), civil service reform and decentralisation, that 
has more to do with the equal representation of minorities in the civil service 
(something that is part of the OFA) (IMF 2007: 47-8). The World Bank for its part has 
provided 39 loans (total $810 million) since 1993. In Appendix 5 documentation is 
provided concerning the strategy of the current programme of assistance. 
FYR Macedonia remains firmly committed to the Copenhagen and Lisbon 
Criteria. Cooperation with the EU is close and there ;s a broad consensus on policy 
goals and their implementation methods (European Commission 2006c). Hence, the 
EU has the role of setting the rules of the game. In addition, the European Agency for 
Reconstruction (EAR) is undertaking a series of projects on behalf of the EU and of 
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course is coordinating part of the financial assistance to FYR Macedonia. The 
cumulative portfolio -of EAR is €293 million, with 89% of this amount already 
contracted. In 2006, the Agency spent BO.S million and its main focus related to 
OFA since it was concerned with support for the decentralisation process. 
Decentralisation involves the largest amount (i.e. €8.l million), followed by justice 
(€7.6 million) and the environment for investments (€4.S million). 
The final part of the international institutional web that operates in FYR 
Macedonia is the SPSEE. FYR Macedonia, as one of the main members of Pact, 
participates in all SPSEE regional initiatives with a special interest in energy and in 
investment attraction projects (Confidential Interview 1; Stability Pact 2006a; OECD 
2006). It is interesting to note that the objectives of the infrastructure projects have 
an intense economic and regional character, which seems to recognise the small size 
of FYR Macedonia and the fact that only within a larger unified regional market can 
FYR Macedonia be attractive for investments. The very small size of the economy is 
also obvious from the low level of FDI, particularly of greenfield FDI; and from the 
low level of bank intermediation (IMF 2007; Stability Pact 2006a). The SPSEE 
administers the Investment Compact Agency, which deals with everything that has 
to do with investments in the region and cooperates closely with the EU, IMF, EBRD 
and the World Bank. An equally important role for the agency is as navigator for FDI 
in the region and as a pressure agency on the national governments for employing 
FDI-friendly policies, since it publishes an annual report on the most FDI-friendly 
national government (OECD 2006). 
Once again, it is obvious that a complete network of agencies is controlling and 
directing the economic actions of FYR Macedonia, which in turn is behaving 
accordingly. Consequently, it could be claimed that the economy is completely 
integrated into the neo-liberal order of the global economy and partict)larly into the 
EU economy. Therefore, these are indications both that foreign capital is in a 
dominant position and that the EU plays its role as the hegemonic institution. 
4.4.3. Domestic institutional framework. 
The response of FYR Macedonia to the demands of EU and other external actors is 
apparent in the 2006-2010 Government programme. In this programme some very 
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interesting characteristics about the economic orientation of the Macedonian 
government can be traced. In general the strategy has three main directions, namely 
EU and NATO reforms; FDI attraction and competitiveness ofthe domestic economy; 
and OFA implementation and politico-economic reforms (Government of the 
Republic of Macedonia 2006: 1). 
The programme covers all dimensions of political and economic life that would 
be pOintless to mention in full detail. For that reason we will focus on those 
economic areas that we believe to be the most important. First is the strategy for FDI 
attraction. Macedonia has set eight actions for this purpose, among which are: 
• 'Promotion of investment opportunities in Macedonia by a team headed by the Prime 
Minister, in cooperation with economic chambers and businessmen'. 
• 'hiring 20-50 distinguished, world-known consulting agencies .. .in order to attract greenfield 
investments' 
• Two ministers without portfolio will work for the attraction of FDI. In addition, '[T]hese 
ministers have spent longer periods abroad, working for famous financial or multinational 
companies and have been involved in international financial and investment activities' 
(Government of the Republic of Macedonia 2006: 10). 
What is obvious from these objectives is the 'desperate' desire of FYR 
Macedonia for FDI as well as the willingness to do whatever is necessary to achieve 
this goal. This is leading to increased regional competition with the other western 
Balkan states, which could easily generate a 'race to the bottom', especially since 
FYR Macedonia aims to achieve the lowest corporation tax in the world as 
proclaimed by the Macedonian Agency for Foreign Investments (for further details 
see the web site of the agency at http://www.investinmacedonia.com). Another 
element that we can identify is the explicit neo-liberal orientation of FYR Macedonia. 
and its close connection with transnational capital, which will be very interesting for 
the following analysis. 
Also interesting is the organisational structure of this 'investment offensive' 
that the Macedonian government is planning. In contrast to Serbia the process is 
from the top and particularly from the executive that operates as a private company 
in a way that partly justifies Friedman's belief in the state company in the global 
world (Friedman 2000). Moreover, in principle, such an initiative can succeed in the 
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era of globalisation but there is some important evidence that proves the opposite. 
Firstly, taking the poor economic condition of FYR Macedonia as given, we find that 
it is impossible to establish more than 10-15 such agencies due to their significant 
cost. Also the 20 international offices seem too optimistic, and we have to take 
account of the traditional Balkan tendency to exaggerate. Furthermore, FYR 
Macedonia faces problems of corruption, administrative delays and lack of 
infrastructure (see European Commission 2008b). 
Other interesting elements of this strategy relate to infrastructure. FYR 
Macedonia has a central location at a crossroads between East and West, and 
therefore they are planning projects in order to exploit this comparative advantage. 
In fact, as our interviewee in EAR told us, FYR Macedonia has a strategic location in 
the area which could/ should be an investment incentive (Confidential Interview 1). 
The main projects are the transport routes linking Turkey-Bulgaria-FYR Macedon ia-
Albania and the Serbia-FYR Macedonia-Greece, and the connection to corridors 8 
and 10 (Government of the Republic of Macedonia 2006). However, infrastructure 
currently remains poor and implementation slow. 
In relation to energy, FYR Macedonia is following EU directives and is planning 
a series of projects (both plants and networks) for the upgrading of its energy 
capacity and the introduction of natural gas (Government of the Republic of 
Macedonia 2006). Currently FYR Macedonia is supplied by refineries in Thessaloniki, 
Greece, and thus in terms of energy supply is over-dependent and weak, as well as 
outside the main energy networks. However, in 2006 it managed to receive €225 
million from the privatisation of the electricity distribution network (IMF 2007: 6). 
The government's strategy has been further elaborated in the 2006 National 
Strategy of FYR Macedonia that followed the EU's 2006 progress report. The main 
economic guidelines remain the same since the focus remains on the necessary 
structural reforms and on attracting FDI. Nevertheless, the strategy provides more 
explicit views of three important issues in our opinion. These are the Copenhagen 
Criteria, the macroeconomic situation and the institutional framework for success. 
The authorities believe that they have a functioning market economy, and this 
objective has broad political and popular support with 90% of the population in 
favour of EU membership, according to the government (see Government of the 
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Republic of Macedonia 2007). The Balkan Monitor currently rates this level of 
support at 66.1% (Balkan Monitor 2009), which is still very high. 
At an institutional level, FYR Macedonia has created its own network which is 
much smaller than in Serbia. In brief the government has the two ministers without 
portfolio whose main role is to attract foreign direct investments and to promote 
FYR Macedonia abroad. In addition, the agency Invest in Macedonia is responsible 
for investments and export promotion. Beyond that, in November 2006, the 
Coordinating Committee was established under the leadership of the deputy Prime 
Minister for Economic Affairs, with the task of implementing the reforms. This task is 
supported by the Commission for implementation of the regulatory reforms. The 
Commission is cooperating with the chambers of commerce, the International 
Council of Investors (ICI) and the National Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness 
Council. Parallel with this there are working groups within the ministries and other 
administrative bodies, while the government has set up a Regulatory Reform sector 
with its own finances (Government ofthe Republic of Macedonia 2007: 2S) . 
. However, FYR Macedonia is not yet ready to cope with the competitive forces 
within the Union since it lacks basic structural reforms and an efficient regulatory 
framework (European Commission 200Sb). In fact, the government accepts this 
delay in structural reforms for which it blames the 'external and non-economic 
shocks, as well as .... (the) lack of information and experience from the developed 
countries on the manner of functioning of the modern market economies and the 
absence of interaction between various social groups' (Government of the Republic 
of Macedonia 2007: 22), even though the social 'partners' (Le. industry and trade 
unions) are committed to the EU goal and to the implementation of reforms. A good 
indication of this is the economic data that were cited in section 4.4.1. Despite these 
problematic figures, which demonstrate the economy's vulnerability in the current 
economic crisis, the public debt remains below the Maastricht Criteria (Government 
of the Republic af Macedonia 2007: 23), which is largely an outcome of the IMF-led 
monetary policy, which is focused on control of the money supply, reduced public 
spending and the pegging of the Dinar to the Euro. 
This evidence demonstrates that the government is taking responsibility for 
the whole strategy, in that way giving a political colour to the investment and reform 
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process. In addition, it shows the commitment of the government to attracting FDI. 
We could claim therefore that there is a connection between the state and investors 
since, as stated, the structure is more political. Nevertheless, the whole structure 
was set up in late 2006 and thus it is too early for it to be properly assessed. 
Nevertheless, this delay itself shows the backwardness of FYR Macedonia in the 
economic transformation of the western Balkans, despite the signs of economic 
stability. 
4.4.4. The economic presence of European and foreign capital. 
European capital is well embedded in the Macedonian economy in terms of both FDI 
and trade. According to the Macedonian Central Bank, the stock of FDI between 
2001-2006 was overwhelmingly dominated by capital from the EU member states 
(see Appendix 6). In particular, the usual four (i.e. Austria, Germany, Greece and 
Italy) are once again the largest economic sources. The difference with the Serbian 
case is that Greece outstrips the other three and Germany seems on the surface to 
.. have a rather modest and stable investment position. In particular, the Austrian 
presence is quite low. However, it would be entirely wrong to judge Germany's FDI 
presence in FYR Macedonia purely on the number of German companies. The reality 
is considerably more complex, in that German capital is using its eastern European 
affiliates extenSively to penetrate FYR Macedonia and the rest ofthe Balkans. Matav 
is arguably the best example. 
Hence, as in Serbia, eastern affiliates are used by western European companies 
to penetrate the Macedonian economy. For instance, Matav (now Magyar Telekom) 
is a Hungarian affiliate of Deutsche Telekom (59.21% holding) and it has made the 
largest investment in FYR Macedonia so far by acquiring 51% of Makedonski 
Telekomunikaci. This purchase brought Hungary to the top of the investor countries 
in FYR Macedonia, despite its (German) subsidiary status. The Matav case is a good 
illustration of transnational elites operating effectively together. Another example is 
Siemens Hellas. It has undertaken several energy projects in the area of FYR 
Macedonia and even though the accounting register refers to Greece, the capital is 
again German (HMFA 2006). A similar example is the operation of aTE as we saw in 
the case of Serbia (see p.138). One of OTE's affiliates operates in FYR Macedonia. 
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Therefore it is now an affiliate of Deutsche Telekom. We can cite plenty of such 
examples of an indirect German presence, especially with a strong presence of 
affiliate corporations in Hungary, the Czech Republic and SIovenia appearing as 
dynamic investors in the region. 
It is interesting to note furthermore the extensive connections of German 
capital with Austrian corporations. Through an wide network of corporate linkages, 
particularly in the banking and engineering sectors, German companies also benefit 
from Austrian penetration in the western Balkans. For instance, the Austrian EVN 
(the biggest Austrian energy company) acquired the electricity network company of 
FYR Macedonia. What is interesting is that 35% of EVN belongs to the German group 
EnBW. In addition; German executives have addressed the security problem as the 
main constraint affecting investments in FYR Macedonia (Makfax 2007a) along with 
the small size of the market and its lack of reforms (Bitzenis et of 2007: 516). Even so, 
by checking the largest Greek registered enterprises operating in FYR Macedonia we 
found that a quarter of them are not Greek, such as Nestle and Toyota Hellas and 
the Athenian Brewery (subsidiary of Heineken), with Germany maintaining a large 
share in the latter. Another interesting difference with Serbia is that the German 
and Greek presence in the banking sector exceeds that of Austria. 
In addition, Edwards in her Wiener Institut fUr Internationale 
Wirtschaftsvergleiche research has proved that many countries are using tax havens 
for investment in the region and in FYR Macedonia in particular. For instance, Greek 
firms as well as Russian and Serbian firms are using c0ty1panies registered in Cyprus 
as investment vehicles, while Liechtenstein is also a popular cover. Two such 
examples in FYR Macedonia that Edwards notes are the 1998 purchase of USJE 
cement by a Cypriot company that was in fact cover for a Greek-Swiss consortium 
and the 1998 purchase of Skopje steel mill by the Serbian multinational Balkan Steel, 
which is registered in Liechtenstein (Edwards 2003: 10). The IMF confirms this by 
listing Hungary as the top investor in 2003 and Cyprus as third (Demekas et of 2005: 
11). In 2004-2006 it was the turn of the Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs (HMFA) 
to show us that among the top four investors were the British Virgin Islands (!) 
(HMFA 2007a). 
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Regional proximity plays an important role as well. Greece has managed all these 
years, and despite bilatera problems at the political level, to become a significant 
economic actor in FYR Macedonia with a registered volume of €950 million in 
investments (HMFA 2007c; Bitzenis et a12007: 516). Greek capital is keen on energy, 
banking and food industries with many SMEs following the big Greek companies 
(HMFA 2007c). Characteristically our first interviewee mentioned to us that whole 
streets are full of Greek companies and names (Confidential Interview 1). 
Regan;jing the other three states, Austria is operating in Telecommunications 
and in energy (paradoxically Austria has no presence so far in the financial sector of 
FYR Macedonia); Germany in metals (e.g. Krupp), chemicals and in the financial 
sector, and Italy in food and dairy products (HMFA 2007b; 2007c). In the 
manufacturing sector Greece controls 39.2% and Germany 10.1% of current 
capacity. The specialisation is also clear, with Greece and Germany focussing on 
textiles, Austria on paper products and Italy on furniture60 (Bitzenis et al 2007: 509-
10). In addition, as the HMFA informs us, many mUltinationals from Germany, 
Austria and the US are moving to FYR Macedonia (HMFA 2007a). Of them, half are 
equally distributed between Greece and Germany (UNCTAD 2005a: 11). Even so, the 
amount of FDI in FYR Macedonia is the lowest in the region and one of the lowest in 
the world and this explains the presence of domestic capital in key sectors such as 
banking, which in the other countries of the region are completely in foreign hands. 
In terms of trade, the situation looks different in the sense that Germany is the 
leader, with trade in the categories food, beverages, tobacco, textiles, miscellaneous 
manufactures, iron and steel (CIA 2008). The first five trading partners of FYR 
Macedonia are shown in the following tables: 
Table 14.1: FYR Macedonia's exports to its first five trade partners 2001-2005 and 2008 in % of the total. 
Country/year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2008 
Germany 10.8 13.3 12.7 13.3 12.3 8.9 
Greece 14.7 18 17.2 16.5 13.8 7.4 
Italy 17.1 6.3 6.2 0.4 6.4 5.2 
Austria 2.5 3.8 3.2 3.3 2.8 
Slovenia 6.4 6.4 8.9 9.2 6.6 2.8 
Source: the WIIW Balkan Observatory; the 2008 data from the State Statistical Office of Macedonia 
2008. 
60 It is interesting that Bulgarian and eastern European countries are also present but we have 
insufficient details to figure out the ownership structures. 
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Table 14.2: FYR Macedonia's imports from its first five trade partners 2001-2005 and 2008 as a % of 
the total 
Country/year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2008 
Germany 18 17.1 21.4 19.7 16.8 14.2 
Greece 5.8 4.1 7.6 9.0 10.8 14.5 
Italy 7.4 8.2 11.4 0.7 11.7 7.6 
Austria 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.7 -
S!ovenia 9.6 1.9 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.7 
Source: the WIIW Balkan Observatory; the 2008 data from the State Statistical Office of Macedonia 2008. 
In both tables the importance of Germany and Greece as trade partners for FYR 
Macedonia is evident. In particular, Germany registers as the main trading partner, 
while Greece seems to be assisted by regional proximity. We have to remember the 
fact that many Greek companies that operate in FYR Macedonia are 'exporting' their 
products to Greece, while some of these companies are also German affiliates. 
Moreover, we can observe a decline in exports in 2008 that might imply that other 
sources of imports have emerged for FYR Macedonia. Most of these are the other 
western Balkan states, and this reveals the impact of CEFTA on regional trade. 
Furthermore, even though the percentages look equal the growing trade deficit 
reveals that the actual volumes are extremely unequal, whilst the difference 
between German and Greek exports with imports implies the low competitiveness of 
Macedonian products in the EU market and reveals a dependency on German 
industrial products. The imports from Greece are mainly oil products, since FYR 
Macedonia lacks sufficient storage facilities for its needs. In relation to this thesis, we 
can confirm the prominent position of Germany as the main trading partner that 
occupies a special position for FYR Macedonia. 
FYR Macedonia ranks as 75th exporter to Germany with €370 million and 80th 
as importer of German products with €343.5 million; currently therefore Macedonia 
enjoys a small trade surplus with Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 
2009). Overall FYR Macedonia's trade is strongly integrated with EU markets; the EU 
accounted for 60% of its exports and 47% of its imports in 2008 (European 
Commission 2008b:29). Despite its small size, its openness to total trade in goods 
and services exceeds GDP by a considerable margin, amounting to 130% in 2007. 
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4.4.5. German economic presence. 
At first glance the German presence does not seem so powerful. However, as was 
mentioned, German companies use their affiliates to enter the Macedonian market. 
Further research on the German presence is revealed by the. Deutsch-
Mazedonischen Wirtschafts-vereinigung (DMWv) (i.e. German-Macedonian 
economic association), which includes more than 130 German (large and medium 
sized) companies as members. Searching the association it also includes German 
subsidiaries in Eastern Europe. The greatest interest is in metals, engineering, 
chemicals and food. Also interesting is that the German interests extend to almost all 
economic sectors (see AHK/DMWV website), something that also only applies to 
Greece in FYR Macedonia. Apart from that, until recently seven German 
transnational corporations have been operating in the country with their main focus 
on industrial and tertiary sectors (UNClAD 2005a). This confirms the above results 
concerning the German presence and its importance. FYR Macedonia also benefits 
from the remittances of the 62,000 Macedonian migrants in Germany, which are 
estimated at $50 million annually (Auswartiges Amt 2008b). 
Germany also has a role as the leading donor in FYR Macedonia, through its 
agencies GTZ and KfW and the BMZ. For Germany FYR Macedonia is classified as a 
priority partner country where their development cooperation began in 1992. In the 
past, this cooperation led to pledges of €6 million in 2003 in order to provide 
assistance in three priority areas. These are drinking water supply and sanitation, 
democracy and civil society and economic reform and development of the market 
system (BMZ 2007). Moreover, Germany also contributes to FYR Macedonia through 
the Stability Pact (BMZ 2005). The German presence is significant in technical 
cooperation too. In fact, since 1992 Germany has spent €100 million in FYR 
Macedonia in the area of environmental policy and developing the market economy 
as the main areas of focus, mainly through the banking sector and small and medium 
enterprises (more on the Auswiirtiges Amt website). In addition, the Federal 
Statistical office is conducting a twinning project with the Macedonian Statistical 
Office (Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2006b). According to the BMZ the 
bilateral ODA commitments to FYR Macedonia in 2003 totalled €4.5 million in 
bilateral technical cooperation and €15.9 million overall (BMZ 2007). 
194 
Therefore, this section ends with three preliminary conclusions. Firstly, that FYR 
Macedonia is strongly keen on the attraction of foreign capital as the solution to its 
economic development. This reflects how.consolidated the neo-classical mentality of 
the Macedonian elite is. Secondly that Germany, even though at first glance it 
appears to manifest modest economic penetration, is considerably more involved 
than appearances suggest. What we can observe in FYR Macedonia is the impact of 
EU and IMF policies that are leading to massive penetration of EU-based capital. 
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for the following section is the willingness of 
German capital to enter FYR Macedonia and, to this end, makes recommendations 
for the implementation of certain reforms that will facilitate this penetration. To the 
latter is added the implementation of certain projects by German aid agencies such 
as in the physical and technical infrastructure that provide the framework for such 
support. 
4.5. Neo-Gramscian application. 
4.5.1. First sphere: social relations of production. 
As before the analysis starts with the first sphere and the social relations of 
production. The objective here, as in Chapter 3, is to demonstrate the existence of a 
social transformation that led to a change in the social hierarchy in FYR Macedonia. 
As is apparent from' the above presentation, FYR Macedonia functions within the 
framework of neo-liberalism as is currently practised and expressed by the EU and 
which reflects German economic preferences and mindset. This economic ideology, 
which is embedded in FYR Macedonia, also reveals the change in the social relations 
of production that have taken place. FYR Macedonia was part of Yugoslavia and in 
the aftermath of the latter's collapse it changed the Yugoslav self-management 
communist model to a western capitalist one. 
The next step is to identify whether this change also meant a change of 
hierarchy within Macedonian society. In contrast with Serbia, the transition to a 
liberal market economy was peaceful under the leadership of Kiro Gligorov who was 
also the communist leader. It was the communist elite that conducted the elections, 
(in which they ended as the second largest party, but Gligorov managed to be 
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elected as president), as well as the referendum for independence from Yugoslavia 
on 8 September 1991 (Heaney 2007: 406; Willemsen 2006). However, FYR 
Macedonia did not escape from the harmful effects of nationalism and inter-ethnic 
conflicts. For instance, in the first elections the nationalist IMRO won with 37 out of 
120 seats with the Albanians voting only for 'their' parties. The latter also abstained 
from the referendum (Heaney 2007). The nationalist elite is personified in IMRO and 
its sub-parties, such as the Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity. These 
developments mean that instead of fundamental political change, there is a 
coexistence of old and new elites, which are mutually assimilated in a way that 
demonstrates transjorismo. 61 This argument is further supported by the clear 
absence of a communist party, as well as by the pro-EU and market oriented policy 
and rhetoric of its successor, the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia. 
The lack of a political struggle for power after the fall of communism is not the 
only difference ofthe Macedonian case. Another difference is the division of society 
into ethnic groups and the important political role of the second largest ethnic 
community, namely the Albanian. It was demonstrated above that after OFA the 
Albanian minority has obtained significant rights as well as an important role in the 
political affairs of FYR Macedonia. At the same time the Albanian elite is following a 
distinct path from the Slav elite which means that we cannot refer to them as one 
elite. In fact, the Albanian parties are dealing mostly with Albanian matters and they 
preserve different agendas from the Slav parties. For instance, in relation to the 
name dispute, the Albanian side was in favour of the Greek approach because for 
them the EU has priority and not the name of the state, which is exactly the opposite 
of Slav side's perception. Hence, there is a significant problem that the application of 
the theory faces. This has to do with the formation of the domestic elite that 
functions within the Bloc. To overcome this problem the domestic elite will be 
analysed on two levels, namely at the level of ethnic community and at state level. 
To this it helps, as it was mentioned earlier, that despite their internal rifts all the 
groups agree to the fundamentals. 
61 As we mentioned in Chapter 1, transforismo in Gramscian terminology is the situation where the 
old and new elites or the old and new historic bloc coexist due to lack of fundamental change or the 
lack of institutional capacity for the assimilation of the external influence (for more details see 
Gramsci 1971). 
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At the community level, as in the case of the Slav group, the Albanian 
community contains both the old and new elite. The old elite refers to those 
representatives of the Albanian side that fought in favour of Albanian rights during 
the Yugoslav era and now continue their activities through political parties. The 
oldest is the DPAs of Xhaferi62 (ICG 2000). The new elite is the one that emerged 
after the Tetovo crisis. Even though it is hard to call them nationalists, since all the 
Albanian parties have similar national aspirations, they maintain the toughest 
position. The central figure is AIi Ahmeti and his party, the DUI. Consequently, at 
state level we are dealing with four political elites that coexist and interact with each 
other. The relations between these elites are not the best or at least are not 
harmonious. A recent article by Willemsen indicates that the polarisation between 
the two ethnic communities and consequent segregation remains marked at both 
political and societal levels (Willemsen 2006). As in Serbia, the domestic elites have 
been forced to work together because of the external environment and not on the 
basis of domestic national communication. The external pressure was manifested in 
OFA and the interest of the' international community in FYR Macedonia's stability, 
which is part of an overall Balkan stability. These elements provide us with two 
conclusions: firstly, that we are dealing with transforismo and secondly that the 
cohesion of this group (i.e. the domestic political elite) seems to have been imposed 
from above and that its future seems uncertain (as we can predict from the frequent 
disputes between the political parties of FYR Macedonia). The loose cohesion is 
evident from the growing conflict between Prime Minister Gruevski and the former 
President Crvenkovski and from the mistrust within the Albanian elite towards 
government policy. However, the imposition of coherence and the agreement on the 
broad targets such as EU and NATO membership and economic transition as well as 
the imposed coexistence of both communities in power, will allow their treatment as 
one elite for further analysis. 
In relation to the domestic economic elite, the situation is rather odd. Until 
recently the bulk of economic life was in state hands, while FYR Macedonia avoided 
the wild economic expansion of certain groups as happened to other states of the 
62 Xhaferi has a history of fighting for Albanian rights and he suffered imprisonment and exile for the 
rights of Macedonian Albanians. 
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Eastern Blac after the fall of communism. The poor economic situation of FYR 
Macedonia, which was at its highest during the Kosovo crisis, played an important 
role and has led to a fragmented domestic economic elite. 
Hence, closing the analysis of the first sphere, the change in the social relations 
of production is obvious. A new domestic elite has been formed (it can only be 
considered as an extension of the old one) as well as a new hierarchy of power, 
which as in Chapter 3 has created a new social order with a new ideological 
framework that promotes certain politico-economic interests, namely the interests 
of the Bloc and the consolidation of the Bloc's economic supremacy. Hence, as in 
Serbia the domestic elite in FYR Macedonia is acting as a member of the Bloc trying 
to promote the hegemonic ideology and to consolidate the hegemony by acquiring 
the consent of society. 
4.5.2. Second sphere: forms of state. 
Entering the second sphere, we examine the formation of the Bloc, as well as the 
interactions between the Bloc actors, which shapes the leadership of the Bloc and its 
function. The current Historic Bloc of FYR Macedonia, is expected to consist of the 
above mentioned domestic elite, the representatives of IFls and NATO, that are 
carrying the hegemonic ideology and promoting policies, as well as by the 
representatives of the EU. Other actors are the foreign economic elite63, the US 
administration with its important influence on FYR Macedonia and its domestic elite. 
The criteria of membership are the same as in Chapter 3 and it will be the same in 
Chapter 5 as well. Briefly, the above actors share common values and goals, share 
the same ideology and interact with each other. One thing to note is that in FYR 
Macedonia there is no church or Russian influence to any great extent, while Albania 
itselfpreserves a discreet role in relation to the internal affairs of FYR Macedonia. 
Following the same format as Chapter 3, the next step is to identify the leader 
of the Bloc and how the Bloc functions. The domestic elite is not coherent and 
preserves its surprising unity due to foreign pressure. Naturally, there are moderates 
63 As was mentioned in Chapter 3 and it will be the case in Chapter 5, in this group we include the 
politico-economic elite from states such as Germany that are active in FYR Macedonia. 
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in both ethnic communities but the continuous existence of inter-ethnic tensions 
between them, which are emerging from the problematic implementation of OFA, 
prove the fragility of this coalition. For example, there is still tension concerning the 
use of Albanian symbols [which according to IMRO is not an OFA obligation, even 
though it is explicitly mentioned] (leG 2005: 9), or the tensions about the name of 
the country, since the Albanians are demanding an equal voice in this matter (Skai 
2007). 
Furthermore, due to it~ small size the domestic elite in FYR Macedonia is 
clearly oriented towards the West (Le. US and EU) and the politico-economic 
ideology that the West represents. Significant evidence that tends to confirm this 
argument is the explicit connection between government and transnational capital, 
as we can see by the establishment of the two ministers for FDI and the background 
of the government members. Moreover, the political declaration of FYR Macedonia 
that it is Willing to do everything necessary (apart from changing its name), in order 
to achieve EU and NATO membership, as well as patronage by the USA and some EU 
. member states on foreign policy deciSions, strengthens the argument about the 
weakness of the domestic elite in playing a leading role within the Bloc. Perhaps the 
theory that an artificial entity (if FYR Macedonia can be described as such), always 
needs foreign patronage for its self-determination (see Allcock 1994) is confirmed in 
this case. In addition, the external actors in addition to patronage and protection 
offer legitimacy to the established politico-economic status quo. This is naturally 
derived from the fact that the established status quo is rooted in the OFA, which is a 
product of certain external actors who in turn guarantee its application. 
The second group that we will examine is the US administration. As we 
mentioned in section 4.3.4, FYR Macedonia considers the US (and US-led NATO) as 
the key to its foreign policy, not to mention for its own existence. This is evident 
from the constant Macedonian pleas to the US against Greece regarding the name 
dispute and corresponding US responses. The same conclusion derives also from the 
effect of the US recognition of FYR Macedonia as Republic of Macedonia on 4 
November 2004 as well as from the reception of the US by Macedonian society. 
Moreover, FYR Macedonia's political world has repeatedly linked its hopes for US 
support on NATO membership to the name dispute. In addition to this 'unconditional 
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surrender' (sic), we have to place FYR Macedonia's participation in the War on Terror 
in Iraq and in Afghanistan. From its side the US continues to support FYR 
Macedonia's stability, which is linked with the name settlement. This was also the 
justification for the 2004 recognition. In relation to this recognition, the following 
quotation is revealing: 
'But playing an unexpected trump card three days before the Macedonian vote-and two days after the 
US presidential vote, so as not to prejudice support for Bush among disgruntled Greek Americans- the 
United States suddenly recognised the Republic of Macedonia by its chosen name, thus rewarding 
Skopje for its calculated participation in America's coalition of the willing in the Iraq war and coalition 
of the unwilling against the International Criminal Court' (Pond 2006: 183). 
Therefore, the US administration has a powerful influence on FYR Macedonia 
as well as exercising a powerful patronage which is recognised by the domestic elite. 
US support is crucial for both the legitimacy of the domestic elite as well as for the 
stability of the state. The US administration also enjoys broad popular support from 
both ethnic communities, which enhances its influential role. As for the criteria for 
membership fa the Bloc, their coverage is obvious. But could the US administration 
be the lead"er of the group? 
From the presentation so far, it is obvious that the US represents the main 
political force that the Macedonians listen to, 'obey' and direct their hopes at. FYR 
Macedonia is one of the most pro-US states in the region and in that sense the US 
can be considered to be a leader. To this is added the open channel of US diplomacy 
with the EU and its member states about the FYR Macedonia's affairs. However, its 
modest economic presence and the fact that the EU has undertaken FYR 
Macedonia's integration and its compliance with the necessary reforms suggests 
otherwise. In addition, despite the significant role of US diplomats in Greece (e.g. 
Rhys, Burns) and in FYR Macedonia (e.g. Milovanovic) as well as in the State 
Department, the crucial decisions are taken in cooperation with the EU or with some 
of its member states. In addition, even in cases of US unilateral actions such as the 
recognition of FYR Macedonia as Republic of Macedonia, the EU did not follow and 
managed to keep its line. Of course, several member states have recognised FYR 
Macedonia as Republic of Macedonia, creating the contradiction by' which the EU 
refers to as FYR Macedonia and its members as Macedonians, not to mention that 
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solidarity towards Greece has prevailed so far. Therefore, the case for US leadership 
of the Bloc is rejected. 
The group of IFI officials transmit the hegemonic ideology and impose a certain 
package of policies on FYR Macedonia that favour foreign and particularly European 
capital and facilitate the consolidation of the Bloc's hegemony. As Stiglitz notes, the 
power of these institutions is such that '[n]ot only countries seeking their help but 
also those seeking their "seal of approval" so that they can better access 
international capital markets, must follow their economic prescriptions' (Stiglitz 2002: 
18), while he also notes the close connection between the officials of those 
institutions with the western business community and with western governments 
whose interests are promoted (Stiglitz 2002: 19). Their leadership is rejected for the 
same reasons as in Chapter 3, namely because they are acting as hegemonic 
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institutions that bear and promote the hegemonic ideology and the Bloc's interests 
instead of formulating an autonomous agenda. 
The same applies to the EU officials. Once again we have to clarify that the 
reference to EU officials denotes those who are dealing with the integration of FYR 
Macedonia. From the moment that EU membership became the primary target for 
FYR Macedonia, the influence of EU officials has been significant. Their role is 
enhanced by the fact that the EU is operating a series of programmes in the country. 
Furthermore, EU membership means survival as a state and for that reason FYR 
Macedonia so far has agreed to everything that the EU has demanded, even though 
the implementation of reforms has hitherto fallen short. This lack of implementation 
has led to the conclusion by scholars, such as Noutcheva, of a challenge to the 
normative power of the EU. Nevertheless, even these scholars agree that the 
material benefits that the EU promises play. an important role in the state's 
conforming to Brussels' norms. One should not forget that, as Noutcheva 
demonstrates, in the end everything has happened after determined EU 64 
intervention (Noutcheva 2007). 
Could we then consider the EU officials as the leading group of the Bloc? The 
answer is negative. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, the EU officials are following the 
64 Obviously, we are referring to EU officials that are monitoring the implementation of FYR 
Macedonia's commitments for EU membership. 
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directions of member states and thus are promoting their interests in FYR 
Macedonia. In addition, the EU is not the only anchor of foreign policy and does not 
have a coherent approach due to the name dispute. Certainly, DG Enlargement has a 
certain. plan for FYR Macedonia and this is directed towards compliance with the 
Copenhagen Criteria, as is evident from its reports about FYR Macedonia. In addition, 
despite the primacy that the EU gives to integration and the enlargement process, 
the slow implementation shows that internal forces are still resistant. Thus, the role 
of the EU remains that of the main hegemonic institution, which seems to be 
consistent with the EU's actions. 
The last group is transnational capital. Here matters look simpler than in the 
previous case study (i.e. Serbia). As we saw earlier, European capital dominates the 
privatised economy of FYR Macedonia, but with the corporations of the big four 
countries (i.e. Austria, Greece, Italy and Germany) sharing the largest part on paper. 
For this group, we have to work at two levels. Firstly we have to show if they do 
constitute the leading group of the Bloc, and then who leads the group. certainly, 
transnational capital is overwhelmingly European and from now on we will mention 
it as European capital; it also has the financial resources to be the leader. The 
question, however, is: how coherent is it in order to use this power? 
In FYR Macedonia at this moment, there is the ICI that operates as the platform 
and the forum for foreign investors in FYR Macedonia. Looking at its website in 
http://www.ici.com.mk we noticed two things. Firstly, that it is a Greek initiative and 
is dominated by Greek economic representatives and secondly that there is an 
apparent absence of Austrian and German capital. A second forum that was 
mentioned above is the DMWv. This forum also has under its umbrella the Austrian 
companies and plays an important role as the portal between the economic relations 
between Germany and FYR Macedonia. In fact, this forum is the largest in FYR 
Macedonia as noted by the DMWV itself: 
'Die DMWV is mit iiber 130 Mitgliedern der grosste bUaterale Wirstcha[tsverband in Mazedonien und 
das Netzwerk und Sprachrohr der hier vor Ort aktiven Untemehmen aus Deutschland und Mazedonien, 
die sich aktivan den Wirtscha[tbeziehungen zwischen beiden Landem beteiligen' [The DMWV is with 
more than 130 members the biggest bilateral economic association in Macedonia and the network 
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and megaphone of the enterprises active on site here from Germany and Mocedonia which take part 
actively in the economic relations between both countries] (DMWV 2008). 
Beyond these two fora, there is a series of smaller ones, which represent the 
economic relations of FYR Macedonia with other national economies. At this point, 
we have to make clear that the importance of each forum is viewed, by us, in terms 
of its activities, size and importance for the recipient economy. Therefore, there are 
instruments that could constitute a coherent voice for foreign capital. However, the 
data so far, indicate no direct and thus open cooperation between them in order to 
claim a holistic representative instrument. At the same time, we observe a lack of 
fierce competition among the different national capitals that we can explain in two 
ways. 
Firstly, there would seem to be a division of the markets among themselves. 
Thus, the Austrians are moving into banks and telecommunications, the Germans 
into mining and raw materials, the Greeks into consumer products and the Italians 
into tourism. Certainly, this national division does not exclude the case of national 
variation in all sectors. However, it is true that certain countries are focusing on 
certain actors, which might be to do with the specialisation of the parent countries. 
For instance, a country with a strong banking sector like Austria is likely to invest 
more in the banking sector of other countries. The second reason might be the 
interconnection of the ownership of various companies from these four countries as 
we saw above. Nevertheless, competition exists in areas. such as energy as we are 
informed by the Greek liaison mission in FYR Macedonia (HMFA 2006) and 
telecommunications. The thing here is that these sectors are not yet completely 
privatised and that there is thus space for conflict over market shares. 
The Bloc formation analysis has revealed that so far no group is strong enough 
to seize leadership. Nevertheless, there is an apparent division of labour among the 
group members. The EU is setting the reform agenda along with other IFls that have, 
however, a narrower agenda and comply with EU demands. Added to thiS, the EU is 
checking, monitoring (penalising when necessary) and coordinating all the activities 
that are taking place in FYR Macedonia. From the latter, the most important factors 
perhaps are the twofold services that the EU provides to the rest of the Bloc. Firstly, 
it provides stability for both the domestic and foreign (economic) elites, through its 
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military, economic and diplomatic protection. Secondly, the EU is creating a 
favourable economic environment and is promoting the development of an 
adequate infrastructure that facilitates investments and trade. 
The domestic elite from its side seems to participate with a dual role. On the 
one hand, it ensures that all the proposed reforms are going to be implemented and 
that the outcome will be in the expected direction. Nevertheless, there are still huge 
delays in implementation that show both institutional weakness and the existence of 
personal interests. However, FYR Macedonia, which is much weaker than Serbia (and 
without the latter's Russian patronage), can be more easily disciplined. Secondly, it 
ensures the compliance of the rest of society towards the externally imposed 
preferences, with extreme efficiency, judging by the support of the population 
towards EU and NATO membership. In FYR Macedonia, this is extremely apparent, 
since the current political elite which, apart from people that have been trained in 
US and British business schools and universities, is focused on FDI attraction and is 
doing everything possible to attract foreign capital. At the same time the target of 
EU and NATO membership is managed so that it has become a national priority for 
the whole society. A recent opinion poll conducted on behalf of USAID shows 89% 
support for NATO and 94% support for EU membership (USAID 2007). 
The US administration also works in the direction of preserving the stability of 
the state and moral support for NATO and EU reforms. An indicative position is 
expressed by the deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, Ms 
DiCarlo, who noted FYR Macedonia's progress but stressed that much has yet to be 
done (US Embassy in FYR Macedonia 2007). This kind of support we believe to be 
very important to a fragile state such as FYR Macedonia because it can downplay 
inter-ethnic tensions. Finally, the foreign economic elite is reaping the benefits of 
this situation; it implements the majority of the projects and most importantly, it 
ensures the 'obedience' of both the domestic elites and the population through the 
economic benefits that it brings and of course provides the necessary legitimacy for 
the reforms that the state is undertaking since they are taking place in the name of 
FDI and development. 
204 
- - _.- -----------
4.5.3. The subaltern reaction. 
The neo-Gramscian hypothesis requires the discipline of the subaltern/working 
classes and how they receive hegemony. FYR Macedonia faces great problems of 
unemployment and poor economic conditions, which instead of leading to 
confrontation with Bloc policies, as one could expect, have significantly turned 
people in favour of the Bloc as a possible solution. According to the Balkan Monitor, 
83.9% of the Albanian community and 56.4% of the Macedonian, support EU 
membership. In our opinion this has to do with the belief of Albanians that their 
national demands will be addressed within the EU. Additionally, as in Serbia, the 
same age groups of 15-24 and 25-39 year-olds support EU membership with 74.2% 
and 68.4% respectively while, with 61.6%, the group of 55+ is the least supportive, 
but again the support is huge, which might have to do with the fact that FYR 
Macedonia was one of the poorest republics of former Yugoslavia and thus less 
favoured by the communist system. Equally, important is the finding that in all 
categories more than 80% of the respondents believe that membership will bring 
stability and security (Balkan Monitor 2009). It is our strong belief that this result 
reflects the huge national and cohesion problems. that FYR Macedonia faces. In 
another poll by USAID there is also support for the hegemonic ideology with the 
specific economic doctrine that it promotes, since 80% believe that FDI is necessary 
for their economy (USAID 2007). This is confirmed by the Balkan Monitor that finds 
more than a 50% belief in the importance of FDI for development (Balkan Monitor 
2009). The opinion polls results also demonstrate the consolidation of the 
hegemonic ideology sinc~ that the SOciety has accepted it as common sense and 
therefore is becoming unable and unwilling to resist the hegemony. 
Nevertheless, as in Serbia, opposition exists in elite resistance towards certain 
reforms and to nationalist forces. For example, the negative outcome of the 
Bucharest summit and the growing tension due to the name dispute caused huge 
demonstrations. The demonstrations were mainly directed against Greece, France 
and other actors that oppose the . Macedonian line, that are subsequently used as 
scapegoats. In relation to the EU, the mood was that they would not sacrifice the 
name for membership. Thus national problems and their exploitation by nationalist 
forces are the main opposition to the Bloc force. 
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4.5.4. Third sphere: world orders. 
FYR Macedonia functions within the politico-economic framework that was 
established in the post-communist era. Particularly, FYR Macedonia as a candidate 
state, functions in the sub-framework, which has been defined by tl:!e EU ·and the 
German initiatives of SAP and SPSEE. The question that we have to ~onsider is how 
the Bloc manages to transmit its hegemonic ideology and thus to establish a 
hegemony. Based on the above-mentioned division of labour, we believe that the 
transmission is taking place by political, economic and cultural means. In all these 
the EU has a key role. 
The political means involve (in addition to the above-mentioned division of 
labour) the use of pressure and of 'advice' from the foreign elites towards FYR 
Macedonia. These can take the form of IMF officials meetings or EU-Macedonian 
meetings about the reforms as well as pressure from other states such as Germany. 
The German political elite has repeatedly mentioned the need for FYR Macedonia to 
reform e.g. on 18 December 2007 (Makfax 2007f). "What all these 'influences' are 
achieving is to deliver both pressure on and reward for, the domestic political elite, 
which in turns convinces the lower classes of the necessity of certain sets of reforms. 
Nevertheless, in order for the population to be convinced, it needs some 'rewards' 
such as US recognition of their institutional name; candidate membership of the EU; 
or the German police missions. These actions are convincing the population that it 
has to continue this particular politico-economic path, without realising that those 
who truly benefit are the Bloc and transnational capital. Here the EU is transmitting 
the ideology and the pressure for the implementation of reforms. 
The economic means are more tangible. Here again there is the same kind of 
pressure and subsequent propaganda towards the population about the necessity of 
reforms and the sacrifices that have to be made. Beyond this there is the direct use 
of material resources (by funding certain projects and events) and the transmission 
of the hegemonic ideology through the working process, e.g. neo"liberal economic 
applications etc. The EU role once again is the transmission of economic ideology 
and implementation of the required reforms as well as the protection of investments. 
Finally, the cultural means are of speCial importance since neo"Gramscian 
hegemony is not only economic but includes cultural aspects. Culture has a 
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I significant role because it can penetrate the society and its class divisions, and can 
establish certain attitudes in the long term that favour the consolidation of the Bloc 
as common sense. In this case study, because of the smooth change of power, this 
could mean that the media, which are the primary agents of the transmission of a 
cultural product, were not used by the Bloc for the support of a certain elite, as in 
Serbia, but for the establishment of a particular status quo between the two ethnic 
communities. An example of this is the media strategy the SPSEE mentions, that 
seeks to promote reconciliation and to bring together the two communities as well 
as to address issues such as corruption (Stability Pact 2004: 12; 2005). For this 
purpose, an extended network of international donors has contributed towards 
these efforts. The following is an example: 
7he OSCE works with MRTV. press now works in the faculty of journalism in Skopje and See University 
in Tetovo. IREX focused on media associations, yet their programme is about to close. IFA supports 
television production in MRTV and legal reform' (Stability Pact 2004: 12). 
The support of the local media by foreign agencies includes the broadcasting of 
certain types of programmes, which are funded by western donors, and which 
promote the ideology of the Bloc. These are programmes that either support the EU 
and the ideas of democratisation, economic liberalisation etc or more purely cultural 
programmes such as western TV shows. This is to be expected since hegemonic 
consolidation requires cultural penetration that will create the environment for 
acceptance of the hegemonic ideology as common sense. Do not forget that in FYR 
Macedonia the SPSEE had admitted that they, along with other donors, had 
supported the Macedonian media that were facing survival problems due to the 
small size of its market, as well as in an effort to promote plurality (Stability Pact 
2004: 7). 
Nobody claims that there is a crude direct influence but the influence exists. 
This takes several forms such as ownership, sponsorship etc. Nevertheless, the 
biggest manipulation is indirect and normative. Media that are convinced that the 
EU is the only way are media that will support this idea. In the case of FYR 
Macedonia, the fall of communism and the desire to become western is a powerful 
factor for the promotion of this purpose in society. This factor is also consistent with 
the theoretical framework being applied here because the acceptance of a reality as 
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common sense, which in this case is the western life-style and EU membership, is 
reproduced by the local media. The net outcome is the reproduction of the 
hegemonic ideology within society and its consolidation as undisputed common 
sense. 
Beyond the media, the EAR informs us that it is funding educational 
programmes such as the 'EU-funded youth campaign on tolerance'. This programme 
receives €900.000 and for two years it brings together the youth of FYR Macedonia's 
communities in order to achieve reconciliation (EAR 2007a). In addition, 'the 
Business Centre for Education and Post-graduate Studies at the South East European 
University' was opened in FYR Macedonia (Tetovo). The university is supported by 
the EAR and its aim is to train 'future managers and entrepreneurs from all 
communities'. Moreover, the University directly works for regional reconciliation 
(EAR 2007b). Therefore, even here we can see an effort for the promotion of the 
Bloc's ideology. Even here the EU money and coordination is key to cultural 
transmission. 
4.5.5. Germany and neo-Gramscian hegemony in FYR Macedonia. 
This thesis is about German hegemony in the western Balkans and in this case FYR 
Macedonia. Therefore, we have to explore whether Germany is the hegemon and, to 
do this, we have firstly to locate the role of Germany within the three spheres of 
activity. 
In the first sphere as was mentioned in Chapter 2, Germany was able to insert 
its economic mindset into EU enlargement policy. Moreover, the German actions 
were important in the formation of the domestic elite, from the moment that they 
undertook diplomatic and. later 'security' actions in the Tetovo crisis and by 
supporting the stability of FYR Macedonia and providing legitimacy to its elite. Thus, 
it could be claimed that Germany has played a key role in social change, since it 
participated in the formation of the new ideological framework of production as well 
as in the consolidation ofthe new domestic elite. 
The second sphere, even though we failed to establish a leader, shows th at 
Germany has an influence. It has a significant economic presence and is regarded by 
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the local elite as an impDrtant pDliticD-ecDnDmic partner. These tWD elements will 
alsD allDw us tD identify the rDle Dfthe German elite within the Bloc. 
The first is cDvered in the intrDductiDn since we demDnstrated that the German 
preferences are cDnsolidated within the EU and in enlargement pDlicy. FDr the 
secDnd, the German pDlitical elite (we are referring mainly tD federal gDvernment's 
Dfficials) have referred tD FYR MacedDnia concerning its stability and its prDgress 
tDwards EU and NATO. An example is the reference of Dr Jung to the stability that EU 
and NATO can bring tD FYR Macedonia at the 44th Munich security conference65 
(Jung 2008). 
Even more explicit is the German embassy in SkDpje which seems tD cDnfirm 
everything that we have claimed SD far. Hence: 
'Die bilateralen politischen Beziehungen sind van besonders guter Qualitiit. Oeutschland ist nicht nur 
der wlchtigste wirtschajtliche bilaterale Partner, sondem ouch einer der wich/igsten politischen 
Partner Mazedoniens. Die frahe und konsequente Unterstutzung Mazedoniens nach seiner 
Unobhiingigkeit, die Rolle Deutschlands 015 wichtigster Handelspartner sowie enge menschliche 
Bindungen durch ca. 70.000 in Deutschland lebende mazedonische Staatsangehiirige miigen far dieses 
ausgezeichnete Verhiiltnis die zentralen Anknapfungspunkte sein. Auch die deutsche Unterstutzung in 
der Kosova-Krise 1999 und in der Krise in Mazedanien im Jahre 2001 sowie die Einhaltung van 
Hi/fszusogen haben den deutschen Ruf gefestigt, ein besanders verliisslicher Partner zu sein. 
Mazedonien sieht in Deutschland femer den wichtigsfen Fiirsprecher fiir seine BemOhungen um eine 
Anniiherung an die NATO und die Europiiische Union. Deutschland unterstutzt diesen Prozess ouch 
durch Beratung und finanzielle Hilfe far eine Vielzahl von Prajekten (u.a. im Rahmen des 
Stabilitiitspaktes far Sadosteurapa). Regelmiijlige Treffen van Bundestagsabgeardneten, Ministem 
und den Regierungschefs sawie den Priisidenten beider Staaten in Skapje und in Berlin unterstreichen 
die engen Beziehungen' [The bilateral political relations are of especially good quality. Germany is not 
only the most important economic bilateral partner, but also one of the most important pOlitical 
partners of Macedonia. The early and logical support of Macedonia after his independence, the role 
of Germany as the most important trading partner as well as narrow human connections by approx. 
70,000 Macedonian citizens living in Germany may for this excellent relation. Also the German 
support in the Kosovo crisis in 1999 and in the crisis in Macedonia in 2001 as well as the observance 
of auxiliary assents have strengthened the German call to be an especially dependable partner. 
Macedonia sees in Germany further the most important advocate for his efforts towards an 
approach in NATO and the European Union Germany supports this process also by consultation and 
65 Dr Jung had repeated this on 30 August 2007 in his visit to FYROM (Makfax 2007d). 
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financial help to a huge number of projects [our emphasis] (among other things within the scope of 
the stability pact for SUdosteuropa). Regular meetings of members of the Bundestag, ministers and 
the heads of the government as well as the presidents of both states in Skopje and in Berlin underline 
the narrow relations.)" (Deutschen Botschaft in Skopje 2008). 
It is important to remember that Germany appeared as guarantor of FYR 
Macedonia's stability by assuming the leading role in KFOR and with its diplomatic 
efforts during the 2001 crisis. Even today, the German political leadership expresses 
its support of the stability of FYR Macedonia. For instance, in June 2007 the 
Bundestag decided to extend the mandate of the German troops in FYR Macedonia 
(within KFOR) as necessary for FYR Macedonia's stability (Makfax 2007c). 
Other interests might be the geographical location of FYR Macedonia in the 
heart of the Balkans. Instability could easily disrupt the whole trade between 
Western Europe and the Middle East. In addition, with so many contenders for 
power within Macedonia (as well with neighbour countries having claims on 
Macedonia itself) the threat of instability is always present. Unfortunately for FYR 
Macedonia, it lacks importance as an energy factor since it is isolated from the 
energy projects of the region. Therefore, we have to focus on the factor of stability 
as the main interest, particularly (as our second interviewee has mentioned to us) 
from the fact that FYR Macedonia is a classic example of a buffer state against 
Albanian expansionism. 
The next thing that we have to answer is the role of the politico-economic elite. 
To answer this, it has to be demonstrated that Germany is influencing the political 
and economic decisions of FYR Macedonia. Evidence in this direction is sparse. Even 
though Germany urges reforms, their implementation is slow. In addition, in the 
name dispute between FYR Macedonia and Greece, the German position is rather 
neutral but again its advice in favour of compromise is not easily accepted. For 
instance, in Bucharest Or Merkel, expressed a desire for a positive signal towards the 
EU but at the same time is bound to EU solidarity. Further to this, the US 
administration's clout appears stronger, as can be judged from the constant 
reference of Macedonian diplomats. At this point perhaps it is useful to note the 
66 Emphasis added. 
210 
view of observers like Noutcheva, that the normative power of the EU (and to a 
certain extent of its member states) in imposing its will is not so powerful 
considering the slow progress of reforms and the growing tension between the EU 
authorities and the elites of the western Balkans (Noutcheva 2007). This is evident 
from the EU and NATO progress reports on FYR Macedonia. 
Therefore, we have, on current evidence, to dismiss the idea of the power of 
the German political elite as hegemonic. Perhaps one reason might be the 
overwhelming focus of German diplomacy on Kosovo. In that respect, the interests 
of the German political elite seem to be around wider western Balkan stability 
instead of onFYR Macedonia as an individual player. What strengthens this 
conclusion are (in the absence of more primary resources) the positions of the 
German elites that mention at every opportunity the need to avoid a wider conflict 
in the Balkans by destabilising FYR Macedon ia and the need for the inclusion of FYR 
Macedonia in NATO and the EU as the only permanent solution for stability. Here we 
have also to note the normative aspects of German society which, based on the right 
to self-determination, justified the decision of the Bundestag to recognize FYR 
Macedonia as Macedonia. 
In contrast to the political elite, the economic elite seems ready to consolidate 
its supremacy in FYR Macedonia's economic affairs. Despite the economic data that 
have been presented, the German economic elite has repeatedly sought to promote 
its interest in investing in FYR Macedonia as is obvious from the numerous exchange 
of German and Macedonian economic delegations such as the Expo Real in Munich 
(Invest in Macedonia 2007), or the June meeting between the Macedonian president 
Mr. Crvenkovski and Bundestag president Mr lammert (IDIVIOI 2007). Furthermore, 
the German economic elite appears powerful enough to 'impose' some of its 
demands on FYR Macedonia. The German economic representatives in FYR 
Macedonia have repeatedly urged reforms in order to invest their capital and they 
have repeatedly stated the need for FYR Macedonia's political stability (Makfax 2008; 
Bitzenis et al. 2007). 
Hence the issue is how these 'recommendations' were received by FYR 
Macedonia's elite. Here is the big difference from the political one. FYR Macedonia is 
implementing (even though slowly but with willingness to speed up) an economic 
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programme that aims largely at attracting capital. In addition, FYR Macedonia's 
leadership is assuming special importance for Germany (Makfax 2007e; Invest in 
Macecdonia 2007) through its participation in various German trade fairs. Another 
requirement is to demonstrate that German capital is more significant than the 
other competing national capitals. As was seen earlier, the German economic elite 
appear to be the umbrella for Austrian capital as well as the main 'negotiator with 
FYR Macedonia's representatives. Certainly we can mention the ICI as another 
important source of economic pressure on FYR Macedonia by capital. For instance, 
'[T]hrough continuous efforts of its Executive Committee and the administrative 
personnel and based on the constant support of its members ICI has managed to be 
an influential partner ofthe competent authorities ofthe country' (I Cl 2009). 
However, the ICI is independent and has an NGO status, and from that 
perspective we can speak of a transnational capital elite. Therefore, it is important to 
try to give a definite answer (if this possible) of German economic dominance even 
though it is not the only pillar of influence. Nevertheless, because German capital is 
the only one that is well represented in FYR Macedonia and this representation 
connects the promotion of German capital with wider German interests in the region, 
we could claim that German capital has strong influence. 
Hence, we have to answer the question of how we connect the actions of the 
German economic elite with wider German interests in the region. Firstly, as was 
mentioned in Chapter 1, the German political elite represents, promotes and 
protects German economic interests. For example, there is German economic 
'advice' which speaks in favour of the regional market, for stability and for business-
friendly policies. At the same time German foreign policy repeatedly mentions 
stability, regional integration (see SPSEE role) and of course the promotion of 
German capital. We should not forget that German delegations always stress the 
problem of stability as regards their investments in FYR Macedonia and in the 
western Balkans in general (Confidential Interview 2; Bitzenis et al. 2007). Two other 
reasons were the small size of the market and the lack of stability. Thus, the German 
economic elite remains (so far) the only one with strong national connections. 
In order to be certain about the role of German capital we have to see how the 
domestic elite perceives German capital. The political elite constantly mention the 
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need for German capital. For example, the Macedonian minister of foreign affairs in 
his interview on 28 December 2008 confirmed this importance. The same view was 
expressed by the former Macedonian president Mr Crvenkovski during his visit to 
Germany in June 2007 (Milososki 2007). It also gives great importance both to the 
political role of Germany for its EU and NATO membership as well as a 
counterbalance to Greek pressure (Milososki 2007; Makfax 2007b). 
4.5.5.1. Transmission of the hegemonic ideology by Germany. 
However, the final conclusion will come in relation to the third sphere, where we 
have to show how the 'hegemon' is transmitting its influence. Firstly, we mentioned 
above that FYR Macedonia is operating within the framework that is set by the EU 
and which is largely based on a German initiative (see Chapter 2). This means alone 
does not prove anything in relation to German hegemony. Moving further, we have 
to prove that the German elite is using its resources for transmitting its ideology. 
Firstly, at the cultural level Germany is using its cultural and education policies for 
the promotion of its interests as we are informed by the Auswartiges Amt: 
'Germany's cultural relations and education policy is part and parcel of our foreign policy. As such, 
policy guidelines in this field are formulated by the Federal Foreign Office ... it is an integral part of 
German foreign policy aimed at conflict prevention and peacekeeping' (Auswartiges Amt 2008b) 
In regard to FYR Macedonia, the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs us 
of an agreement on cultural cooperation which was signed on 16 October 1997. The 
interesting feature of this agreement is the focus on the German language. The 
German embassy and the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst are not the only 
pillars of German cultural policy in FYR Macedonia. The KAS is operating in the 
country through its 'Media programme for South East Europa', which aims to 
'strengthen the media as an important factor in democratisation and to encourage 
positive developments' (KAS 2008). 
Another institution is the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, which is associated 
with the liberal Free Democratic Party in Germany and which has an office in FYR 
Macedonia. Nevertheless, for us the most important element of German 'cultural' 
policy is its educational branch. As the Auswartiges Amt states, Germany is 
conducting an active campaign for the promotion of the German language which is 
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considered the second in importance in FYR Macedonia (Auswartiges Amt 2008b). 
From a neo-Gramscian point of view this could be claimed to be an effort to transmit 
the hegemonic idea. There is the promotion of liberal economic ideas as well as 
media reconstruction along more western lines. As for the use·of language, again the 
neo-Gramscian view provides an answer/justification. language is a powerful 
cultural tool and its promotion is part of cultural promotion as well as of the creation 
of a pro-German society. Thus, the cultural aspect is covered and with this the 
application of the three spheres on Germany is concluded. However, the question 
about the role of Germany as the hegemon in FYR Macedonia, has not yet been 
answered. This is attempted below. 
4.6. Concluding remarks. 
Trying to make an assessment of the data that have been presented in this chapter, 
we could claim that Germany has characteristics that might justify the use of the 
neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony in FYR Macedonia. As outlined, Germany has a 
significant economic presence, which is growing. It has also political influence, whilst 
it promotes German culture in this country as well. An equally important hegemonic 
element is the German guarantee of FYR Macedonia's stability, even by military 
means, through the German military presence in the region. Also significant is the 
indirect German economic influence through the affiliates of German companies, 
with some of them located in 'competitor' countries such as Greece and Austria. 
Therefore, the actual economic clout of Germany is much greater than it appears. 
The indirect political influence that Germany exercises in FYR Macedonia, 
through the institutions that are operating there (mainly the EU), is also important, 
since as was mentioned in Chapter 2 Germany was successful in inserting its 
preferences in the EU enlargement policy. Consequently, the EU policies in FYR 
Macedonia, contain German preferences in a way that satisfies German interests. In 
addition, as neo-Gramscian hegemon, the German elite is using the EU as a 
hegemonic institution in FYR Macedonia, and at the same time the EU actions are 
leading to a tremendous penetration of EU-based capital, and to a significant 
opening-up ofthe Macedonian economy. 
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However, some questions remain. Firstly, the economic power of Germany, 
even though significant, is not hegemonic. For the first requirement, despite the 
strong economic presence of Germany, (and the use of its 'competitors'), the other 
states, particularly Greece, remain economically strong. Thus this economic presence 
might be huge but not hegemonic. Nevertheless, even in the case that the German 
economic presence was hegemonic, problems exist with the second requirement. It 
is worth adding that FYR Macedonia only has secondary importance for German 
political interests and it sees it as part of the wider Balkan puzzle. In fact, German 
interest is more on Kosovo and elsewhere in the western Balkans where there is a 
problem which could jeopardise its interests, such as in the case ofthe latest Serbian 
elections. 
Hence, neither the economic nor the political German elite could claim 
leadership of the Bloc. Even the promotion of German culture is embedded in the 
wider promotion of western culture and EU policy towards the media and 
westernisation. To this is added the fact that the German military presence is within 
• a multilateral framework either of the EU or NATO and thus is not directly 
representing the expression of German interests. Therefore, all the evidence 
indicates that the hypothesis of German hegemony in FYR Macedonia has to be 
rejected. In fact, none of the actors of the Bloc exercises hegemonic power, but at 
the same time there is hegemony. Signs of this hegemony are located in the political 
patronage, in the economic dependency towards the Bloc and of course in the 
cooperation of the members of the Bloc, to a degree that allows us claim collective 
actions. 
Who then is exercising the hegemony? 
If we want to provide a satisfactory answer, then we have to say that the Bloc is 
one with a distinct division of labour among its members. However, this thesis 
investigates the role of Germany and thus from this perspective the answer is that 
there is no German hegemony in FYR Macedonia, because there is no direct 
influence, while the embeddedness through the EU is not very clear since other 
member states benefit from the EU's actions. 
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Chapter 5: case study Albania. 
5.1. Introduction. 
Before beginning the historical presentation, it is useful to say a few words about 
this case study. Albania is a completely different case from the other two. Firstly, it is 
not a Slavic state and Its historical development is very different from that of the 
other two. In addition, Albania endured very distinctive communist rule which 
emphasised self-sufficiency, while its minority problem relates to the Greek minority 
in the South and not to a Slavic one. To the latter we have to add the role of Albania 
in the minority problems of both FYR Macedonia and Serbia and the existence of the 
'Albanian Question', which continues to unsettle political leaders across the Balkans. 
5.2. Historical background. 
Contemporary Albanians claim to be descendants of the illyrian tribes (see Crampton 
2002; Pond 2006), even though Vasiliev mentions a much later arrival date (Vasiliev 
1932). Albania was an important Byzantine province and later had an exceptional 
role during the Ottoman rule in the Balkans. (see Ostrogorsky; Joffe 1996). During 
this period large sections of the population converted to Islam (see Gatzios 2003; 
Crampton 2002). 
The collapse of Ottoman rule in the Balkans peninsula found Albanian 
inhabitants annexed into the newly formed Balkan states which resulted in the 
artificial creation of minorities that have played an important role in Balkan history. 
Albania has been an important component of the 'Great Power' plans in the region 
(leG 2004; Vickers 2008: 13). Not only were Albanian lands used for the formation of 
protectorates, but also the creation of the Albanian state was an outcome of 'Great 
Power' diplomacy that saw Albania as a buffer to Serbian expansion towards the 
Adriatic in 1913 (Pond 2006: 193). 
The exploitation of Albania by foreign powers and their use of patronage was 
constant until the late communist period. The newly formed Albanian state used to 
be an Italian protectorate, with indirect and direct patronage including the 
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occupation of a united Albania in 1941-1944 by Italy (Glenny 1999; Ahrens 2007). 
This explains the important influence of Italy in the country, through language and 
religion. It also accounts for the considerable Italian economic presence. Therefore, 
later in our analysis we have to expect limited German influence or links since 
historically the Germans were not so interested in Albania. Foreign patronage 
continued in the communist period until Albania broke from the Soviet block and 
followed an isolated, self-sufficient path (Gatzios 2003). Hence, it is obvious that 
Albania was almost always under foreign patronage and this has sbaped Albanian 
attitudes until today. 
Political awareness began with the San Stefano Treaty of 1878, which depicted 
the threat of the assimilation of Albanians within Slav and Greek states. At that point, 
there was the first Albanian response in the direction of the creation of a 'Greater. 
Albania', i.e. the inclusion of all Albanian communities into one state, with the 
Prizren League (Crampton 2002; Jelavich 1983b). The fear of their neighbours also 
cultivated negative stereotypes towards the neighbouring nationalities and fuelled 
the notion of 'Greater Albania'. The natiorial stereotypes are also connected with 
another Albanian belief that the international community is always against them, as 
well as with the belief that Albania has never possessed a reliable foreign patron and 
that it has gained everything through armed struggle. All these elements make up 
the core of the 'Albanian Question'. Thus, in relation to the thesis it is interesting to 
examine the role of the new patron in the Historic Bloc and the extent to which the 
norms influence the formation of hegemony. 
5.3. Political developments. 
The fall of communism found the Albanian political system polarised between two 
main political parties, namely the Democratic Party of Albania (DPA) of Sali Berisha 
and the Socialist Party of Albania (SPA) of Fatos Nano.67 The two parties are largely 
representative of the 'clannish' character of Albanian society with its regional 
divisions, since the DPA represents the Gheg 'clan' of the North and SPA the Tosk 
'clan' ofthe South. Certainly, both parties have delegates from the whole of Albania 
67 Since 2005 Edi Rama is the leader of SPA 
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but the party base is primarily distributed according to the 'clannish' criteria (see 
Crampton 2002; Pond 2006). Crampton also indicates that 'neither side found it easy 
to abandon the habits and aspirations of one-party domination' (Crampton 2002: 
299). 
The DPA is the party in office and the first non-communist party in post-Hoxha 
Albania. The party began with a pro-western and· market economy agenda. Its 
founder is Sali Berisha, who is also a central figure in Albanian politics. His first 
presidency between 1992-1996 was marked by his efforts to reintegrate Albania into 
the West and particularly to align the country with the USA. Equally memorable was 
the authoritarianism of his government involving political and media purges (see 
Crampton 2002; Pond 2006). For example, in 1995 with the 'Genocide Act' he 
prevented his political opponents from having an active role in political life (see 
Heaney 2007). His foreign policy brought Albania close to the US, offering every 
assistance during the NATO operations in Bosnia and at the same time he clashed 
with Greece over the treatment of the Greek minority of south Albania (Crampton 
2002: 301). 
After a decade of SPA governance, in 2005 Berisha won the elections, which 
were characterised by irregularities and violence (Pond 2006; Southeast European 
Times 2005). The current Berisha administration appears to be pursuing a more 
careful foreign policy, with a more 'democratic' way of dealing with the opposition, 
and a focus on the daily problems of the Albanian people. Hence, in relation to this 
thesis, we can expect a pro-US position by the current government in its foreign 
policy. Moreover, we are expecting that the regime will be favourable to foreign 
capital and to the EU path, since this is what is revealed by its attitude as well as 
from the actions of the current administration. 
The other side of the political spectrum is the SPA, which is the successor of the 
communist party (Crampton 2002). In contrast to the previous case studies, the 
communist party won the first mUlti-party elections in March/April 1991, and held 
power until Berisha's victory in 1992. The leading figure of the party until the 2005 
electoral defeat was Fatos Nano, On 9 October 2005, the SPA voted Edi Rama as its 
new leader after Nano's resignation. The SPA's agenda is pro-western and with the 
market economy as a model. In fact, its agenda is more or less the same as the 
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DPA's and, despite its communist past, it follows the agenda of a west European 
socialist party. Hence, another difference in Albania is the evolution of the 
. communists in the direction of acknowledging the new realities, something which is 
more obvious with the election of Edi Rama as president of SPA. Mr Rama, who is an 
artist, became popular during his term as mayor of Tirana with his 'ambitious 
programme to beautify the capital's public spaces' (Southeast European Times 2005). 
Th us, as regards the creation of the Albanian Historic Bloc, there is an old 
political elite that is fully embedded in the current hegemonic ideology, and what we 
have to prove, is whether the elites of both parties can be accommodated in the 
same Bloc, and if so, under what conditions. 
To the latter, the answer seems to be negative. Albanian society was so 
oppressed by the self-sufficiency programme of Hoxha that the transformation of 
the SPA did not cause problems. The electoral success of the party confirms this. 
However, as regards political co-existence of SPA and DPA elites, things are not clear. 
Despite their common ideas, the two groups have a history of bitter competition and 
struggle. Albanian political history since 1990 is full of political abuse of power, e.g. 
the use of the security forces for Berisha's political means (Pond 2006), corruption 
and scandals, such as the politically promoted 'pyramid' schemes which were 
exposed in 1997, which cost the population of Albania $1.25 billion. Emblematic of 
the competition between the two parties was the detention of Fatos Nano by the 
Berisha regime for abuse of power (Crampton 2002: 302); while in the latest 
elections the international observers noted political irregularities and the abuse of 
voters (Heaney 2007: 59). Hence, in relation to the demands of our theory there are 
two opposing domestic elites that probably co-exist under external pressure . 
• 
Beyond the two main political parties, there are a number of other political 
forces with limited influence. A good example of this 'bipolarity' in Albanian politiCS 
is that in the last elections the two main parties received 98 out of the 140 seats, 
leaving the other 52 shared among eleven other parties (Heaney 2007: 80). What 
we have to remember is that the Albanian political setting is highly fragmented and 
, 
represents the division of Albanian society as a whole. In addition, it is a highly 
corrupt system with suspected connections to organised crime (see European 
Commission 2008a). 
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Albania is a parliamentary republic with the Prime Minister holding executive. 
power. This also explains the great effort of the elite figures to gain the premiership. 
Therefore, in the construction of the Historic Bloc we have to take into account the 
background of the political actors that participate and how ideologically coherent 
they are. The president of the state has typical powers and is elected by the 
parliament in a secret ballot. Albania has three main political issues, according to 
National Strategy for Development and Integration: 2007-2013 (NSDI), namely EU 
membership, NATO membership and the combating of corruption and organised 
crime (Albanian Government 2008a). To these can be added the Albanian Question 
which in our opinion represents an important factor in the relations of Albania with 
the rest of the western Balkans and with Europe in general. 
5.3.1. EU membership. 
EU membership represents a national priority for Albania, with the popular support 
currently standing at 83.1% (Balkan Monitor 2009). To achieve this target Albania 
has developed an institutional network and has followed a pro-EU political agenda. 
Within this framework, in March 2008, the Albanian government has launched the 
NSDI, which represents the Albanian road-map towards EU membership. Prior to this 
strategy there was the Government Plan of 2005-2009, in which the national 
priorities were firstly established. As a senior official from DG Enlargement informed 
us, the Albanian institutional network is still in a very rudimentary state, due to lack 
of funds and inexperience; the Albanian side is not yet ready to progress faster, 
which also explains part of the slow progress (Confidential Interview 6). 
Albania is participating in the SAP and in November 2006 signed an SAA. Before 
that in January 2006, Albania had signed a European Partnership, which provides 
guidance for what has to be done to achieve membership. The difference in this case 
is that the reforms are encouraged through political dialogue, which is conducted by 
'Ministerial Troika, joint committee and consultative task force meetings at 
ministerial level and working party meetings at deputy minister level' (European 
Commission 2007b:5). 
According to the 2008 EU progress report on Albania, despite the focus on the 
implementation of the political Copenhagen Criteria, Albania has a long distance to 
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cover (see European Commission 2008a). The polarisation of the political system 
prevents a constructive consensus between political parties on implementing the 
required reforms (European Commission 2007b: 6; Confidential Interview 6), 
although lately there are signs of a greater consensus on major issues (European 
Commission' 2008a: 6). Another important parameter is the power of the executive 
that is such that it has the ability to influence the judicial system, while state officials 
and members of parliament enjoy immunity from criminal investigation and 
prosecution (European Commission 2008a: 10). This power of the executive is 
another unstable variable ofthe Albanian political system. 
The structure of the Albanian political system creates a situation in which, 
when an issue is receiving serious attention from the EU in the form 'do it or incur a 
penalty', the Albanian leadership becomes disciplined; but when there is no pressure, 
things go slowly. Particularly, when some reforms are touching certain interests, 
their implementation halts. In addition, in Albania as a senior official with high 
expertise in this country, has mentioned, the Commission has to convince the 
Albanians to do certain things (Confidential Interview 6). For instance, despite the EU 
efforts the accountability mechanisms in public administration remain weak and 
appointments are based on political preferences that favour the clientele relations 
and certain interests (see European Commission 2008a). 
The European Commission has also identified serious shortcomings in the 
judiciary, with problems of independence, corruption, law enforcement and 
infrastructure; in the civil service that is highly politicised and corrupt; with an 
absence of supervisory institutions, and, imperfect democratic institutions. An 
equally serious problem is the police abuse of power, given that '[TJhe European 
Court of Human Rights ( .. ) delivered five judgements finding that Albania had 
violated the European Convention on Human Rights ( ... ) and related protocols' 
(European Commission 2008a:11). Overall, the European Commission observes that 
progress has been made but at a slow pace. 
The Albanian Ministry for European Integration (AM El) has a central position in 
the institutional network of Albania. This is the main coordinating ministry 
(European Commission 2008), something that is obvious by looking at its mission 
statement that outlines all the necessary steps from preparing the institutions for EU 
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membership to making Albanian law compatible with the acquis communitaire. In 
addition, it supervises and coordinates the activities of all other agencies relating to 
EU integration (Albanian Ministry for European Integration 2008). However, the 
European Commission stresses two serious problems with the AMEI, which 
undermine the overall integration process of Albania. The first is the AM El's 
underfunding and the lack of staff, and the second its bypassing by the other 
ministries. The result is law-making that is not fully compatible with SAA 
requirements (European Commission 2008a). 
Beyond the MEI the institutional setting is accompanied by EU integration units 
in twelve ministries, while according to the National Strategy there will be twenty-
three sector strategies and ten cross-cutting strategies (European Commission 2006d: 
6). Furthermore, as can be seen in the NSDI, the requirements of the SAA and 
particularly the deficiencies in the rule of law are the subject of special attention 
(Albanian Government 2008a). Of course the level of consistency in implementing 
the NSDI remains a question. However, as was stressed by the European Commission, 
what is important is the relative progress, which is significant even if, by absolute 
measurements, Albania lags behind to a great extent (Confidential Interview 6). 
From this brief view, the high importance of EU membership for the Albanian 
politico-economic establishment is apparent, because the EU seems to be the factor 
that can normalise Albanian institutions that to date are dominated by a powerful 
political elite, something that we will use in the Albanian Bloc formation analysis. EU 
membership also reveals the commitment of the political elite, which seems to be 
motivated by the need for legitimacy as well as the financial benefits, the latter 
being obvious by the nature of those reforms that look good on the surface, that 
indicate a partial absorption of EU norms and demands. Hence, what we might 
expect to find is a pro-EU elite largely integrated in the Bloc and to the hegemonic 
ideology with the EU playing an important role in decision-making. 
5.3.2. The Albanian Question. 
The Albanian Question describes the creation of 'Greater Albania' by including all 
Albanian ethnic communities in one state. Such communities are located today in 
Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo and FYR Macedonia, with the number of Albanians 
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outside Albania proper, standing at around 3 million (Gatzios 2003; IICG 2004). There 
is also a significant number of Albanian economic immigrants in Greece and Italy 
(Kostovica 2008). In addition, the Albanian minorities are located in areas. 
neighbouring Albania proper, which makes a possible unification easier. Therefore, 
pan-Albanian ism as the ICG notes, ' ... is seen by many observers as a serious threat to 
. Balkan stability' {lCG 2004: i). 
Historically, the Question emerged in the nineteenth century with the late 
awakening of Albanian national awareness, prompted by the actions of the 'Great 
Powers' as was mentioned above. During the Cold War, the Albanian issue was 
neglected, since Yugoslavia was the focus of both the Eastern and Western camp. 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the fall of the Hoxha regime, awakened the 
Albanian Question from its communist hibernation {lCG 2004; Ahrens 2007). The 
armed conflicts in Kosovo (see Chapter 3) and Tetovo (see Chapter 4) have further 
fuelled concerns about the creation of 'Greater Albania'. The nationalist approach of 
the Berisha regime was largely motivated by the support ofthe (Gheg) Kosovars and 
of the Albanian Diaspora; which funded and promoted the Albanian cause played a 
significant role in this support (Kostovica 2008; Pond 2006; Ahrens 2007). 
The Albanian question is important because of the implications that it has for 
Balkan and European stability. A 'Greater Albania' could bring instability to Serbia 
and Montenegro and could lead to the collapse of FYR Macedonia, while the 
Albanian demands on the Greek territory of Hipirus are also worrying (see Ahrens 
2007). For the latter, the Albanian propaganda about Chameria (Taal10Uplcl in Greek) 
is characteristic, with demands for compensation for expelled Albanians as well as 
claims for the support ofthe Albanian minority in Greece68 (ICG 2004; Glenny 1999). 
However, the probability of another crisis resulting from the Albanian Question 
seems unlikely today. The main reason is the clear negative response of the 
international community to any such development. As Ahrens noted, when the 
international community said 'no', immediately, the Albanian delegation turned its 
focus onto minority and human rights issues (Ahrens 2007). The 'external factor' is 
important to a society that has always been patronised by the 'Great Powers' of the 
68 Note that the Greek state does not accept the existence of Chams. 
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time (see Glenny 1999; Vickers 2008). The same external factor has shaped the 
Albanian Question in Kosovo and Tetovo in a way favourable to the Albanian cause. 
Another reason is division among the Albanian communities. 'There are cultural 
differences which derive from the different political processes. in the two 
communities, which actually creates two separate 'nations' with the same language 
(Gatzios 2003; Vickers 2008). 
Today, Albanians are committed to Euro-Atlantic and regional integration, and 
for the Albanians this is the only way to create a free space with economic, cultural 
and family connections among the Albanian communities without the threat of 
changing borders (Vickers 2008; Confidential Interview 6). Indicative of this is the 
fact that both KLA and NlA received popular support when they abandoned the 
Greater Albania rhetoric (ICG 2004). In political terms, both big parties have 
abandoned the policy of Greater Albania. Hence, as Vickers notes: 
'Although Albanians would like to see what they regard as a tremendous historical injustice redressed 
- the imposed incorporation of Albanian-inhabited territorie~ into Yugoslavia and Greece - political 
elites in Tirana, Pristina and Tetovo fully accept the notion of the inviolability of existing borders and 
consequently have nO desire to push for a Greater Albania ... Today, the Albanian national essentially 
centres on the indeterminate status of Kosovo and the political future of the ethnic Albanian 
populations of Macedonia and Montenegro' (Vickers 2008: 14). 
To this we add the statement of Berisha in Kosovo on 22 November 2008 that 
A)bania will support a multi-ethnic Kosovo and that the Serbian minority of Kosovo 
has to be protected (Albanian Government 2008m). 
Since the threat of Albanian extremism seems to have declined then, why have 
we incorporated it into our analysis? The Albanian Question is an issue which is 
easily influenced bY,external factors, such as the US and EU. Thus, the role offoreign 
elites might influence the future development of the Question. 
5.3.3. US as factor and NATO membership. 
Albania is one of the most pro-US states in Europe. Characteristic of the close 
relations was the reception of the US president George W. Bush, as a national hero 
by the Albanian population and leadership in 2007 (The Economist 2007b). On this 
visit, the cooperation between the two states was reinforced by the exchange of 
military delegations and joint military manoeuvres (Vickers 2008: 21). Another 
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example was the speech by Berisha on the signing of the protocol for Albania's 
membership of NATO when he called the US president the 'most distinguished friend 
ofthe Albanian nation' (Berisha 2008b). 
The pro-US attitude is also reflected in Albanian participation in Afghanistan and 
Iraq (CIA 2008). In addition, Albania offered assistance to the US and NATO forces as 
a base during the war in Kosovo. In a more official tone, according to the 
Government Programme of 2005-2009: 'Relations with the United States remain of a 
primary strategic importance to us .. : (Albanian Government 2005). The US 
administration confirms the warm relations between the two sides since, according 
the State Department, 'Albania has been a steadfast supporter of US policy in Iraq, 
and was one of only four nations to contribute troops to the combat phase of 
Operation Enduring Freedom' (US Department of State 2008). 
The explanation of this pro-US stance is the role of the US in relation to the 
Albanian Question. The US has intervened in Kosovo favouring the Albanian side and 
it was the US that supported Kosovo's independence. The same actor brokered an 
agreement between the Albanians and Slavomacedonians of FYR Macedonia, with 
the OFA. The US government was active in the Albanian transition in both political 
and economic terms, with USAID contributing Significantly to Albania's transition 
(see USAID 2008). 
Another important role of the USA has been the promotion of Albania's 
candidacy for NATO membership. Albania began negotiations for NATO membership 
in 2003 and in 2004 joined the PfP Initiative. The importance of NATO integration for 
Albania is well illustrated in the NSDI by the statement: 
'NATO integration is one of the main goals of the country's foreign policy ... This goal constitutes a 
major national project that enjoys support from all political forces as well as more than 90% of the 
public. Albania will not spare any efforts to meet all criteria for receiving the invitation for 
membership' (Albanian Government 2008a: 23). 
The invitation was extended at the Bucharest NATO summit of 2008, after 
strong US backing. The US also ratified the protocol for Albania's membership of 
NATO on 25 October 2008. Nevertheless, the strong commitment towards NATO is 
in contrast to the lack of serious progress in relation to EU membership (Confidential 
Interview 6) and one of the more obvious reasons, beyond the pro-US orientation of 
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the Albanian elite, is that the feasibility of joining NATO is greater than joining the EU 
(Vickers 2008). 
The support for NATO also has a strong popular base according to a survey on 
the Albanian perceptions of NATO by the Institute for Democracy and Mediation 
(IDM), on behalf of NATO in 2007. According to this survey 89.4% of the population 
were in favour of NATO membership. 21.4% found alliance with the US most 
important and 24.3% with the EU, while 52% consider both to be of equal 
importance. Finally, for Albanian society NATO membership is not strictly military 
business but also a means of EU integration and socio-economic progress (IDM 2007). 
In relation to the later analysiS the US factor is expected to have an important 
influence on the domestic elite and it remains to be seen to what degree US 
preferences collide with those of the EU and Germany (if the latter has any). The US 
approach resembles the traditional approach of Albania towards Great Powers. This 
relationship could be evidence that the power of the EU and of Germany is weaker in 
Albania than in the other parts of the region. 
5.3.4. Organised crime and corruption. 
These two issues are of great importance for Albania and represent very serious 
challenges for the country since they influence both EU and NATO membership. 
According to the 2008 progress report of the European Commission, 'corruption 
remains a particularly serious problem in Albania' (European Commission 2008a: 10) 
In more detail the European Commission identifies deficiencies in almost all 
aspects of public life in Albania. Corruption extends as far as the judiciary, political 
parties and administration, while organised crime is involved in the trafficking of 
human beings, drugs and arms (European Commission 2008a). Both corruption and 
organised crime are dealt with as part of the European Partnership and therefore 
their management is requirement for Albania's membership of the EU. The European 
Commission speaks of modest steps towards addressing these problems, even 
though Albania has entered international fora and has signed international 
agreements and conventions against these two problems (European Commission 
2007b). In fact, as our interviewee told us, there is a distinct lack of Albanian political 
will on that subject (Confidential Interview 6). 
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Similar to those of the EU, are the comments of EUROPOL that finds Albania to 
be an important transit state for trafficked human beings and drugs (Europol 2008). 
The 'notorious' Albanian mafia is everywhere in Europe, while the clan system of 
Albanian society makes it hard to combat the gangs (Pond 2006; Confidential 
Interview 6). 
The Albanian response to these two problems 'seems' to be determined on 
paper. In the Government programme it is stressed that '[T]he government declares 
as top priority the fight to uproot and demolish the pillars of the corruption system' 
(Albanian Government 2005: 14). The same applies to organised crime, i.e. '[T]he 
fight against organised crime and trafficking, ... , will be a priority of the government' 
(Albanian Government 2005:17). The response is more detailed in the NSDI that puts 
the problem in its proper dimension, by accepting that growing corruption is 
undermining the trust of the population in state institutions (Albanian Government 
2008a: 32). For both problems, the Government is adopting a series of measures in 
accordance with the SAA and the EU recommendations (see Albanian Government 
2008a). However, the problem of implementation, we believe, is very hard and yet 
to be faced. 
Hence, in relation to this thesis, we expect the response of the domestic elite to 
be negative in some of the aspects of EU legislation since it will be in contrast to 
their interests. Thus, it will be interesting to see the cohabitation between domestic 
and foreign elites within the Bloc, especially when the former is suspected of links 
with 'underground' elements. Thus, this might have implications for Bloc formation 
and reveal the true extent of EU persuasive power and to the degree that its 
influence is hegemonic. 
5.4. Economic developments. 
Albania is one of the poorest states in Europe, with per capita income of only $6,400 
in 2008 (CIA 2008) which equates to one fifth of the EU-27 average (European 
Commission 2008a: 19). The poor condition of the Albanian economy is not a 
surprise conSidering the long era of radical autarkic communism and the huge 
organised crime networks, plus the civil unrest in 1997 after the collapse of various 
pyramid schemes. The Albanian economy was also tested during the Yugoslav wars 
227 
- - - - ---------------------------
and particularly during' the Kosovo war, when a mass influx of refugees69 onto 
Albanian soil put the Albanian economy under a severe burden. A good example of 
the bad shape of the Albanian economy is the huge number of Albanian economic 
migrants all over Europe, accounting for a quarter of the total population (Heaney 
2007: 68; CIA 2008). 
It becomes obvious that Albania has started on its path of transition into a 
liberal market economy from a very low point. Along this path, Albania has the 
assistance of the international community and particularly of the EU, the USA, the 
IMF and the World Bank. These actors offer guidance and aid and are playi~g a 
crucial role in the economic policy of Albania. 
5.4.1. External institutional setting. 
As previously explained, the examination of this institutional setting will help us in 
identifying the exact role of these institutions as well as providing a clear picture of 
the 'freedom of choice' of Albanian authorities in their economic policy. 
Once again, the EU is the dominant actor with Albania needing to follow the 
Copenhagen and Lisbon Criteria (Albanian Government 2008a) and the Commission 
defining what has to be done and how and (mainly through the European 
Partnership reports) monitoring Albania's progress. The EU is the actor, which 
'coordinates', up to certain degree, the actions of the other financial institutions and 
is the largest donor, and through IPA it has allocated {70.7 million in 2008 (European 
Commission 2008a: 5). 
The second most influential institution is the IMF,'o The IMF has been in 
Albania since 1992, when the newly post-communist government asked for the 
Fund's assistance. After the pyramid crisis, the IMF became more involved, with 
actions such as the 2002 three year Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
Programmes and of course linked its assistance with certain policies that Albania had 
to implement (Nano 1997; Heaney 2007). Until today the Fund has channelled 45.04 
SDR million (IMF 2008d: 55) and as previously, its priorities are macro-economic 
69 Around 450000 (McGrath 1999). 
70 This categorisation reflects our personal view and it is based on the magnitude of actions and the 
institution's reception by the local authorities. 
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policy and structural reforms. In comparison to the previous two case studies, 
Albania is a much weaker and more underdeveloped state and therefore it has to 
implement more radical and stricter reforms, which make it also less able to 
negotiate. 
Nevertheless, despite the 'imposition' of certain policies, there are still 
elements of 'resistance' in the form of serious implementation delays that cannot be 
explained in mere technical terms. This is obvious in the IMF criticism on that very 
subject (see IMF 2008d). This attitude is also apparent in Serbia where, as one 
interviewee stated, as soon as the IMF is repaid, nobody pays attention to it 
(Confidential Interview 7). Particularly in Albania, our last interviewee noted that 
when the reforms affect certain interests, then nothing moves on (Confidential 
Interview 6). 
The third main institution is the World Bank. Relations between the World Bank 
and Albania date back to 1991, when Albania joined the World Bank Group. Since 
then, the Bank remains a central institution in development assistance with 67 
projects totalling $997.5 million (World Bank 2008b). The Bank is the second largest 
donor after the EU and its current portfolio is $311 million, with most of the funds 
going to energy, infrastructure and business environment projects (World Bank 
2006a; 2008b). 
The blueprint for the World Bank's operations is the 2006-2009 Country 
Assistance Strategy. looking at this strategy it is interesting to note that the Bank's 
projects are in line with the SAP provisions and that its aim is to assist Albania in 
achieving the SAP requirements (World Bank 2006a; IMF 2008d: 54) and this is 
further evidence of the central role of the EU. Another interesting element is that 
among the projects there are programmes for the de-politicisation of the civil service 
along with anti-corruption measures (see World Bank 2006a). Hence, the Bank goes 
further than mere technical projects. 
Beyond the three main institutions there are a number of smaller ones which 
are operating within the established framework. From these we can pick out the 
EBRD and the SPSEE, which focus on trade, privatisation, democratic reform and 
energy. The EBRD operates forty projects with a total .value of €1.2 billion (EBRD 
2009a) and according to its website: 
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'The Bank is concentrating on developing the private sector and emphasising infrastructure 
development as an integral part of business progress. The present focus for infrastructure activity is 
the restructuring and rehabilitation of the energy sector and the development of transport and 
telecommunications networks' (EBRD 2009a). 
Hence, once more the division of labour among the various external institutions 
is obvious and powerful. The EU has the central role in setting the agenda and the 
.implementation process. This was inevitable from the moment that Albania planned 
to join the EU. Furthermore, the EU is acknowledged by the other institutions to be 
the primary actor in Albanian affairs. It is true as well that all the external institutions 
share the same ideological mindset, imbued namely with neo-liberal economic 
doctrine. This means that there is no ideological conflict and thus no conflict on what 
has to be done and how. 
Within this framework, which reflects EU preferences, the World Bank and the 
EBRD are dealing with structural projects, which are intended to establish the 
foundations of a liberal market economy and a business environment which is 
favourable towards international capital. The IMF ensures that both fiscal and 
monetary policy follows neo-liberal doctrine and that Albania implements all the 
(neo-liberal) structural reforms. The Pact's responsibilities range from 
democratisation to privatisation and it has played a major role in creating a free 
trade regime among the western Balkan states. 
At this pOint, it is necessary to mention what the senior official from the 
European Commission stated about cooperation: firstly, that cooperation and 
coordination are necessary in order to avoid overlaps or conflicts. The good thing 
with Albania is that everyone has the same targets. While this fact has reduced the 
cost of coordination, some sectors are left outside because none of the participa nt 
actors was interesting in dealing with them. Furthermore, the Commission 
undertakes all the coordination (and the accommodation ofthe Albanian side within 
this coordination). For instance, the IMF asks the Commission before doing anything, 
since the EU has the greatest weight (Confidential Interview 7). 
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5.4.2. Domestic institutional setting. 
As was expected, the Albanian government has developed its own structure in order 
. to cope with the demands of its transition. Albanian economic policy is consistent 
with the Copenhagen and Lisbon Criteria, which not only reveals the overwhelming 
influence of the EU but also the neo-liberal character of its policies. 
The National Strategy stresses that Albania follows the economic priorities of 
the SAA and that it 'shares with the European Union and its member states the goal 
of a balanced, harmonious and sustainable development and the Lisbon Agenda of 
growth and jobs' (Albanian Government 2008a: 42). The main priorities are in 
infrastructure and energy which seem to be the main problems of the economy at 
the moment. The neo-liberal pattern of Albanian economic policy is also revealed in 
the Government programme. The Programme mentions the need for open trade and 
free competition along with FDI as the basic means of economic development. 
Particularly for the latter, the Programme states: '[Ajttracting foreign investments is 
of crucial importance to ensure higher rhythms (sic) of development and integration 
of Albania' (Albanian Government 2005: 28). The NSDI goes even further by defining 
clear actions for trade promotion and FDI attraction (see Albanian Government 
2008a). In relation to free trade as a means of development, Albania is a member of 
CEFTA, and the NSDI states as a target the creation of a free trade zone with the EU 
(Albanian Government 2008a: 21). Further elements of neo-liberalism in the NSDI 
include the admission that the Albanian economy has to 'adapt to the logic of 
internationalisation and integration into the world markets' (Albanian Government 
2008a: 53). As before the implementation of these policies is yet to be seen. 
The research so far has revealed the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of 
Economics, Trade and Energy to be the main ministries involved. Other important 
pillars are the Bank of Albania and the Albanian Investment Promotion Agency, the 
Albinvest. 
Albinvest is coordinated by the Ministry of Economics and includes in its 
objectives 'assisting and accelerating the inflow of foreign investment into the 
Albanian economy, improving the competitiveness of Albanian exporters, and 
providing professional services to assist the growth of Albanian SMEs' (Albinvest 
2009a). The agency has undergone recent restructuring and according to its annual 
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report and the assessment by the Investment Compact for South East Europe (an 
OECD-Stability Pact unit) it is a success (see Albinvest 2007; OECD 2006). The 
responsibilities of the agency are so great that it can be claimed that in fact it 
operates the main investment and export promotion strategies alone, despite its 
political supervision by the Ministry of Economics. For instance, the agency 
cooperates with the Albanian diplomatic missions abroad for the promotion of 
Albania as an investment destination and it. is the institution which speaks to the 
business world (Albinvest 2007). Except for its clear neo-liberal attitude, it is 
interesting that investment attraction is considered a national cause, as stated in the 
annual report: 
'Since its inception, this department was conceived to bring the best and brightest of young people 
returning to Albonia after study and work in top institutions overseas, to contribute to a mission of 
increasing investments in the country' (Albinvest 2007: 7). 
The Bank of Albania from its perspective is responsible for the difficult task of 
monetary stabilisation and low inflation, taking into account the structural problems 
of the Albanian economy. Despite the difficulties, both the EU and the IMF credit the 
Bank with some success (see European Commission 2008a; IMF 2008d). 
At first glance, it seems that Albinvest is bearing the whole burden of 
promoting FDI and trade policies. The Central Bank controls monetary policy and the 
ministries are responsible for the creation of a favourable business climate by 
implementing the reforms and maintaining responsible fiscal policy. Nevertheless, 
the efforts of Albinvest cannot materialise without prior progress in the economic 
climate, which is in political hands, coordinated as it is by the Ministry of Economics 
which contains the seeds of political influence. Furthermore, the Prime Minister 
along with the diplomatic corps play important roles in the economic diplomacy of 
Albania (Albanian Government 2008j). Therefore, even though the setting seems 
decentralised, in reality it functions in a top-down manner. Another characteristic of 
the structure is the complete acceptance of EU preferences and therefore of the 
neo-liberal ideology, as has been demonstrated so far. 
When conSidering this, the acknowledgement of the efficiency of this setting by 
both the EU and IMF is not a surprise. The EU sees that Albania is taking the 
necessary steps and plans, and sees political consensus (European Commission 
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2008a: 19). Other positive elements are the privatisation process and the measures 
for improving the business climate (European Commission 2008a:21). However, in 
the 2007 Progress Report, the European Commission notes that: 
'the business environment remained very weak and calls for further significant improvements. 
Outstanding deficiencies of the judiciary, uncertainty about property rights, a high level of corruption, 
inadequate infrastructure and unreliable energy supply, in particular, continued to hinder economic 
development and investment' (European Commission 2007b: 24). 
The Fund from its side is even more favourable since it speaks of 'new 
milestones in its (i.e. Albania's) economic and political development' (IMF 2008d: 6). 
Here the criticism refers to weak governance (IMF 2008d: 6) with concern for the 
institutional weakness that hampers progress (IMF 2008d:17). The Fund, additionally, 
agrees with the EU on the weakness of the judiciary and on the extensive corruption 
that distorts efforts to achieve a favourable business environment (IMF 2008d: 10, 
20). 
However, as a well-informed interviewee has told us, what is interesting for the 
Commission is the significant relative progress in Albania, but this still leaves the 
country at a low economic level. Moreover, in relation to the efficiency of the 
domestic institutions, the interviewee mentioned that Albanian officials are telling 
the Commission that they are ready to implement further reforms but that they lack 
the funds and therefore request the Commission to find extra funds. Moreover, the 
international institutions that were described above, ignore the Albanians in 
programming and implementing reforms, with the result that the Albanians lack 
information about what is going on. Finally, the interviewee admitted that, despite 
the good will and the institutional framework, Albania lacks the administrative 
capacity to cope with all these actors and all these challenges (Confidential Interview 
6). 
This information means that the international institutions and particularly the EU 
have significant clout in Albania and that the latter is fully integrated in the former's 
preferences and demands. 
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5.4.3. The Albanian economy today. 
Growth has been substantial during the last five years with GDP growing at an 
annual rate of 6% in 2007 and 200S. This was mainly the outcome of an increase in 
industrial production and the opening of new mines, growth in the construction and 
services sectors and an increase in domestic demand (European Commission 200Sa; 
EBRD 2009b). Inflation has been kept below 3%. This success on the inflation front 
was the result, in part, of monetary tightening (which reduced the expansion of 
credit) and of prudent fiscal policies (EBRD 2009b; IMF 200Sd: 10). However, 12% of 
GDP is composed of remittances from abroad (European Commission 200Sa: 19), 
which demonstrates the weakness and the vulnerability of the Albanian economy 
and mirrors the situation in several other Balkan economies. A good example of the 
underdevelopment of Albania is the sectoral structure of the economy with 
agriculture accounting for 24% of GDP, industry 13%, services 39%, transport 12%, 
construction 11% and remittances 12.S% (US Department of State 200S). It is 
obvious that the primary sector is still big but that the productive base is rather small. 
External debt fell to 24.S% of GDP in 2007 from 25.1% the previous year. A 
similar fall was in the public external debt to 15.4% of GDP, while the overall public 
debt fell to 51.2% of GDP in 200S from 56% in 2006. This fall was the result of large-
scale tax administration measures?l The government deficit reached 3.5% of GDP 
and the current account deficit has risen from 10.6% of GDP in 2007 to 12.2% in 
200S (European Commission 200Sa: 19, 20, 21; IMF 200Sd: 11, 16). The increase in 
the government deficit is the outcome of an expansive fiscal policy, which seems 
rather necessary for an underdeveloped country such as Albania. However, for the 
European Commission fiscal expansion in Albania hides risks, taking into account the 
increasing vulnerabilities of external balances and the serious problems in the area 
of electricity production (see European Commission 200Sa; IMF 200Sd: 23). The debt 
problem and the general vulnerability of the Albanian economy force it to rely on 
foreign aid and institutions and thiS, from a theoretical perspective, reinforces the 
hegemony. 
71 This is important since according to our interviewee, Albania has a culture of tax evasion and 
avoidance (Confidential Interview 7). 
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Exports rose 24% in 2007 but imports were increased even more (25%), with the 
result that the trade deficit exceeded 25% of GDP. As for FDI, its volume increased to 
6% of GDP (EBRD 2009b). Once again the increase in food and energy72 import prices, 
the high demand for imports due to construction and the increase in commodity 
trade are the main reasons for this deficit (EBRD 2009b). The external imbalances 
remain high and risky, particularly since the remittances from abroad are likely to be 
absolutely reduced. In 2007, the reduction was covered by increased net FDI inflows 
that rose to 5.9% of GDP in 2007 from 3.5% in 2006. However, the trade deficit was 
such that even these inflows failed to relieve the Albanian economy from its external 
deficit (IMF 2008d: 23; European Commission 2008a: 19, 20). Of course, the current 
financial and economic crisis is expected to hit Albania hard since the volume of FDI 
will be seriously reduced on top of lower remittances and since the economy still has 
a weak productive base, external vulnerabilities will be reinforced. This deficit has 
similar effects as previously but also reveals the impact of Albanian economic 
integration that allows penetration by foreign capital and makes the state 
dependent on external actors. 
Below the main variables of the Albanian economy are presented: 
Table 15- Basic economic data of Albania 1997 2007 
-
Year/indicators 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Growth (Real GDP %) -10.8 9.0 13.5 6.7 7.9 4.2 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.4 
Unemployment 
-
- 18.4 16.8 16.4 15.8 15.0 14.4 14.1 13.8 
Inflation 
-
8.7 -loO 4.2 3.5 1.7 3.3 2.2 2.0 2.5 
General government balance 12.7 11.8 9.0 7.6 6.9 6.1 4.9 5.1 3.4 3.3 
(deficit) (GDP %) 
Government debt IGDP %) 49.8 53.5 53.7 60.2 58.5 63.9 61.5 58.3 55.3 59.7 
Trade balance Ideficit) lin 433 565 754 896 1145 1259 1252 1344 1585 
mill'lons() 
Current account balance 313 61 129 185 315 422 331 288 493 535 
Ideficit) lin millions €) 
External debt IGDP %). 15.0 17.0 16.1 17.0 17.2 22.1 21.1 19.0 16.6 16.9 
Exports lin millions €) 140 185 258 277 340 346 395 486 530 631 
Imports lin millions €) 615 722 884 1174 1489 1567 1572 1762 2007 2316 
FDI in million :( 42 40 39 157 231 141 157 278 224 259 
Source: European Commission 2007b; IMF 2008d. 
The above table confirms the poor condition of the Albanian economy. In 
particular, the growing trade deficit represents a clear threatening factor, since the 
72 Albania's energy is based on hydroelectric plants with the result that the 2007 draught caused 
many problems in the energy supply of Albania. 
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Table 16.1: Total exports of Albania by country of de stination for the period 2001-2005 as a 
percentage of the total. 
Countryjyear 2001 2002 2 003 2004 2005 
Italy 36.6% 39.3% 3 8.2% 34.7% 32.7% 
Greece 24% 24.4% 2 1.2% 19.8% 18.3% 
Germany 5.6% 5% 5. 3% 5.2% 6.1% 
EU-27 80.3% 77% 7 4.3% 70.5% 67.2% 
Source: WJlW 2007; European Commission 2007b. 
Table 16.2: Total imports of Albania by country of origin fa r the period 2001-2005 as a % of the total 
CountryJyear 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Italy 69.8% 76.6% 73.2% 73.4% 63.5% 
Greece 12.7% 2.7% 4.2% 4% 3.5% 
Germany 5.6% 5.6% 5.2% 4% 4.3% 
EU-27 91.3% 92.6% 93.8S 90.9% 89.4% 
Source: WJlW 2007; European Commission 2007b. 
Both tables confirm the overwhelming econ omic importance of the EU and the 
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vision and diversification and this makes it vulnerable to economic downturns. 
Furthermore, Albanian imports are either machinery (German mainly) and food 
(from Greece and'the Balkans) or energy. Exports, even though they show large 
percentages, are actually very small by volume. This explains the difference between 
exports and imports since, as we will see in the following paragraphs, Albanian 
production is destined for certain markets and therefore Albania is a low-skill and 
low-wage economy compared to its developed neighbours. Another conclusion is 
that Greek penetration is declining over time and the best explanation of this might 
be Greek inflation that makes the substitution of Greek products by Balkan goods 
much easier. Also interesting is that the share of the EU, although great, is steadily 
decreasing. The European Commission explains 'this in terms of the effects of CEFTA 
on Albania which has opened up the western Balkan markets for Albanian products 
(European Commission 2008a). To this, we can add the important penetration of 
China and Turkey (see CIA 2008). 
Italy's dominance can be viewed from its penetration in key sectors of Albania's 
economy. According to Albinvest the main economic sectors of Albania are clothing, 
agriculture (25% of GDP); tobacco, tourism, mining and agriculture (Albinvest 2009b). 
Characteristic of the garments sector is that Italy owns 69% of total investments, 
followed by Greece (27%) and Germany (4%) (Albinvest 2005a). Part of the garment 
industry is shoe-making which ,accounts for the country's leading export products, 
with 1.2 million pairs per month, making Albania one of the main shoe-making 
countries in Europe. In this sector, Italian dominance is well consolidated such that 
100% are oriented towards exports to Italy and from there to the rest of Europe 
(Albinvest 2005b). The main advantages which Albania poses are geographical 
proximity and low wage levels (Albinvest 2005b), with both advantages allowing Italy 
to use Albania as its low cost investment destination. The latter indicates how 
inflexible the production base in Albania is and how it is oriented towards low-skill 
products for the satisfaction of certain markets. Furthermore, speaking about 
proximity for Italian producers, Albania offers them the opportunity to ship 
production to Italy within 24 hours (Albinvest 2005a). In November 2008 at a 
meeting between a group of Italian investors with Berisha, the importance of Albania 
as a base for the Italian economy became explicit, since, according to the investors, 
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147,9 672,5 
34,2 ~80,2 
FYR Macedonia 2,2 30,9 
Turkey 2,0 28,1 
USA 2,0 28,1 
Germany 1,3 18,3 
France 1,3 18,3 
China 1,3 18,3 
Source: HMFA 2004. 
Even though this table is five years old, due to the lack of recent data, it provides 
us with important details. Firstly, the geographical proximity and the dominance of 
238 
Italy and Greece is apparent. Equally important is the appearance of FYR Macedonia 
(that indicates the presence of foreign affiliates) as well the presence of Turkey and 
China which has been strengthened since then. Also interesting is the low level of 
German investments and the US presence, which is bigger in comparison to the 
other two case studies. The main thing that has to be noted is the Italian and Greek 
economic domination73• 
5.5. Neo-Gramscian application. 
Once again the analysis is conducted in accordance with the three spheres of activity· 
within which hegemony is constituted. 
5.5.1. First sphere: social relations of production. 
The first sphere tries to demonstrate whether there is a change in the social 
relations of production. Albania could not be an exception from what is happening in 
the region. With the fall of the Hoxha regime and particularly with the 1992 Berisha 
victory, Albania has begun its transition to a liberal market economy. The transition 
is obvious from the programmes and the policies of all post-communist governments. 
Another indication, beyond the blunt adoption of EU-style neo-liberalism, is the 
'agreement' between the two main parties on the necessity of integrating into 
western structures, notably the EU and NATO, that demonstrates the commitment 
towards change. Thus, indeed there is a new social method of production, namely of 
European neo-liberalism in contrast to the previous communist system of self-
sufficiency. This change is not only theoretical but also at a practical level with the 
adoption of reforms towards the establishment of a liberal market economy. 
Furthermore, the change in Albania is even greater than in the other two case 
studies, since Albanian communism was the most radical in eastern Europe. 
73 Before going to the next section, we have to state that due to the low level of German presence, 
we skip the presentation of the German economic presence at this point and we have address this in 
a later section. 
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5.5.2. Second sphere: forms of state. 
Entering the second sphere, we have to remember that the prerequisite for a group 
to be a member of the Bloc is the existence of the same purpose, ideology and way 
of exercising hegemonic power. According to the first sections, the groups which 
seem to fill the above criteria in Albania are the domestic elite, the officials of IFls 
and of the European Commission/EU, the US administration and the foreign and 
transnational capital elite. 
The domestic elite, as was demonstrated, consists mainly of the two biggest 
parties, reflecting approximately the 'clannish' character of Albanian society where 
cooperation and coherence are largely imposed from abroad. In the second group, 
the European Commission operates the enlargement policy, and sets the politico-
economic framework within which Albania moves. It is also the actor that directly or 
indirectly coordinates the actions of all the other institutions, which as was 
mentioned, do not always inform the Albanian authorities about their actions. This 
indirect influence means that the EU sets the framework and the other institutions 
are 'forced' to operate within this given framework. Certainly, the EUis working 
within the guidelines which have been set by its member states through the various 
European summits. However, the Commission also has the flexibility to act 
independently by choosing how it will fulfil the task that has been established. The 
European Partnerships are indicative of this flexibility, because the Commission sets 
out what has to be done and how. However, the research so far shows the main role 
of the EU, namely as the main hegemonic institution. Therefore, its importance 
within the Historic Bloc is secondary. 
Albania is the state where the third group (Le. the US administration) has the 
biggest influence compared to previous cases. Albania is one of the most pro-US 
states in the world, with participation in the 'War an Terrar' and with enhanced 
cooperation with the US military establishmene4• This support is largely a reaction to 
the US role during the Kosovo war and later in the diplomatic field in favour of 
Kosovo's independence. Therefore, the USA is considered a protector of Albanian 
rights and interests and of Albania proper. The US is the champion of Albania's NATO 
74 I.e. by providing military bases; common military exercises etc. 
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membership as was apparent in the Bush speech at the Bucharest NATO summit 
(Bush 2008). The US administration has an apparent influence on political decisions 
in Albania since it represents an important reference for Albanian foreign policy 
(Confidential Interview 6; Berisha 2008a). Berisha for instance declared: 'I would like 
to assure President Bush and the US administration that Albania and the Albanians 
will be with them in all their efforts to develop and consolidate freedom and 
whenever there is a need' (Berisha 2008a). For its part and as is stated on the 
website of the US State Department, the Albanian pro-US stance is fully 
acknowledged (US Department of State 2008). Another difference with the previous 
two case studies is that the USA has a strong economic presence in Albania as well. 
This presence is in terms of US companies operating in the country, while the FDI 
and trade volumes, even though they look bigger than in the other cases, are still 
small. The presence is also apparent in the significant role of USAID in Albania with 
overall US aid amounting to $616 million since 1991 (US Department of State 2008): 
Furthermore, it preserves personal contacts with the domestic elite and particularly 
with the Berisha regime. 
The fourth group looks even more influential within the Bloc than the US 
administration. It' is obvious from the economic presentation of Albania that foreign 
economic penetration is massive and in many respects reaches levels of an African 
colony, especially since it would seem that Italian capital owns half of the country! 
According to the HMFA in 2004 Italy accounted for 47.9% and Greece of 34.2% of . 
total investments (HMFA 2004). For Albania, foreign capital is the main source of 
economic development since the country has never had an industrial base or serious 
infrastructure. To this can be added the lack of strong domestic economic actors in 
order to highlight the great importance of foreign capital for Albania. This is also 
evident in the approach of Albinvest towards FDI, which is the approach of a national 
cause (Albinvest 2007). 
Hence, also in Albania we observe a division of labour within the Bloc. It is 
obvious that the EU operates and sets (with assistance from the other IFls as well) 
the framework of action and ensures the preservation of the special conditions 
within Albania and the consent of the population towards the hegemonic project. 
The domestic elite implements the externally designed reforms and deals with the 
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rest of society. The US administration participates in the whole process and although 
it has allowed the EU a free hand in Albania's integration into western structures, it 
intervenes to influence certain policies such as the consent of Albania in certain US 
actions (e.g. in the Iraq war). Finally, international capital legitimises the whole 
process and the existence of the hegemonic framework, and it is the group that 
transcends and confirms the existence of the hegemony. 
The next step is to investigate whether there is a leader of the Bloc. For 
obvious reasons the domestic elite is excluded from the candidacy for leadership. 
This group is weak and unable to oppose the other actors of the Bloc, and on the 
contrary implements, what the other actors have decided. Moreover, the domestic 
elite bases part of its legitimacy on the support of the external actors: the US, the EU, 
or the business community. Added to this is the lack of strong national economic 
capital, which makes the dependence of the domestic elite on foreign actors even 
greater. It must not be forgotten that, as an economy, it cannot survive without 
external help. The second group (i.e. EU and IFls officials), by acting mostly as a 
hegemonic institution, i.e. as an operational tool of the Bloc, has been excluded from 
claiming the leadership of the Bloc. Even though the EU exercises tremendous 
influence on Albania as well as on the actions of other actors who operate in this 
country, for reasons that have been explained in Chapter 2, the EU must be rejected 
as leader of the Bloc. Its actions are limited by the preferences of the member states 
and its role as the main coordinator is a result of a Euro-Atlantic agreement and of 
the EU's expertise in issues of integration. In addition, its role as the hegemonic 
institution hampers its bid for leadership. To this is added the US influence that 
dilutes the overall influence of the EU. 
In relation to the other IFls their role in relation to the leadership is even 
smaller. Not only do they never express such notions but they also operate within 
the EU framework or in some cases with strong influence from their national state 
members as in the case of World Bank with the US (see van Houten 2007). 
, 
The USA, despite its influence on Albanian issues, is not powerful enough to 
play the group leader. This 'weakness' is mainly a two-factor outcome. Firstly, 
although USAID has a significant presence in Albania, its actions are within the SAP 
and SAA provisions which were set by the EU enlargement policy, an~ focus more on 
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development and relatively technical projects. Secondly, task of reconstruction and 
integration of the western Balkans (Albania included) has been given to the EU and 
its member states (Gardner-Feldman 2001) and thus the US role is located in issues 
of parallel importance, such as participation in the 'War on Terror' or the facilitation 
of us missions. Consequently, its influence does not seem powerful enough to 
suppress that of the EU particularly in non-security related policies. 
Therefore, the foreign capital group has the strongest claim to be the Bloc 
leader. It is the group which benefits most from the actions of the Bloc. It is also the 
actor which is the primary agent of the hegemonic ideology, and it is the actor in 
whose name certain policies and reforms are adopted. Nevertheless, the question of 
the cohesion of the group and the awareness of its existence as a group is yet to be 
answered. Beginning with the latter, foreign capital appears to move collectively in a 
manner that resembles a herd or as Thomas Friedman smartly describes it in' his 
book The Lexus and the Olive Tree, international capital represents an electronic 
herd (see Friedman 2000), as a 'herd' moves in one direction but without having a 
central gUide or a pre-set plan. However, it has one common purpose, which is 
profit, and, as long as all the agents of foreign capital in Albania are working towards 
the same purpose and using approximately the same means, one can justify their 
grouping as a distinct group within the Bloc. Communication is also reinforced by the 
operation of investors' associations such, as the FIAA, which is the main 
representative of foreign capital. To this, we add chambers of commerce such as the 
Albanian-Italian, the Greek-Albanian and the recent German-Albanian Chamber of 
Commerce, which promote the interests of foreign investors. Moreover, the 
overwhelming presence of capital from two countries solidifies this cohesion. 
In relation to their awareness that they represent a distinct group of an Historic 
Bloc, the answer can be given by examining their internal and external awareness. 
With the term internal awareness, we mean their awareness that they constitute a 
group. In this case, the awareness is apparent through the establishment of foreign 
'investors associations such as the FIAA, as well as with the establishment of 
chambers of commerce and the holding of events such as conferences. The external, 
i.e. their awareness of being part of an Historic Bloc, also seems to exist but in a 
more subtle manner. There is clear communication between companies and their 
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parent states, with Germany being the best example. There are also consultations 
between institutions and the business community, something that is the case with 
the EU since the business community undertakes the implementation of the bulk of 
EU projects in Albania. In fact, as one piece of research has shown, the vast majority 
of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) preserve their national character by keeping 
their main offices in parent states (see Swyngedouw 2004; POlO-Martin 2006). On 
the other hand, everything (in terms of reforms and projects) functions in the name 
of attracting foreign capital. 
All these elements give primacy to the foreign capital group, which is aware of 
its special role; particularly, since in the era of globalisation the TNCs can destabilise 
any economy within a day through the use of international markets. The word subtle 
indicates that the group has not openly sought that role. Finally, the cohesion exists 
in the sense of common purpose and the means of its successful materialisation. In 
Albania, this cohesion is even greater because there is little diversity of foreign 
capital in terms of nationality, since half of Albania is producing for Italy's market. 
Therefore, we can claim that the foreign economic elite represents the leading group 
of the Bloc and particularly in the shape of Italian capital. 
Based on the analysis so far we have to decide on who is the leader of the Bloc. 
However, none of the groups can be an absolute leader. Transnational capital, even 
though it seems to have an advantage over the. others, has severe limitations in 
relation to foreign policy and in promoting political reforms. The very fact that the 
Albanian economy is designed for few markets is also a factor that makes 
transnational capital less interested in assuming leading control in this state. In 
addition, even though most ofthe relations are implemented in the name of FDI and 
economic development, the TNC is not able to impose orders on the other actors, or 
at least, we do not have indications for this yet. What exists instead is cooperation 
with the other actors. For what can be safely claimed is that the current division of 
labour offers the ability for a collective hegemony with the leadership 'rotated' 
among the groups. What is meant with the term 'rotated' is not that each group 
takes the leadership for a certain amount of time; what is meant instead is that 
within the existing division of labour each actor has supremacy in its 'sector'. Thus, 
the US is the main security point of reference; the EU the coordinator of other 
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institutions and of the integration; and capital controls the economy. Lastly, the 
domestic elite is the one that has supremacy on domestic affairs and over relations 
with the rest of Albanian society. 
5.5.3. The subaltern reaction. 
Albania's uniqueness is also apparent in the almost complete lack of social 
opPosition to the Bloc. In a poor and clannish society, like the Albanian, that has also 
faced radical communism, to oppose the only possible way of achieving some kind of 
prosperity and rationalisation of governance is difficult. Even the political parties 
have the same agenda, with the only differences to be found in the way policy is 
made and domestic issues are addressed. A good example of the lack of opposition is 
that the only demonstrations that were held in Albania were against corrupt 
governments or for national causes like Kosovo's independence. The Balkan Monitor 
poll is indicative of this, showing that support is above 80% with those over SS being 
the biggest supporters with 85.5% and the age 'group 40-54 the least supportive with 
80.9%. These results might be because of the grave memories of the Hoxha era. The 
support towards EU membership is evident in the regional character of the 
responses where 81.4% of urban population and 85.3% of the rural population 
supports this target (Balkan Monitor 2009) that proves a universal support that 
penetrates all social classes. 
Another explanation could be that the lack of an industrial base for 
restructuring social relations (which also caused problems in other transition 
societies), clearly plays a role here. Furthermore, social discontent is also 
downplayed by the existence of a huge informal sector that absorbs a significant part 
of the unemployment pool. It must be noted that, for the Albanian population, the 
EU is viewed as the only way of achieving the eventual unification of all Albanian 
territories (Confidential Interview 6). This is reinforced by the tendency of the Bloc to 
favour the Albanian cause, a's in the case of Kosovo, We have to add that Albania has 
no open national issues as in the other two case studies and this helps to down play 
the nationalist and anti-western voices. 
245 
- - ----------~~~---------I 
5.5.4. Third sphere: world orders. 
The third sphere is the world order within which Albania is functioning and within 
which the Hegemonic Bloc consolidates its power. Unquestionably, the world order 
is known and the same with the other two case studies. Nonetheless, the analysis 
cannot close without exploring the mechanism of transmission and control. It is 
obvious from what has been said that transmission takes place through the 
implemented projects; through the domestic elite with its actions and through mass 
media propaganda. Institutions, such as USAID, IMF, EU, the World Bank etc, are 
implementing two kinds of programmes. The first are the infrastructure programmes, 
which indirectly promote the Bloc's hegemony by showing the benefits of their 
actions. 
The second kind of projects are those that are aimed at the society under such 
labels as the promotion of civil society, the reform of governance, free media 
support etc. There are programmes that are intended to train and educate and there 
are those that are indirectly promoting the Bloc's hegemony by transmitting certain 
norms and preferences into Albanian society. Such projects include the World Bank's 
'Protecting the relations of ethnic minorities by increasing the role of the electronic 
independent media in the sub-prefecture of Saranda' and the €4 million from the EU 
for the promotion of civil society and the media (World Bank 2008a; European 
Commission 2008a). 
The domestic elite promotes the hegemonic project through its policies (e.g. 
education) and its direct communication with the rest of society. In Albania the clan-
based system makes this process even easier, since it is very difficult for members of 
a clan to oppose the clan's principles. Finally, the media have the usual role of 
promoting or hiding issues and the ability to imbue the population with their 
messages, transmitting the hegemonic ideology in an easy way. 
5.5.5. Germany and the neo-Gramscian hegemony in Albania. 
Even though we assumed that there might be no single leader of the Bloc, we have 
to look at the role of Germany and of German capital in Albania. From what has been 
presented so far, it seems that the German economic presence and role in the 
Albanian economy is marginal or at least 'late-coming'. Italy and Greece appear 
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dominant in relation to which foreign countries have invested and operated most in 
Albania. If we try to find the rationale behind this, a good argument could be the 
geographical isolation of Albania (particularly in relation to energy projects); the 
small size of the Albanian economy and; its structural problems such as poor 
infrastructure and corruption. The Auswartiges Amt mentions as the main reasons: 
'Bilateral trade relations suffer from the small size of the Albanian market, legal uncertainty and the 
lack of Albanian supplies. Nevertheless, the Albanian market for German consumer and investment 
goads is larger than in the past thanks to an increase in purchasing power (Auswartiges Amt 2008a). 
Someone could supplement this with the comment of one of our interviewees, 
that Albania is excluded from the main pan-European networks as well, as the very 
poor infrastructure prevents any serious investment outside the region of Tirana 
(Confidential Interview 6). Despite the negative elements, there is still a German 
economic presence, and a German economic interest, underpinning the relationship 
between the two countries (i.e. Germany and Albania). 
First of all, there are a number of big German companies that operate in 
Albania, such as Siemens, Hochtief, Berlin Wasser et aes Furthermore, even though, 
the presence of German capital is currently minimal, there are efforts on both sides 
for a more intensive economic relationship. Examples of these efforts are the 
business conferences in Frankfurt in 2006 and in Tirana in 2007 that were aiming at 
attracting German investors (see Deutsch-Albanische Wirtschftsgesellschaft e.V. 
2006; 2007). This is consistent with the Annual Report of Albinvest, according to 
which 'Albinvest considers Germany as a favourable market for attracting potential 
investors in Albania' (Albinvest 2007: 13). Turning back to these conferences it is 
interesting that Albania promotes economic cooperation between the two states. As 
for the presentation at the Frankfurt conference Albinvest's effort to promote, 
Albania as a favourable place for German investors is explicit, particularly in tourism 
and raw materials. Also interesting in this presentation was the highly professional 
preparation of cooperation pursued hitherto between Albania and Germany and 
which according to the data is increasing steadily (more in Albinvest 2006) that 
seems to reveal a serious focus on increasing German-Albanian relations. 
75 According to a presentation of Albinvest there are around 30 large German corporations that are 
operating in Albania (Albinvest 2006). 
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Within this framework in late 2007 the Albanian-German Chamber of Commerce 
was established but it is still in its infancy. Consistent with this climate are positions 
of prominent members from both states. In October 2008 the Albanian Prime 
Minister Sali Berisha stressed the desire to 'extend economic cooperation with 
Germany and joint efforts to enhance this cooperation into levels of political 
cooperation constituted a major task for the government' (Albanian Government 
2008b). An example of the importance of German capital for the Albanian leadership 
and of the unconditional 'surrender' to foreign capital is the admission in the same 
report that German businessmen 'expressed their highest estimations on reforms in 
Albania and establishment of a positive climate for investments in major projects in 
all fields' (Albanian Government 2008b). 
On the other side, the German political and economic elites do express a clear 
interest in Albania. For instance, the Federal Minister of Economics and Technology, 
Mr. $chauerte, indicated that 'political and economic relations between the two 
countries are excellent, but they need intensification, taking into account the fact 
that Albania has great potential in many fields' and concludes by stating that 'we [i.e. 
Germany] would like to have a serious and long-term economic cooperation in 
Albania', while promising a visit with 'a wide delegation with businessmen and high-
rank German authorities in the field of economy, in the framework of promotion of 
German investments in Albania' (Albanian Government 2008g). Even more 
important was the position of the German Chancellor Dr Angela Merkel on her 
meeting with the Albanian Prime Minister, in which she stated Germany's willingness 
for more cooperation in economic and political fields and German satisfaction with 
the participation of German companies such as Siemens in Albania (Albanian 
) 
Government 2008d). Similar praise and interest was expressed by the Federal 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Frank-Waiter Steinmeier who 'ensured Premier Berisha 
of the support of the government of Germany for Albania's quick NATO integration 
as well as for EU integration' (Albanian Government 2008e). 
It is more than evident that both sides want to enhance their bilateral 
relations, and the fact that the current German presence is small, might indicate that 
German interest is developing rather late. Therefore, in the future the situation 
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might be different. This possibility is reinforced by the rapid increase of more than 
30% in trade flows between the two states (see Albanian Government 2008b). 
However, there is one area where the German role is very significant. This field 
is bilateral aid. Germany is Albania's biggest donor, with €lOO million, which is the 
highest per capita aid in the world (see Albanian Gover.nment 2008c). The aid is 
directed towards infrastructure projects (Albanian Government 2008c) which are the 
projects that promote the business environment and facilitate the economic 
penetration of foreign investors such as the Germans. In October 2008, Premier 
Berisha stated that Germany was about to commit €120 million to investments in 
major projects (Albanian Government 2008i). In this field, intensive activity comes 
from the BMZ, the GTZ and the KFW banking group. All of these focus on the 
promotion of infrastructure and the business climate, as their websites state. From 
the deployment of assistance, it is becoming obvious that they are aimed at 
facilitating both economic activity and the penetration of foreign capital. 
Furthermore: it has to be noted that the cooperation of the German actors in the 
implementation of the assistance projects are both private and public. An example 
of this action is the €30 million agreement between the German and Albanian 
governments for economic cooperation and between Albania and the KFW which is 
undertaking the implementation of the proposed actions (Albanian Government 
2008h). According to the BMZ the main priorities are in energy and economic 
development, which includes tourism and the business environment (BMZ 2008). In 
relation to tourism, it is not only the BMZ that assists Albania in this sector but also 
USAID with its director of the Albanian office underlining that tourism currently 
accounts for 12% of total employment in Albania and 15% of GDP (USAID 2009). The 
pattern of aid might reveal two things. Firstly, Germany is becoming very important 
for Albania and this might imply dependency. Secondly, the projects that are 
sponsored by Germany are largely aimed at business and investment promotion that 
favours foreign capital and German capital in particular. 
So far this research has ignored the political field, because so far it seems to 
be the 'weakest link' of the German presence in Albania, since Albania is not a part 
of German diplomacy in the region. As in the economic field, at first glance the role 
of Germany seems to be marginal with other actors, such as the USA and Italy 
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playing a more important role. For instance, during the pyramid crisis of the mid 
1990s, Italy, the USA and Greece had undertaken the peace missions. German 
activity seems to have been deployed more within NATO and the EU, with the aim of 
the integration of Albania ,into western structures. Such an approach was to be 
expected since Germany is used to operating as a multilateral civilian power. We find 
, 
more concrete support in Angela Merkel's speech on 18 February 2008 in which she 
expresses the need to pursue foreign goals within NATO, the EU or UN 
(Bundeskanzlerin 2008), as well as in her speech on 11 May 2007. according to which 
Germany, as member of the EU and NATO, was supporting Albanian integration 
(Bundeskanzlerin 2007a). The position of the German Minister of State, Mr Gernot 
Erler, was similar on his visit to Albania, when he confirmed the support of Germany 
for Albania's candidacy for membership of the ,EU and of NATO. He also mentioned 
Germany's willingness to intensify the political dialogue between the two states 
(Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007). However, so far we are unable to find 
political communications and dealings between Germany and Albania outside the 
framework ofthe EU and NATO, unlike the case with US-Albanian relations. 
Hence, so far we have observed that, despite the desire of both sides for 
closer relations, their development is still low. Perhaps the fact that diplomatic 
relations between Germany and Albania have a history of just 20 years may explain 
the limited extent of German influence in this country. Characteristic of this late 
German presence in Albanian affairs is that the Konrad Adenauer foundation, which 
was present in the previous two case studies is only now planning to open an office 
in Albania in order to 'organise and coordinate all the activities ... in the framework of 
consolidation of the democratic institutions, the rule of law' (Albanian Government 
2008f). Therefore, the only way to claim any considerable German influence is 
indirectly through the EU. Such an approach seems valid from the point of view that 
the EU sets the framework and coordinates the actions of other actors. 
5.6. Concluding remarks. 
In this case study, the research seems to disprove the hypothesis of German 
hegemony. German economic presence is marginal, while the political focus of 
Germany towards Albania is late and limited. In other words, Albania does not seem 
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to attract German interest. Even cultural promotion and military presence seem 
negligible in Albania. Thus, there is no direct influence. 
What about indirect influence? Here things might be different. As before 
Germany is exercising indirect influence through the EU. The difference is that the 
EU influence is biggest in Albania and in fact German influence could be claimed to 
be substantial. However, this is not proven, because what appears instead, is that 
Italy and Greece have benefited most. It seems that Germany is not greatly 
interested and therefore other member states are gaining from this indirect 
influence. 
Furthermore, the special conditions of Albania, such as the pro-US position and 
the economic dependency, prevented us from locating a candidate for leader of the 
Bloc and thus a potential hegemon. This might seem strange, since in Albania all the 
indications of the hegemony's existence are evident, such as economic dependency, 
political cooperation and ideological commitment. Nevertheless, no single actor was 
powerful enough for us to claim its supremacy. Therefore, for Albania we have to 
admit that the hegemony is exercised without a central hegemon, but with 
cooperation and division of labour within the Bloc. Such a case is not in contradiction 
with our theoretical assumptions since for neo-Gramscian scholarship what matters 
is the hegemony and the hegemony can exist without a central actor as long as a 
cohesive hegemonic ideology exists. 
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Conclusion. 
Summary and findings: 
The purpose of this thesis was to examine whether Germany exercises politico-
economic hegemony in the western Balkans, a hegemony that has been practised 
directly, or indirectly through EU operations in the region. For this purpose the neo-
Gramscian theory of hegemony, as elaborated mainly by R. W. Cox was applied and 
tested. On the basis of this theory we developed a theoretical framework which, 
with necessary modifications, has been compatible with the scope of this thesis. 
Hence, the focus was on the formation of the Historic Bloc76 (in cases that the 
formation of a Bloc was possible) and its operation. Fundamental to this theoretical 
structure has been the role of Germany. 
In the introduction, the initial hypothesis was presented, namely whether 
Germany exercises politico-economic hegemony in the western Balkans, as well as 
the tools for conducting this research, like the supportive research questions (see p. 
:' . 
3). Hence, by referring to the methodology that we intended to use, we moved onto 
the first part of this thesis, which is the construction of the theoretical framework. 
The exploration of the hypothesis and the testing of the methodology 
commenced in Chapter 1. In this chapter, the main part of the theoretical framework 
was constructed. The criteria by which this research was conducted and its findings 
justified were defined. These were the regional character of the hegemony, its 
economic character and the separate consideration of each case study. Chapter 1 
also presented the general developments in the field and indicated what makes this 
approach quite novel. Of course the weaknesses ofthis approach were presented in 
an effort to provide the reader with the overall theoretical background for judging 
the findings of this thesis. last but not least was the identification of the hegemonic 
ideology, that of neo-liberal economics, which represents a focal point of this 
research. An equally important part of Chapter 1 was given over to the description of 
the German politico-economic model, in order primarily to find those elements that 
76 We remind the reader that the term Historic Bloc describes the way in which the ruling social 
forces of a particular society establish a relationship with and over competing social forces. 
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influence the hegemonic ideology of the Historic Bloc and the general economic 
mindset of Europe. A secondary aim was to identify the connections between public 
and private actors within Germany that would allow us to treat the German political 
and economic world as one elite and as such to establish it within the Historic Bloc. 
Hence, the analysis in Chapter 1 sought to demonstrate sufficient links between the 
political and economic elites of Germany, such that they could be treated as one. In 
addition, we were able to trace elements of German influence on the hegemonic 
ideology and to identify the required elements for move further. 
Having managed to provide the platform for the theoretical application of this 
thesis, we moved to Chapter 2. In this chapter, the formulation of the theoretical 
framework was concluded by defining the last crucial part of the puzzle, namely the 
identification of the key hegemonic institution, namely the EU. The importance of 
this identification lies in the extensive activity of the EU in the region that fits 
perfectly with the parameters of the hegemonic institution, since it transmits the 
hegemonic ideology and obtains the consent of the population. TheEU is also 
coordinating the work of the other IFls that operate in the area. Nevertheless, this 
identification required showing that the EU is a channel for member states' interests, 
something that we managed to establish for enlargement policy, which is the main 
framework of hegemony, without moving deeper into EU governance issues. The 
second requirement was to show that the EU has a distinct hegemonic ideology. This 
was also demonstrated since the EU neo-liberal model preserves part of its social 
characteristics that make it differ from the US neo-liberalism. 
Equally important was the connection that we established between Germany 
and EU enlargement and EU ideology. We demonstrated that Germany was able to 
'upload' key elements of its institutional setting to the EU, particularly through the 
Single Market and EMU to shape the economic ideology of the EU to a degree that it 
largely reflects German preferences. This was important because, the hegemonic 
institution is the vehicle that transmits the hegemonic idea and consolidates the 
hegemony by gaining the consent of the subject population. Thus, by confirming 
German influence on this institution, we could claim indirect German influence on 
the western Balkan states. In addition, we can claim that Germany might be the 
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hegemonic leader. With the theoretical framework complete we entered the 
empiri<;al part of the research, namely the case studies. 
Beginning with Serbia, the research revealed a society divided into two 
opposing camps. There are those who support an unconditional integration with the 
West and those who put Kosovo's status as the national priority. The division is not 
only within society but also in the political realm which gives the division an 
ideological character. Emblematic of the division is the role of external actors that 
play the role of 'patron' like Russia and the EU member states. This 'conflict' and 
competition has resulted in the creation of an anti-hegemonic group, which has 
provoked the response of the Serbian Bloc. In fact, this very response of the Bloc in 
safeguarding its interests by intervening in the domestic affairs of Serbia has 
confirmed both the Bloc's existence and function. In this chapter, we saw that 
Germany is seen to have the most prominent presence (in comparison to the other 
case studies) at both the economic and political levels. Hence, Chapter 3 confirmed, 
within the parameters that were set, the existence of German economic hegemony, 
but mainly in an indirect way through the EU and through the foreign capital group. 
In relation to the research questions, all of them were answered in a positive manner. 
Hence, we demonstrated that Germany uses the EU as a means of establishing 
hegemony (RQl); we showed also a political influence, as in the case ofthe elections 
(RQ2) and we indicated the intentionality of the actions (RQ3). Chapter 3, by 
presenting the role of the Bloc and of Germany, introduced the pattern upon which 
the other two case studies were examined. 
The FYR Macedonia case study was slightly different from the Serbian. In this 
case, the split in the society is ethnic, while in political terms the split between the 
domestic elite is not ideological but ethnic or in relation to policy planning. Actually, 
the Bloc made its existence apparent in this case study by imposing the co-existence 
of opposing elements of the domestic elite, namely an old and new Slav and an 
Albanian elite respectively. This .also happened because the threat to the Bloc was 
much less apparent and thus the Bloc has less reason to intervene and make itself 
apparent. Furthermore, as in Serbia, the Bloc's response was a catalyst for political 
developments in FYR Macedonia. The Bloc's actions also demonstrated that the 
weaker the recipient state, the greater the hegemonic control that is imposed upon 
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it. The weak economic position of FYR Macedonia also revealed the extent of the 
economic hegemony that can be established and the level of dependence of this 
state. 
In general, the research revealed many common elements with the case of 
Serbia, but also differences which result largely from the different historical process, 
from national challenges and from the interactions of external actors. These 
differences were proven to be powerful enough to dismiss the role of Germany as 
the unquestionable hegemon. 
Once again in relation to the research questions the answers vary. We showed 
that Germany uses the EU but also that other member states have profited and 
make use of the EU. So the answer is not dear (RQ1). Nevertheless, the political 
character of the hegemony was revealed (RQ2); as well as certain levels of 
intentionality (RQ3). Therefore, we showed the existence of hegemony but in a less 
intensive way, while the German presence makes it an important factor, and an 
indirect hegemony on Germany's part a possibility. 
The last case study was chosen because we believed in advance that it would 
have had the most negative outcome in relation to the validation of the core 
hypothesis. The research on Albania demonstrated the very poor condition of 
Albania and its transformation into an economic 'colony' of Italy and to a lesser 
degree of Greece. It revealed as well the almost total lack of social and political 
resistance towards the Historic Bloc and an absolute focus on the hegemonic 
ideology and project. This was consistent with the complete dependence of Albania 
on the Bloc. Moreover, as in the previous case studies, the research was able to 
confirm the role of the EU as hegemonic institution and to identify a Bloc formation 
similar to that in FYR Macedonia. Nevertheless, Albania's distinctiveness along with a 
significant US influence on Albanian policy-making did not allow us to identify 
elements of German hegemony. Here also, the notion of indirect German influence 
seems not to work. However, the late 'discovery' of Albania by German capital might 
change these results in the future. In relation to our case studies, the answer to RQl 
is negative, because Italy and Greece rather than Germany profit from EU actions. 
The political dimension of hegemony was evident (RQ2) and intentional (RQ3) but 
not from Germany. 
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In all the case studies, the research revealed some common trends. There is 
the same division of labour among the hegemonic groups and in all the case studies 
the existence of an Historic Bloc was vital for the legitimatisation of domestic elites. 
EU activity is significant and its 'ideology' has been totally absorbed and 
implemented by the recipient states and thus in all cases there is a strong popular 
support for the Bloc. The EU appears as the main coordinator and the only actor with 
clear power and influence in the case studies. Finally, hegemony exists in all the case 
studies but with different configurations of power. However, the findings disprove 
the case of German hegemony since German hegemony can only be claimed in a 
very indirect and diluted manner. 
Trying to make an overall assessment, we have been able so far to trace 
elements of hegemony in all case studies. What seems to vary is the configuration of 
power. Thus Germany appears strong in Serbia, less powerful in FYR Macedonia and 
absent from Albania. Instead, because of the special provisions of the theoretical 
framework that requires a hegemonic group, we were able to find collective 
structures of control, largely of an indirect nature and mediated by the EU. 
Explanation ohhe results. 
Perhaps the best explanation for the results is to be found in the different conditions 
that exist in each case study. In Serbia, the current political and economic 
establishment was born of the wars that led to the disintegration of Yugoslavia; of 
the NATO bombings during the Kosovo war, and of political developments around 
Kosovo'.s status. It is also an outcome of the Milosevic legacy, which fuelled further 
nationalism and the anti-western feelings of the population. All these elements 
(particularly Kosovo's status) were easily exploited by Russia in order to penetrate 
the western Balkans region which is claimed by the West as a sphere of influence .. 
The West, for its part, has created its own domestic political elite, which it protects 
and supports, while at the same time the Bloc prevents the anti-Bloc elite from 
acquiring political power. In this chapter, Serbia's central position in the geopolitical 
and energy competition between the West and Russia was examined. Therefore, 
Serbia was the 'battleground' of this competition with the result that the Bloc's 
activity was seen to be intensive and explicit. In other words, the threat, to its 
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interests provided basic proof of the Bloc's existence. Finally, in relation to Germany, 
it has to be noted that Serbia and Germany have traditional links which have created 
the conditions for the current politico-economic presence of Germany in Serbia, not 
to mention the vested interests of Germany in relation to Serbia, which we had 
already mentioned. These reasons led to the validation of our hypothesis to a 
significant degree. 
In FYR Macedonia, the conditions were such that the Bloc has no need of 
making its presence as apparent as in Serbia. Even though FYR Macedonia, escaped a 
huge armed conflict, it had a small civil war, which opened ethnic wounds in 
Macedonian society. Nationalism and cohesion are the key words here. FYR 
Macedonia has two big national problems, namely the accommodation of the 
Albanian ethnic community and the name dispute with Greece. These form the basis 
of Macedonian identity and the social cohesion of the state. The state is built on 
'weak foundations' with the result that its cohesion is under threat. This threat has 
been the driving force of the Bloc's activity and appearance. Hence, here again the 
Bloc's existence was evident by its response'to the threat to its interests and 
cohesion, because in this case the possible dissolution of FYR Macedonia is perceived 
to be a destabilising factor in the Balkans. In FYR Macedonia the power of the Bloc 
(and thus of the hegemony) is stronger due to the absence of an opposing camp and 
the lack of social opposition towards the Bloc. As a result, the Bloc has less need of 
making explicit its role, which however, is manifested by the imposition of 
cooperation between the two opposing ethnic elites. Finally, in FYR Macedonia the 
validation of our thesis was weaker; furthermore other actors such as the USA are 
diluting the role of Germany. Therefore, we had to dismiss the existence of a central 
role of Germany in the Bloc, in favour of a more collective hegemonic structure. 
Albania appeared to be the country most dependent on the Bloc. The Historic 
Bloc has consolidated its power simply because Albania based its development on it. 
The poor economic conditions and the particular structure of Albanian society, in 
combination with the lack of open national or minority problems, prevent any 
serious opposition to the Bloc, and in contrast encourage the courting of foreign 
patronage. Therefore it was expected that the Bloc's hegemony would be strong in 
Albania, something which again was manifested by the imposition of cooperation 
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between opposing domestic political elites. Despite this, the core hypothesis was 
rejected since Italy, the USA and other actors have much more influence than 
Germany. However, in Albania we encountered the problem of finding a leader of 
the Bloc and thus we ended up with a collective exercising of hegemony. 
Another factor that help us to understand the different results among the 
case studies, relates to the transnational links between the case studies and 
Germany. As the term of transnationalism indicates these are links created by 
human activities and social institutions that exceed national boundaries and are 
taking the form of migration patterns, remittances, investments (especially by small 
diasporic entrepreneurs), ideas etc (see Vertovec 1999; Basic 2006; Spohn and 
Triandafyllidou 2003). As the research showed there are active links of Germany with 
Serbia and in a lesser degree with FYR Macedonia. We depicted that German 
companies operate in these countries and they are bringing their expertise. There is 
also a certain number of immigrants in Germany, which according to German 
statistics there are 62000 Macedonians and around 200000 Serbs (Bundesamt fUr 
Migration und Fliichtlinge 2008) and which not only sending back remittances but 
also ideas and personal experiences that help in creating the 'myth' about Germany, 
even thought their small number is not causing fundamental influence. Its not 
coincidence that during the Yugoslav era, Germany was considered as the promise 
land by Yugoslavs. These links have also cultural aspect since as we have seen 
German cultural institutions are operating in these states adding further to the 
acceptance of Germany as something positive (see Baker 2006; Cohen 1996). Hence, 
these links could explain to a degree why Germany is accepted as something positive 
and thus why its hegemony could be easier established. In FYR Macedonia, because 
of the US and Greek influence the German attractiveness is less strong and our 
results showed that the case of German hegemony was weaker than in Serbia. In 
contrast, Albania is very close to Italy and Greece. Half of the Albanian workforce, as 
was mentioned, is working in Italy and Greece sending back an important volume of 
remittances and most importantly due to the regional proximity the immigrants are 
bringing back to Albania parts of the Italian and Greek culture, ideas and business 
expertise. In fact, small diasporic entrepreneurs are opening businesses in Albania 
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and, in many cases, continue to preserve their links with Italian and Greek businesses. 
Therefore, from this perspective we have to admit that the difference between 
Albania and the other two case studies also reflects that Albania's links with 
Germany are still negligible. 
Theoretical explanation. 
If we try to find an answer in more theoretical terms, then we have to look at the 
concept of passive revolution. The term describes the 'modernisation of society from 
above' (Gramsci 1971: 114), or in Adam Morton's words: it is 'a revolution, marked 
by violent social upheaval, but it involved a relatively small elite leading to the 
creation of state power and an institutional framework consonant with capitalist 
property relations' (Morton 2007:66). The term refers to the reorganisation of social 
relations and of the balance of power within society in order to fit the new social 
order. Passive revolution takes place when the ruling class fails to integrate the 
producer class with the conditions of hegemony. Thus the state is modernising but 
. without a prior political revolution, which means that the 'new' social structure is 
developed without fundamental changes and without the ideological mechanisms to 
cope with the new order. In other words, what changes is the composition of the 
elite instead of the social structure. Consequently, the state creates structures, 
which are imitations of the international structures of the given order. Hence the 
structure~ of public power, administration, planning and national development are 
'mirrors' and do not reflect the conditions and needs of the recipient state. 
This process of mimicking the international system reveals the second aspect of 
passive revolution, i.e. the influence of the international on the national. Hence, in 
addition to the description of how certain identities were constructed through a 
series of class struggles; passive revolution also reveals how the expansion of state 
power' and the reorganisation of state and subaltern producer class identities have 
been developed through the influence of international pressure. This can be via a 
new system and ideology or an intervention of a powerful external factor. We can 
summarise the meaning of passive revolution with a passage from Adam Morton's 
book Unravelling Gramsci, according to which: 
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'Imitative behaviour within such states coping with social crises generated by the circumstances Dj uneven and 
combined development therefore entailed attempts to create a modern state as the necessary precondition jor 
the furtherance of capitalism. This means that the universal rule of capital through passive revolutions-... -ojten 
resulted in a 'bastard birth~ of "strikingly incomplete' achievements besides the construction of a modern state' 
(Martan 2007: 152). 
All the case studies have undergone passive revolution even though with 
different expressions. In Serbia it ended up with an imposed Caesarism, namely that 
a leading elite was imposed by outside forces, while the other two case studies 
involved an imposed trans/orismo, i.e. the imposed co-existence of opposing elites. 
Hence, from the moment that there is passive revolution, the western Balkan states 
enter a phase of mimicking western norms and structures, (mainly those of the EU) 
and become net recipients of the hegemonic ideology, without the necessary 
structures for filtering and adjusting this ideology for society as a whole. Particularly 
in the western Balkans, this influence of the international is explicit. This is 
happening because the EU, through the process of enlargement, is setting the 
momentum of state transformation and modernisation in a way that is compatible 
with the EU-preferred modes of production and ideology that the EU itself is 
transmitting to the region. This also reveals the strength ofthe hegemonic institution 
in the case studies. At the same time, at the national level, again in total accordance 
with the concept of passive revolution, there is an expansion or reconfiguration of 
the elite instead of a fundamental political revolution. Even in the case of Serbia, 
parts of the old elite participate in the new Historic Bloc. 
Within this framework, the western Balkan states become easy 'prey' for the 
Historic Bloc, which can transmit its hegemonic ideology and dissolve any serious 
social opposition against it. This development is enhanced by two basic elements. 
Firstly, it is the Historic Bloc which creates the structure. In the theory of hegemony, 
the eXisting structure is modified (or upgraded) in order to accept the hegemonic 
ideology. In the case studies, there is a fundamental reconstruction of the structure 
according to the Bloc's preferences and interests. Hence, the hegemony is 
uncontested. Secondly, due to the special conditions of the western Balkan states 
(e.g. poverty, nationalism etc), the hegemonic domestic elite bases its legitimisation 
and power on the Bloc and on the structures that the Bloc provides. In this sense, 
the local elites can be viewed as corporate managers of a multinational subsidiary. 
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At the same time, the domestic elite undertakes the further consolidation of 
hegemony and hegemonic ideology by communicating with the society and 
controlling the civil society apparatus. Therefore, the Bloc controls structure, 
ideology and operation, which automatically means total control. 
The manifestation of hegemony lies in its imposition in all case studies. This 
imposition confirms the above analysis since, by controlling structure and ideology, 
the Bloc can impose the operation. In Serbia, the Bloc has imposed a certain elite 
which governs within the framework of Caesarism, i.e. by assuming power and 
balanCing the opposing forces. The power of the Bloc is such that it not only imposes 
the elite that it wants but manages to curb the opPosition in an effiCient manner, 
mainly through the operation of the hegemonic institution. In Chapter 3, moreover, 
we realise that the Bloc is prepared to become aggressive in order to safeguard its 
control and interests. 
In the other two cases there is an imposed transjorismo (i.e. the creation of a 
broader coalition of forces and interests which diffuses the polarisation and assists in 
the assimilation of opposing and counter-hegemonic forces by including them in the 
hegemonic Historic Bloc). However, the weakness of the domestic elite to achieve 
control, the dependence on the Bloc, and the sharing of the same hegemonic 
ideology force them to work together under the aegis of the Bloc. FYR Macedonia is 
the best example of this. Even now, the rift between the two political camps is 
significant but they are working on the same project i.e. EU and NATO membership, 
and on promoting the same interests. This situation also reveals that both camps 
have the same foreign patronage. 
Thus, in theoretical terms the existence of hegemony is confirmed. What has 
to be defined is the existence of a hegemonic leader and of a Historic Bloc. The 
research has managed to locate the Historic Bloc in each case study but it failed to 
find a clear hegemonic leader in each of the Blocs. While the former has been 
identified the existence of a leader was not. This might reflect some of the 
limitations of the framework that we used that require certain criteria for the 
hegemon that we could not trace in the case studies, with for the exception of Serbia. 
Perhaps a test of the theoretical framework on more pro-German states such as 
Bosnia and Croatia would produce different results. Equally interesting could be a 
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modification of the hypothesis or of the framework in relation to what kind of 
hegemony we want to find. For instance, we can look for an EU hegemony. All these 
suggestions could be used for future research that might produce different results. 
Finally, despite the limitations of this theoretical approach, that we discussed 
in Chapter 1 and which explain into a certain degree the findings of this thesis, it 
remains the best available for the type of hegemony that we want to examine, i.e. a 
politico-economic hegemony at elite level. After all the choice of this approach was 
based on the opportunity to work at elite level instead on a more statist approach 
with focus on balance of power. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. 
Table 19: Natural resources and export commodities of the western Balkan states. 
--
Export commodities Natural resources 
Albania textiles and footwear; asphalt, metals and metallic ores, crude getroleum, natural gas, coal, bauxite, chromite, 
oil; vegetables, fruits, tobacco cogger, iron ore, nickel, salt, timber, hydropower 
BiH metals, clothing, wood products coal, iron ore, bauxite, cogRer, lead, zinc, 
chromite, cobalt, manganese, nickel, clay, 
gypsum, salt, sand, forests, hydropower 
Croatia transport equipment, textiles, chemicals, foodstuffs, fuels oil, some coal, bauxite, low-grade iron ore, 
calcium. gypsum, natural asphalt, silica, mica, 
clays, salt, hydropower 
FYROM food, beverages, tobacco; miscellaneous manufactures, iron low-grade iron ore, cORRer, lead, zinc, chromite, 
and steel manganese, nickel, tungsten, gold, silver, 
. asbestos, gypsum, timber, arable land 
ontenegro nla bauxite, hydroelectricity 
Serbia manufactured goods, food and live animals, machinery and oil, gas, cgal, iron ore, CORRer, lead, zinc, 
transport equipment antimony, chromite, nickel, gold, silver, 
magnesium. pyrite. limestone, marble, salt, arable 
land 
Source: CIA 2008. 
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Appendix 2: Areas of cooperation between World Bank and IMF 
1) Public expenditure management 
2) Energy sector reform 
3) Pension health and social assistance reform 
4) Restructuring and privatisation of enterprises and banks 
5) Legal reforms with a bearing on the business environment (IMF 2006a:58-59). 
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Appendix 3: The structure of economic coordination in Serbia. 
The first agency is the Council for sustainable development which provided the 
conditions for the National development strategy, while the Guarantee Fund 
undertakes to provide loans to SME. SIEPA is the main agency for FDI and trade 
promotion and operates with the Commission for promotion of investment in Serbia. 
The Commission contains members from 17 ministries and government institutions 
and the leading one is the International economic relations ministry. The main task 
of the Commission is the implementation of the 2004 Action Plan for investments. 
SIEPA is also assisted by the Export Promotion Agency whose task, apart from 
exports, is to improve the area of trans-European networks and infrastructure. The 
final agency is the Energy Agency (more information at the web site of the EU 
integration office and in Heaney 2007:558-559). 
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Appendix 4: Economic targets of Serbia. 
1.5% annual increase of GDP until 2010 
2. Increase of export participation of goods and services from 24% in 2004 to 28% in 
2005 and to 36% of the GDP in 2010 (or export increase from $3.8 billion to $10 
billion). 
3. Reduce of the deficit of services and goods from 29.2% in 2004 to 19% of the GDP 
in 2010 
4. Investment participation in GDP from 15.8% in 2004 to 25% in 2010 
5. Reduce the participation of collective expenditure from 26% in 2004 to 17% in 
2010 (Serbian EU integration office 2005:57, 59). 
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Appendix 5: Assistance programme of the World Bank. 
'The World Bank's current program of assistance is outlined in a Country Partnership 
Strategy discussed by the Board on March 27, 2007. Reflecting Government priorities, 
the CPS aims to accelerate FYR Macedonia's perspective to join the European Union. 
Proposed activities envisaged under this CPS are focused on two pillars: (i) fostering 
job-creating economic growth, and increasing living standards for all, and {ii} 
improving governance and transparency in public sector delivery to support a market 
economy. The CPS will employ a selected mix of investment and policy lending, along 
with a robust program of Analytical and Advisory Activities ( ... ) work to support the 
CPS goal. The CPS also provides for total financing in a high case lending scenario of 
up to $280 million over four years' (IMF 2007:46). 
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Appendix 6: FYR Macedonian FDI stock 2001-2006 in million Euro. 
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2001 2002 2003 2004 200S 2006 Country ! 
U-estv 
Vrednost 0 Vrednost U~estvo Vrednost U-estvo Vrednost U-estvo Vrednost U-estvo Vrednost U .... estvo FDJ in FYR Macedonia I 
Value Share Value Share (%) Value Share(%) Value Share (%) Vaiue Shore (%) Value Share (%) 
(%) 
604,602 0 2,064,266 0 2,041,741 0 4,417,347 0 3,570,681 0 11,600,709 1 Albania 
442,527 
° 
1,815,732 
° 
2,114,154 
° 
2,097,674 
° 
2,083,457 
° 
2,317,219 
° 
Australia I 
36,778,261 4 37,693,821 3 42,822,229 3 62,285,239 4 57,.718,630 3 219.412,093 10 Austria 
1,868 
° 
-1,042 
° 
Bahamas I 1,076 0 4,267 0 0 1,550 0 
418,741 0 502,994 
° 
1,254,327 0 1,307,485 
° 
1,279,852 
° 
886,444 0 Belgium 
I. 2,397,050 0 2,420,824 0 2,364,570 0 702,906 0 200,134 0 1,003,883 0 Bosnia and Hercegovina 
3,855,750 0 7,000,535 1 11,325,467 1 8,724,623 1 11,795,687 1 15,848,664 1 British Virgin (stands 
1 
6,570,681 1 11,682,775 1 23,283,474 2 24,328,309 2 27,361,708 2 42,792,300 2 Bulgaria 
79,059 0 95,042 0 283,963 0 411,834 
° 
472,813 0 1,063,730 0 Canada 
I 
44,746 0 64,080 0 221,854 
° 
933,422 
° 
1,083,034 
° 
1,413,074 
° 
China 
4,213,154 
° 
3,481,682 0 3,276,988 0 2,547,394 
° 
768,643 0 2,161,855 0 Taiwan I 
10,325,170 1 12,326,147 1 10,924,355 1 15,742,169 1 20,338,018 1 30,594,727 1 Croatia 
I 
141,065,16 Cyprus 
138,699,026 13 141,584,243 12 9 11 150,526,273 9 160,805,917 9 182,226,922 9 
138,553 0 179,056 0 224,510 0 258,613 0 269,427 0 288,083 0 Czesh Republic 
104,139 0 97,597 
° 
80,181 
° 
66,430 0 
° 
535,238 0 Denmark 
° 
0 
° ° 
-5,145 
° 
~,450 
° 
Dominikan Republic 
5,888,730 1 10,748,272 1 15,175,901 1 19,582,981 1 1,466,397 ° 291 220 ° France 
~545i16;9i4 ,<5 /;:5':#O,910r ",~, ~·i56,.11fi;; .. 1:01>:. x .• ,4 , ":70,5l·~.2i .i .. ·~;.· 6W72'3~i; ~[(1Iany.·;· •. ;,:t;.'; ~ 
782,852 0 1,009,406 
° 
351,330 
° 
443,058 0 508,406 ° 696,932 0 Gibraltar 
223,016,63 Greece 
174,205,844 17 213,018,388 18 2 17 264,104,655 16 279,210,632 16 320,396,743 15 
313,366,33 Hungary 
300,581,333 29 300,101,080 26 2 24 354,400,334 I 22 350,006,902 20 350,351,151 17 
36,857 0 
° 
0 .' 0 
° 
0 0 Iceland 
1,609 0 1,638 0 1,156 
° 
1,193 
° 
1,235 0 112 0 India 
0 0 0 0 0 10,099 0 Israel 
13,882,985 1 16,499,994 1 14,966,520 1 32,094,957 2 37,688,220 2 44,386,691 2 Italia 
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16,093 
° 
Johanson Island 
18,471 0 17,435 
° ° ° ° 
0 
° 
Jordan 
6,485,561 1 4,067,732 0 22,002,496 2 1,476,514 
° 
2,459,565 0 6,698,043 
° 
Liechtenstein 
2,325,438 0 2,300,395 0 2,235,357 0 10,828,175 1 15,162,880 1 25,424,784 1 Luxembourg 
0 
° 
3,185 
° 
3,184 0 
° 
0 0 Malaysia 
5,311 0 31,326 0 -33,855 0 -121,314 0 -179,266 0 -131,423 0 Malta 
0 0 0 0 -45,760 0 -21,545 
° 
Moldova, Republic of 
I 
15,589,724 2 61,057,615 5 69,717,035 5 103,231,015 6 213,346,080 12 211,986,795 10 Netherlands 
0 0 0 98,871,026 6 69,515,583 4 54,710,711 3 Netherlands Antilles 
74,196 0 51,583 0 29,459 0 -83,487 0 0 0 0 Norway 
207,294 0 185,526 0 254,504 0 281,790 0 19,267 0 21,551 0 Marshal/Island 
-7,770 0 -10,758 0 -4,244 0 -8,049 0 -11,520 
° 
-15,902 0 Pakistan 
12,926,988 1 13,303,766 1 13,342,473 1 2,980,353 
° 
3,238,156 
° 
4,129,544 0 Panama 
1,026 
° 
23,708 0 47,916 
° 
60,337 0 115,870 0 529,123 0 Poland 
1,810,795 
° 
Portugal 
138,700 0 328,826 
° 
326,460 0 472,725 
° 
431,459 0 54,833 
° 
Romania 
11,886 0 1,293,457 
° 
1,311,454 0 1,384,063 0 1,342,678 
° 
1,345,046 0 Russia 
° ° 
0 
° 
36,091,292 2 17,551,445 1 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
0 785,082 0 674,209 0 695,242 0 755,587 
-
0 882,598 0 San Marino 
60,443 0 87,954 0 -123,456 0 2,064,926 0 -6,900 0 77,712 
° 
Seychelles 
58,827,472 6 66,405,087 6 84,741,531 7 101,847,319 6 106,794,022 6 126,712,182 6 Slovenia 
0 
° 
6,894 
° 
7,536 
° 
0 0 
° ° 
South Africa 
26,366 0 22,205 0 -44,917 0 -41,816 0 3,110 0 23,074 0 Spain 
1,102,952 0 2,344,475 
° 
1,956,712 
° 
2,508,467 0 2,474,721 
° 
2,568,585 
° 
Sweden 
101,851,72 Switzerland 
79,198,223 8 85,150,895 7 2 8 143,900,886 9 164,196,796 9 150,781,300 7 
89,763 0 179,524 
° 
151,848 
° 
147,723 0 153,Ol8 0 0 
° 
Syria 
36,756 0 41,365 
° 
37,092 
° 
59,294 0 42,973 0 -2,295 0 United Arab Emkotes 
16,234,899 2 17,983,215 2 18,860,126 1 26,488,657 2 25,060,107 1 27,722,719 1 Turkey 
9,116 
° 
8,990 
° 
180,366 0 641,821 0 3,551,614 0 3,279,086 
° 
Ukraine 
26,607,787 3 21,939,799 2 34,691,449 3 38,391,742 2 38,179,347 2 67,386.435 3 Great Britain 
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0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Is/eo/man 
33,960,002 3 41,267,743 4 42,238,907 3 25.616,228 2 29,841.371 2 45,317,972 2 United States of America 
170,946 0 221,525 0 483,510 0 829.813 0 857,780 0 1.244.939 0 Virgin Islands of the USA 
0 0 2,121 0 3,711 0 0 ·92,680 0 Uzbekistan 
29,654,357 3 26,680,194 2 29,128,773 2 29.496,76' 2 32,830,400 2 53.769.542 3 Serbia and Montenegro 
15,563 0 15,780 0 233 0 67A74 0 181,714 0 1,898 0 Slovakia 
1,292,135,2 1~610~221,2S 2,098,572,63 
1,039.153,449 100 1,160,707,392 100 92 100 2 100 1,768~974,786 100 7 100 Total 
Source: National Bank of Macedonia 
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